Gods and Humans in the Ancient Near East



Plate 5 Basreliefs at an entrance to a small temple (Nimroud)

Tyson L. Putthoff

Gods and Humans in the Ancient Near East

In this book, Tyson Putthoff explores the relationship between gods and humans, and between divine nature and human nature, in the Ancient Near East. In this world gods lived among humans. The two groups shared the world with one another, each playing a special role in maintaining order in the cosmos. Humans also shared aspects of a godlike nature.

Even in their natural condition, humans enjoyed a taste of the divine state. Indeed, gods not only lived among humans but also lived inside them, taking up residence in the physical body. As such, human nature was actually a composite of humanity and divinity. Putthoff offers new insights into the ancients' understanding of humanity's relationship with the gods, providing a comparative study of this phenomenon from the third millennium BCE to the first century CE. His book will be of interest to scholars and students of history, philosophy, theology and anthropology of the Ancient Near East and the biblical world.

Tyson L. Putthoff is an associate faculty member in the Schusterman Center for Judaic and Israel Studies at the University of Oklahoma. He is the author of *Ontological Aspects of Early Jewish Anthropology* and *Divine Embodiment in Pauline Anthropology*.

Gods and Humans in the Ancient Near East

TYSON L. PUTTHOFF
University of Oklahoma

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India

79 Anson Road, #06–04/06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108490542
DOI: 10.1017/9781108854139

© Cambridge University Press 2020

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2020

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
NAMES: Putthoff, Tyson L., author.
TITLE: Gods and humans in the ancient Near East / Tyson L. Putthoff, University of Oklahoma.
DESCRIPTION: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, USA : Cambridge University Press, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
IDENTIFIERS: LCCN 2020003298 (print) | LCCN 2020003299 (ebook) | ISBN 9781108490542 (hardback) | ISBN 9781108795883 (paperback) | ISBN 9781108854139 (epub)
SUBJECTS: LCSH: Gods. | Incarnation. | Human body–Religious aspects. | Middle East–Religion. | CYAC: Mediterranean Region–Religion.
CLASSIFICATION: LCC BL473 .P88 2020 (print) | LCC BL473 (ebook) | DDC 202/.1109394–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020003298
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020003299

ISBN 978-1-108-49054-2 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

To Judah John, Addie Pearl, Zevie Rose and Andi Lane.

You are my beloved.

me-en-ze$_2$-en kiĝ$_2$-ĝu

Contents

Preface *page* ix
Acknowledgements xi
List of Abbreviations xiii

1 Introduction: Self, Space and the Divine Embodiment Model 1

2 Godlike Bodies and Radiant Souls: Divine Embodiment in Ancient Egypt 14

3 Composite Beings and Sexy God-Kings: The Divinity of Humanity in Ancient Mesopotamia 48

4 Metallic Bodies and Deification by Ingestion: Material Embodiment in Hittite Anatolia 84

5 YHWH and His Theomorphic Body: The 'Image of God' in Israelite Anthropology 118

6 Divinity for All: The Godlike Self in Graeco-Roman Thought 156

7 Conclusion: Gods and Humans, Gods in Humans 190

Bibliography 199
Index 243

Preface

In many ways, this book serves as the 'prequel' to my previous monograph (Putthoff 2017). There I looked at early Jewish beliefs about what happens to humans who encounter the divine directly. Throughout that project, I knew that there must have been even more ancient beliefs about similar matters. So I continued to expand my scope, during and after my doctoral work, to look at what others in the ancient world thought about such ideas. In this book, I therefore go farther back in near eastern history to look at the relationship between gods and humans and between the divine nature and human nature. In the third book in this project, also complete and soon to be in print, I explore the same ideas in the Apostle Paul's writings.

In this book, I argue that, in the Ancient Near East, gods lived both *among* humans and *within* humans. To be sure, the two groups shared the world with one another, each playing a unique role in maintaining order in the cosmos. However, more than sharing the world with the gods, humans also had a share in their nature. Even in their natural condition, humans enjoyed a taste of the divine state. Indeed, gods not only lived among humans but they lived inside them, taking up residence in the physical body the same way they did inside images and statues. As such, human nature was actually a composite of humanity and divinity.

In an attempt to gain insight into how the ancients understood humanity's relationship with the gods, this book will therefore take you from one end of the Ancient Near East to the other, and from the third mill. BCE to the first c. CE. I am quite sure that you will not agree with everything I suggest. If you do, please go back and read the book again, and surely you will find something you disagree with. Some of you will find the size

of the book refreshing, as it is not overwhelmingly long. Others of you will wish I had spent much more time in each culture or region of the Ancient Near East or in a particular primary text. Admittedly, this book will leave room for expansion, whether in my own work or by others equally or more qualified than I. Regardless of these disputable matters, and knowing that there are areas in my evaluations of the sources and suggestions for interpretations that will meet with certain critique, this book fills a necessary gap in our understanding of ancient conceptions of the human self and its relationship to the divine. My hope is that, albeit rapid and at times vexing, this journey across time and space will provide you with fresh ways of thinking about God, gods, humans and human nature.

Acknowledgements

Many people have taught, encouraged, critiqued and mentored me over the last decade and a half. Indeed, I will always be indebted to Stephen Barton, Mark Given, John Barclay, Robert Hayward and Lutz Doering. Their willingness to devote themselves to an eager but inexperienced graduate student like me remains truly inspiring. I continue to look to their example as academics in my own research and teaching.

During and after my time as a student, I have had the privilege to continue to learn from a remarkable group of scholars. Ben Wold, Crispin Fletcher-Louis and Michael Lakey have served, in many ways, as post-doctoral mentors. I have learned so much in the years following my PhD from these men, and I cannot thank them enough for their willingness to give of themselves to help me succeed in academia and in life. In the last couple of years, Daniel Snell, Alan Levenson, Rhonda Dean-Kyncl and Alisa Fryar have likewise shown me what it looks like to be a prolific scholar and successful academic as well as a genuinely good person. Not only have these men and women proven to be tough critics, treasured mentors and valuable dialogue partners, but they have proven to be wonderful friends as well.

I am especially grateful to Crispin and Michael for their thoughtful critique of the book. I truly cannot express how thankful I am to them for their willingness to read the manuscript thoroughly and to provide the much-needed feedback that they provided. Not only is the book much better because of them, but I am certain that I have grown as a person and as a thinker because of them as well.

A number of others have contributed to the strengths of this book, though of course I take full responsibility for its errors or weaknesses.

I am grateful for the conversations I had with Mike Seaman and Marlin Blankenship, especially during the formative stages of this book. In the latter stages, Justin Wollenberg helped me to clarify some issues that had proven difficult for me. I am also thankful to Joey Silver, for his friendship, generosity, support and always lively conversations over the last seven years.

I am thankful to my parents, John and Pam Putthoff, for their constant love, support and encouragement. They helped me see long ago the value of hard work in pursuing my goals. I am certain that without the lessons they instilled in me growing up, this book would never have made it to publication. I am also thankful to my father- and mother-in-law, John and Janna Boyer. Their continued support of my family has been priceless, and I am grateful for all that they have done for us.

Now, about my beautiful family. My sweet Judah John, Addie Pearl and Zevie Rose, thank you for sharpening my thinking, sparking my imagination and warming my heart in ways I never thought possible. Thank you for encouraging me when I let this book get the better of me. Thank you for teaching me how to enjoy life when I forget how. I love you. My beautiful Andi Lane, thank you for supporting me, encouraging me, pushing me and loving me the way you do. Thank you for being patient with me when I am not so easy to be around. Thank you for showing me what it must have been like to encounter the divine like those in this book. Thank you for being mine. I cannot imagine life without you. I love you. When I look at my family, it is easy for me to imagine why entire cultures, for thousands of years, believed that humans had an element of the divine within them. My beautiful family truly are living embodiments of the subject of this book, visible manifestations of the divine in my life. Judah, Addie, Zevie and Andi, this book is for you. I love you.

Lastly, I am forever grateful to Beatrice Rehl, Eilidh Burrett, Shalini Bisa, Charlotte Bryan, Vinithan Sedumadhaven and Trent Hancock for their tireless work and guidance throughout the publication process. Working with them has truly been a pleasure.

Abbreviations

Akk.	Akkadian
Aram.	Aramaic
BCE	Before the Common Era
c.	century, centuries
ca.	circa
CE	Common Era
Grk.	Greek
Heb.	Hebrew
Hitt.	Hittite
Lat.	Latin
mill.	millennium, millennia
Sum.	Sumerian
Syr.	Syriac
tb.	Tablet
tbl.	Table

1

Introduction

Self, Space and the Divine Embodiment Model

PREFATORY REMARKS

Since our incipient days on the earth, *Homo sapiens* have been on an introspective quest. We have sought not only to survive, to thrive, to grow but also to know who we are, what it means to be human. Interestingly, we tend to ask questions about the self within the framework of the transcendent or the divine. What is here (you, me, us) only seems to make sense in the light of what is out there (divine, gods, God). Indeed, in asking, what is the *human self*? we inevitably want to know, what *is* the human self? What is this mysterious *thing* really *made of*? And how is this self-thing similar to or different from that which is *out there*?

We think that we can know ourselves better when we hold our*selves* against some divine other. This is why such questions are especially visible in cultures in which religion and cult maintain a central role. In cultures at whose heart stands some concept of the divine – a God, a pantheon, a godlike ideal – humans openly ask: what is the relationship between this self-thing and the divine, deities, God? What can we know about our*selves* in the light of and in relation to the transcendent?

With an eye towards these perennial questions, I seek to understand what the peoples of the biblical world[1] believed about human nature. More specifically, I investigate ancient beliefs about the self's possession

[1] By 'biblical world', I mean the world of the peoples and traditions found in the Hebrew Bible, intertestamental Jewish literature and New Testament from the third mill. BCE to the first c. CE. I am aware that the biblical texts were not written in the third or second mill. BCE, and that there is ample debate about the historicity of the figures found therein. However, the ancient near eastern, Mediterranean and North African environments

of or potential for the divine ontological state in its present condition.[2] I thus investigate sources that indicate underlying assumptions about divine aspects of human nature.[3]

Relying on the work of experts, I examine ancient texts, inscriptions and artefacts in fresh light and offer a new conceptualisation of human nature in the biblical world. My aim is to gain a more profound understanding of the human self as it relates to the divine in the present life. I hope to provide more nuanced ways of imagining near eastern anthropologies and envisaging the relationship between the self and the divine.

My approach to the subject is historical, theoretical and comparative. I focus on sources that other scholars have recognised to shine light on beliefs or assumptions about the divine aspects of the self. Looking at a wide range of sources from Egypt, Mesopotamia, Anatolia, Syro-Palestine, Greece and Rome allows us to consider multiple voices on human nature alongside one another.

I should note that I discuss some matters that are old news to experts of the Ancient Near East. Such scholars have long discussed ancient ideas about deities' ability to embody physical objects. However, I must discuss these matters for two reasons. First, readers who are not experts in the Ancient Near East are likely unaware of such discussions. Since these issues are of critical importance for how we understand ancient conceptions of human nature, I must discuss them at some length in each chapter. Second, I do not merely point out where we find such beliefs in the ancient sources. Rather, I seek to understand what the union between the deity and the embodied object looks like. If we can understand what the ancients imagined when they pictured a deity to reside within a physical object, this will shine light on how they imagined the divine to reside within the physical space of the human body.

nevertheless served as the historical, social and religious context out of which such traditions and writings emerged. Furthermore, given the debate about the relationship between the proper 'Ancient Near East' and 'Ancient Mediterranean' and given that I explore Greece and Rome in the following study, I shall refer to cultures and sources from the vast region surrounding the Mediterranean Sea as well as those areas that stretch North, South and East variously as the 'Ancient Near East', 'Ancient Near East and Mediterranean' and/or 'biblical world'. For a helpful discussion of defining this time and place in history, see e.g., Snell, 2011, 1–6.

[2] Ontology and ontological here refer to the nature, essence, condition, composition, constitution, construction, organisation, make-up or stuff of the self.

[3] The divine here can refer to the state or space recognised as participating in or possessing traits a given culture views as divine, including but not limited to the heavenly world, God, multiple deities or other so-called divine entities, forces or elements.

THE SELF AS SPACE

The Study of the Self

In his study of the self in Daoism, L. Komjathy aptly writes, 'Theoretically speaking, conceptions of self are ubiquitous. Every discussion, whether anthropological, historical, philosophical, psychological, or scientific, assumes some conception of self'.[4] Because understandings of the self abound in the literature, it is important that I express the way I conceptualise it in the present discussion.[5]

The Self As Bounded Space

I suggest that we understand the self as a bounded space.[6] Boundaries are intrinsic to identity and to selfhood. 'I' am 'me' because something differentiates me from 'you'. There are boundaries between 'us' – whether these are tangible (i.e., the body), social or other.

The self's boundaries distinguish it from others. Like a city, the body has two key sets of boundaries. It has a set of outer boundaries that separate it from the outside and from other selves. This set, of course, takes the form of the body. But it also has inner boundaries that divide it into any number of constituent parts.[7] What these inner boundaries look like depends on the way a given culture conceptualises the self. These may take the form of organs or appendages, or they may take the form of a soul or spirit, or a series of other inward parts. Because one could classify any physical object as a type of space, it should not be too difficult to see the human self likewise.

The Study of Space

If the self is a space, we must ask, what do we mean by *space*? And *in what sense* is the self a space? In helping us to conceptualise the self as space, I rely on the work of M. Foucault.

[4] Komjathy, 2007, 64. For bibliography on the study of the self, see e.g., Snell, 2005b; Putthoff, 2017, 3–5.

[5] See also Putthoff, 2017, 7–14. I am grateful to A. Gaidhu (private communication) for her thoughts on self and space.

[6] On the body and space in antiquity, see Worman, 2009, 45–62; cf. Komjathy, 2007, 65; Smith, 2010, 333, 343.

[7] Douglas, 2001, 116. Cf. Putthoff, 2017, 10–11. On the body and the city, see esp. Hopkins and Wyke, 2005. Cf. Brown, 1988, 26–27; Komjathy, 2007, 66.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Foucault, along with H. Lefebvre and others, began to make sense of this difficult concept.[8] In a lecture to a group of architects in 1967, Foucault would set forth a profound way of thinking about space:

> The space in which we are living, by which we are drawn outside ourselves, in which, as a matter of fact, the erosion of our life, our time, and our history takes place, this space that eats and scrapes away at us, is also heterogeneous space in itself. In other words, we do not live in a kind of void, within which individuals and things might be located. We do not live in a void that would be tinged with shimmering colors, we live inside an ensemble of relations that define emplacements that are irreducible to each other and absolutely nonsuperposable.[9]

In this brief essay, Foucault discusses the two types of space: utopias and heterotopias. These are critical in that they connect 'to all other emplacements ... in such a way that they suspend, neutralize, or reverse the set of relations that are designated, reflected, or represented [*réflechis*] by them'.[10]

Before moving forward, I should briefly discuss two terms key to Foucault's observations. In the first place, the French term 'emplacement' (*l'emplacement*) is critical to the way he conceives space. As Foucault explains, 'emplacement is defined by the relations of proximity between points or elements'.[11] For Foucault, the term emplacement 'has the sense of *placing* in a certain location', P. Johnson explains. 'Usually referring to archaeological sites, the term makes explicit the action of marking out a position'.[12]

For Foucault, the term emplacement refers to more than mere geographical location. Rather, it designates the relationship between multiple elements. It points to what others like Lefebvre speak of in terms of 'thirdspace' (*l'espace vécu*) or 'lived space'. Here already Foucault demonstrates the complexity of space. It is not simply a fixed location, nor is it simply a social phenomenon. It is an amalgam of physical, social and other elements, and understanding it is hardly a simple task.[13]

In the second place, Johnson clarifies the way Foucault uses the French terms *espace* ('space') and *lieu* ('place'):

[8] Lefebvre, 1991; Foucault, 1998, 175–85. I am grateful to R. Pinto (private communication) for her insights into the complex nature of space.

[9] Foucault, 1998, 177–78. Translations of Foucault's 1967 (=1998) essay entitled 'Different Spaces' are from Foucault, 1998, unless otherwise noted.

[10] Foucault, 1998, 178. [11] Foucault, 1998, 176. [12] Johnson, 2006, 77.

[13] Lefebvre, 1991, 6–14. Cf. Kahn, 2000, 7.

'Space' is more abstract than 'place'. The former term can refer to an area, a distance and, significantly in relation to Foucault's concept of heterotopia, a temporal period (the space of two days). The latter, more tangible term, refers to an event or a history, whether mythical or real (Augé, 1995, 81–84). Foucault uses 'place' when there is a sense of intimacy or subjectivity, as in his description of the mirror, but it is also noticeable that he can use both words generally within the same sentence, as well as exchanging 'difference' and 'other' quite freely as in 'these different spaces, these other places' [*de ces espaces différents, ces autres lieux*].[14]

The important point to note is the abstract quality of *espace* against the more concrete *lieu*.[15] This is vital for the way Foucault's theory of space applies to our conceptualisation of the self. Although the self is a physical, bounded entity, it is too complex to define using a term that otherwise refers to a concrete, physical location. Therefore, *lieu* does not help us in conceptualising the nature of the self the way *espace* does. To speak of a *place* is to speak of a fixed geographical location, a topographic point that can be located. However, to speak of a *space* is to speak of an area, a sphere, a realm that can be either unbounded (infinite) or bounded (finite). As a concept, space (*espace*) applies to any number of *things* that are not so static that they have a fixed topographical place (*lieu*).[16]

With these two terms on the table, let me now move forward in discussing Foucault's two types of space. The first is the utopia, or utopian space. Of utopias, Foucault writes,

> Utopias are emplacements having no real place. They are emplacements that maintain a general relation of direct or inverse analogy with the real space of society. They are society perfected or the reverse of society, but in any case these utopias are spaces that are fundamentally and essentially unreal.[17]

According to Foucault, a utopia is not real space. Rather, it is a mirror or idealised representation of real space. Real life – lived space – is never homogeneous but 'heterogeneous'.[18] Therefore, utopias can only exist in the ideal realm of the mind or of a mirror.[19] Utopian space is simply too perfect or too imperfect to be real. It is either too wholly perfect or imperfect, sacred or profane, holy or impious. Utopian space is so much

[14] Johnson, 2006, 77. [15] Cf. Tuan, 1977, 6.
[16] I am grateful to Crispin Fletcher-Louis (private communication) for his remarks on the issue of distinguishing space from place.
[17] Foucault, 1998, 178. [18] Foucault, 1998, 175–85. [19] Foucault, 1998, 178.

of one extreme quality that it simply cannot exist in reality.[20] In reality, all space possesses at least some element of otherness. Because such utopian space cannot exist in reality, Foucault concludes that all space is heterotopian space.

A heterotopia is literally a 'different space' or an 'other space', an emplacement that is by nature a *mixed* space. Heterotopian space is space characterised by its intrinsic otherness. A heterotopia is the opposite of a utopia in that it is a space in which various things, phenomena, experiences, conditions or states exist simultaneously alongside one another.[21] Whereas utopian space must be *either* sacred *or* profane, for example, heterotopian space can be *both* sacred *and* profane simultaneously. It can consist of both good and bad, pure and impure, or as I argue in the following chapters, divine and nondivine, at the same time.

Self Space As Heterotopian Space

If we think of the self as a bounded space, we must recognise its intrinsically heterotopian nature. Humans naturally conceive of the self as a bounded space with outer and inner boundaries. From Foucault's analysis, we can draw out four notable characteristics of self space that will help us in understanding ancient near eastern conceptions of the self.

First, as noted already, every space contains some element of otherness, so that all space is heterotopian space. Whatever the self is, as a type of space, it must always be inherently different on or in itself in some way.

Second, all space is intrinsically relational. By nature, space relates to and interacts with other space, including the space next to it and around it. Self space must always be examined in the light of the type of space that surrounds it.

Third, as a bounded entity, the self is simultaneously open and closed to external influences. Sometimes it voluntarily opens itself to such influences (e.g., ingestion), while at other times the other invades it without permission (e.g., possession). The boundaries of the self are in constant renegotiation such that they undergo transformation as a result of the activity taking place in, on or upon them.

Fourth, as relational space, the self tends to be mimetic. Under the right circumstances it tends to reflect, represent or mimic adjacent or surrounding space when that space is somehow perceived to be greater or stronger than the self. However, because of the self's heterotopian nature, what

[20] Foucault, 1998, 177–78. [21] Foucault, 1998, 178–79.

happens to one part of the self may not happen to the other. Again, an activity occurring in or on one part of a city does not necessarily affect all other parts of that city. The same can also be true of the self.

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

Space and Existence in Early Judaism and Christianity

Recent scholarship on early Judaism and Christianity has made great progress in understanding the relationship between the self and space. Scholars have shown a direct link in the ancient mind between human nature and the space in which one exists. We should benefit from a brief review of some of these works.

Early Judaism and Jewish Mysticism

For some time, scholars have demonstrated that early Jews widely assumed that the self participated in the divine state when in contact with divine space. C. Morray-Jones insists that certain humans could experience glorious transformation in the presence of God.[22] M. Himmelfarb argues that such figures could become ontologically akin to the angels in heaven when in their presence.[23] In a somewhat different context, A. Orlov demonstrates that the (evil) demons mirrored or imitated the (good) angels on various levels.[24] C. Fletcher-Louis maintains that the Qumran sect, as God's true people, thought they could enter divine space during worship and become like the angels therein.[25] M. Schneider holds that the High Priest could take on the ontological properties of God himself during his annual entry into the Holy of Holies on Yom Kippur.[26] D. Forger claims that, according to Philo Judaeus, the human self was an embodiment of the divine even in the present life.[27] Elsewhere, I examine the link between the self, space and human nature in multiple varieties of early Judaism.[28]

Early Christianity and the New Testament

Scholars have examined this concept in the New Testament as well. V. Rabens argues that, according to Paul, by being filled with the Spirit

[22] Morray-Jones, 1992, 1–31.
[23] Himmelfarb, 1993. Cf. Bousset, 1901, 136–69, 229–73.
[24] Orlov, 2011; 2015.
[25] Fletcher-Louis, 2002.
[26] Schneider, 2012a; 2012b.
[27] Forger, 2018.
[28] Putthoff, 2014; 2017.

and brought into proximity with other Spirit-filled persons, the Christian would undergo divine ontological transformation.[29] E. Rehfeld suggests that, in Paul's thinking, participation in the 'Christ-relationship' would lead to participation in Christ's divine state.[30] M. Lakey describes the believing community in terms of a 'cosmic space' whose boundaries 'circumscribe that part of the κόσμος that is ordered correctly εἰς God'.[31]

Interest in pertinent issues surrounding deification and theosis has also expanded rapidly in recent years.[32] B. Blackwell examines Paul's remarks on deification alongside those of the Church Fathers, providing us with very useful categories for analysing these matters.[33] D. Litwa has argued that Paul, like many in his ancient context, believed that the human self could share in the divine identity through participation in the Spirit.[34] A. Byers similarly highlights the ontological nature of Christian participation in the divine in John's Gospel.[35] M. Thiessen contends that Paul believes that Christ enjoyed a fluid constitution such that he could inhabit multiple physical bodies simultaneously.[36]

Christian 'Theological Anthropology'

The current investigation is not a proper theological enterprise. However, it does rely on various disciplines in exploring the ancient sources. With that said, my work also draws on the insights of 'theological anthropology'.[37] Theological anthropology seeks to understand more about the human person as it relates to God. It is largely a Christian theological endeavour, but it incorporates the thinking of biblical writings and historical thinkers.[38] Thus, it considers the many issues surrounding the biblical view of the self as the 'image of God'.[39] Moreover, just as contemporary theologians assert, ancients likewise believed that humanity and the divine could not be understood apart from one another.[40]

[29] Rabens, 2013; 2014a; 2014b; 2014c. [30] Rehfeld, 2012. [31] Lakey, 2010, 91.
[32] Cf. Kharlamov, 2012. [33] Blackwell, 2011.
[34] Litwa, 2012; cf. 2008; 2013; 2016. [35] Byers, 2017. [36] Thiessen, 2013.
[37] See esp. the recent works of Schwarz, 2008; 2013; Cortez, 2010; 2016. See also the standard works, including: Moltmann, 1974; Murphy-O'Connor, 1982; Thunberg, 1985; Zizioulas, 1985; Pannenberg, 1999; Zeindler, Graf and Mathwi, 2004; Hopkins, 2005.
[38] See Cortez, 2016.
[39] E.g., Barth, 1958, 184–85; Lossky, 1967; Moltmann, 1985, 188; Harrison, 2010; Cortez, 2016, 14–40.
[40] Cf. Schwöbel and Gunton, 1991; Torrance, 1996.

Divine Embodiment in the Ancient Near East

In seeking to understand ancient beliefs about divine embodiment, scholars have likewise made great progress in understanding the relationship between space and existence in the Ancient Near East.[41] They have moved us forward in how we now understand the divine nature and how deities in particular and the divine essence in general related to physical spaces, including cult objects and the human body alike. Many scholars have made contributions to this study, and I discuss these in the following chapters. But three in particular need to be mentioned at this point. Their work forms the foundation for the framework within which I examine ancient conceptions of the divine nature of the self.

In his ground-breaking monograph, B. Sommer examines ancient Israelite and near eastern ideas on divine 'fluidity'.[42] Scholars have long been aware of the notion of divine embodiment in the biblical world. However, Sommer presses our understanding of Israel's god to a new level. He finds that the ancients widely believed deities could install themselves within cult objects, which served as physical bodies for otherwise disembodied deities. Israelites were no different: they too believed that YHWH could inhabit *many* bodies without ever losing his singular identity.[43] On the contrary, in doing so he could expand his presence in locations beyond his sanctuary.

Sommer does not pursue this matter in ancient anthropologies. However, his findings are of direct relevance for how we understand divine embodiment in the context of the human self. If the divine can reside in the material spaces of a cult object, it is worth considering how this helps us understand ancient conceptions of the self as potentially embodied space.

M. Hundley expands Sommer's exploration, looking specifically at the role of temples and earthly dwellings as spaces of divine residence.[44] He demonstrates how the peoples of the biblical world envisioned the gods to have lived in sacred, physical objects.[45] Humankind could encounter, worship and even feed the deities, whose real presence inhabited material temples and shrines. Furthermore, Hundley notes the ability of the divine

[41] Important works that I do not review here but return to throughout the following chapters include Hamori, 2008; Kamionkowski and Kim, 2010; Allen, 2015; Smith, 2016.

[42] By body, Sommer, 2009, 2, means simply: 'something located in a particular place at a particular time, whatever its shape or substance'.

[43] Sommer, 2009, 124. [44] Hundley, 2013; cf. 2011.

[45] See e.g., Hundley, 2013, 139–52.

to deify objects in their immediate proximity. Such objects could become participants in the divine state by virtue of their closeness to the divine.[46]

Hundley does not pursue the anthropological implications of his findings. However, like Sommer, he moves us forward in our own exploration of ancient conceptions of the embodied self. Hundley helps us understand how the ancients believed deities could not only embody but also deify material objects. With this in mind, we must ask how the divine presence – or divine space more generally – could effect the same changes in the human self.

S. Herring examines biblical conceptions of the human as the divine image within the framework of divine embodiment.[47] He argues that the biblical writers believed that YHWH embodied the human – the image of God – the way that their ancient neighbours believed their deities could embody images resembling them. Such images were not considered mere replicas. Rather, they were physical extensions of the deity inside them.[48] Through ritual deification, cult statues could *become* the deities inside. Likewise, in biblical anthropology, humans were the bodily incarnations of God on earth.[49] As Herring insists, humans were not merely bearers of the divine rule but of the divine presence as well.

Herring's exploration of divine embodiment in the context of biblical anthropology provides a bridge between ancient near eastern beliefs about gods and humans. My study will find much agreement with that of Herring. But I will provide additional insights into the anthropologies of the Israelites and their neighbours.

The Divine Embodiment Model

In the following chapters, I argue that the peoples of the biblical world envisioned the self as divine embodied space. While they disagreed on certain details, they imagined that the human was capable of embodying the divine, in its natural condition, even in the present life. As a type of space inhabited by and/or comprising divine components, the self enjoyed a natural share in the divine state. Which aspects and *in what sense* the self participated in the divine would differ in some ways from one culture to the next.

[46] Hundley, 2013, 125, 367. [47] Herring, 2013. [48] Herring, 2013, 47.
[49] Herring, 2013, 48.

The framework I utilise to examine the ancient sources will draw together the two key elements highlighted previously: (1) the spatial conception of the self and (2) the notion of divine embodiment. I call this framework the *divine embodiment model*. The model views the self as *real embodied space*, because it takes seriously the belief that the divine presence could take up residence *in reality* in material spaces on earth. With this model in hand, I hope to be able to understand what the peoples of the Ancient Near East believed about humanity's share in the divine nature.

When it comes to images and other embodied cult objects – including the human self – I will distinguish between two types of spaces. The first type of space is what I call a 'representational copy' (cf. *Abbild* or *Symbol*). The representational copy (or simply 'copy') was a type of image that merely represented the 'original' (*Urbild*) in appearance. The relationship between the copy and the original had to do with simple representation. It was a symbol of the god who was absent. This is how we in the modern world think of portraits of family members or statues of famous athletes. For the most part, we do not tend to believe our children actually live spiritually inside their photographs or athletes actually reside inside their statues. The objects merely remind us of them by reminding us of their appearance.

The second type of image I call the 'embodied double' (cf. *Bild*). The embodied double was a type of space in which the 'original' (*Urbild*) lived in reality. This was a material object or body that somehow served as the physical space in which a god or divine essence could reside. There was sometimes a resemblance in appearance, though this aspect of the embodied double was less important to the ancients than its function. Its function was not so much to remind humans of the gods. Rather, it was to give the otherwise disembodied gods a physical space to inhabit on earth. It was not a symbol of a god who was absent but instead of one who was very much present.

A Note on the Structure and Sources

I have chosen to structure my book roughly chronologically. However, I have also placed the more widely influential cultures at the beginning. I thus begin in Chapters 2 and 3 with Egypt and Mesopotamia, respectively, focusing especially – though not exclusively – on sources from the third/second mill. BCE. In Chapter 4, I turn my sights to

Hittite Anatolia, whose sources date primarily to the second mill. BCE. In Chapter 5, I examine the Israelites in their Syro-Palestinian environment, along with the anthropogenies of Gen 1–2. In Chapter 6, I discuss Greek and Roman sources dating between the seventh c. BCE and first c. CE. In Chapter 7, I then summarise the results of my study and set forth a synthetic conceptualisation of the divinity of the self in the biblical world.

In each chapter, I discuss two types of sources. The first type includes those that explain the origins of the cosmos (cosmogonies) and the human race (anthropogenies). In these, we gain insight into ancient beliefs and assumptions about the human creature in its created or natural condition. With the exception of Chapter 7, I begin each chapter by exploring this type of source. The second type of source relates to ideas on the divinity of the king or queen. It is well known that ancient cultures commonly recognised the royal figure as having a unique relationship with the divine. For this reason, it is proper that we examine sources that help us to understand in what sense they believed this to be so. Again, in all but Chapter 7, I devote the second half of each chapter to a discussion of the monarch's divinity.

The format of Chapter 7 differs from the rest. With so much debate about what Greeks and Romans actually believed about ruler deification, I give only a brief discussion of the ruler's divinity. What is more, the Axial Age philosophers and scientists discussed human nature more directly than their near eastern and Mediterranean predecessors. For this reason, I leave anthropogenic myths aside and focus instead on sources that address such matters straightforwardly.

Primary texts remain in the form in which they appear in the sources from which I have taken them. Experts in the languages of the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean have gone to great lengths to reconstruct, translate and interpret the difficult texts, and I am truly indebted to their efforts. In terms of how the transcriptions and/or transliterations of texts appear, I follow both the sources themselves and the conventions of the field. Thus, Sumerian text is in normal, non-italicised format (e.g., numun), sometimes in all capitals and sometimes in lowercase. Other forms of cuneiform (Akkadian, Hittite) are italicised (e.g., *melammu*). Egyptian appears in italics as well (e.g., *b3*), as does Latin. Hebrew, Aramaic, Syriac and Greek are quoted in foreign script. In every case, I give an English translation of the text – whether mine or someone else's – and note the source from which I have taken it.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The following chapters investigate the divine ontological aspects of the self in the anthropologies of the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean. Each chapter will serve more as a case study than an exhaustive account of a given view on humanity's share in the divine nature. With these preliminary matters in hand, we now attempt to make sense of this fascinating aspect of ancient thought. To do so, we have much ground to cover and many challenges to address. To this task we now turn.

2

Godlike Bodies and Radiant Souls

Divine Embodiment in Ancient Egypt

PREFATORY REMARKS

The Present Chapter

The founding of the mighty Egyptian empire dates to around 3100 BCE, when king Narmer unified Upper and Lower Egypt. The Egyptians would remain a powerhouse until the sixth c. BCE, when the Achaemenid empire began to dominate and its kings took control of Egypt. On a slow decline from its imperial heights of the second mill. BCE, this once formidable empire finally met its match in 332 BCE at the hands of Alexander the Great.[1] Egypt remained a cultural centre well into the Common Era, but it would never become the mighty political force it had been in earlier days.

Mentioned over 700 times in the Hebrew Bible and New Testament, Egypt holds an important place in biblical history and myth. While the biblical writers insist that the Israelites spent upwards of 400 years in Egypt (Exod 12.40), the precise nature of this relationship remains hotly debated. In biblical narrative, Egypt often plays the role of Israel's oppressor and the arch-enemy of its god. However, Israel's relationship with Egypt also contains a number of positive moments. For example, the land provided safety for figures such as Abraham and Sarah (Gen 12.10–20), Joseph and his brothers (Gen 37–50), Jeroboam, the king of Israel (1 Kgs 11.40), the Judahites fleeing from the Babylonians (2 Kgs 25.26) and Joseph, Mary and the newborn Jesus (Matt 2.13–15).

[1] On ancient Egypt, see esp. Arnold, 1999; Shaw, 2000; Wilkinson, 2007a; 2007b; 2011; van de Mieroop, 2011; Nyord, 2019a.

The few scholarly treatments of Egyptian anthropology seem to recognise the human self as a composite of human and divine aspects. D. Snell's assessment of Egyptian anthropology is useful. He notes that 'it is wrong to think that Egyptians did not see themselves as unified persons. They did, but they knew there were various aspects of themselves that might have different adventures, especially after death'.[2] This plurality of the self in Egyptian thought has drawn the attention of others as well. As H. te Velde argues, the ancient Egyptians 'conceived [the self] as a plurality of material, bodily, spiritual and divine aspects'.[3] He insists that they thought of the 'person' within an 'I-Thou' framework.[4] Humanity and human nature were inseparable from the divine. This had relational implications, of course, but it had ontological implications as well. As a 'plurality of material, bodily, spiritual and divine aspects', the human was a composite of divinity and mortality. In particular, te Velde finds that among the many components comprising the self, the body, the *ba* and the *ka* were the most essential.[5]

More recently, R. Nyord has sought to understand ancient Egyptian conceptions of the body.[6] Nyord's conceptualisation of the body as space is particularly insightful. He examines the body as physical space delineated from the space around it (i.e., *Körper*) and as lived space or as the 'locus of lived experience' (i.e., *Leib*).[7] Nyord rightly insists that these otherwise distinct modes of viewing the body are not opposed to one another but two poles on a continuum. The body was neither merely a list of biomedical parts nor an ethereal, unbounded experience. The human body was one and all at the same time. Nyord likewise recognises the divine nature of the body, especially in the afterlife,[8] but also perhaps in the present life, by virtue of its relationship to the divine *ka*.[9]

In this chapter, I offer a fresh conceptualisation of the human self in ancient Egyptian anthropology. Whereas te Velde seeks to understand the person more generally and Nyord the body in the afterlife, I aim to understand the potentially divine nature of the self in the present life. By approaching the self as a type of space, I shall be able to explore the relationship between the various components of the human being.

[2] Snell, 2011, 65. [3] te Velde, 1990, 98.
[4] te Velde, 1990, 83–84; see also Hubbeling, 1990, 7–24. [5] te Velde, 1990, 97–98.
[6] See Nyord, 2009; 2012; 2014; 2016. [7] Nyord, 2009, 2. [8] Nyord, 2014, 41.
[9] Nyord, 2019b, 181.

Ultimately, this will give us insight into how ancient Egyptians imagined the human in relation to the gods and the divine existence and, more importantly, how they imagined human nature in relation to the divine nature.

The Sources

Sources for the study of ancient Egypt are vast and variform. They range from the inscriptions and images decorating the monuments to tablets, amulets and documents preserved in tombs and temples. The primary sources I deal with thus include the Pyramid Texts (PT), Coffin Texts (CT), writings on papyri (p) and inscriptions and images. The online *Thesaurus Linguae Aegyptiae* is also invaluable in the study of Egyptian sources.[10] Bibliographical references to texts can be found throughout the footnotes.

THE BODY, THE *BA* AND THE *KA*

The Creation of the Cosmos

I begin with a look at ancient Egyptian cosmogonies and anthropogenies. G. Pinch offers a helpful entrée into the complex study of Egyptian cosmogony and anthropogeny.[11] She observes that the various anthropogenies from ancient Egypt have three elements in common. They posit an initial creation of the body, followed by, in her words, 'the transfer to that body of some part of the divine essence of the creator', and finally 'the animation of the body by the breath of life'.[12] Before looking at these matters in detail, it will be helpful to have a general understanding of Egyptian traditions surrounding the creation of the cosmos.

Several creation myths held a place in the ancient Egyptian imagination. Each took root at a different time within a different region of the empire, including Thebes, Heliopolis, Memphis and Hermopolis. In the Theban myth, the cosmos and the Egyptian pantheon came into being

[10] See http://aaew2.bbaw.de/tla/index.html. Unless otherwise noted, all primary texts are from the *Thesaurus Linguae Aegyptiae*.

[11] Pinch, 2002, 61. For further discussion of Egyptian cosmogony, see e.g., Wilson, 1946, 31–61; Clark, 1959, 35–67; Brandon, 1963, 14–65; Freund, 1965, 79–80; Bilolo, 1986; Lesko, 1991; Bickel, 1994; Leeming, 2004, 61–77.

[12] Pinch, 2002, 61.

from the very presence of the supreme deity, Amen (pLeiden I 350).[13] In the Heliopolitan myth, Atum – the 'self-developing god' (CT 75–81) – is the source from which the cosmos and the other assisting gods came into existence (CT 75; 714; PT 527, 600; BD 17; pBerlin 3027; pBremner-Rhind 10188; pBrooklyn 47.218.50). In the Memphite myth, the craftsman god, Ptah, envisioned heaven, earth and humankind in his mind and then spoke these mental blueprints into being (PT 345; CT 647; BD 82; 'Shabaka Stone'; pBerlin 3048; pBerlin 13603; Stele Copenhagen GNC 897).[14] In the Hermopolitan myth, the males and females of the Ogdoad joined together and brought order to the primordial world (PT 301, 446; CT 76, 80, 107; BD 17; cf. pBM 10042).

Other creation myths can be found in the sources, and I shall look into these shortly. But this brief overview gives us a sense of how Egyptians imagined the world to have come into being. It gives us reason to think that they were also concerned to understand humanity's place in the cosmos. At this point, we may now turn to a more detailed look at the human self as a critical piece within the Egyptian universe.

The Constituent Parts of the Self

Albeit somewhat dated, E. Budge's treatment of Egyptian anthropological terms remains valuable.[15] His list at least gives us a sense of the different parts of the human. In his list, he includes such items as 'flesh' (*ỉwf*), 'bone' (*ḳs*), 'head' (*tp*), 'heart' (*ḥ3ty*), 'double' (*k3*) and 'soul' (*b3*), among many others.[16] Unfortunately, many of these parts have to do *either* with non-ontological *or* post-mortem aspects of the self. Because these take us beyond the scope of my investigation, I focus on three parts that scholars recognise as especially important, namely, the body (*ḥꜥw*, *ḏt*, *ḥꜥ*(*w*)-*nṯr*), the *ba* (*b3*) and the *ka* (*k3*).[17]

The Body

A papyrus called 'Repulsing of the Dragon and the Creation' (fourth c. BCE) offers insight into Egyptian views on human nature. This ritual was designed to ward off the dragon who interfered with Ra's daily trek

[13] See Allen, 1988, 51–54. [14] See Wilson, 1969, 4–6. [15] Budge, 1920, lxviii.
[16] Budge, 1920, lxviii.
[17] On the body, see e.g., Nyord, 2009; 2012; 2014. On the *ba*, see esp. Žabkar, 1968; Allen, 2001, 161–62. On the *ka*, see e.g., Bell, 1985; Bolshakov, 1997; 2001, 215–17; cf. Greven, 1952.

across the sky. Although the text is relatively late, it employs myths that likely date to the third mill. BCE.

Redeploying the myth of the Eye of Ra, the ritual credits Ra with creating the cosmos (esp. 26.21–27.5).[18] According to this myth, Ra sends his eye to shine light in the darkness so that Shu and Tefnut can see. After some time without his eye, he believes that it is lost and proceeds to find its replacement. In the meantime, his original eye returns, becomes jealous and begins to weep. From the eye's tears, alas humanity springs into existence. The connection between the moisture of Ra's eye and humanity's birth is no accident. As R. Wilkinson notes, the play on words explicitly links 'humanity' (*rmṯ*) with the 'tears' (*rmwt*) from which they emerged.[19]

The divine liquid was the medium from which humanity came into existence. What precisely is meant is difficult to know. In discussing this text, J. Wilson writes, 'in somewhat uncertain terms, there is a relation of the creation of the gods to the creation of humans, both exudations of the creator-god'.[20] Wilson may be correct. The text posits an ontological kinship between the eye's tears and the human creature. The eye's tears were the stuff from which the self came and thus that of which the self was made.

There is evidence elsewhere to support this interpretation, which I present shortly. However, the meaning of this text may be less metaphysical and more common sense, as it were. Egyptians were keenly aware of how much liquid was in the body. They also understood how important water in particular was for survival. It is plausible that the text is making a simple link between human life and this divine liquid. With that said, based on the link between divine fluids and human existence elsewhere, I tend to interpret 'Repulsing of the Dragon' more metaphysically. It appears to communicate a message about humanity's origins from the divine liquid and ontological kinship with the deity from whom they came. This meaning should become clearer as we proceed through an analysis of several other ancient Egyptian sources.

A slightly different story about human origins appears in the 'Instructions of Merikare'. The composition survives on three papyri

[18] Pritchard, 1969, 6.
[19] See Wilkinson, 2017, 140; cf. Pritchard, 1969, 6n11; Walton, 1989, 33; Darnell, 1997; Goebs, 2002.
[20] Pritchard, 1969, 8n6.

(pHermitage 1116a; pMoscow 4658; pCarlsberg 6),[21] which date to the 18th Dynasty (1550–1292 BCE). However, the content of the writing is from the father of king Merikare, who lived during the first Intermediate Period (ca. 2150–2025 BCE). In this early form of Egyptian wisdom literature (Egyp.: *sb3yt*), the reigning king instructs his son how to be a great ruler once he took the throne. This source also provides insight into ancient Egyptian ideas on human nature.

As in 'Repulsing of the Dragon', mention of humanity's creation is brief, though it is quite important. Scholars have long noted the similarities between 'Merikare' and Gen 1–2.[22] The connection is rather obvious in one portion of the account:

> *ỉrnf ṯ3w ʿnḫ fnḏw sn snnwf pw pr m ḫʿwf wbnf m pt n ỉbsn*
>
> He [Ra] made the breath of life for their nostrils. They are his images which came forth from his body. He shines in the sky for their desire. (trans. Hoffmeier, 1983, 47)[23]

In designating humans as Ra's 'second', 'double' or 'image' (*snnw*), this statement presents an intriguing idea. The text appears to make a claim about the kind of double (*snnw*) the human was. As J. Hoffmeier observes, pCarlsberg 6 of 'Merikare' frequently couples the hieroglyphic determinative for 'statue' with the term *snnw* (double).[24] According to this tradition, the human was the divine double in the sense that it bore the physical likeness of Ra on earth. Just as a pharaoh, for example, would construct a *snnw* in his own likeness, Ra created humanity to be his own image on earth.

E. Hornung, E. Otto, B. Ockinga and others have noted the widespread Egyptian view of the royal figure as the 'image' of the gods.[25] In fact, Hornung insists that the royal figure was the physical incarnation of the gods on earth.[26] The image and the royal figure were linked conceptually. Both were embodied space that physically represented and embodied the divine on earth.

A. Spalinger offers a wonderful treatment of the concept of the 'statue' or 'image' in the 'Dedicatory Inscription of Ramesses II in Abydos'.[27] This source helps us understand the ontological relationship between the image and its original. According to cols. 36–37, on a visit to this temple, Ramesses II found Seti I's statue (*sšmw*) lying on the ground (*KRI* II 326.4).

[21] For discussion of 'Merikare', see Lichtheim, 2006, 97–109.
[22] See e.g., Hoffmeier, 1983. [23] Cf. Walton, 1989, 33. [24] Hoffmeier, 1983, 47.
[25] Hornung, 1967, 123–56; Otto, 1971; Ockinga, 1984, 40–51.
[26] Hornung, 1967, 147–51. [27] Spalinger, 2009, 59–60nn285–88.

Following Hornung, Ockinga and M. Eaton-Krauss, Spalinger maintains that the word used here (*sšmw*) means 'manifestation of a divinity'.[28] Although the term *sšmw* is used in the 'Dedicatory Inscription' and *snnw* in 'Merikare', the two terms carry the same meaning. Both designate physical 'manifestations of a divinity', or what I call 'embodied doubles'.

The meaning of the terms *sšmw* and *snnw* is not unlike that of others used of images in ancient Egypt.[29] As Eaton-Krauss has shown, the terms *twt* and *šzp* designate statues of rulers and gods.[30] But more than mere 'representational copies', these objects were 'embodied doubles' of the humans or gods they resembled. This function becomes evident especially when the terms are coupled with the adjective *ʿnḫ* ('living') as in *twt ʿnḫ* and *šzp ʿnḫ*. The designations seem to indicate that the otherwise inanimate statue 'will receive life or is living'.[31] The *sšmw*, *snnw*, *twt* or *šzp* not only seems to have resembled its original, but in some way the original somehow resided in the physical object in real time and space.

Conceptions of the royal figure were important and widespread in ancient Egypt.[32] Otto, W. Schmidt and H. Wildeberger maintain that Egyptian ideas surrounding the human as divine image only or primarily applied to the pharaoh.[33] This may well be true in many cases, specifically in sources whose focus is on the pharaohs.[34]

While this may be the case in other Egyptian sources, in this remark about Ra's *snnw*, 'Merikare' does not appear to be referring to the royal figure alone. The case could conceivably be made that 'Merikare' also presents a view of the royal figure as a sort of representative of humanity. If this is the case, 'Merikare' therefore refers to the pharaoh as Ra's original image (*snnw*), and because he is humanity's representative, all humans then share with him in this divine condition. Regardless, the remark in 'Merikare' is ultimately a statement about humanity in general. It asserts that the divine condition otherwise touted as a privilege of the ruler extends to non-royal humanity as well.

Furthermore, 'Merikare' does not say *how* Ra brought the human creature into existence. However, it does indicate *what* he used to do

[28] Spalinger, 2009, 59n287. See also Hornung, 1967, 123–56; Eaton-Krauss, 1984, 77–88; Ockinga, 1984, 40–51.
[29] Eaton-Krauss, 1984, 77–88. [30] Eaton-Krauss, 1984, 77–83.
[31] Spalinger, 2009, 59n285. [32] See Section on Ramesses II.
[33] Wildeberger, 1965, 245–59, 481–501; Schmidt, 1967, 137–40; 1983, 182–206; Otto, 1971, 343–44.
[34] For primary examples, see Middleton, 2005, 109–10.

so. Whereas YHWH constructed the human from the 'dust' (עפר) of the earth (Gen 2.7), here Ra's image (*snnw*) literally 'came forth from his body' (*pw pr m ḫ*ʿ*wf*). This would seem to be a case of what Pinch calls 'differentiation' – the process 'in which one original force was gradually divided (without necessarily diminishing itself) into the diverse elements that made up the universe'.[35] I shall say more on this shortly.

Embedded in the myth is the motif of ontological kinship. If the human derived its existence directly from the deity, it would also seem to share in the divine state on some level – even if only in latent or trace amounts. The idea is that, if someone or something derives its existence *from out of* someone or something else, it naturally shares in the nature of its source.

What is more, 'Merikare' seems to have in view specifically the human *body*. Ra first constructed the physical double in his likeness. The body was thus the part of the human that would manifest Ra visibly on the earth. But this physical double was initially only a 'representational copy' that merely resembled the deity in appearance. It changed and became a true 'embodied double' when, as the text recalls, Ra brought it to life by imbuing it with his 'breath of life' (*ṯ3w* ʿ*nḫ*).

Like YHWH in Gen 2.7, Ra is said to have given life to the first human by breathing life into its 'nostrils' (*fnḏ*; אף). The human was not yet *alive* until after the deity breathed his divine air into it. R. Williams has noted several occurrences of this idea in Egyptian sources. One source refers to Ptah as 'the breath of life for all people' (*ṯ3w n* ʿ*nḫ n ḥr-nb*, pHarris I 44.7).[36] Likewise, the evening sun is said to 'give breath to their nostrils' (*dỉk ṯ3w r fnḏwsn*, BD 15).[37] And here in 'Merikare', we learn that it is 'in order that their nostrils might live that he [Ra] made the air' (*ỉrnf ṯ3w nỉ-b* ʿ*nḫ fnḏwsn*, *Inscr. dédic.* line 37).[38]

This myth has further parallels elsewhere in Egyptian mythology.[39] In one set of traditions, Khnum is depicted as creating the body on his potter's wheel and vivifying it with the breath of life (see e.g., Famine Stele of the Ptolemaic period). In a source from Hatshepsut's lifetime (1473–1458 BCE),[40] the queen recalls the process by which, at Amen-Ra's orders, Khnum shaped her and gave her life:

'Fashion for me the body of my daughter and the body of her ka', said Amen-Ra, 'A great queen shall I make of her, and honour and power shall be worthy of her dignity and glory'.

[35] Pinch, 2002, 61–62. [36] Williams, 1969, 94. [37] Williams, 1969, 94.
[38] Williams, 1969, 94. [39] See Hoffmeier, 1983, 47–48.
[40] See e.g., Spence, 2005, 247–48.

'O Amen-Ra', answered Khnum, 'It shall be done as you have said. The beauty of your daughter shall surpass that of the gods and shall be worthy of her dignity and glory'.

So Khnum fashioned the body of Amen-Ra's daughter and the body of her ka, the two forms exactly alike and more beautiful than the daughters of men. He fashioned them of clay with the air of his potter's wheel and Heket, goddess of birth, knelt by his side holding the sign of life towards the clay that the bodies of Hatshepsut and her ka might be filled with the breath of life. (text from Spence, 2005, 247–48)

On his potter's wheel, Khnum gave shape to Hatshepsut's body and *ka* from clay (cf. PT 445, 522). He 'fashioned them' with precision so that both Hatshepsut and her *ka* mimic one another exactly. With the queen's body and *ka* in place, Heket, the goddess of birth, then readies it to receive the 'breath of life'.[41]

I should note that none of the sources explicitly states that the breath (*ṯ3w*) is itself divine. Egyptians may well have viewed this less metaphysically and more physiologically: that is, they knew that without breath, humans die. However, they would at least occasionally have ruminated on the nature of breath within the sort of cosmological and metaphysical framework given shape by these myths. Thus, while humans remain alive by breathing, they did not initially come to life until, according to this complex of myths, they received a dose of the breath (*ṯ3w*) of the gods at their inception.

Additionally, it may be important that Khnum did not *create* Hatshepsut from nothing. Rather, he created her body from the clay of the earth. This may seem trivial, to be sure. But it may also point to an assumption about the ontological stuff of which the human body was made. In its natural condition, the body was a sort of ontological derivative of the physical earth. There was an ontological kinship between the physical body and stuff of the earth that bears fleshing out at this point.

The question is, what might these cosmogonies indicate about ancient Egyptian conceptions of the self? Clearly, the myths represent a common belief about the way the human body originated from the clay of the earth.[42] But what might this indicate about the nature of the body? Given

[41] On the motif of the 'breath of life' in Egyptian and biblical sources, see e.g., Williams, 1969, 93–94. Furthermore, in some traditions (e.g., pBerlin 3033 [Westcar Papyrus]), Meshkenet plays the role of Heket, creating the individual's soul and breathing into it to bring it to life. On which, see Lichtheim, 2006, 215; Wilkinson, 2017, 152–53.

[42] Elsewhere it emerges directly from the body of Ra, which would suggest an even more direct connection between the human body and the divine body of the gods.

that the body must have something in common with the earth, it will be worth looking more closely at Egyptian beliefs about the nature of land for the moment.

Land holds a central place in Heliopolitan cosmology. The best source of information for Heliopolitan cosmogony is the Pyramid Texts.[43] These writings are among the earliest in the world. They date to the third mill. BCE and are generally thought to be the work of the priests of the Old Kingdom (ca. 2686–2181 BCE),[44] who performed them to the ruler at his or her funeral and after his or her burial.[45] The texts capture traditions from Egypt's Early Dynastic Period (ca. 3100–2686 BCE), but they would go on to capture the Egyptian imagination for thousands of years.

According to this set of myths, Atum did not just *create* land. Rather, land actually originated from his being. We read in one well-known account in the pyramid of Pepi II:

> §1652a Atum Scarab! When you became high, as the high ground (*ḫ3ỉk m ḫ33*) – 1652b when you rose, as the benben (*wbnnk m bnbn*), in the Phoenix Enclosure, in Heliopolis – §1652c you sneezed Shu, you spat Tefnut §1653a and you put your arms about them, as the arms of *ka*, that your *ka* might be in them. (PT 600, trans. Allen, 1988, 13–14)

This text makes some remarkable claims about the nature of the primordial land. J. Allen seems to understand the text to mean that Atum *is* the 'high ground' (*ḫ33*) and the *benben* (*bnbn*). By rendering the preposition *m* as 'in', he interprets the remark as equating the deity with the primal piece of land emerging from chaos.

However, S. Mercer interprets *m* with 'as' both here (§1652a, b) and in §1652c (i.e., 'as Shu'; 'as Tefnut').[46] He understands *m* to signify not that Atum is *in* the material land or that the land somehow embodies him. Rather, Mercer understands this as a comparison between the way Atum rose up and spat: he rose up like (*m*) the *benben* (§1652b) and spat like (*m*) Shu and Tefnut (§1652c).

Furthermore, Mercer understands the term *wbn* as a reference to Atum's radiance bursting forth from the waters. The term *wbn* can mean either 'rising' or 'shining' depending on the context, and there can be some ambiguity as to which meaning is preferred. For example, in Unas's pyramid, Unas is told to say to Atum, 'May you rise/shine (*wbn*) on the

[43] See esp. Allen, 2005; 2013; Hays, 2012; cf. Sethe, 1908; Hays and Schenkh, 1997, 97–115.
[44] Pinch, 2004, 11. [45] See Hays, 2002. [46] Mercer, 1952.

horizon, in the place where you are glorious' (PT 217, §152d, my trans.). Again in Unas's pyramid, we read that 'the fire rises/shines' (PT 269, §376a, my trans.). Thus, in Mercer's thinking, Atum did not arise or become elevated when he appeared as the primordial ground. Rather, in those primal moments of creation, the deity shone forth brightly like the *benben*. For Mercer, the *benben* is not a symbol of the material land but of the sun.[47]

PT 600 may employ such language precisely because of the dual meaning it carries. We know the Egyptians were keen to employ word-plays of different sorts to communicate complex ideas. It may be that the *benben* was more than mere land as we tend to think of it. The ancient Egyptian might well have imagined the primal piece of terra firma that burst forth through the chaotic waters as a radiant, sun-like material that would become the first place and moment of *cosmos* amidst the primordial *chaos*. Likewise, the writers of this myth may have understood the link between Atum and the *benben* as both one of comparison and one of embodiment. Arising (embodied) 'in' (*m*) the primal land at the first moment of *creation*, he shone 'as/like' (*m*) the *benben*, for he and the land were one and the same.[48] Land was therefore not understood as separate from its creator, Atum. It *was* Atum. Atum embodied the earth-stuff in such a way that there was no distinction between the mound and the god.

Other aspects of Atum's essence were viewed as the original substance from which everything originated. PT 600 explains that Shu and Tefnut came into being from Atum's spittle (*išš*) when the god sneezed them into existence (PT 600; cf. 301, 660). Elsewhere, the same two gods are said to have come from Atum's semen, which he expelled through a creative act of masturbation (PT 527).[49] It must not be overlooked that in this complex of tradition, Shu and Tefnut themselves are equated with the elements of creation. Like Atum, they are inseparable from the parts of the cosmos for which they are responsible. Not only is Atum the self-begotten god, but all other gods and elements in the cosmos came from his very essence. He is the egg from which all of creation originally derived its existence (cf. CT 714; Alabaster-Stele-Sethos I, line 4).[50]

[47] On this view, see e.g., Breasted, 1972, 70–75; Edwards, 1979, 289–92.
[48] Cf. Pinch, 2002, 63–64.
[49] See Allen, 1988, 13. Cf. pBerlin P 3027: 'Spells for Mother and Child (F)'; Yamazaki, 2003.
[50] See Allen, 1989, 13–14; Davies, 1997, 257.

Memphite traditions dating to the Old Kingdom identify Ptah as the creator god. The primary evidence for Memphite cosmogony comes from the 'Shabaka Stone' (BM 498).[51] The rectangular 'Stone' measures 92 cm × 137 cm and contains 62 columns, divided into 4 sections,[52] having been used before its recovery either as a millstone[53] or the foundation of a pillar.[54]

The inscription of the 'Shabaka Stone' preserves a much older message of great interest to King Shabaka, the Kushite king of the 25th Dynasty (744–656 BCE).[55] Apparently, King Shabaka discovered a poorly preserved, worm-eaten writing of great antiquity (lines 1–2). To preserve its message forever, he ordered that it be inscribed onto the slab of black stone (lines 1–2). He would then erect the stone in the House of Ptah in Memphis and proclaim that, with Ptah, he had reunified the great Egyptian empire of old (lines 3, 61–64).

Lines 48–61 form the 'Memphite Theology', 48–53 of which are of particular interest:

(48) The gods who came into being in [*m*] Ptah:
(49a) Ptah-on-the-great-throne ———.
(50a) Ptah-Nun, the father who [made] Atum.
(51a) Ptah-Naunet, the mother who bore Atum.
(52a) Ptah-the-Great is hear and tongue of the Nine [Gods].
(49b) [Ptah] ——— who bore the gods.
(50b) [Ptah] ——— who bore the gods.
(51b) [Ptah] ———.
(52b) [Ptah] ——— Nefertem at the nose of Ra every day.
(53) There took shape in the heart, there took shape on the tongue the form of Atum. For the very great one is Ptah, who gave [life] to all the gods and their *ka*s through this heart and through this tongue,
(54) in which Horus had taken shape as Ptah, in which Thoth had taken shape as Ptah.[56]

Line 48 of the 'Stone' is especially suggestive: 'The gods who came into being in Ptah'. The hieroglyphic symbol rendered 'gods' consists of the

[51] See Breasted, 1901, 39–54 and pls. i–ii; 1933, 29–42; Erman, 1911; Junker, 1940; Žabkar, 1954; Sethe, 1964; Pritchard, 1969, 4–6; Krauss, 1999; Miriam Lichtheim, 2006, 51–56; El Hawary, 2007; Bodine, 2009.
[52] See Lichtheim, 2006, 51; Bodine, 2009, 8n32; Breasted, 2009, 39–54 and pls. I–II.
[53] Breasted, 1901, 40. [54] El Hawary, 2007, 569–70. [55] See Bodine, 2009, 2–4.
[56] Unless otherwise noted, translations of the 'Shabaka Stone' are those of Lichtheim, 2006, 51–56.

three flagpoles that typically signify multiple gods. Here Ptah is responsible for their 'coming into existence'.

Line 48 literally states that the gods came into existence 'in Ptah'. The simple preposition 'in' (*m*) once again indicates that Ptah, like Atum above, is the space and substance out of which all of creation emerged. He is the space 'in' (*m*) whom the other gods once existed in potentiality, only later to have come into existence from out of him in reality (lines 55–56).

Once again, as in Heliopolitan myths surrounding Atum, here too Memphite tradition equates the creator deity Ptah with the original land from which all else came into being (line 58). As we read:

> Thus it is said of Ptah: 'He who made all and created the gods'. And he is Ta-tenen, who gave birth to the gods, and from whom every thing came forth, foods, provisions, divine offerings, all good things. Thus it is recognized and understood that he is the mightiest of the gods.

Like Atum, Ptah *is* identified as the divine pyramid-mound, the primordial mound god, Tatenen. The 'Stone' asserts rather boldly that this mound of land, 'the mightiest of the gods', was none other than the physical embodiment of the creator god himself. By the 19th Dynasty (1292–1189 BCE), Memphite traditions would fully associate Ptah with Tatenen, the divine primordial mound whose name literally means 'exalted land'. By that point in history, the two distinct gods came to share a single identity: Ptah-Tatenen.

What is more, Memphite cosmogony seems to have embraced certain assumptions about human nature. Humanity could trace its ontological roots back to Ptah-Tatenen himself (cf. 'Shabaka Stone', line 64). Albeit undetectable to the naked eye, the self apparently shared an ontological kinship with the land, and through this lineage with the creator god himself, from whose essence the physical world derived its existence.

Divine Material in the Cosmos and the Self

A brief look at these well-known cosmogonies reveals a common belief about the divine nature of creation. The primordial land was the link between the creator gods and everything else. Confirming this idea, Walton remarks:

> There is no specific material used for the creation of the cosmos in the Egyptian way of thinking, but neither is it creation out of nothing. All matter (existing in chaotic form) becomes part of the creator-god, who then creates, drawing from himself.[57]

[57] Walton, 1989, 32.

Allen likewise states, 'the Egyptians lived in a universe composed not of *things*, but of *beings*. Each element is not merely a physical component, but a distinct individual with a unique personality and will'.[58] The cosmos was ontologically inseparable from the gods who created it. This appears to be true in the sources we have examined so far. It finds further confirmation in instances in which the Egyptians deem, for example, the Nile (*ḥꜥpy*), the moon (*iꜥḥ*) and grain (*npr*) to be intrinsically divine in nature.[59] For this reason, as Allen suggests, the 'totality of forces and elements of the universe' is sometimes written with the hieroglyphic sign meaning 'group of nine (gods)' or Ennead (*psḏt*).[60] The gods were everywhere and in everything.

Furthermore, the divine essence that was *in everything* was also present *in everyone*. By virtue of the body's ontological kinship to the material world and existence in germinal form 'in' the creator god, the human likewise enjoyed a share in the divine state even in its natural condition.

The Cosmos As Heterotopian Space

It might be helpful at this point to make some observations of a more theoretical nature on our findings. In Chapter 1, I established a conceptual framework that I call the divine embodiment model. It is my view that this model helps us to understand ancient conceptions of the self.[61] As we have seen, ancient Egyptian ideas surrounding human nature cannot be understood apart from their ideas about the cosmos.

The Egyptian cosmos was a heterotopian space. As a heterotopia, the cosmos was a single space comprising an infinite number of other spaces. To take two examples from the cosmogonies mentioned earlier, land and water formed two prominent spaces within the singular cosmic space. The celestial bodies might be understood as yet additional spaces within this whole.

As we have seen, the cosmos was through and through an embodied space as well. The elements that comprised it are themselves infused with the divine essences of the pantheon. Not only did the gods and goddesses create the world and everything in it, but everything in the world in fact came from the very presence(s) of those gods. The world was, in its natural condition, divine embodied space.

The same model seems to apply to the human self as well. The human self was a microcosm of the world. Like the cosmos, it was a heterotopian space comprising multiple spaces or types of space. So far we have seen, in

[58] Allen, 1988, 8. [59] Allen, 1988, 8. [60] Allen, 1988, 8. [61] See Chapter 1.

particular, that the body – the physical space of the self – shared in the ontology of the physical material of the cosmos. It was metaphysically linked to the gods and goddesses from whose essence the physical makings of the cosmos originally came into being. In this regard, Snell's understanding of the ancient 'individual' as conceived largely as a member of the group finds a metaphysical expression.[62] Not only was the human bound to and understood as part of a social group, but it was also inextricably linked to the cosmos itself.

As an entity that was literally drawn out of the material earth, which itself originated from the gods themselves, the human body likewise enjoyed a residual share in the divine state. There is no indication that this share had any superhuman empowering effects on the human. Along with every physical element in the cosmos, the human body experienced corruption, decay and death. However, there is a sense in which the divine breath had deifying powers. Just by breathing, humans continually shared in and benefitted from the divine breath originally breathed into their bodies at creation.[63]

Even before we get to the 'soul', we thus find that the body itself shared in the divine nature. The panentheism that permeates Egyptian cosmology extended also to Egyptian anthropology. At the end of the day, the anthropos was a smaller heterotopian space within the cosmos, which was simply a larger heterotopian space. And like the latter, the former participated in the divine nature on some level.

It is not hard to see why the human-as-image motif (*sšmw*, *snnw*, *twt ꜥnḫ* or *šzp ꜥnḫ*) made sense in the ancient mind. Within this heterotopian world, the physical being (human, image) created to resemble the gods also mimicked the space from which it came (land). As the gods embodied the land and other types of space, they also embodied the human creature. Granted, the human body shared in the divine state more generally than the image, since the image housed a specific deity's presence. However, the body nevertheless had a share in the divine. In any case, both spaces initially derived their quasi-divine nature from the source from which they came, namely, the primordial land. But the conceptual link between the divine nature of the human and image extends beyond their physical space, as we see in the next section.

[62] Snell, 2005b.

[63] I am grateful to J. Wollenberg (private communication) for challenging me on these matters.

The ba

Having gotten a sense for Egyptian ideas on the nature of the body, what can we know about the non-bodily aspects of the self? In ancient Egypt, the human consisted of several parts. However, as noted earlier, the two that are of especial interest are the *ba* and *ka*. The first, the *ba*, was that aspect of the self that we think of as a soul or soul-aspect, and I discuss it first.[64]

The ba *As Manifestation*

In his seminal study of the *ba*, L. Žabkar provides insight into the many meanings of this fascinating concept.[65] He finds that the *ba* was closely associated with the idea of *manifestation*. This soul-aspect not only resided in someone or something, but under certain circumstances it could reveal one's true nature to the outside world. For example, through their *bas*, the gods manifested themselves in creation. Thus Atum manifested himself through the winged-disk, which shone throughout the cosmos.[66] Using the demonstrative enclitic particle *3*, PT 480 declares that Atum's ascension to heaven 'with his *ba* upon him' (*b3 ftp*) was a truly 'beautiful' (*nfr*) 'sight' (*m33*, §992a–b). Atum's *ba* was not just 'in' (*m*) him, but it was also 'upon him' (*ftp*). A deity could also be the *ba* of another deity. As the 'Ba of Ra, his own body', Osiris was thus a manifestation of Ra.[67] In a similar way, Khnum was the *ba* of Shu, Ra, Osiris and Geb all at the same time.[68] Gods could manifest themselves in other entities as well. Thus, the ram of Mendes was the *ba* of Osiris, the crocodiles were the *bas* of the Suchos gods, the serpents were the *bas* of all the gods and the celestial bodies were the *bas* of various gods.[69]

E. Otto seems correct that the *ba* required a physical space in order to do what it was made to do.[70] In order to manifest itself, the *ba* needed to inhabit the moon or a star or another celestial body. In order for one deity to manifest him- or herself through another deity, his or her *ba* needed to find its way into that deity or into its cult image.

The ba *and Its Statue*

Just as the gods' *bas* inhabited animals or stars, they also inhabited physical representations. This is significant, given the connection

[64] Budge, 1920, 197–200; cf. Snell, 2011, 64. [65] Žabkar, 1968.
[66] Žabkar, 1968, 12. [67] Žabkar, 1968, 12. [68] Žabkar, 1968, 12.
[69] Žabkar, 1968, 13–14. [70] Otto, 1941; 1942.

that Egyptians made between the body, images and physical land. As Žabkar explains:

> In their statues the gods and goddesses resided in their cult statues. These statues were animated by the gods' Bas, which descended upon them and united themselves with them each time the proper ritual was performed.[71]

It is difficult to know *in what sense* the *ba* 'united' with its statue. Egyptians had several terms to designate the concept of mixture or union (e.g., *ꜥb*, *ḥtr*, *iꜥb*, *3bḫ*, *dmḏ*, *ỉnḳ*, *sm3-t3*, *sm3*, *twt*, *ḫnm*). Each signified the coming together of two parties or entities with one another.

The more notable of terms to do with mixture of this sort is *ḫnm*. In several sources, *ḫnm* signifies the union between the deity or deity's *ba* and his or her material body. For example, in a text from the Roman Period, Horus is said to 'unite with his shrine' (*ḫnm f ḫm*) and to reign within his 'monument' (*mnw*, Opet 186.7).[72] Similarly, the goddess Nekhbet both 'unites with her sanctuary' (*ḫnmnk ỉwmnk*) and 'unites with the faience' (*ḫnmm m ṯḥn*, Opet 227.L).[73] Likewise, a hymn to Isis states that the deity's *ba* 'comes from the heavens daily to unite with his image in this place' (*ỉyi b3 s n pt rꜥ-nb ḥr ḫnm sḫms m st tn*), that is, in the divine house (*pr*, Opet 139.1).[74]

A Ptolemaic-period inscription on the west tower of the temple at Edfu reads as follows:

> His [Horus Behdety's] living *ba* (*b3*) comes from the heavens (*ỉỉ b3f ꜥnḫ n pt*). He sees the monument made for his *ka* (*mnw ỉrỉtw n k3f*). He flies to his house (*ꜥḫỉf r prf*). He rests on his secret cult statue (*f ḫnỉf ḥr bs*) ... His royal majesty unites with his great seat. (*ḫnm ḥmf st-wrtf*, Edfou VIII line 68.8–11, my trans.)[75]

This text reveals a remarkable belief about the *ba*'s ability to inhabit physical spaces. When the *ba* of Horus Behdety, the sun disk, descends from the heavens, he enters his house and comes to rest on the secret cult image. In this moment, he unites with his great seat (Edfu), becoming one with his sacred abode. Through his *ba*, he installs himself within his secret image, at which point the material space becomes embodied space and the manifestation of his presence on earth.[76]

[71] Žabkar, 1968, 39. [72] de Wit, 1958, 182, 186–87; 1962, tbls. 15–17.
[73] de Wit, 1958, 182; 1962, tbls. 21. [74] de Wit, 1958, 182; 1962, tbls. 5.
[75] See de Rochemonteix, 1987.
[76] In a similar inscription, we read: 'Horus-Ra unites with his sun disk in the location of his throne [i.e., Edfu]'. So they call it [i.e., Edfu] 'union-with-the-sun-disk' (Edfou VII line 18.10–19.2). See de Rochemonteix, 1987.

Lastly, an early papyrus dating to the 18th or 19th Dynasty shines light on the reality of the deity's union with its image. Without mentioning Ra's *ba* explicitly, the text asserts: 'May you [Ra] unite with your shrine as you wish' (*ḫnmk k3rik r mrrk*, pMoskau 167, my trans.).[77] According to this text, it is Ra's desire to unite with his 'shrine' (*k3r*). The *k3r* was the small, holy space – shrine, chapel, sanctuary – in which the deity's presence took up residence. It was not atypical to find the gods to be either 'united with' (*ḫnm*) their shrine or situated 'within the inner space' (*m-ḫnw*) of it. If Ra's desire was to unite with his shrine, the worshippers hoped they might 'see the great god united with his shrine' (*m3nf nṯr-ʿ3 mḫnw k3rỉ*, pLondon BM EA 10477, my trans.).[78]

The term typically rendered 'descend' (*ḥ3ỉ*) communicates similar ideas. One early tradition insists that the deceased 'descends' (*ḥ3ỉn*) to heaven the way Anubis 'descends' (*ḥ3ỉ*) and enters his 'shrine' (*mnỉw*, PT 659 §1867b, my trans.; cf. PT 675 §2001b).[79] At the moment the deity descended upon his shrine, the shrine became the deified body of the god inside it. In discussing this text, J. Assmann insists:

> The text unequivocally expresses what we must emphasize as the basic Egyptian concept regarding this point: *The statue is not the image of the deity's body, but the body itself*. It does not represent his form, but rather gives him form.[80]

Assmann refers to this unitive process as *descensio* or *Einwohnung* ('installation' or 'indwelling'). He insists that this process occurred in all types of images, not just physical statues. The gods could install themselves in 'all the representations in the temple, even those on the walls'.[81] Following H. Junker, Assmann states:

> The gods do not 'dwell' on earth, which would merely be a condition; rather, they 'install' themselves there, and specifically, they 'install' themselves in their images: this is an event that occurs regularly and repeatedly.[82]

Assmann's remarks are important for understanding the way the *ba* embodied material objects and images. But more importantly for our study, the process of *Einwohnung* may shed some light on the relationship between the *ba* and the human body.

[77] Caminos, 1956, 40–50. [78] Lapp, 1997, pls. 18–19.
[79] See Assmann, 2001, 44; cf. 1984, 53; 2003, 1–14. On *Einwhonung* in biblical and Christian traditions, see esp. Lehmkühler, 2004.
[80] Assmann, 2001, 46, ital. original. [81] Assmann, 2001, 42; cf. 2003, 1–14.
[82] Assmann, 2001, 43. See also Junker, 1911, 6; 1957, 88.

The ba *and the Self*

Debate about the nature of the *ba* has been ongoing for at least a century. The *ba* is that soul-aspect that went along with and guided the body throughout life (i.e., *b3 … ḫntỉ ꜥnḫ b3*, PT 665a), but this does not necessarily tell us anything about its nature. According to H. Kees, the *ba* of a deity was different in nature than the *ba* of a human.[83] Kees may be correct that gods had one type of *ba* and humans another. However, I have yet to find a single source that makes a clear distinction between the nature of the deity's *ba* and that of the human. There is evidence that the *ba* of a deity was more powerful than the *ba* of a human (pLondon BM EA 10477 [pNu], tb. 078, 136A).[84] But being more powerful is hardly the same as being different in nature.

I am not alone in seeing the *ba* in this manner. Based on an investigation of the Coffin Texts, Otto insists that the *ba* was the same in a deity as in a human.[85] He admits that the king's *ba* was more powerful than a non-royal human's *ba*, while the *ba* of a deity was the most powerful of all.[86] Nevertheless, the nature of the *ba* was the same regardless of who possessed it.

A number of sources seem to indicate that the nature of the human's *ba* was no different from that of the gods. For example, in his deified postmortem state, Teti – whom the texts call 'Shu who came from Atum' (*šw pri m ỉtmw*, PT 360 §603b) – became '*ba* divine' (*b3ỉ nṯri*, PT 360 §603d). Even though he possessed a *ba* on earth, in the afterlife he became more *ba* than before. Teti did not come to possess a different *type* of *ba*. Rather, he merely became more '*ba*–powerful' than he was on earth. The nature of the *ba* did not change, but it did become more powerful than before. Much like Horus, who was 'so very *ba*' (*b3 ỉr f ḫrw*) in the otherworld that he could accomplish extraordinary feats (PT356 §580a, my trans.), the deified Teti's *ba* became far more powerful than it was on earth. Upon entering the afterlife, Teti's *ba* therefore became much more like that of his divine counterpart (e.g., Edfu VII lines 105.13–15, 127.11–13, 131.6–8).[87] The nature of Teti's *ba* did not change in any way, just as Horus's *ba* remained the same. But like the deity's *ba*, Teti's did undergo an enhancement in power in the otherworld.

[83] Kees, 1926, 58–60.
[84] Lapp, 1997, pls. 38–41, 46–48.
[85] Otto, 1941, 151–60; 1942, 78–91. On which, see Žabkar, 1968, 2–3.
[86] Otto, 1941, 151–60; 1942, 78–91.
[87] Laskowska-Kusztal, 1984, 33–34, fig. 18, pl. 5; de Rochemonteix, 1987.

It seems reasonable to think that the human *ba* enjoyed a share in the divine nature. Certainly, gods' *bas* were more powerful than human *bas*, and the gods' could shine visibly in the sky in a way that humans' did not. Nevertheless, in terms of their nature, *bas* were the same in both types of being.

As a heterotopian space, the body was home to the divine *ba*. Thinking about the cosmos within the conceptual framework of divine embodiment, we see a correspondence between the *ba* and physical spaces it inhabited. In particular, Egyptians saw a link between the human body and the divine image. As Ra's 'double' or 'second' (*snnw*), the human body was the physical space in which the divine manifested itself on earth. It was the embodiment of Ra's *ba* even in its created state.[88]

Within this conceptual framework, we see a link between the way the *ba* 'installed' itself in images and the way it inhabited the body.[89] In the body, the *ba* permeated it from boundary to boundary. According to a number of sources, the *ba* would reside 'in the interior of' (*m-ḫnw*) the physical body. Thus, we read on several occasions: 'your *ba* is in the interior of you' (*b3k m-ḫnwk*, PT 676, 690, 422, 582). While the preposition *m-ḫnw* is sometimes used of the divine embrace (PT 215, 222, 578), in many contexts it carries more spatial force (e.g., BM EA 572; Cairo CG 20539; pBerlin P 3022). For example, in an inscription on the façade of his official tomb, Sarenput I (12th Dynasty) describes himself as the one who 'spends the night in the divine booth (*sḏr m-ḫnw sḫ-nṯr*) on the day of the great festival' (Qubbet el-Hawa 36). Texts likewise describe events taking place 'in the interior of' (*m-ḫnw*) the heavenly world (PT 1049 + 1050).

In cultic contexts, the *ba* could also install itself 'in the interior of' a cult image. Thus PT 419 envisions Isis grabbing Teti and allowing him to enter into a cosmic shrine (e.g., *m-ḫnw mniw*; cf. *m-ḫnw ḥwt-nṯr*, Cairo JE 39755). We even find explicit statements about one being within or inside his or her own body (i.e., coffin). Thus CT 586 reads: 'I am within my body, I am placed within my body' (*i m-ḫnw ḫt i m-ḫnw ḫti*). Upon descending from the divine, the *ba* came to reside 'within' (*m-ḫnw*) the physical body the way a deity would reside 'within' (*m-ḫnw*) an image or the way the deceased body would rest 'within' (*m-ḫnw*) the coffin.[90] Here the correspondence between the body and other physical spaces becomes even clearer. While Egyptians viewed the body as having a latent share in

[88] Žabkar, 1968, 44–45. [89] Cf. Lehmkühler, 2004, 19–52, 287–335.
[90] See Žabkar, 1968, 92–99.

the divine nature by virtue of its origins 'in' the creator gods, their understanding of the divine nature of the human self really becomes evident after looking at their views of the *ba*.[91]

But the *ba* did not just reside inside the body. It was also 'around', 'outside' or 'roundabout' (*ḥ3*) the body, travelling alongside it in the present life and remaining with it in the afterlife (PT 665D; cf. PT 255, 357, 379). It existed 'roundabout' (*ḥ3*) the external bounds of the body (cf. PT 582). This is why gods' *bas* shone brilliantly in the celestial bodies. Their *bas* were not only *in* the moon or stars, but they also *surrounded* them in the form of radiant auras. The human *ba* was not located in a specific place in the body. Even if the *ba* did not shine visibly around the human the same way it did around a deity, this soul-aspect possessed a radiant nature nonetheless.

The ka

The second aspect of the self attached to the body in some manner was the *ka*.[92] Translations of the term *ka* range from 'twin' or 'double' to 'vital force',[93] 'animating force',[94] 'Lebenskraft',[95] 'hyper-physical vital force',[96] 'meta-person'[97] or 'divine aspect of the king'.[98]

Although the *ba* and *ka* differed, the two related to the body in similar ways. In this regard, we might pick up with the *ka* where we left off in our discussion of the *ba*. Like the *ba*, the *ka* could be found 'in/within' (*m*) the body (e.g., PT 346 §561a; pTurin Museo Egizio 1791).[99] However, it could also be found 'around' or 'behind' (*ḥ3*) the body (e.g., PT 273 + 274 §396a; PT 25).

But the *ka* had some autonomy that the *ba* did not have. While the *ka* was part of the self, it was also separable from the physical body. Thus, an individual could enter the afterlife not just with his *ka* inside but also 'with/alongside his *ka*' (*ḥnʿ k3f*, PT 534 §§1275a, 1276a; PT 25). One's *ka* could even do things that the individual did not want to do (PT 489). The separable nature of the *ka* extended even into the afterlife. Once the body died, the *ka* lived on, only no longer in the deceased but in an altogether different physical space.

[91] Žabkar, 1968, 45; cf. Alliot, 1979, 516–18. [92] See recently Nyord, 2019b.
[93] Frankfort, 1978, 78, 189. [94] Gordon and Gordon, 1996, 31–35.
[95] Bonnet, 1970, 357–63. [96] Morenz, 1973, 170. [97] Nyord, 2019b, 163.
[98] Bell, 1985, 251–94. [99] Lepsius, 1969.

The Physical Nature of the ka

The autonomous nature of the *ka* may be tied to its ontological constitution. The *ka* was not as immaterial as the *ba*, but how closely it resembled the material of the body is difficult to know. When thinking of the nature of the *ka*, it is hard to overlook traditions surrounding its origins. In particular, traditions in which Khnum creates the human on his potter's wheel posit a direct correspondence between the *ka* and the body.[100] Not only is he said to have created the *ka* alongside the body, but he used the same material for both.[101] As the body's twin, the *ka* resembled the body physically, to the point that it had its own arms, legs and flesh (PT 25; 268 §372d Bîgeh 19.6).[102]

Like the body, the *ka* also consumed real food and drink. This was true both in the present life and in the next, where it would feed on the 'food' (*k3w*) from offerings left at burial sites.[103] From at least as early as the 5th Dynasty (twenty-fifth–twenty-fourth c. BCE) in Giza, Egyptians would present sacrifices not to the deceased per se but to the *ka* of the deceased (G 2088; cf. G 2240; PT 46).[104] Thus, according to the inscription in Unas's cemetery at Saqqara, bread, beer, cattle and other offerings were to be given 'to your *ka*' (*n k3k*, Opferhalle, Südwand, Szene 40.A.2; cf. DEB 16.2; Opet 199).[105] Thus, Snell insists that it was 'to the *k3* of a person that offerings were supposed to be made after death'.[106] Not only was the *ka* made of the same material as the body, but it could do the same things as well. Albeit invisible, the *ka* enjoyed a material nature akin to, if not equivalent to, that of the physical body.

The Contagious Nature of the ka

The *ka* had certain traits that the body did not have, even if the two were both material in nature. Among the more interesting of these was that, as a type of contagion,[107] it could pass from one person to another through

[100] See Hamilton, 1995, 157; cf. Simkins, 1994, 66–67.
[101] Bolshakov, 1997, 152–54; cf. Schweitzer, 1956, 63.
[102] See Blackman, 1915.
[103] Cf. Thomas, 1920, 265–73.
[104] See Roth, 1995, 88, pl. 31, 152b.
[105] See Moussa and Altenmüller, 1977, 163–67, tbs. 86–87. On DEB 16.2, see Laskowska-Kusztal, 1984, 29–30, figs. 15, 18, pls. 5, 16; on Opet 199, see de Wit, 1958, 182, 199; 1962, tb. 15. Cf. Munro, 1993, 60–62, tb. 13.
[106] Snell, 2011, 65.
[107] On Contagion – also called the Law of Contagion, Contagious Magic or Sympathetic Magic – see Frazer, 1922; Tylor, 1958, 116; Lévy-Bruhl, 1985; Nemeroff and Rozin, 2000; Rozin and Nemeroff, 2002, 206; Mauss, 2005. The *ka* might also be compared to *mana*. On *mana* and 'mana-concept', see e.g., Durkheim, 2001, 140–82; Lindstrom, 1996, 346–47.

physical contact. According to the 'Shabaka Stone', a parent could pass his or her *ka* to a child through the physical act of embrace. As te Velde rightly observes, the *ka* was not 'passed on exclusively by biological inheritance' but instead through physical touch.[108]

This raises an important question about whose *ka* could pass to another person via contact. Was this only true of the pharaoh's *ka*, or was it true also of a regular human's *ka*? Was the pharaoh's *ka* ontologically different than others' *kas*? Scholars such as H. Frankfort, L. Bell and A. Gordon maintain that this characteristic belonged to the *ka* of the royal figure alone.[109] Frankfort insists that the king was dependent upon his father to be his successor. As such, if he wanted to rule successfully, his father had to pass his *ka* through physical embrace. But this does not mean that the regular human's *ka* was somehow different ontologically. It only means that most of the sources are concerned specifically with the pharaoh's *ka*. As Frankfort observes, 'the Ka of the commoner is never pictured; that is an outstanding difference between it and the Ka of the king'.[110] But just because more sources discuss the royal *ka* than the non-royal *ka* does not mean that 'the Ka has never been the object of concrete imaginings as far as the ordinary man is concerned'.[111] Indeed, I find it hard to follow Frankfort on this point.

Egyptians were interested in issues concerning the nature of all things, humans included. They did not think of the nature of the cosmos without thinking about the nature of the self, nor did they think about the self as a whole without also thinking of its constituent parts. In fact, there is evidence that the *ka* was not just part of humans but pervaded the entire cosmos. According to the 'Shabaka Stone', Ptah's *ka* permeated everything in creation, not just humans, and certainly not just the royal figure (line 58). Even though Frankfort is aware of this text, he still maintains that the *ka* was by and large limited to the pharaoh.[112]

The *ka* of the non-royal human was not equal in every way to that of the pharaoh. The royal *ka* was clearly more powerful than the non-royal *ka*. After all, this heightened power, which manifested itself in the might that the pharaoh displayed while in office, was the primary grounds for determining his or her legitimacy.[113] Without the royal *ka*, the pharaoh was not recognised as the god-ordained ruler of the world. It makes sense

[108] te Velde, 1990, 96.
[109] Frankfort, 1978, 77; Bell, 1985, 257–58; Gordon and Gordon, 1996, 33.
[110] Frankfort, 1978, 63. [111] Frankfort, 1978, 63. [112] Frankfort, 1978, 65.
[113] Bell, 1985, 257.

why the sources discuss the pharaoh's *ka* more than those of regular humans. The ruler was of primary concern in such records. Even still, there is no evidence to suggest that the royal *ka* was different *in nature* than the non-royal *ka*. A *ka* was a *ka* regardless of who possessed it.

Because of their *kas*, humans and not just pharaohs had a collective nature. A king would pass on his own *ka* to his son when his son took the throne. In this way, he would not just give him his blessing, but he would embody him through his *ka*. But this was not limited to rulers. Parents could likewise pass on their *kas* to their children, who then shared in the *kas* of their parents, grandparents and earlier ancestors. While each person received his or her own *ka* on Khnum's potter's wheel, there is also a sense that the *ka* was, in part, passed down from one person to the next. This apparent inconsistency seems not to have bothered the Egyptians. When a person would die, he or she literally went to 'be with his or her *ka*', joining those who had died before.[114] Only, in the afterlife, the deceased would live on in a new body – in the case of pharaohs, a body constructed in his or her likeness (e.g., pLeiden T 31, tb. 168 Pleyte).[115]

The Composite Self

Egyptian ideas concerning the nature of the cosmos and the self were rather well developed from an early stage.[116] For Egyptians, anthropology was inseparable from cosmology. The body began as an extension of the physical world, which itself had its origins in the creator gods. By way of this ontological lineage, the human body shared on some level in the divine nature. Within this panentheistic *Weltbild*, Egyptians pictured the human as existing in kinship with the land and the land with the gods embodying it. But it was not only the physical body that enjoyed a share in the divine nature. This bounded space, like the broader space of the cosmos, was itself embodied space. Within it existed two additional parts – the *ba* and the *ka* – themselves having a share in the divine.

It would be exciting to state that the *average* Egyptian went about his or her day thinking of him- or herself as a god or goddess in the flesh. But this was not likely the case. While the sources suggest that the self shared in the divine on multiple levels, Egyptians probably did not think of

[114] Assmann, 2005.

[115] On this text, see Pleyte, 1881. See e.g., Khodzhash and Berlev, 1982, 15–16; Bell, 1985, 259–60, 269–71, 284; Bolshakov, 1997, 153.

[116] Cf. Silverman, 1991, esp. 9–30.

themselves in this way on a daily basis. The situation was likely no different in antiquity than it is today. Even Christians today who believe they are indwelt by the divine Spirit do not actively think about this every waking moment, even if it is a very real part of their worldview. However, like Christians today, Egyptians would have speculated about these matters during certain rituals or when engaged in such conversations. Yet even then, they understood the difference between their share in the divine and the divine nature of the gods and goddesses. They also understood the difference between their own share in the divine and that of the pharaoh, whose divinity we now examine.

THE DIVINITY OF THE PHARAOH

The Pharaoh and the Gods

For the pharaoh in ancient Egypt, divinity took on a whole new significance.[117] Naturally, beliefs about the pharaoh's divine nature underwent shifts over the course of Egypt's long and storied history. However, Snell seems correct that by and large 'from a very early period, kings were gods'.[118] Indeed, D. Silverman notes that the practice of worshipping the deified ruler during his or her lifetime was especially prevalent by the New Kingdom.[119]

Ancient Egyptians understood the pharaoh to be like other humans with his or her own body, *ba* and *ka*. This automatically gave him or her a share in the divine state. However, for most of Egypt's long history, the royal figure was viewed as more than that. He or she was seen as the physical embodiment of Egypt's first god-king, Horus.[120] The pharaoh's link to Horus is evident not least in his three-part 'Horus Name'. This title consisted of a picture of a palace façade – the falcon, symbolic of Horus, standing on top of the palace – and the pharaoh's name inscribed on the palace's frame.[121] Frankfort notes that pharaohs from the 4th and 5th Dynasties went on to refer to themselves as 'the Great God', redeploying an epithet reserved at that time for Horus alone.[122] From an early period,

[117] See Posener, 1960; Brunner, 1964; Hornung, 1982, 135–42; O'Connor and Silverman, 1995. For primary examples, see Sethe, 1909, 17–18. For translation, see Gardiner, 1925, 69; Kitchen, 1982, 174–75; Abitz, 1984.

[118] Snell, 2011, 18.

[119] See Silverman, 1991, 55–56.

[120] See Frankfort, 1978, 39; Ullmann, 2002, 198–207, 235–38.

[121] See e.g., Andreu, Rutschowscaya and Ziegler, 1997, 43. Cf. Smith, 1990, 317.

[122] Frankfort, 1978, 39. These pharaohs include Snefru, Khufu (Cheops) and Sahure and Pepi I.

the pharaoh therefore sought to establish himself as Horus 'incarnate', to use Frankfort's turn of phrase.[123]

The pharaoh's divine nature had partly to do with the elevated power of his *ka*. While all humans possessed a *ka* that had an intrinsic share in the divine state, that of the pharaoh was sometimes depicted as a living deity. As Gordon and Gordon observe, PT 136–37 and PT 582 identify the pharaoh's *ka* not only with Horus, as we might expect, but also with Ra.[124] Frankfort likewise notes that, upon entering the afterlife, the pharaoh would meet his Ra-*ka*, who would call him across the lake separating him from life on earth and eternal bliss (PT 561–62).[125] While on earth, the pharaoh enjoyed a share in the divine existence that transcended that of non-royal humans. His body was apparently the same as others, and like all humans, physical death was inevitable for the pharaoh as well. But unlike other humans, the pharaoh's *ka* possessed godlike power equal to that of the true gods of Egypt. The pharaoh's share in the divine state was not static, either. Rather, he or she sought to become *more divine*, as it were, upon initiation and through various rituals during his or her reign.[126] And, of course, there were a small number of pharaohs who believed they existed in an even higher divine state than all others, one of whom may offer further insight into ancient Egyptian conceptions of the divinity of the human self. I mean, of course, Ramesses II.

Ramesses II

Few pharaohs are better known to students of the Bible than Ramesses II (ca. 1303–1213 BCE), the third pharaoh of the 19th Dynasty.[127] Ramesses II is important for our study. As Egypt's most (in)famous megalomaniac, he serves as a case study in extremes. Like other pharaohs, he viewed himself as a living embodiment of the divine on earth. However, he appears to have understood his own share in the divine state as so great that he believed he was equal or even superior to the great gods of Egypt.[128]

[123] Frankfort, 1978, 189. For a standard treatment of deification in ancient Egypt, see Wildung, 1977.
[124] Gordon and Gordon, 1996, 33. [125] Frankfort, 1978, 76–77.
[126] Kees, 1912, 123. [127] For Ramesside texts, see Kitchen, 1978; 1979.
[128] On Ramesses II's divine self-conception, see esp. Roeder, 1926; Habachi, 1969; Wildung, 1972; Silverman, 1991.

Ramesses II's Worship of Seti I

It is hard not to see the connection between Ramesses II's elevated self-conception and the way he viewed his father, Seti I. Presumably, Ramesses II believed he had received his share in the divine state – his allotment of the divine royal *ka* – from his father.[129] On the southern half of a temple in Abydos, we read a dedication from Ramesses II to his father:

> What I have done for you is truly extraordinary. Hail you as the repeater of life. I brought you into existence. I built your beloved *temple* (*ḥwt*) – with your *statue* (*sšmw*) in it – in the sacred land of Abydos, the nome of eternity. I gave gods' offerings (*ḥtp-nṯr*) to your *likeness(es)* (*snn*). With *enduring (sacrifices)* being presented to you (*imnyt ḥr m3ʿnk*, 'Great Dedicatory Inscription of Ramesses II at Abydos', my trans.).[130]

Granted, Ramesses II's dedication to his father was not entirely without a bit of his own self-aggrandisement. Throughout his praise of his father, Ramesses II did not allow him to forget who was responsible for his new sacred home.

Beyond this, two items help us understand how Ramesses II viewed both himself and statues. The first item is that Ramesses II considered his father worthy of the 'gods' offerings' (*ḥtp-nṯr*). As their name indicates, these offerings belonged to gods alone. These were brought to the great god Ra (pBerlin P 15723 [recto]; pCairo 602 frame 11),[131] they were presented to many other gods (PT 599), and they were also offered to deified kings in the afterlife (PT 424; cf. PT 223). Such offerings consisted of different foods, drinks, animals and other goods (pCairo 58063 frame 1 [recto]). What they all had in common was that they served to appease the gods, hence: 'The god has been presented[132] with the *gods' sacrifice*' (*ḥtm nṯr m ḥtp-nṯr*, PT 223, my trans.; cf. PT 199). It is no surprise to find a reference both to 'god' (*nṯr*) and the 'gods' sacrifice' (*ḥtp-nṯr*). It would be difficult to think that, in offering such sacrifices to his father, Ramesses II was ignorant of what he was doing and what he was saying about the one (i.e., Seti I) to whom he was doing it (i.e., offering gods' sacrifices).

Ramesses II also offered 'enduring sacrifices' (*imnyt*) to his father. The term *ḥtp-nṯr* explicitly refers to the daily offerings presented, again, to the

[129] Cf. Bell, 1985, 259.

[130] On this inscription, see esp. Maderna-Seven, 2003, 237–82; Spalinger, 2009, 69–70. And see Mariette, 1869, pls. 5–9.

[131] See Posener-Kriéger and de Cenival, 1968, pls. 33–35 and 82, respectively.

[132] Cf. with 'has had his/her thirst quenched'.

gods (e.g., Cairo CG 20543: 'Stele des Rediuikhnum'). We find a reference to this type of offering in the Cemetery of Teti at Saqqara (Mastaba of Ankh-mahor, Room 4, South face), which refers to the enduring sacrifices (*ỉmnyt*) that devotees brought to the gods.[133] The same meaning can also be seen in the Amarna Period (ca. fourteenth–thirteenth c. BCE) text from Altar A at Karnak, which records the dedication of enduring sacrifices (*ỉmnyt*) to Aten, listing even the nature of the foods the deity received.[134]

Ramesses II understood what he was doing in offering *ḥtp-nṯr* and *ỉmnyt* to Seti I. He also understood what his actions communicated to others. He offered to his father the same ritual sacrifices that Egyptians had been offering to their gods and to deified kings in the afterlife for many centuries. In so doing, he was declaring his father to be divine.

There is a second important item in this account worth considering. Ramesses II knew that when he presented sacrifices to his father, his father was not actually present in person, in human form. However, while he was not there in human form, he was present in a different form. In offering sacrifices to the 'statue' (*sšmw*), Ramesses II was offering sacrifices to none other than Seti I, whom he knew to be present in the statue the way gods were present in their own. He could speak to his father about the way he had built a temple to house a statue (*sšmw*) and multiple 'likenesses' (*snn*) of him and in the same breath tell his father that 'I am' presenting sacrifices 'to you' (*nk*).

Ramesses II believed that as pharaoh, his father shared in the fluid nature of the gods.[135] This enabled him to inhabit a cult image the same way another deity inhabits his or her image. Why else would he offer sacrifices in the temple, to a statue? Certainly, he could have been offering the sacrifices *on behalf of* his father. However, this would not explain why he presented them to the statue (*sšmw*) and likenesses (*snn*) of his father and not of a deity. Furthermore, if this was what he was doing, then why did he not just say so?

As participants in the divine on a level beyond regular humans, rulers enjoyed the ontological fluidity otherwise available to the gods alone. Just as the gods installed themselves in multiple bodies (i.e., 'images'), the

[133] See e.g., Badawy, 1978, 11–57, figs. 16–64, pls. 20–90; Kanawati and Hassan, 1997, 47 pl. 51.

[134] See Murnane, 1995, 99.

[135] See the discussion on this phenomenon in Mesopotamia in Winter, 1992; Herring, 2008, 486–87.

pharaohs could do the same. For this reason, when Ramesses II offered sacrifices to his father's statue (*sšmw*) and likenesses (*snn*), he believed he was offering them to the man himself (i.e., 'to you', *nk*), whom he knew to be present in those physical bodies in real time and space.

Ramesses II's Divine Self-Conception

Ramesses II carried his own divine self-conception to a whole new level. We gain insight into his self-conception from a number of items. For example, Stele 410 in the Hildesheim Museum designates Ramesses II: 'King of Upper and Lower Egypt, the Lord of the Two Lands, Ramesses-Meryamun, the God'.[136] Ramesses II not only declared himself king or god-ordained ruler. Instead, he actually declared himself to be none other than '*the* God'.[137] He did not appear to see himself as merely a divine human. Rather than being a human who believed he shared in the divine state, Ramesses II viewed himself as a deity, as it were, sharing in the human condition. He saw himself as enjoying a whole new category of existence: a god-king of the highest order, who lived, breathed and ruled on earth the way Ra does in heaven.[138]

Ramesses II was not the first to make this claim. Pharaoh Sneferu of the 4th Dynasty (ca. 2600 BCE) declared himself in a graffito to be the 'great god' (*nṯr ʿ3*).[139] While Ramesses II was not the first to see himself in this manner, he was one of the few to state it publicly and with such magnitude. Through such claims and architectural aspirations, he made his self-conception known throughout the land in a way that few pharaohs had done before and few have done since.[140]

The Great Temple at Abu Simbel provides further evidence of the way he saw himself. Beyond the atrium along the back wall of the inner sanctuary we find a statue of Ramesses II seated alongside Ra, Amen and Ptah. Notably, Ramesses II's statue is equivalent in size and detail to the adjacent gods. These statues are not colossi like those at the façade of the same temple. But their meaning seems rather clear: Ramesses II saw himself as worthy of a seat alongside the greatest gods in heaven. Subservient to no one, he placed himself equal in size, contented, gazing forward at the world, alongside these otherwise transcendent gods.

[136] Roeder, 1926, 59, 60, 63. [137] Cf. Silverman, 1995, 87, and see his references.
[138] On which, see esp. Baines, 1983; 2013, 21–22; Lorton, 1999, 128; Shalomi-Hen, 2006, 46–52.
[139] Gardiner and Peet, 1952, pls. ii–iii.
[140] With the possible exception of Amenhotep III.

Elsewhere in this temple and elsewhere at Abu Simbel, Ramesses II actually commissioned reliefs of *himself worshipping himself*.[141] One relief portrays Ramesses II twice. Here one Ramesses II is seated on his throne, with horns of divinity on his head and the divine sun disk hovering above.[142] The other Ramesses II stands and presents offerings to the seated Ramesses II. On a basic level, the relief appears to depict Ramesses II as both king (standing) and god (seated). However, there seems to be more going on here than this. Seeing how we find both the royal and divine representations of Ramesses II, I am inclined to think that this relief points to the king's understanding of divine fluidity. He understood that gods could inhabit multiple bodies simultaneously without losing their singularity. Knowing this, he chose to depict himself as enjoying the same fluid ontology as other gods. Like them, he too could inhabit two bodies at once, just as he did in this relief.

It is not entirely clear if all pharaohs understood their ontological constitution and/or the function of their images in this way. Certainly, most agreed that after death, their *kas* would return to the world to dwell in images and statues bearing their likenesses. Ramesses II clearly believed this about his father, Seti I. Such images would then have been viewed not merely as 'symbolic representations' but as 'embodied doubles' of the deceased, deified kings they represented. There is no question that upon entry into the afterlife, the pharaoh came to enjoy a fluid nature that enabled him or her to reside both there (in the afterlife) and here (in images on earth) simultaneously.

But did pharaohs believe they could reside in multiple bodies at once while still alive? Or were their images and statues simply 'symbolic representations' meant to communicate something else to onlookers? Perhaps they intended them as propaganda. The physical representations told onlookers that, although somewhere else in the empire, the pharaoh was nevertheless still in charge here. Or perhaps they were less political and more honorific in nature. They were intended less to ward off those who might think of rebelling or breaking the law and more to demonstrate the pharaoh's patronage over all of the empire.

In many cases, both of these meanings were likely *part* of the reason behind the pharaoh's image. This was especially likely in statues situated in public places. The colossi of Ramesses II situated at the façade of his great temple at Abu Simbel would certainly have demanded fear and

[141] See Kitchen, 1982, 177; te Velde, 1982, 136; Keidorn, 1999, 87–90.
[142] Habachi, 1969, pl. IIa.

honour of passers-by. The four colossi tower at 20 metres tall and depict Ramesses II wearing the double-crown of Upper and Lower Egypt.[143] Their size would have declared to onlookers just who was in charge and to whom it was in their best interest to remain loyal.

However, as C. Price observes, a propagandistic interpretation of the pharaoh's image only makes sense of public icons.[144] But as we have seen, Ramesses II established images of himself in locations that were only accessible to royalty and priests. Moreover, there is no reason to think that the public images functioned any differently than his private ones. The sources never make this distinction. We thus have no real reason to think that he did not inhabit the colossi at Abu Simbel in the same way that he inhabited the private images inside the temple.

Price suggests that the reason Ramesses II situated these colossi in a public space instead of in a private sanctuary had less to do with a difference in meaning or function and more to do with their sheer size.[145] At 20 metres tall, the four colossi were simply too big to fit inside private worship spaces, so they were instead placed outside.[146] In this sense, the colossi could still serve as cult objects and thus 'embodied doubles' as well as propaganda. However, they made the divine presence inside them available to a much larger audience than those inside the temple.[147] As Price explains:

> While there is no firm evidence for the 'official', state-sponsored inception of the cult of the colossi, as has been suggested by some, it is possible that the popular worship of such statues may have been inspired simply by their visibility and/or accessibility.[148]

This seems to align with what we know about Ramesses II. He was not only interested in establishing himself as a deity among the elite or the priesthood. Rather, he also wanted to make sure *everyone* knew just who – and *what* – he was: the god-king above all god-kings. He knew he was a living god, which is indicative even in the way he wrote his name on the statues. As L. Habachi observes, he encircled his name in a cartouche, thereby associating himself with the true gods.[149] More than just any god-king, Ramesses II thought of himself as greater than all others.

One way to demonstrate his transcendence was to show the people visibly just how great he was. In this regard, one might say that size

[143] Kleiner and Gardner, 2017, 53–54. [144] Price, 2007, 407; cf. 2008, 113–21.
[145] Price, 2007, 407. [146] Price, 2007, 407. [147] Price, 2007, 407.
[148] Price, 2007, 407. [149] Habachi, 1969, 48; cf. Price, 2007, 405n29; cf. Kitchen, 1987.

mattered to Ramesses II. It is true that a great many Egyptian statues and shrines were small in size – often less than a metre in height.[150] However, for such pharaohs as Ramesses II (and Amenhotep III before him), size seems to have been a major concern. In addition to depicting himself *equal* in size to the Egyptian gods, he also constructed enormous colossi of himself.

In addition to the size of Ramesses II's images, the number four seems to have been significant. In three notable locations – at the façade of his great temple, in the sanctuary of this same temple and again at the façade of the nearby temple of Nefertari to Hathor – representations of Ramesses II are found in fours. Perhaps he thought that the greater the size of the cult image, the more of his presence would be available therein. Or perhaps he believed that his divine presence was so potent that it demanded not one colossus but *four*. We cannot know for sure, but either of these interpretations seems reasonable.

Further still, the placement of these images *at* but not *within* the temple space was important for another reason. Following D. Wildung, Price observes that these colossi were situated at what has been conceived as 'the boundary of the sacred and the profane'.[151] D. Ragavan has demonstrated the same function of gates in Sumerian culture.[152] Gates marked a boundary, a *limen*, between profane and sacred space. While her focus is on Sumerian thought, her analyses make sense of Ramesside locations in particular. Ramesses II understood the importance of placing colossi at the façade of his temples. When visitors beheld these monuments, they knew they were about to enter divine space. The four colossi were not just reminders of the pharaoh's power or of a god who was absent. Rather, they were the god-king himself, keeping watch over all who entered his precincts in real time and real space. They were not representations of a god-king who was *there* but of one who was very much *here*.

The Pharaoh As the Embodied Deity

Based on what we have found in this chapter, it seems evident that the twin notions of divine fluidity and divine embodiment were pervasive in

[150] See e.g., Dunham, 1929, 164–66; Moorey, 2003. But see also Gabra, 1981.
[151] Price, 2007, 407, quoting Wildung, 1977, 13.
[152] Cf. Ragavan, 2013, for analysis of gates in Sumerian culture. Cf. van Gennep, 1909; Turner, 2008; Putthoff, 2017, 86–87.

ancient Egyptian thought.[153] Here we find that, as B. Sommer insists, 'a deity can produce many small-scale manifestations that enjoy some degree of independence without becoming separate gods'.[154] In some cases, this aspect of the divine ontology was available not only to true gods but to royal figures as well.[155]

Like most Egyptians, Ramesses II believed that gods had a fluid nature. The divine nature was such that gods could install themselves within multiple bodies whilst always retaining their singular identities. If Ramesses II could speak of himself not merely as a divine human but as a true god, then it makes sense that he also believed that he enjoyed a fluid ontology as well.

Therefore, he believed that he could install himself in and expand his divine presence throughout the empire. He could make himself available to priests and elites with access to his smaller representations in the inner sanctuaries. And he could make himself available to onlookers and worshippers who did not have access to those inner precincts. Either way, all could access his presence and worship him the way he deserved. Whether small or large, private or public, Ramesses II's statues were 'conduits' of his divine presence, embodiments of his royal *ka*.[156] Likewise, whether here at Abu Simbel or at his Luxor temple, his colossi embodied his royal *ka*.[157] Like the gods, pharaohs like Ramesses II believed they could also 'exist simultaneously in several bodies' and thereby expand their presence throughout the earth.[158]

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Divine fluidity and divine embodiment were important for ancient Egyptian conceptions of the self. On the one hand, Egyptians believed that the human in its natural state possessed some aspect of the divine. While humans shared in some aspect of the divine nature, this did not make them equal to the gods, so they could not do what gods or pharaohs could do. Nevertheless, the human self was truly embodied space, participating in the divine from its outer boundaries (body) to its inner parts (*ba* and *ka*).

On the other hand, pharaohs had such a share of the divine state that they were much closer in nature to the gods. In particular, like the gods,

[153] Sommer, 2009. Cf. Kamionkowski, 2010, 1–10. [154] Sommer, 2009, 38.
[155] Assmann, 2001, 40–47. [156] Bell, 1985; Price, 2007, 406; cf. Kitchen, 1982, 175.
[157] Bell, 1985, 259. [158] Sommer, 2009, 12.

the pharaohs could inhabit both their natural physical bodies and other spaces bearing their images simultaneously. The ontology of the pharaonic self was fluid and powerful just like that of the gods. The pharaoh thus became a meeting point between the existence of *true* gods and *regular* humans. In the case of Ramesses II, this seems to have taken on a whole new meaning, even compared to the self-conception of other pharaohs. He thought that as pharaoh and god-king par excellence, he *was* divine, as it were. He had such an extreme share in the divine state that he thought of himself as no longer human but as a true god.

3

Composite Beings and Sexy God-Kings

The Divinity of Humanity in Ancient Mesopotamia

PREFATORY REMARKS

The Present Chapter

Considered a cradle of civilisation, Mesopotamia is perhaps the most expansive and influential region of our study.[1] At different points in history, empires from this 'Land between two rivers' stretched beyond Iraq well into Iran on the east, Israel to the southwest and Turkey to the northwest. As the home of the Sumerians, Akkadians, Assyrians and Babylonians, Mesopotamia left an indelible mark on virtually every aspect of the ancient near eastern world.

Key biblical figures and events have ties to Mesopotamia. Abraham came from Ur around the start of the second mill. BCE (Gen 11.27–32; 12.1–3). Isaac and Jacob married women from this region (Gen 24.10, 15; 28.2–7; 35.26; 46.15). In the eighth c. BCE, the neo-Assyrians conquered the northern kingdom of Israel (2 Kgs 15.29; 18.9–12; 19.17). Less than 200 years later, the neo-Babylonians would conquer the southern kingdom of Judah, destroying the Jerusalem Temple in the process (2 Kgs 24.1–16; Jer 52.1–30). But Mesopotamia's influence on the biblical peoples did not end with a series of historical events. Rather, the Mesopotamians had a tremendous impact on the Israelites and Judahites, such that many of the foundational biblical myths have clear parallels in Mesopotamian sources.

[1] For more on Mesopotamia, see e.g., Diakonoff, 1969; Dalley, 1989; 1998; Foster, 1995; Pollack, 1999; van de Mieroop, 1999; Bottéro, Finet, Roux and Lafont, 2001; Bertman, 2003; Stiebing, Jr., 2016.

In recent decades, scholars have moved us closer to understanding ancient Mesopotamian anthropologies. For example, B. Foster provides a useful entrée into ancient Mesopotamian conceptions of the self.[2] Foster takes issue with scholars who argue that Mesopotamians did not have a conception of the 'person' but conceived of the human from a 'primitive' or 'savage' view of the world. According to this scholarly stance, Mesopotamians lacked the 'sense of individuality' that we find among the Greeks (and Europeans).[3] By consequence, they only understood the person as one of many 'parts[s] of society, and society as imbedded in nature and dependent upon cosmic forces'.[4] This scholarly camp further insists that, even if the ancients did have some conception of the self, it would have been 'socially, spiritually, intellectually, and morally different from, and even antithetical to, the Classical ideal so long emulated by educated Europeans'.[5]

However, Foster maintains that Mesopotamians actually did hold formal ideas about the individual 'person'.[6] While they believed the self to consist of multiple parts, Foster insists that they viewed the body as the 'essential person'.[7] For this reason he refers to the other, non-bodily parts as 'disembodied human spirits' and 'detached phenomena rarely encountered', which he contends were seemingly less important in Mesopotamian anthropology than the body.[8]

Foster's insights are helpful on many levels. However, other works give us reason to think that Mesopotamians held these non-bodily aspects of the self in higher regard than Foster seems to suggest. In fact, some scholars insist that Mesopotamians believed these aspects of the self gave humans a share in the divine nature. According to L. Oppenheim, Mesopotamians thought of the human as a combination of divine and nondivine elements.[9] In particular, T. Abusch identifies the *eṭemmu* ('soul', 'ghost') and *zaqīqu* ('ghost', 'phantom') as having a share in the divine state.[10] When these parts joined the body, Abusch states, 'Divine and human are thus joined up in what we call the human being'.[11] U. Steinert likewise sees the human as consisting of body parts (e.g., *pagru, zumru*: 'Körper', 'Leib'; *šīru*, 'Fleisch')[12] and soul parts (e.g., *eṭemmu*: '(Toten)geist'; *zaqīqu*, 'Traumseele'),[13] which Mesopotamians

[2] See Foster, 2011. [3] Foster, 2011, 117.
[4] Frankfort and Frankfort, 1949, 12, quoted by Foster, 2011, 117.
[5] Foster, 2011, 117. [6] See Foster, 2011. [7] Foster, 2011, 120.
[8] Foster, 2011, 120. [9] Oppenheim, 1964, 199–200. [10] Abusch, 1998.
[11] Abusch, 1998, 370; cf. Asher-Greve, 1997; Bauks, 2016. [12] Steinert, 2012, 231–57.
[13] Steinert, 2012, 295–384.

believed formed the human self.[14] G. Selz adds that at different points in history, this 'composite' understanding of human nature motivated Mesopotamian ideas of royal deification.[15] As he explains, 'because a human's identity is of composite nature, it is easy to see that under certain circumstances humans could be transferred to the class of gods'.[16] To understand the king as a 'divine figure', though on an even higher level than other humans, then 'becomes almost unavoidable'.[17]

In this chapter, I shall offer fresh ways of conceptualising the human self in ancient Mesopotamian anthropology. Building on the work of others, I seek to understand the potentially divine nature of the self in its natural condition. Here, as in Chapter 2, I approach the self as a type of space and thereby explore the relationship between the various components comprising the human being. I do not have time to discuss all aspects of the self but only those that help us better understand the ontological aspects of human nature – or of the relationship between the self and the divine state in the present life.

The Sources

The sources under investigation in this chapter come to us in the form of writing called 'cuneiform' (Lat.: *cuneus*, 'wedge') – the name given to it because of its wedge-shaped script. By and large, I devote my attention to Sumerian and Akkadian sources. In addition to the many valuable primary texts cited in the footnotes, I am indebted to such electronic resources as the *Cuneiform Digital Library Initiative* (CDLI),[18] *The Open Richly Annotated Cuneiform Corpus* (ORACC),[19] *The Electronic Pennsylvania Sumerian Dictionary* (ePSD),[20] *Die Keilschrift-Bibliographie im Netz* (KeiBi)[21] and *The Electronic Text Corpus of Sumerian Literature* (ETCSL).[22]

HUMAN CREATION IN MESOPOTAMIAN COSMOGONY

The Human Self in Mesopotamian Origins

As in Chapter 2, here too it seems wise first to take a close look at ancient Mesopotamian cosmogonies and anthropogenies. A number of origin

[14] Steinert, 2012. [15] Selz, 2003. [16] Selz, 2008, 25. [17] Selz, 2008, 25.
[18] See https://cdli.ucla.edu. [19] See http://oracc.museum.upenn.edu/index.html.
[20] See http://oracc.museum.upenn.edu/epsd2.
[21] See http://vergil.uni-tuebingen.de/keibi. [22] See http://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk.

myths circulated amongst the earliest Mesopotamians. In his seminal work on Mesopotamia, J. van Dijk offers something of a typology of the different cosmogonies, theogonies and anthropogenies.[23] In the 'cosmic motif' (*le motif cosmique*) that likely originated in Uruk, the cosmos is the result of the sexual relations between an ('heaven') and ki ('earth'). From this primordial union, the entire creation was brought into existence: first the subsequent gods, then the cosmos and finally humankind.

Van Dijk distinguishes between two types of Mesopotamian anthropogenies. *Emersio* anthropogenies assert that the god an brought humanity into existence by fertilising ki through sexual intercourse. *Formatio* anthropogenies assert that the creator deity first formed the human body from the earth and then gave it life. M. Luginbühl insists that the *formatio* type of anthropogenies can be divided into an entirely new category that she calls *sacrificatio*.[24] This type asserts that humans were the result of the violent sacrifice of a deity, who was the substance(s) from which they emerged.[25] However, J. Lisman maintains that, *sacrificatio* is better understood as a subdivision of the *emersio* type than the *formatio* type.[26]

Such classifications are indeed useful. However, we need to bear in mind that ancient Mesopotamian creation accounts overlap in many ways. In some we can detect elements from some or all of these categories. Furthermore, a general schema pervades the myths regardless of their classification.[27] The schema is as follows: (1) In a primordial time, the gods decided to create the cosmos. (2) They would proceed to create subsequent gods and populate the celestial world. (3) They would then also create (a) the cosmos and (b) humankind.

It seems more beneficial to focus on the sequential nature of ancient Mesopotamian anthropogeny. This sequence indicates something about the relationship between the human and the cosmos. G. Pettinato seems correct that there was a connection between the nature of creation and the nature of the self.[28] It is not clear what this connection might be. However, it seems reasonable to think that like the Egyptians, Mesopotamians saw an ontological kinship between the self and that from which it emerged. Hence the significance of the sequential nature of Mesopotamian creation

[23] van Dijk, 1964. [24] Luginbühl, 1992, 30–31. [25] Luginbühl, 1992, 30–31.
[26] Lisman, 2013, 9–22.
[27] See also Pettinato, 1971; Dietrich, 1984; Lisman, 2013; George, 2016, 7–25, 132–33, 140.
[28] Pettinato, 1971, 29–35.

accounts. With these preliminary claims in hand, I turn now to two important sources: *Enuma Eliš* and the myth of Atraḫasīs.

The Human Self in Enuma Eliš

Perhaps the most famous Mesopotamian creation account is the so-called *Enuma Eliš*.[29] This myth was pervasive in Mesopotamian lore for many centuries. Not only does it offer insights into the nature of the cosmos but it also addresses matters related to human nature.

Overview of Enuma Eliš

The title of *Enuma Eliš* derives from the myth's opening line, *e-nu-ma e-liš* ('when on high'). Because *Enuma Eliš* is explicitly concerned with the origins of the cosmos, scholars consider it a proper *creation myth*.[30] First discovered in the mid-1800s in Ashurbanipal's library at Nineveh, the Akkadian work survives on seven tablets, each containing between 100 and 175 lines. Aside from Tablet 5, the majority of the myth has survived. While the myth survives in Ashurbanipal's tablets from the seventh c. BCE, it contains traditions that date to the early second mill. BCE. It is plausible to think that the myth both gave shape to and, in turn, was shaped by the beliefs of a wide number of Mesopotamians in the second–first mill. BCE.[31]

The myth begins in primordial times, before heaven and earth became separate states or spheres of being (tb. 1). At that time, Apsu (fresh water) and Tiamat (salt water) existed as a single entity. From these two gods, subsequent gods and the rest of creation would eventually emerge.

Already in the opening lines, we gain insight into the initial days of the cosmos' existence. As in Egyptian cosmogonies, the primordial gods and subsequent makings of the cosmos actually came *from* those gods. Thus, after Apsu and Tiamat 'had mingled their waters together' (*mē*^{meš}*-šú-nu iš-te-niš i-ḫi-au-ú-ma*, 1.5), subsequent gods began to emerge.[32] In a combination of both *formatio* and *emersio* motifs, the myth asserts quite plainly, 'the gods were created within them' (*ib-ba-nu-ú-ma ilāni*

[29] Text of *Enuma Eliš* is from Talon, 2005; trans. Lambert, 2013; cf. 2007, 15–60. See also King, 1902; Deimel, 1934; Speiser, 1969, 60–72; .

[30] See Talon, 2005, ix–xi; Speiser, 1969, 60.

[31] As Lambert (2013, 6–9) has shown, quotations of, allusions to and references to *Enūma Eliš* can be found in a number of ancient sources from various locations throughout Mesopotamia.

[32] Lambert, 2013, 50–51.

qí-rib-šú-un, 1.9), after which Tiamat 'gave birth to them all' (*mu-al-li-da-at gim-ri-šú-un*, 1.4).[33] Soon after this, the rest of the gods would come into being (1.10–20; 5.73).

According to *Enuma Eliš*, paradise did not last long. Not long after their creation, the new gods began to disturb Tiamat, and Apsu had no way to calm them down. Against the desires of Tiamat, Apsu and Mummu decided that the best solution to this problem would be to destroy the insufferable gods. Upon hearing about their plan, Ea bound Mummu and killed Apsu. Having done nothing to help Apsu, Tiamat would experience harsh criticism from the others. Eventually, she decided to team up with Kingu to engage in battle against those who criticised her.

There is no mention of humanity's creation just yet. However, the ground is laid for their emergence. From line 21 on, the narrative moves quickly from the birth of the pantheon to the creation of humanity.

Tablets 2–5 describe the moments before the battle between Marduk and Tiamat, the battle itself and the aftermath. While some scholars regard this portion as separable from a true 'creation myth', I am not convinced that this is the case.[34] Thus, A. Kragerud insists that the material in 1.108–4.134 describing 'the pantheon and the struggle of Marduk against Tiamat' seems 'out of proportion with the function of the myth as a cosmogony in the usual sense'.[35] Because this battle and its aftermath take up so much space, Kragerud argues that 'kingship', not creation, is the primary point of the myth.[36]

The implications of this are important. If cosmogony is not the myth's primary concern, then neither is anthropogeny. If kingship is the central theme, then the anthropogeny likely has to do with the royal figure alone, not regular humans.

However, kingship and creation are not mutually exclusive. Nor is anthropogeny a secondary concern. In the Ancient Near East, kingship and creation often went hand in hand. R. Clifford insists that the divine battle is common in ancient accounts of human origins.[37] T. Jacobsen argues that the battle between Marduk and Tiamat is 'central' to the cosmogony of *Enuma Eliš*.[38] C. Crouch likewise asserts that these joint motifs play a critical role in this work.[39] P. Steinkeller demonstrates that theomachy – the motif of slaughtering a god – is pervasive in other Semitic cosmogonies, including Atraḫasīs and KAR 4.[40] We therefore need not

[33] Lambert, 2013, 50–51. [34] Kragerud, 1972, 39–49. [35] Kragerud, 1972, 39.
[36] Kragerud, 1972, 40–42. [37] Clifford, 1984. [38] Jacobsen, 1968, 107.
[39] Crouch, 2013. [40] Steinkeller, 1992, 245; cf. Lisman, 2013, 23–75.

make too sharp a distinction between kingship and human origins in this important work.

With some of the gods behind Marduk and some behind Tiamat, the two would eventually come to blows. After Marduk's defeat of Tiamat and her army, humans become the myth's central concern. This theme comes into focus in Tablet 4. According to this tablet, Marduk would take the next step in bringing humans into existence by violently bashing his slain adversary's head:

> 129 *ik-bu-us-ma be-lum šá ti-a-ma-tum i-šid-sa*
> 130 *i-na mi-ṭi-šu la pa-di-i ú-lat-ti muḫ-ḫa*
>
> 129 Bēl [=Marduk] placed his feet on the lower parts of Tiāmat
> 130 And with his merciless club smashed her skull.
> (4.129–30, text/trans. Lambert, 2013, 92–93)

He would proceed to slice her body into two parts, using half of it to create the heavens and the other to create the cosmos (4.135–5.158). Tablet 4 proceeds as follows:

> 135 *i-nu-úḫ-ma be-lum šá-lam-taš i-bar-ri*
> 136 ^{uzu}*ku-bu ú-za-a-zu i-ban-na-a nik-la-a-ti*
> 137 *iḫ-pi-ši-ma ki-ma nu-un maš-ṭe-e a-na ši-ni-šu*
> 138 *mi-iš-lu-uš-ša iš-ku-nam-ma šá-ma-mi uṣ-ṣal-lil*
> 139 *iš-du-ud maš-ka ma-aṣ-ṣa-ra ú-šá-aṣ-bit*
> 140 *me-e-ša la šu-ṣa-a šu-nu-ti um-ta-ʾ-ir*
>
> 135 Bēl rested, surveying the corpse,
> 136 In order to divide the lump by a clever scheme
> 137 He split her into two like a dried fish:
> 138 One half of her he set up and stretched out as the heavens
> 139 He stretched the skin and appointed a watch
> 140 With the instruction not to let her waters escape.
> (text/trans. Lambert, 2013, 94–95)

The connection between kingship and creation becomes evident here in Tablet 4. Theomachy links the two motifs together. In fact, Tiamat's violent death and dismemberment would lead to the birth of the cosmos. The cosmos did not originate apart from the creator gods. It instead came *out of* Tiamat's slain body. The question is, if it came from her, did the cosmos also share in her divine nature?

One could take these remarks entirely metaphorically. The myth might simply be promoting the superiority of Bel/Marduk as king and creator and Babylon as the divinely established empire. If so, the slain deity's role in the cosmos' creation was simply intended to demonstrate Marduk's supremacy.

However, this explanation fails to make sense of how specific the links are between the slain goddess's body and the elements of the universe. Marduk used Tiamat's body to create the cosmos. He used 'half of her' body to fashion the 'heavens' (4.138) and 'half of her' to make 'as firm as the earth' (5.62); her 'skin' to form the earth (4.139), ensuring that her 'waters' be put to use in due time (4.139); her 'foam' to make the clouds and the thunderstorms (5.47–50); her 'spittle' to fill the abyss with water (5.51–54); her 'two eyes' to form the Euphrates and Tigris (5.55); her 'breasts' to form the mountains (5.57), boring wells into her to channel the springs (5.58); her 'crotch' to wedge up the heavens (5.61); her 'tail' to be the cosmic wire which would keep the stars on course (5.59).[41]

Marduk is without question the chief deity (e.g., 5.79, 88, 93–94, 124, 154). But he is also divine creator, an aspect that becomes abundantly clear in Tablet 7. Here Marduk is explicitly called:

89 ^{d}*giš-numun-áb ba-nu-ú nap-ḫar niši* ^{meš} *e-pi-šú kib-ra-a-*[*ti*]
90 *a-bit ilāni* ^{meš} *šá ti-amat e-piš niši* ^{meš} *ina mim-mi-šú-un*

89 Gišnumunab, creator (*banú*) of all the peoples, who made (*ēpiš*) the world regions,
90 Who destroyed Tiāmat's gods, and made (*ēpiš*) peoples from part of them.

There is no question that the myth is as concerned with Marduk as the 'creator' (*bānû*, 7.89)[42] who 'made' (*ēpiš* [or *ēpeš*], 7.90) humanity as it is with his kingship.[43] There is also no impetus for separating the motif of kingship from that of creation. Clearly, as lines 89–90 make explicit, the two go hand in hand.

The terms used here are intriguing. While *bānû* indicates *that* Marduk created humanity, *ēpiš* indicates *how* he carried this out. Like a builder or craftsman (*ēpiš*), Marduk carefully and magically gave the human its unique form.[44] He placed the primordial substances into a 'mould' (*iptiqu*, STT 1, 014a, obv. 2, CDLI P338331) like an inspired artisan casting an image. As a magical craftsman, he combined these sacred materials, and from them he fashioned (*ēpiš*) the human creature.

[41] See the helpful discussion of these elements in Geyer, 1987; George, 1992, 257, 274, 333. The topography of this portion of the myth would appear to correspond to that of Mesopotamia.

[42] Lambert, 2013, 380–81, 469; cf.; Rogers, 1926, 44–46; Lambert, 1998, 189–93; Ambos, 2004, 180–85, 210–11.

[43] Sparks, 2007, 630. Interestingly, YHWH, both 'created' (ברא, Gen 1.27) and 'shaped' (יצר, 2.7) the human from the earth.

[44] Lambert, 1970, 43; 2013, 149, 157–58, 241, 505.

There is certainly precedent elsewhere for Mesopotamians to have thought about the cosmos in this manner. As we saw earlier, Egyptians believed that the material land emerged from the primordial gods and thus shared in the divine nature. Whereas the motif of theomachy was not present in Egypt, the idea of an ontological kinship between land and deity was. In Egypt, the earth's divine nature derived from its coexistence *as* the creator gods, while in *Enuma Eliš* it was the by-product of the slain deity herself. In both cases, the earth was a material extension of the gods' presence. As we shall see later, other Mesopotamian myths posit a link between the material cosmos and primal divine substance.

The Creation of Humanity in Enuma Eliš

This ontological kinship between the cosmos and the gods had a direct effect on human nature. In Tablet 6, the myth turns its focus to the creation of humanity. The tablet begins as follows:

1 [^{d}*marū*]*tuk zik-ri ilāni ina še-mi-šú*
2 *ub-bal lìb-ba-šú i-ban-na-a nik-la-a-te*
3 [*e*]*p-šu pi-i-šú a-na* ^{d}*é-a i-qab-bi*
4 *šá i-na lìb-bi-šú uš-ta-mu-ú i-nam-din mil-ku*
5 *da-mi lu-uk-ṣur-ma eṣ-me-ta lu-šab-ši-ma*
6 *lu-uš-ziz-ma lul-la-a lu-ú a-me-lu šùm-šu*
7 *lu-ub-ni-ma lullâ* (lú-u$_{18}$-lu-*a*) *a-me-lu*
8 *lu-ú en-du dul-lu ilānī-ma šu-nu lu-ú pa-áš-ḫu.*

1 When Marduk heard the gods' speech
2 He conceived a desire to accomplish clever things.
3 He opened his mouth addressing Ea,
4 He counsels that which he had pondered in his heart,
5 'I will bring together blood to form bone,
6 I will bring into being Lullû, whose name shall be 'man'.
7 I will create Lullû – man
8 On whom the toil of the gods will be laid that they may rest'.
(text/trans. Lambert, 2013, 110–11)

In the earliest days of creation, the divine community was forced to work the earth on their own. In order to relieve them of their toil, Marduk thus proposed to create humans. Once again, the method by which the gods elected to bring about something new was theomachy.

Upon the recommendation of Marduk and Ea, the gods eventually decided to sacrifice the deity responsible for instigating Tiamat's rebellion (6.11–26). Collectively, they identified Kingu as the ring leader and condemned him to death (6.27–30), at which point:

31 *ik-mu-šu-ma maḫ-riš* ^{d}*é-a ú-kal-lu-šú*
32 *an-nam i-me-du-šu-ma da-me-šú ip-tar-*$^{\flat}$*-u*
33 *ina da-me-šú ib-*[*na*]*-a a-me-lu-tú*

31 They bound him, holding him before Ea,
32 They inflicted the penalty on him and severed his blood-vessels.
33 From his blood he (Ea) created mankind.
(text/trans. Lambert, 2013, 110–13)

According to this description of Kingu's bloody fate, Kingu's 'blood' (*damu*) becomes the primary ingredient from which Marduk would create the human (6.33). This is not a surprise, since Marduk had already predicted that he would 'bring together blood to form bone' (*i-na da-me-šú ib-na-a a-me-lu-tú*, 6.5). The fundamental element of which the human was made is divine blood. The importance of blood is evident not least in the fact that it appears three times in Tablet 6 alone (lines 5, 32, 33), each time in reference to humanity's creation.

Scholars have long understood blood to have divine meaning in the biblical world. For example, E. James insists that the ancients viewed it as a 'divine sanguinary substance'.[45] This understanding of blood is based on the view that the body derives life from the blood (e.g., Gen 9.4; Lev 17.11; Deut 12.23). However, not all scholars agree that blood was divine in the ancient mind. D. McCarthy maintains that there is little evidence to suggest that non-Israelite cultures viewed blood as 'a divine element'.[46] McCarthy's argument makes sense in sacrificial contexts, where blood carried other meanings. But the case seems to be quite different in cosmogonic contexts. In *Enuma Eliš*, blood is the metaphysical link between humans and the gods. Here human blood is nothing short of the blood of Kingu (6.32, 33).

Blood carries a similar meaning in the Sumerian myth called *Enki and Ninmaḫ*. At one point, Enki addresses his mother, Namma, as follows:

30 ama-mu (! tablet: -ni) mud-mu ĝar-ra-zu i-ĝal-la-am zub-sig diĝir-re-e-ne kešda-i
31 ša im ugu abzu-ka u-mu-e-ni-in-ḫe
32 se_{12}-en-$^{sa}{}_{7}$sar im mu-e-kir-kir-re-ne za-e me-dim u-mu-e-ni-ĝal
33 ^{d}nin-maḫ-e an-ta-zu ḫe-ak-e
34 ^{d}nin-imma ^{d}šu-zi-an-na ^{d}nin-ma-da ^{d}nin-šar$_6$ {^{d}nin-šar$_6$}
35 ^{d}nin-mug ^{d}mu-mu-du$_8$ ^{d}nin-NIĜIN?-na
36 tu-tu-a-zu ḫa-ra-gub-bu-ne
37 ama-mu za-e nam-bi u-mu-e-tar dnin-maḫ-e zub-sig-bi ḫe-kešda

[45] James, 1962, 27. [46] McCarthy, 1969, 176.

30 'My mother, there is my blood which you set aside(?), impose on it the corvee of the gods.
31 When you have mixed it in the clay from above the Apsu,
32 The birth goddesses will nip off clay, and you must fashion bodies.
33 Your companion Ninmaḫ will act and
34 Ninimma, Šuzianna, Ninmada, Ninšar,
35 Ninmug, Mumudu and Ninniginna
36 Will assist you as you bring to birth.
37 My mother, you decree their destiny so that Ninmaḫ may impose their corvee.
(§I.30–37, text/trans. Lambert, 2013, 335–45)

Enki's plan is then set into motion in the next section:

1 . . . m]u?-e?-x x x [. . .
[(x x x x x x)] x-NI-NI nam-lu-[lu_7 . . .
2 [x x den-ki]-ke_4 nam-lu-lu_7 ⌜am⌝-[ma-ni-in-dim-eš]
3 [x x x x ḪA/pe]š saĝ-e KA am-m[a . . ..
4 [x x x (x)] x su unu-ri su-bi-a a[m? . . ..
5 [ninda-e ZI×ZI]+[LA]GAB-e ĝiš-nu11 mi-ni-in-ri nam-⌜dam?-še? ba⌝-a[n-tuku]
6 [x (x)] PA ninda ZI×ZI+LAGAB-e mi-ni-in-ri u-tu ⌜ša⌝-ga ⌜nam-ta-e⌝

1 . . .] . . .. [. . . (. . . . ..)] copulated(?), man [. . .
2 [By the plans] of [Enki they created] man.
3 [. . ..] . . . . . [. . .]
4 [. . ..] . those meals . [. . ..] their bodies.
5 [The man] cast his eye on the woman and [took her] in marriage.
6 [By] the man's [insemination] the woman conceived, she brought forth offspring of the womb.
(§II.1–6, text/trans. Lambert, 2013, 335–45)

Although difficult to read, the opening lines assert that humanity came into being as a mixture of Enki's blood and clay from the earth. Having come from the gods, human blood is divine blood. The two are one and the same.

What is more, the divine state that belonged to original humankind also belonged to subsequent humans. The myth seems to establish an ontological kinship between Enki (I.30–37) and primordial humanity (II.1–4), and then between primordial humanity and present humanity (II.5–6).[47] There is no reason to think that human blood was different from the blood that gives life to the gods. The myth never makes such a distinction, and we as interpreters should be careful to do so.

When we look again at *Enuma Eliš* in the light of other Mesopotamian traditions, we notice that blood was much more than just liquid inside the

[47] KAR 4.20 likewise asserts that blood 'makes humanity grow'.

body. It is that from which Marduk made the physical body. In the words of Marduk:

> I will bring together blood to form bone (*da-mi lu-uk-ṣur-ma eṣ-me-taˀlu-šab-ši-ma*, 6.5).

The myth specifically associates blood (*dāmu*) with bone (*eṣemtu*). As a by-product of blood, bone was the primary substance of which the human body was made. The Akkadian term *eṣemtu* referred to human 'bone' or the 'frame of the body' (cf. Sum.: GÌR.PAD.DU; Heb.: עצם ['bone']).[48] Instead of two separate parts of the body, *eṣemtu* and *dāmu* constituted human physicality in toto.

Enuma Eliš and *Enki and Ninmaḫ* seem to agree that, even in its fragility and mortality, the human body shared in the divine state even in its natural condition. Having their origins in the body and blood of the primordial gods, humans were living kin to the gods who literally gave of themselves in order give humanity life.

The Myth of Atraḫasīs

Another important depiction of humanity is found in the Sumerian flood myth of Atraḫasīs.[49] As W. Moran observes, 'the most important single witness to Babylonian speculation on the origins and nature of man is the description of his creation in the first tablet of the Atraḫasīs myth, especially lines 192–248'.[50] The myth of Atraḫasīs indeed shines critical light on early Mesopotamian conceptions of the human self.

The myth recalls the conditions of the cosmos shortly after they were created, and it culminates with an early version of the epic flood sent by the gods to cleanse humanity from the earth. It survives in several versions, all of which date, in writing, to no later than the seventeenth c. BCE.[51] Such versions include Old Babylonian, Middle Babylonian, Late Babylonian, Late Assyrian and Syrian attestations. Some suggest the myth is based on an earlier Sumerian version, since parts of it are found in the third mill. BCE *Epic of Gilgameš*. Of course, there are also parallels between the myth of Atraḫasīs and the account of Noah and the flood in Gen 6.

[48] CAD vol. 4 (E), 341–43. Or in reference to 'holy tamarisk' wood used in images as the 'the bone of the gods'.

[49] See Steinert, 2012, 324–25.

[50] Moran, 1970, 48.

[51] Translation of Atraḫasīs from Foster, 2005, 227–80, unless otherwise noted. Akkadian text from Lambert and Millard, 1999. See also Dalley, 1989, 1–38.

The Creation of Humanity in Atraḫasīs

The story picks up not long after the creation of the cosmos but just before the creation of humanity. Humanity's appearance on the scene comes about as a result of the created cosmos, which humanity will need to maintain and work to keep in proper order. Before humanity, the pantheon must undertake such tasks, indeed a difficult set of tasks in their minds. To remedy this, the gods deliberated and eventually decided to bring humans into the picture in order to lighten their workload.[52]

It is here where we pick up in the Atraḫasīs myth. It is worth having the full text before us, so I shall quote the Old Babylonian version of Tablet I:

> 195 Create a human being, let him bear the yoke,
> 'The yoke let him bear, the task of Enlil,
> 'Let man assume the drudgery of god'.
> Nintu made ready to speak,
> And said to the great gods,
> 200 'It is not for me to do it,
> 'Th(is) task is Enki's.
> 'He is the one who purifies everything,
> 'Let him give me the clay (*ṭiṭṭu*) so I can do the making'.
> Enki made ready to speak.
> 205 And said to the great gods,
> 'On the first, seventh, and fifteenth days of the month,
> 'I will establish a purification, a bath.
> 'Let one god be slaughtered,
> 'Then let the gods be purified in it.
> 210 'Let Nintu mix clay (*ṭiṭṭu*) with his flesh (*širu*) and blood (*damu*),
> 'Let that same god and man be thoroughly mixed
> in the clay (*i-lu-um-ma ù a-wi-lum li-ib-ta-al-li-lu pu ḫu-ur-i-na ṭi-iṭ-ṭi*).
> 'Let us hear the drumbeat for the rest of time,
> 215 'From the flesh of the god let a spirit remain,
> 'Let it make the living know its sign,
> 'Lest he be forgotten, let the spirit remain'.
> The great Anunna-gods, who administer destinies.
> Answered 'Yes!' in the assembly.
>
> (trans. Foster, 2005)

Once the gods decided together to move forward in creating humanity and how they should go about this process, the myth recalls straightaway how they undertook this task:

> 221 On the first, seventh, and fifteenth days of the month.
> He established a purification, a bath.
> They slaughtered Aw-ila (lit.: ^{d}*we-e-i-la*), who had the inspiration,

[52] See e.g., Lisman, 2013, 60–61; Bauks, 2016, 186.

in their assembly.
225 Nintu mixed the clay (*ṭiṭṭu*) with his flesh and blood.
<That same god and man were thoroughly
mixed in the clay>.
For the rest [of time they would hear the drumbeat],
From the flesh of the god a spi[rit remained].
It would make the living know its sign.
230 Lest he be forgotten, [the] spirit remained.
After she had mixed that clay (*iš-tu-ma ib-lu-la ṭi-ṭa ša-ti*),
He summoned the Anunna, the great gods.
The Igigi, the great gods, spat upon the clay (*ru-u'-tam id-du-ú e-lu ṭi-iṭ-ṭi*).
235 Mami made ready to speak.
And said to the great gods,
'You ordered me the task and I have completed (it)!
'You have slaughtered the god, along with his inspiration.
240 'I have done away with your heavy forced labor,
'I have imposed your drudgery on man.
'You have bestowed(?) clamor upon humankind.
'I have released the yoke, I have [made] restoration'.
They heard this speech of hers,
245 They ran, restored, and kissed her feet, (saying),
'Formerly [we used to call] you 'Mami',
'Now let your n[am]e be 'Mistress-of-All-the-Gods'
(Belet-kala-ili)'.

(trans. Foster, 2005)

There is nothing here about what the human looked like. Nor is there anything about how the gods fashioned the human. However, the myth emphasises the components out of which the human was made and appears to stress their divine origins.

To understand human nature in Atraḫasīs, it might be helpful first to look at its conceptualisation of the primal relationship between humans and gods. This is made plain in the opening line. There was a time when humans and gods were one, hence:

i-lu a-wi-lum

(when) gods (were) humans (Atr. I.1).[53]

This declaration points to the belief that, as D. Snell explains, the gods 'were not so far away or so different'.[54] There was a general

[53] On the wordplays in Mesopotamian sources, see e.g., Jacobsen, 1977; Bottéro, 1982; Noegel, 1996; Abusch, 1998, 367–70; Alster, 2002; Loesov, 2004; Foster, 2005, 229, 235.
[54] Snell, 2011, 19.

understanding about the proximity between gods and humans, both spatially and ontologically, as it were. As B. Alster explains, the myth draws a metonymic connection between 'human(ity)' (*awīlu*, I.194, 212) and 'deity' (*ilum*, Atr. I.1; cf. I.223).[55] But just what might this connection have been? S. Geller regards *i-lu a-wi-lum* as a compound term that signifies the original union between humanity and divinity.[56] This association becomes clearer when we find out the name of the slain deity from whom the pantheon would create humanity: Awilu (^{d}*we-e-il-a*, Atr. I.223). In primordial times, divinity (*ilum*) and humanity (*awīlum*) coexisted in Awilu.[57] The deity is human and god in its commixed form. From the opening line (I.1) to the moment of humanity's creation (I.223), the myth therefore establishes a clear link between human and deity that then finds elaboration in I.195–245.

This point cannot be missed. The opening line declares unequivocally that long ago humans and gods were one and the same. Whereas *Enuma Eliš* and *Enki and Ninmaḫ* establish an ontological kinship between the gods and the cosmos, Atraḫasīs here establishes a link between the gods and the human creature.

The Components of the Self

The myth increasingly provides details about humanity's relationship with the gods. As we learn, the human was a composite of various elements, including the 'flesh' (*širu*, Atr. I.210, 215, 225), 'blood' (*damu*, I.210, 225) and 'spirit' (*eṭemmu*, I.215) of the slain Awilu; the 'spittle' (*ru'tu*, I.234) of the great Igigi gods; and the 'clay' (*ṭiṭṭu*, I.211, 226) of the earth. M. Bauks correctly observes that aside from the clay, the rest of the human came *from out of* the gods themselves.[58] But if Clifford is correct that gods' bodies were also made from clay (*ṭiṭṭu*), then this would mean that all of the components of the self were divine in some way, clay included.[59] This certainly deserves consideration, given that other cosmogonies link the clay of the earth with the bodies of the slaughtered gods.

The precise nature of each part of the human can be understood in one of two ways. W. Lambert and A. Millard translate I.210–11 to read, 'From his flesh and blood / Let Nintu mix clay'.[60] By rendering the

[55] Alster, 2002, 37. [56] Geller, 1993, 63–70; Abusch, 1998, 368.
[57] Geller, 1993, 63–70.
[58] Bauks, 2016, 186. On spittle in a magical context, see e.g., Thomsen, 1992. In Egyptian sources, spittle mixed with earth can have creative powers. See e.g., Hollis, 1998; Brunner-Traut, 1997, 150.
[59] See Clifford, 1994, 59. [60] Lambert and Millard, 1999, 59.

Akkadian preposition *ina* as 'from', they understand the clay as the product of a mixture between flesh and blood. This is a legitimate translation, as *ina* can mean 'in, with, from'. However, it does not make sense in the light of I.212–13, which states that the reason for this mixture is so that god and human might 'be thoroughly mixed in (*ina*) the clay' (trans. Lambert and Millard, 1999, 59).

Foster translates the line to read a bit differently. By rendering the lines, 'Let Nintu mix clay (*ṭiṭṭu*) with his flesh (*širu*) and blood (*damu*)', he understands Nintu to mix clay 'with' (Akk.: *ina*) the deity's flesh and blood.[61] The process then results in a commixture of clay (*ṭiṭṭu*), flesh (*širu*) and blood (*damu*).

Both Lambert and Millard and Foster correctly translate *ina* in I.213 with 'in'. However, Foster seems correct to take this same preposition as 'with' (or 'in') instead of 'from' in I.210. Rendering *ina* in I.210 as 'from' seems to confuse the situation. The clay was neither the result nor the source of the mixture of flesh and blood. Rather, it was the substance 'with' or 'in' which the deity mixed the divine elements.

The body was a commixture of divine flesh (*širu*) and blood (*damu*) with clay (*ṭiṭṭu*) from the earth. In spite of their translation of I.210, Lambert and Millard correctly write, 'both are mixed in the clay, so that in lines 212–13 this is spoken of as a mixing of god and man'.[62] After the gods united these elements and gave them their shape, the physical body came into being.

Atraḫasīs identifies yet another element in the list of ingredients comprising the human self. As we read in I.215:

> *i-na ši-i-ir i-li e-ṭe-em-mu li-ib-ši*
>
> Let there be a spirit from the god's flesh. (trans. Lambert and Millard, 1969, 59)

In addition to the body, the human received a 'spirit' (*eṭemmu*).[63] Based on what we have seen, Foster seems correct that Mesopotamians placed

[61] Foster, 2005, 235. [62] Lambert and Millard, 1998, 22.

[63] One might also consider the *zaqīqu* in discussing the human self. Unfortunately, I cannot devote much space to this aspect of the self, primarily because I am focusing on Atraḫasīs in this section. With that said, a few important points can be made regarding the *zaqīqu*. It was made of a wind-like essence corresponding to 'breath' or 'spirit' (נפש) in Hebrew thought (Scurlock, 1995, 1889–92; Steinert, 2012, 347–65, cf. 370–78). CAD offers four renderings of *zaqīqu*, including: phantom, ghost, nothingness, foolishness; haunted place; the god of dreams; soul (CAD vol. 21 (Z), 58–61. Cf. Michalowski, 1998, 237–47). Like the Egyptian *ka*, *zaqīqu* was only loosely bound to the body (Cf. Cohen and Hurowitz, 1999). It was part of the self, but with some autonomy it was able to come and go as it

primacy on the physical body.[64] J. Asher-Greve likewise insists, 'the body was the essential ego/being. In the absence of a specific concept of mind the corporeal body was representative of the totality of the individual'.[65] The physical body has proven important in the anthropologies we have examined so far. However, Foster may overstate the case that the *eṭemmu* was among those 'detached phenomena rarely encountered'.[66]

In the first place, *eṭemmu* enjoyed a quasi-physical nature[67] and had a 'corporeal shape'.[68] Its corporeality derived from the substance from which it was taken, namely, the deity's flesh (*širu*, Atr. I.215, 228).[69] *eṭemmu* retained its material nature even in the afterlife.[70] As J. Scurlock notes, *eṭemmu* was so physical that at times it was 'spoken of as if it were identical with the corpse'.[71] *eṭemmu* was so physical and so imbedded within the body that even at death the two remained attached. While *eṭemmu*'s constitution was not as physical as the body, it was not as fleeting as other aspects of the self, either.[72]

In the second place, the dualism that pervades Western thought[73] was absent from Mesopotamian anthropology. The body and spirit (*eṭemmu*) formed a union with one another. As Asher-Greve explains, 'the self is located in the inseparable unity of body and spirit'.[74] Not only were the two aspects inseparable, but they had always been this way, as Atraḫasīs presents *eṭemmu* 'as being integral to the whole body beginning with creation'.[75] Abusch further demonstrates that, according to Atraḫasīs, *eṭemmu* emerged along with the body from Awilu's blood.[76] He explains that in the human

> the clay retains the older function of matter, [while] the god's blood and flesh represent the divine sources from which, respectively, the life force and nature of man, on the one side, and the body and ghost, on the other, are created.[77]

pleases, departing at night to traverse the dream world only to return to the body in the morning (Scurlock, 1995, 1889–92; Steinert, 2012, 347–65; cf. Dijkstra, 2013, 85; Zgoll, 2014). Two other aspects of the self include the *bāštu* and *napištu* (see Segal, 2004, 73; Steinert, 2012, 271–94, 405–510; CAD vol. 11 [N pt. 1], pp. 296–304).

[64] Foster, 2011, 120. [65] Asher-Greve, 1997, 447. [66] Foster, 2011, 120.

[67] Steinert, 2012, 330–31. [68] Asher-Greve, 1997, 447.

[69] Lambert and Millard, 1999, 22. [70] Selz, 2005, 585.

[71] Scurlock, 1995, 1892; cf. Sonik, 2002, 1–6; Steinert, 2012, 295–384; Pongratz-Leisten and Sonik, 2015, 30.

[72] Scurlock, 1995, 1892. [73] E.g., Dietrich, 2008; 2010.

[74] Asher-Greve, 1997, 452. Also see Steinert, 2012, 124–25, 328–32.

[75] Asher-Greve, 1997, 452. [76] Abusch, 1998, 370–71. [77] Abusch, 1998, 371.

The body was a commixture of earthly clay (*ṭiṭṭu*), divine blood (*damu*) and divine flesh (*širu*). But the spirit (*eṭemmu*) was also located in the same bounded space of the body. After all, the deity's flesh was the source from which the spirit came (I.215, 228). The body was the physical space in which the human spirit was located.[78] Abusch explains that 'while the clay represents the material form of man, the blood and flesh transmit respectively the life and kinship of the god'.[79] Abusch insists outright that the Atraḫasīs myth depicts the human as 'created from the flesh and blood of a god', and he adds, 'Divine and human are thus joined up in what we call the human being'.[80]

As modern interpreters, we tend to see participation in the divine nature in wholly positive terms. But Atraḫasīs does not. Possession of the divine *eṭemmu* was not entirely good. As Moran points out, the pantheon decided to slaughter Awilu precisely because of his *ṭemu* ('intelligence', 'scheme', Atr. I.223, 239).[81] Through the use of another set of puns, the myth asserts that the *ṭemu* of the slain, rebellious deity, Awilu, was passed on to humans through his *eṭemmu*. J. Middleton likewise notes that the myth associates *eṭemmu* with the 'spirit of the dead' or 'ghost' rather than with more 'positive notions of vitality' (Atr. I.217, 229, 230).[82]

Participation in the divine state therefore takes an ugly turn in Atraḫasīs. Humanity's propensity for rebellion and disobedience was directly related to their share in the divine *eṭemmu*. The physical impulse in humans to displease the gods was the result of their intrinsic divinity. Somehow, this divine aspect could cause the body to engage in wicked actions. It was this aspect of the self that empowered the chaotic or monstrous potentiality inherent in the human body.[83]

The Mixed Nature of the Self

Atraḫasīs depicts the physical body as the embodiment of various divine and nondivine elements. The myth gives some indication as to *in what sense* the gods mixed these elements together. In I.210–14, we read:

[78] Steinert, 2012, 296. Cf. Hasenfratz, 2002, 121–30.
[79] Abusch, 1998, 371. Abusch (1998, 371) finds evidence for this idea in the poetic ABAB structure of Abrahasis I.214–17.
[80] Abusch, 1998, 370.
[81] Moran, 1970, 52. See note 35 in this chapter for further references to Mesopotamian use of puns and wordplay.
[82] Middleton, 2005, 175; cf. Batto, 1992, 23, cited by Middleton.
[83] I explore humanity's monstrous nature in a forthcoming volume.

210 *i-na ši-ri-šu ù da-mi-šu*
211 [d]*nin-tu li-ba-al-li-il ṭi-iṭ-ṭa*
212 *i-lu-um-ma ù a-wi-lum*
213 *li-ib-ta-al-li-lu pu-ḫu-ur i-na ṭi-iṭ-ṭi*
210–11 'Let Nintu mix clay (*ṭiṭṭu*) with his [Awilu's] flesh (*širu*) and blood (*damu*),
212–13 'Let that same god and man be thoroughly mixed in the clay'.
(trans. Foster, 2005)

The language here is explicit: the human was a mixture of various elements. The Akkadian *balālu* used here carries a number of meanings related to *mixing*:[84] 'to mix, to brew beer, to make an alloy, to knead, (in the stative) to be spotted, variegated, to mix up, confuse, to pollute, to be numb, to have a share'.[85] Like the Sumerian LU, Hebrew בלל and Syriac ܒܠܠ,[86] the Akkadian *balālu* signifies permanent mixing of two entities to create a single new entity. Thus, one would mix (*balālu*) ingredients to brew beer, make medical remedies, concoct magical potions or create bricks.[87] Jacobsen's translation of *balālu* as 'drench' is plausible, suggesting that Nintu drenched the clay with liquids to create the human. Unfortunately, as Lambert notes, Jacobsen gives no reason for this interpretation.[88] Mixture still makes better sense.

The question is: How did Mesopotamians understand the mixture between deity (flesh, blood, spittle, *eṭemmu*) and human (clay)? When the writers recorded this myth, and when Mesopotamians passed it down through the generations, how did they envision this mixed creature to look? Foster employs the adverb 'thoroughly' in translating line 213. In doing so, he captures the thrust of the mixed state of the self quite well. When Nintu mixed the components together, she created something entirely new. The human came into being as a 'fusion' – a permanent mixture whose constituent parts could never be separated from the whole.[89] The deity intermixed the divine flesh, blood, spittle and spirit with the clay of the earth so thoroughly that, as we have seen, it is actually quite difficult to know where the boundary between one element ends and the other begins. Not until Nintu fused the components together like liquid in clay or metals in an alloy did the self come into existence.

[84] See CAD vol. 2 (B), 39–44. [85] CAD vol. 2 (B), 39. [86] Smith, 1999, 46.
[87] See CAD vol. 2 (B), 39–44. [88] See Lambert, 2013, 505.
[89] For more on 'fusion' and other types of mixture, see Chapter 6, and see Putthoff, 2017, 80–81, 134–37.

HUMAN CREATION IN THE *SONG OF THE HOE*

Overview of the Song of the Hoe

I turn now to an examination of the Sumerian *Song of the Hoe*, which sets forth another early Mesopotamian account of creation.[90] The *Song* dates to the late third mill. BCE and survives on clay tablets recovered from Nippur and Ur.[91] It resembles *Enuma Eliš* and Atraḫasīs in many ways. However, it adds a dimension to our understanding of human nature not yet encountered.

The star of the myth is the 'hoe' or 'pickaxe' (Sum.: al), by which Enlil 'ma[d]e the world appear in its correct form' (line 1).[92] In creating the cosmos, Enlil first separated heaven from earth (line 4) and then suspended the axis of the world at a place called Dur-an-ki (line 7). The hoe is the implement by which he not only established the cosmos but by which he would bring humanity into existence. As we read, 'The hoe makes everything prosper, the hoe makes everything flourish' ([jic]al lum-lum-ma [jic]al lam-lam-ma, line 94).

The story moves quickly from Enlil's creation of the cosmos to the origins of humanity. In this myth, one gains intriguing insight into Sumerian beliefs about the self in its natural condition. On this matter, three notable items deserve our attention.

The Human Seed (numun)

According to the composers of the *Song*, humanity began as a 'seed' (numun; cf. Akk.: *zēru*).[93] It is no surprise to find mythical links between 'seeds' and human existence in a civilisation whose prehistoric ancestors settled the area after learning to plant and harvest food.[94] The link between humanity and seeds is ubiquitous in Mesopotamian sources. For example, *A Balbale to Ninurta* declares of the king, 'Good semen, good seed' (a zid-zid-da numun zid-zid-da, ETCSL 4.27.06, line 3). Similarly, according to *An Adab to Suen or Ibbi-Suen*, the goddess Nintur 'causes human seed to emerge and gives birth to living people' (numun i-i

[90] For text and translation of *Song of the Hoe*, see ETCSL 5.5.4 at http://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk/. Unless otherwise noted, sources taken from ETCSL are quoted in the transliterated and translated form found there.

[91] Jacobsen, 1946; Farber, 1999, 369–73.

[92] Jacobsen, 1946; 1997, 511–13; Pettinato, 1971, 82–85; Selz, 1998, 281–344; Farber, 1999, 369–73.

[93] Cf. Field, 1932; Salonen, 1968.

[94] On the human as seed in the ground, see e.g., Horowitz, 1998, 134–36.

saĝ zi-ĝal$_2$ ù-tud, ETCSL 2.4.5.3, line 48). Of course, Sumerians were not the only ones to use seed-language for humans. 'Seed' carries the same meanings in Akkadian (*zēru*) and Hebrew (זרע) as well. Like the Sumerian numun and Akkadian *zēru*, the Hebrew זרע designates seeds of plants (Isa 5.10; 23.3) and human offspring (Gen. 3.15; 7.3; 17.19; 21.13).

Spending too much time on this point seems unnecessary. However, it is important to note the role of the 'seed' (numun) as that from which humanity first grew (line 3). In its germinal state, the human existed in the form of the seed, from which it would eventually become a living being. With no mention of where the seed came from, it is plausible that the humanity originated from a divine source. Perhaps the seed was a special, primordial creation of Enlil, who then planted it in the 'earth' (ki) or 'land' (kalam, line 3). What we can know is that, at one point in the distant past, this seed was all there was of the human race. It was the seed of *genesis* which contained the makings of the human self in potentiality.

'Where Flesh Came Forth/Grew' (uzu-ed$_2$-a/uzu-mú-a)

Perhaps more clarity will come when we examine what the myth reveals about the place from which humanity emerged. Line 6 of the *Song* gives this place two names: 'Bond between Heaven and Earth' (dur-an-ki) and 'Where Flesh Came Forth/Grew' (uzu-ed$_2$-a/uzu-mú-a). This place would become the axis between the divine (an) and nondivine (ki) and the place from which the human would grow from the ground.

The name Dur-an-ki literally means the 'bond (dur) between an and ki'.[95] In Mesopotamian architecture, the Dur-an-ki was a pillar that physically linked the lower (ki) with the upper (an) parts of a temple.[96] Likewise, as a geographical location Dur-an-ki was the *axis mundi* and the centre of the divine and nondivine spheres. The created order emerged from the pillar/bond that connected an with ki, where divine and nondivine once intersected. It is also the place from which humans came into being.

We saw several sources that depict 'flesh' as sharing in the divine nature of the slain gods from which it came (Atraḫasīs; *Enuma Eliš*; KAR 4). While a different source mentions 'divine flesh' (uzu DINGIR.MEŠ), the *Song* never depicts flesh like those other sources.[97] However, by

[95] George and George, 2014, 108–09. [96] George and George, 2014, 141–42.

[97] See CAD vol. 7 (I and J), 91. NB: The superscript ^{d} seen throughout this chapter signifies the dingir, or divine determinative, and indicates the divine nature of the name or object to which it is attached. On the meaning of near eastern words for 'god', see the helpful discussion in Snell, 2011, 15–19.

designating the *axis mundi* as the place 'Where Flesh Grew' (uzu-mú-a), the myth does establish a correspondence between the primordial land and human flesh. As we saw earlier, 'flesh' was far more than we think of it today. It was more than just the outer covering of the human body. Rather, it was the space in which the human impulses, its spirit-aspect, were found, and it was composed of the divine essence that it derived from the slain gods. In the *Song*, this primordial location was literally the place 'where flesh grew' into existence. Therefore, in its own way, the *Song* does depict flesh like those other sources. Like the primal *axis mundi*, flesh was a physical meeting point between divine and nondivine. There is no mention of a deity's blood or flesh serving as ingredients for the human's flesh. But there is still a sense that, like the so-called uzu-mú-a, the human flesh was nevertheless a composite of divine and nondivine.[98]

Having come from the divine seed and from the substance of the *axis mundi*, the human body shared in the divine nature even in its natural condition. Certainly, human flesh did not radiate like that of the gods as it was said to do, for example, in *Enuma Eliš* (2.24; 3.28).[99] However, it shared in *some* aspects of the divine nature even if not in *every* aspect of it. Human flesh therefore may not have possessed 'radiance' (*melammu*) and shined like the gods, but it was still, in part, in the same category of existence.[100] It was the physical, fleshy intersection between divine (an) and nondivine (ki) and the spatial intersection between the above (an) and the below (ki).

Cosmos, Temple, Human

At the beginning of creation, the gods separated an and ki, divine and nondivine, into two distinct categories. However, they established a location where the two would meet, calling this Dur-an-ki. As the place where the two spheres intersected, Dur-an-ki was a composite divine-nondivine space. This is not only an important element of the cosmology of the *Song*, but it is also an important element in its anthropology. According to the *Song*, there was a link between the human and the space from which it grew. This is evident not least in the fact that it was literally the place from which 'flesh grew'. There is thus a correspondence between the self and the cosmos, such that, as I suggest, the self was a microcosm

[98] On the notion of 'growth' in the *Song*, see *The Body As Microcosm* in this chapter.
[99] See CAD vol. 7 (I and J), 105. [100] On *melammu*, see e.g., Hundley, 2013, 80.

of the cosmos. But there was also a correspondence between the cosmos and the temple, which likewise features in important ways in the *Song*. Like the cosmos, and like the self, the temple was a composite divine-nondivine space. What appears to be taking place in the *Song* is a threefold relationship between the cosmos, temple and human. We have already looked at the composite nature of cosmic space. It will be useful to look at the relationship between the cosmos and the temple within this framework, and then to return again to an analysis of where the human fits into this picture.

The Temple As Microcosm

Mesopotamians appear to have associated the temple with the primal space from which all of creation emerged. The temple was, as noted already, a microcosm of that original space that once united divine and nondivine. Just as Sumerians called that piece of ground Dur-an-ki ('Bond between Heaven and Earth'), they also referred to the temple in the same way. Thus, *A Praise Poem of Šulgi (D)* refers to the temple/shrine of Nibru as the 'temple/shrine of Dur-an-ki' (ec_3 $nibru^{ki}$ ec_3 dur-an-ki-cè, ETCSL 2.4.2.04, line 375). Again, *Enlil and the Ekur* refers to both the primordial land and the temple standing at the centre of the four corners of the cosmos as Dur-an-ki (ub-da 4-ba $murub_4$-ba dur-an-ki-ka ki ba-e-ni-tag-ge, ETCSL 4.05.1, line 68).

Elsewhere, Sumerian sources utilise different language to depict the temple as the space where divine and nondivine intersect. Thus, *The Temple Hymns* refer to the temple as the 'foundation of heaven and earth' (temen an ki, ETCSL 4.80.1, line 2), employing a term (temen) elsewhere used of the gods themselves (e.g., *A Praise Poem of Šulgi [E],* ETCSL 2.4.2.05, line 1). The same work likewise refers to the sacred ziggurat as 'grown together with heaven and earth' (é-u_6-nir an ki-da mú-a, line 1). The temple was a microcosm of the original Dur-an-ki in particular and of the cosmos more broadly – the present-day *axis mundi* and meeting point between the two spheres of existence.

The nature of the relationship between Dur-an-ki and the temple is not hard to see. The two were both functionally and ontologically linked together. In creating the cosmos, Enlil and his co-creators fashioned for themselves a *new kind of dwelling*. This new composite of an-ki was a type of space never to have existed before, where they could reside in a whole new way. Likewise, in the temple, the gods could take up residence as they had done long ago when they created the cosmos. The difference is that they could inhabit the temple in full concentration the way they had

done at Dur-an-ki in primordial times. If Dur-an-ki was a space where divine and nondivine intersected, the temple was also the space where the gods could reside among humankind and where humankind could meet them directly.

Precisely *how* the divine embodied temple space is intriguing. In a very basic way, the temple was the space inside which the divine presence resided. One might imagine it as a type of container, whose empty space was filled by the divine presence. However, there is evidence that the divine embodied the temple in a much more dynamic way. For example, *Enki's Journey to Nibru* (ETCSL 1.1.4) recalls the time when Enki built a resplendent temple or house (Sum.: É; cf. Akk.: *bītu*; Heb. בית) from silver and lapis lazuli (lines 1–8).[101] Perhaps this is our first clue as to how the work intends to depict the temple's nature. As V. Hurowitz and K. Benzel have shown, Mesopotamians associated these specific materials with the divine nature.[102] The temple had a share in the divine state simply by virtue of the stuff of which it was made.

What is more, early in the work, we read of the temple:

> Its brickwork makes utterances and gives advice. Its eaves roar like a bull; the temple of Enki bellows. During the night the temple praises its lord and offers its best for him. (é-e lugal-bi-ir ji6-a ar2 im-ma-ab-de6 dug3-bi mu-un-já-já, lines 14–17)

The temple itself praised its lord and presented offerings to him. Not only was the temple alive, but the priest, Isimud, is said to have praised it as if he were praising a deity:

> Before Lord Enki, Isimud the minister praises the temple (lugal ^{d}en-ki-ra sukkal ^{d}isimud-dè mí {dug_3-ge-ec}); he goes to the temple and speaks to it (é-e im-ma-jen gù im-ma-dé-e). He goes to the brick building and addresses it (ceg_{12}-e im-ma-jen gù im-ma-ab-cum_2-mu): 'Temple, built from precious metal and lapis lazuli; whose foundation pegs are driven into the abzu; which has been cared for by the prince in the abzu! Like the Tigris and the Euphrates, it is mighty and awe-inspiring (?). Joy has been brought into Enki's abzu'. (lines 18–25)

Isimud would continue his praise of the temple for the majority of the work (lines 20–70). In all of this, he clearly directed his praise to the temple itself

[101] See also *A Hymn to the Ekur* (ETCSL 4.80.4); *The Keš Temple Hymn* (ETCSL 4.80.2); *The Temple Hymns* (ETCSL 4.80.1).

[102] Hurowitz, 2006; Benzel, 2015. On the various materials thought to embody the divine, see also van der Toorn, 1997; Hurowitz, 2003; Pongratz-Leisten and Sonik, 2015, 3–69; Sonik, 2015, 142–93. And see the many discussions of I. Winter, C. Walker, M. Dick and others on the many aspects of divine embodiment in material objects.

and not, for example, to a deity inside. Thus 'Isimud the minister praises the temple; he goes to the temple and speaks to it' (lines 18–19), and 'This is what Isimud spoke to the brick building' (line 70).

The work makes it quite clear that the temple was not just a containment for the gods inside, but it was itself a living divinity. It shared in specific characteristics otherwise reserved for the gods. For example, it gave wisdom like a deity: 'its brickwork makes utterances and gives advice' (ceg_{12}-bi inim dug_4-dug_4 ad gi_4-gi_4, line 14). It also shone brilliantly like a deity: 'its silver and lapis lazuli were the shining daylight' (kug $^{na}{}_4$za-gin_3-bi ud kar_2-kar_2-a-ka, line 7).[103] The temple's divine nature is further evident when we realise that in this work, it is often difficult to distinguish between the temple, the shrine inside and the gods who inhabit it. Thus, on occasion when Isimud appears to have been praising the temple, he was actually praising Enki, to whom the temple belonged (e.g., lines 34–43, 49–61; cf. 71–73). And the temple was so great that even Enlil would praise it (lines 117–29).

The temple was not only a 'house' (É) for the deity but it also had a share in the divine nature. However, there seems to be an assumption that, although divine, the temple was still subservient to the gods who created and came to inhabit it. For this reason, the temple would offer its own praise to the gods: 'During the night the temple praises its lord and offers its best for him' (line 17). Therefore, while the temple itself was a microcosm of the cosmos and embodiment of the divine like the cosmos, it was still not equal to the gods themselves. It might house them the way Dur-an-ki once did. But they were still superior in nature and status, just as the cosmos – and Dur-an-ki – albeit divine, was never equal to the gods who made it.

The Body As Microcosm

The question now becomes what this might reveal about Mesopotamian views on human nature. If the *Song* asserts a threefold interrelationship among the cosmos, the temple and the human self, then what can we learn about the latter in the light of what we have now seen?

A number of items suggest that the *Song* asserts a connection between, in particular, the temple and the self. We need to remember that the hoe (al) is the hero of the *Song*. Importantly, the hoe is the tool by which both the temple and the human came into existence. As noted earlier, Enlil 'made it possible for humans to grow ... with the help of the hoe'

[103] Cf. Hundley, 2013, 80, on divine radiance.

(lines 6, 8). Once he made the ground ready, he then 'set this very hoe to work' by having it 'place the first model of humankind in the brick mould' (saj nam-lu$_2$-ulù ù-cub-ba mi-ni-in-jar, line 19). Later, the work turns its focus to the hoe's role in the establishment of the first temple. The *Song* makes a rather clear connection between the way the hoe brought the human and the temple into being. As we read, the hoe founded the 'Ekur, the temple of Enlil' (é-kur é ^{d}en-lil$_2$-lá ^{jic}al-e jar-ra-am$_3$, line 35) by none other than 'caus[ing] it to grow' (ĝi$_6$ al-mú-mú, line 36).

Indeed, the *way* both humanity and the temple came into being would appear to be another deliberate link between the two. According to the *Song*, the hoe causes both to 'grow' (mú) from the ground (lines 6–8, 19, 35–36). That the verb mú appears only twice in the *Song* (lines 6, 36) clearly indicates there is a connection between its two subjects, namely, the human and the temple. Thus, in line 6 the hoe causes humanity to 'grow' (mú-mú-dè), while in line 36 it causes the temple to 'grow' (ĝi$_6$ al-mú-mú). At the work of the hoe, both the human and the temple 'grew' from the ground and thereby enjoyed their first taste of existence. The hoe is responsible for many creative activities. But alongside bringing the cosmos into being, nothing is more important in the *Song* than the hoe's role in initiating the 'growth' of humanity and the temple.

One issue that we face when trying to draw these connections has to do with the ostensible differences in the appearance of the primordial humans and the temple. Sumerian sources depict the temple as a radiant entity whose divinity is evident in its outward brilliance, while the human does seem to share in that same radiant appearance. This is at least how it would appear at first glance. However, our conception of primordial humanity changes radically when we consider that the term mú can signify either 'grow' or 'shine'. This presents us with a remarkable image. Might the *Song* be making a claim *both* about the way the two entities 'grew' from the ground *and* about the way they 'shone' brightly in their incipient state?

There is reason to think that this is the case, in addition to the fact that Mesopotamians were keen to employ wordplays to communicate profound ideas. There is comparative support for such a suggestion elsewhere in ancient near eastern cosmogony. For we know that in Egypt, the primordial mound (*benben*) shone radiantly like the sun as it burst forth from the chaotic waters. We also know that Mesopotamian sources attest to the radiant nature of the temple. Based on the dual meanings of the term mú, the *Song* may be presenting the present-day temple and the first human similarly, perhaps as having burst forth from the ground of

Dur-an-ki in radiant fashion. To be sure, I highlight this aspect of the relationship between the human and the temple somewhat tentatively, but in the ancient mind it would certainly have made good sense.

The temple was a microcosm of the created cosmos, and the self was then a microcosm of both the cosmos *and* the temple. As we saw in Egypt, here too we find that the human was not just bound to its social group, but it was also inextricably linked to the cosmos itself.[104] The cosmos, temple and self were related to the other functionally in that each was a divine dwelling space. The cosmos consisted of an and ki and gave the gods a space in which to interact with humans. They were also related ontologically in that the cosmos, the temple and the human were made of the same divine-nondivine elements.

Divine Embodiment in the Human Body

If there was a link between temples/shrines and the human body, we need to consider the potential role of embodiment in this equation. To begin with, the cosmos was a heterotopian space comprising various types of spaces. There was a type of space called divine (an) and another called nondivine (ki). Within the cosmos, then, were any number of constituent spaces that comprised the cosmos in toto.

Different spaces could be embodied spaces. Spaces within the cosmos that were of particular importance when it came to their role in housing the divine presence included temples and related cult objects. I discuss Mesopotamian beliefs about images and statues in Chapter 5. There I follow other scholars in arguing that Mesopotamians viewed divine images as 'embodied doubles' rather than mere 'representational copies'. Like the larger cosmos, the temple was likewise a space within the larger world that provided a physical residence for the divine. While the divine presence pervaded the entire physical world, the temple had a special share in the divine state. The divine could inhabit the temple more than any other physical space on earth. The temple was after all the *axis mundi* and the present-day link (dur) to the primordial divine-nondivine meeting point.

Based on the cosmos-temple-body correspondence, it is reasonable to see the self as embodied space like the temple. Like the temple and the Dur-an-ki before, the body could house the divine on earth. In this regard, the human was also a living *axis mundi*, the bodily nexus between divine and human.

[104] Snell, 2005b.

The *Song*'s depiction of the self aligns with other Mesopotamian sources. While the gods did not embody humans the way they did temples, the self was a composite that shared in the divine state in its natural condition. But the situation changes with the royal self. As we shall see, the king enjoyed a share in the divine apparently off limits to non-royal humanity.

MESOPOTAMIAN GOD-KINGS

The King and the Gods

E. Ehrenberg maintains that by holding the divine office of kingship, the king enjoyed a unique relationship with the gods.[105] The king was the human selected to carry out the rule of the gods on earth. He was to maintain order throughout the cosmos as the gods originally intended. However, this was not the only aspect of divinity that the king enjoyed. At certain points in Mesopotamian history, he also embodied and manifested the divine presence on earth. The royal self shared in the divine state on a much higher level than non-royal humanity.

Upon taking the throne, the king received a share of the divine *melammu* (Akk.) or me-lam$_2$ (Sum.), both meaning 'majesty', 'glory', 'radiance', 'luminosity'.[106] This gave him a radiant and often terrifying aura that made him appear as a god, legitimating not only his royal election but also his divine nature. As A. Oppenheim writes, 'this halo legitimates the king by endowing him with godlike appearance and power'.[107] E. Cassin likewise adds, 'La distance qui sépare les rois des autres hommes est telle qu'ils en viennent à recevoir en partage quelques-unes des propriétés des dieux'.[108] It was their possession of the 'properties of the gods' (propriétés des dieux) that separated kings from other humans. S. Aster insists that at times *melammu* could be defined as 'the covering, outer layer, or outward appearance of a person, being, or object, or rays emanating from a person or being, that demonstrate the irresistible or supreme power of that person being or object'.[109] In the minds of many, the king was the real and physical embodiment and manifestation of the sun-like radiance otherwise possessed only

[105] Ehrenberg, 2008. See also Westenholz, 1997; Selz, 2000; Wilcke, 2002. And see the essays in Brisch, 2008.
[106] See Oppenheim, 1943; Cassin, 1968, 65–82; Emelianov, 2010; Aster, 2012; 2015.
[107] Oppenheim, 1943, 31. [108] Cassin, 1968, 65. [109] Aster, 2012, 352; 2015, 15.

by the gods[110] or, as V. Emelianov has shown – and as we saw previously – the gods' temples.[111]

The king's *melammu* was both an internal and external phenomenon. It was internal in that the king was the physical embodiment of the divine, and it was external in that he was the visible manifestation of this radiant divine light. It is true that, as Aster notes, the 'radiance is not an intrinsic element of *melammu* in many periods'.[112] But he insists that depicting a king having the 'radiance' of the gods was a powerful way to reify his power among locals and foreigners alike.[113]

As a human who embodied and frequently manifested visibly the godlike splendour on earth, the king deserved to be treated differently than anyone else.[114] Thus, sources such as *Ludlul Bêl Nêmeqi* ('The Poem of the Righteous Sufferer') claim to have 'made praise for the king (*šarru*) like a god's'.[115] ABL 992 states more explicitly: 'The king (*šarru*) is my god' (rev. line 17).[116] Likewise, lines 1–2 of 'Ara[*ḫa*]ttu von Kumidi an den König' assert: '[Zu dem Köni]g (*šarru*), m[ei]n[em H]e[r]rn (*bēlu*), den Göttern [*meines*] Kopfe[s], hat gesprochen' (EA 198 lines 1–2).[117] Each text declares the king to have been nothing short of a god.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to know precisely *in what sense* the king was a god. However, these cursory observations do indicate the fuzzy distinction between the nature of the king and that of the gods. As Selz observes, especially during the third mill. BCE, the king was thought of as 'transgressing categorical boundaries'[118] and to 'have had – varying degrees – divine status'.[119] But P. Jones has shown that conceptions of the king as a deity were prominent as late as the twelfth c. BCE.[120] And Cassin has shown that the belief about the king's intrinsic splendour extended even into the first mill. BCE.[121] This raises the issue of who was divine and who was not. Early Mesopotamian kings established a precedent: the king was a god in both power and nature. While there were periods during which certain records are less emphatic about the king's divine nature than others, most ancients did not know whom to recognise as divine and whom to consider merely human. Even when they did not

[110] Cassin, 1968, 68. [111] Emelianov, 2010, 1114. [112] Aster, 2012, 352, cf. 22–59.
[113] Aster, 2012, 99–106; 2015, 15.
[114] For Sumerian examples of me-lam$_2$, see Emelianov, 2010, 1114–16.
[115] *Ludlul Bel Nemeqi*, tb. II, line 31 (ref. from CAD vol. 7 [I and J], 92). Text/trans. Lambert, 1996, 40–41.
[116] Trans. CAD vol. 7 (I and J), 92; text from Harper, 1911.
[117] Trans. Knudtzon, 1915, 728–29. [118] Selz, 2008, 22. [119] Selz, 2008, 25.
[120] Jones, 2005. [121] Cassin, 1968, 65–82.

know all of the details about a given king, they knew that, based on tales dating back to the third mill. BCE, the king existed on a different level. Actions taken towards him thus mimicked those taken towards the gods and his words carried the same weight as those of the gods. But there were some cases when there was no question about the king's nature, and in such instances, as we shall see, the people outright declared him a god.

Narām-Sîn's Divine Self-Conception

One of the earliest kings who claimed to be divine while still alive was Narām-Sîn (ca. 2254–2218 BCE).[122] Narām-Sîn was the fourth king of Akkad and the grandson of King Sargon, the founder and the first ruler of the Akkadian empire. Although his arrogance and defiance of Enlil would eventually lead to the 'Curse of Akkad' and to the empire's fall,[123] Narām-Sîn nevertheless viewed himself as god on earth. As Snell explains, many Mesopotamian 'rulers were happy to have themselves seen as the chosen ones of gods and even as children of gods'.[124] But Narām-Sîn 'claimed to be a god'.[125]

He regularly referred to himself, for example, as 'Narām-Sîn, king of the four quarters' (*na-ra-am-*^{d}*suen lugal* ^{d}*a-ga-dè*^{ki} *an-un-da limmú-ba*, Naramsin 2001 [E2.1.4.2001]).[126] And he openly called himself the 'God of Akkad' (^{d}*a-ga-dè*^{ki}; CDLI texts: Naramsin 2018 [E2.1.4.2018] line 5; Naramsin 2020 [E2.1.4.2020] line 2; cf. CDLI no. P216658).[127] He thought of himself as having a place among the gods, whose reign began in Akkad and extended to the ends of the earth.[128] His self-conception was not unlike that of Ramesses II in Egypt, only Narām-Sîn asserted his divinity centuries earlier.

Others recognised Narām-Sîn as a deified king as well. In what P. Michalowski describes as 'the *only* explicit contemporary view of the divinization of Narām-Sîn', we learn that Narām-Sîn was not actually born with a share in the divine state but inherited it after becoming king.[129] As we read in the Bassetki Statue:

[122] For discussion of Narām-Sîn and other instances of divine kingship, see e.g., Farber, 1983; Gelb and Kienast, 1990, 81–83; Harper and Amiet, 1992, 166–68; Winter, 1996; 2008; Westenholz, 1999; Bernbeck, 2008, 162–64; Michalowski, 2008.
[123] See Cooper, 1983; 1990; Snell, 2011, 37. [124] Snell, 2011, 18.
[125] Snell, 2011, 18. [126] See Winter, 2008, 76–77.
[127] See Franke, 1995; Bernbeck, 2008, 162–64; Michalowski, 2008, 34.
[128] Franke, 1995, 836. [129] Michalowski, 2008, 34, italics original.

In view of the fact that he protected the foundations of his city from danger, (the citizens of) his city requested from Aštar in Eanna, Enlil in Nippur, Dagān in Tuttul, Ninḫursag in Keš, Ea in Eridu, Sîn in Ur, Šamaš in Sippar, (and) Nergal in Kutha, that (Narām-Sîn) be (made) the god of their city, and they built within Agade [=Akkad] a temple (dedicated) to him. (*ì-li-íš* URU.KI-*śu-nu a-kà-dè*.KI *i-tár-śu-ni-íš-ma qáb-li-ma a-kà-dè*.KI É-*śu ib-ni-ù ša* DUB, Narām-Sîn E2.1.4.10, text/trans. Frayne, 1993, 113–14)[130]

Narām-Sîn was not born a god. Instead, he became a god only after securing and expanding Akkad, at which point his people petitioned the gods to make him a god. Once the gods agreed to do so, the people built their newly deified god-king a temple and worshipped him as a deity. Whatever was true of the gods was also true of Narām-Sîn. However, his deification did not make him equal to all of the gods in the pantheon. Clearly, Mesopotamians would ultimately remember Narām-Sîn as the god-king whose defiance of Enlil led to the fall of this once mighty empire.

Narām-Sîn's Divine Sexiness

Narām-Sîn's share in the divine state was observable in his power and military successes. However, it also appears to have had ontological implications. This is especially visible in the famous *Victory Stele of Narām-Sîn*. Constructed during Narām-Sîn's lifetime, the *Stele* celebrates the god-king's victory over the Lullabi, a mountain people from the region.[131] Centuries later (twelfth c. BCE), the Elamite king Shutruk-Nahhunte would claim the *Stele* as booty and take it back to Susa. It lay there until 1898 when M. de Morgan, the French ambassador to Persia at the time, would recover it.

The *Stele* is a remarkable piece of art. On the left side, it contains cuneiform from the time of Narām-Sîn. On the right, king Shutruk-Nahhunte would inscribe a dedication to himself in the wake of his successful campaign in Mesopotamia. In the two-metre tall limestone stele, Narām-Sîn stands as a giant, towering over his Lullabi subjects in what K. Sonik calls the 'mastery posture'.[132] Asserting his status as a god, he dons the horns of divinity on his head, a symbol clearly intended to communicate his divine nature.[133] Based on legends surrounding Narām-Sîn, many likely believed he looked like he does in the *Stele*.

[130] Cited by Michalowski, 2008, 34, although he offers a different translation.
[131] For more in the *Stele*, see e.g., Parrot, 1960, figs. 212–13; Amiet, 1976, 29–32; Carus, 2010, online at opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/ocj/vol1904/iss9/8.
[132] Sonik, 2002, 157. [133] Michalowski, 2008, 34; Selz, 2008, 13–31.

His reputation was such that many thought he had superhuman size and strength.[134]

Even a modern viewer can appreciate the sexy portrayal of the god-king in the *Stele*. However, I. Winter insists that in order to understand Narām-Sîn's message, we must understand how Mesopotamians viewed sexuality, power and divinity. Winter remarks:

> What, the modern viewer may ask, is Naram-Sîn of Agade doing on his Victory Stela (cf. Figures 1–3), displaying for us not only his victory in battle but his well-rounded buttocks, his muscled calves, his elegantly arched back, his luxuriant beard? More Baryshnikov than Stallone, he is nonetheless, within our cultural lexicon of value, well proportioned, lithe, fit, and simply 'divine'![135]

Winter argues that in Mesopotamia, 'sexuality was inextricably linked to potency, potency to male vigor, and male vigor to authority and dominance, hence rule'.[136] But beyond being a ruler, Narām-Sîn was making a claim about his divinity.[137] Narām-Sîn was declaring that he be counted among the gods of ancient lore. As Winter explains, 'his physical body reflects the perfection of one accorded divine status'.[138]

In this artefact, we gain insight into two aspects of Mesopotamian conceptions of divine embodiment. On the one hand, there is the issue of embodiment in the person represented in the image. The *Stele* depicts Narām-Sîn as a god. His sexuality and his stature communicated to all that he was the physical embodiment of the divine. Even as 'a minor deity rather than a fully established member of the high pantheon', his enemies, the Lullabi, could only look up at him from below, from their conquered, mortal state. Standing between mortal humanity and the gods above, he gazes upward at the superior gods, represented in the astral images at the top of the *Stele*.[139]

On the other hand, there is the issue of divine embodiment in the image on the *Stele*. As god in the flesh, perhaps Narām-Sîn believed he shared in the fluid nature of his fellow gods. He could inhabit his own physical body and his image simultaneously.[140] Like Ramesses II in Egypt, Narām-Sîn likely believed that worshippers could encounter him in his image. If this is true, then the *Stele* did not just commemorate Narām-Sîn's victory over the Lullabi. Rather, it was a permanent fixture

[134] Cf. Winter, 1989, 573–83; 2008, 76. [135] Winter, 1996, 11.
[136] Winter, 1996, 11. Cf. Hundley, 2013, 77–79. [137] Winter, 2008, 76.
[138] Winter, 2008, 76. [139] Winter, 2008, 76.
[140] Cf. Winter, 1992, 13–42; Herring, 2008.

through which Narām-Sîn could expand his presence and rule in places where he was not present in person.

There is no evidence to confirm this suggestion unequivocally. It is possible that Narām-Sîn simply meant to make sure his descendants knew of his great feat. It is possible that he never imagined an ontological link between himself and the *Stele*. However, Mesopotamian kings shortly after Narām-Sîn's lifetime did believe they had access to divine fluidity and could thus inhabit images of themselves. Within a couple centuries of Narām-Sîn's death, a ruler called Gudea would view himself as a deity. He even instructed his priests to prepare his image in a way that would allow his divine presence to bring it to life.[141] Gudea understood that as a god, he enjoyed the fluid ontology of his divine counterparts. He knew he could expand his presence beyond the bounds of his own physical body. We cannot know for sure, but it is certainly plausible that Narām-Sîn also believed he could inhabit the *Stele* as if it were his own body.

Narām-Sîn's story also seems to indicate what obtaining divinity did *not* mean in Mesopotamia. It did not convey invincibility or immortality on a person. At best, a deified human was never equal to the true gods.[142] Narām-Sîn eventually died at the hands of Enlil. He exercised power over humans, but he always remained beneath the true gods.[143] In the light of Narām-Sîn's fall, it is no surprise that claiming divinity for oneself did *not* become contagious immediately after his lifetime.[144] Narām-Sîn's immediate successors would not follow his lead in making such lofty claims to the divine state. Michalowski is correct that, while Mesopotamians held all kings to be 'sacred' and to 'mediate between sacred and profane', they did not view all kings as gods.[145]

Narām-Sîn's Ur III Successors

Not until the Ur III period (2112–2004 BCE) would others begin again to make claims to divinity like Narām-Sîn. During this period, Šulgi, Amar-Sîn, Šū-Sîn and Ibbi-Sîn – and perhaps also Šu-ilišu at Ehnunna slightly thereafter – believed they had a share in the divine.[146] To take one example, as Snell notes, Amar-Sîn had a temple rededicated to himself as

[141] Walker and Dick, 1999, 58; cf. Civil, 1967, 211; Steinkeller, 1984, 39–41.
[142] Bernbeck, 2008, 162–63. [143] Bernbeck, 2008, 163; Winter, 2008, 76.
[144] Michalowski, 2008, 33–45. [145] Michalowski, 2008, 34; cf. Snell, 2013, 39.
[146] For a helpful overview, see Brisch, 2006; 2013. See also Wilcke, 1988; Sallaberger, 1997; 1999, 121–390; Steinkeller, 2003; Jones, 2005; Michalowski, 2008, 33–45; Snell, 2013, 39.

a god while he was still alive (ca. 2030 BCE).[147] However, these kings did not claim to be descendants of Narām-Sîn. According to N. Brisch, the Ur III kings instead claimed to be heirs of Gilgameš, whom they saw as the prototypical king.[148] They had good reasons for doing so.

When Ur III kings thought of themselves as heirs to Gilgameš, what might they have imagined this to entail? Presumably, they were aware of stories about Gilgameš and traditions concerning the mythical king's divine nature. After all, Gilgameš's reputation as a divine-human spanned the near eastern world for at least two millennia.[149] According to A. George, Gilgameš appears in several god-lists from as early as the third mill. BCE.[150] Thus, for example, we find the name ^{d}bil.ga.<mi>.iš (var. [^{d}]bil$_4$.ga.m[es]) in a single-column god-list from Nippur (*SLT* 125 rev. ii 6 // 124 viii 5; cf. An = *Anum* vi 284–86).[151] References such as this clearly indicate that Mesopotamians considered him a god from an early period. Gilgameš's reputation as a divine-human was so widespread that his name even appears at Qumran (e.g., 4Q530 2 ii 1–3; 4Q531 22) near the end of the first mill. BCE.[152]

Aside from a general conception of Gilgameš as a divine-human, what can we know about *in what sense* he shared in the divine nature? In contrast to Narām-Sîn, Gilgameš was in fact born with a share in the divine state. As we read:

47 ^{d}GIŠ-*gím-maš ul-tu u$_4$-um ı̀-al-du na-bu šum-šú*
48 *šit-tin-šú ilum*(dingir)*-ma šul-lul-ta-šú a-me-lu-tu*

47 Gilgameš was his name from the day he was born,
48 two-thirds of him god but a third of him human.
(Gilg. 1.47–48; text/trans. George, 2003, 1.540–41)[153]

According to this statement, Gilgameš was not a full god. Rather, he was two-thirds god but one-third human. Even though he had a share in the divine nature, he was also human, and he was never said to have escaped his humanity.

Even still, he was quite a remarkable divine-human. The surrounding lines in Tablet 1 offer detail about his composite nature. Thus, Gilgameš was:

[147] Snell, 2013, 39.
[148] Cooper, 1993; George, 2003, 1.119; Michalowski, 2008, 36–37; Brisch, 2013, 43.
[149] On which, see esp. George, 2003. [150] George, 2003, 1.119–35.
[151] George, 2003, 1.120.
[152] George, 2003, 1.120–22. Cf. Cohen, 1993, 54–55; Goff, 2009.
[153] Cf. CAD vol. 7 (I and J), 94–95.

'surpassing all (other) kings' (line 29);
a 'hero endowed with a superb physique' (line 29);
a 'brave native of Uruk, butting wild bull!' (line 30);
a 'mighty bank, the protection of his troops, a violent flood-wave that smashes a stone wall! (lines 33–34);
'Wild bull of Lugalbanda, Gilgameš, perfect in strength, suckling of the exalted cow, Wild-Cow Ninsun!' (lines 35–36);
'so tall, perfect and terrible' (line 37).

Slightly later we learn that his 'strength is as mighty [as a lump of rock from the sky]', or as George notes, literally a 'lump of Anu', that is, 'meteoric iron' (137).[154]

Lines 45–62 of Tablet 1 offer additional details about the hero's physical strength and beauty:

45 Who is there that can be compared with him in kingly status,
46 and can say like Gilgames, 'It is I am the king'?
47 Gilgames was his name from the day he was born,
48 two-thirds of him god but a third of him human.
49 Bēlet-ilī drew the shape of his body,
50 Nudimmud brought his form to perfection.
51 [. . .] . . . was majestic [. . .. . .]
52 [. . .] stature . . . [. . .]
53 [. . .] the distance between [. . .,]
[lacuna]
56 A triple cubit was his foot, half a rod his leg.
57 Six cubits was [his] stride,
58 [x] cubits the . . . of his [. . .]
59 His cheeks were bearded like those of [. . .]
60 the locks of his hair growing [thickly as Nissaba's.]
61 [*As*] *he grew up* he was perfect in [his] beauty,
62 *by human standards* [he was] very handsome.
(text/trans. George, 2003, 1.540–41)

Gilgameš and Narām-Sîn resembled one another in many ways. The myth repeatedly emphasises Gilgameš's perfect beauty, enormous size, unmatchable strength and potency of a bull. The hero's divinity is undeniable, simply based on this colourful description, which offers a list of what M. Hundley calls 'intrinsic characteristics [that] make a god a god'.[155]

But as noted already, the Ur III kings viewed themselves as heirs of Gilgameš instead of Narām-Sîn. In their minds, Narām-Sîn took things too far. He thought he could defy the orders of Enlil, but his arrogance led

[154] George, 2003, 1.547n23. [155] Hundley, 2013, 76.

to his downfall. On the contrary, although Gilgameš was two-thirds a god, he always remained *one-third* human. If we only had the depiction of Gilgameš from this section, we might assume that he was a full member of the pantheon. But as Gilg. 1.47–48 make clear, that was never the case.

As partakers in the divine, the Ur III kings did what others would do to indicate their transcendent nature. For one thing, they consistently coupled their names with the dingir (e.g., ^{d}Šulgi, ^{d}Amar-Sîn). Hundley observes that the dingir was a simple way to declare something or someone to be divine.[156] What is more, like Narām-Sîn and Gilgameš, they depicted themselves in perfect beauty. They would construct images of themselves with perfect bodies in which they would install themselves like gods.[157] For this reason, they referred both to deified kings and their statues with the dingir.[158] These cult objects were the corporeal embodiment of the divine presence on earth.

The Ur III kings believed they were divine. But they did not take the matter as far as Narām-Sîn. For them, Gilgameš was a better example to follow. Like the hero of old, they shared in both the divine and human natures, and they were content to leave it at that.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Mesopotamians imagined the human self as a composite divine-nondivine space, even in its natural condition. By virtue of its correspondence to the primordial Dur-an-ki and to the temple, the self was a commixture of divine and nondivine elements. The body, like the cosmos and the temple, formed an intersection between the divine and human existence.

At different times throughout history, the king's share in the divine state was far greater than that of non-royal humans. Because of his divine nature, the king possessed the same fluid constitution of the gods, and as such he could inhabit multiple bodies simultaneously. However, in times when Mesopotamians believed the king to have enjoyed such an elevated state, they still recognised his divinity as lower than that of the true gods. To share in the divine nature was one thing. To be a god or goddess was quite another.

[156] Hundley, 2013, 72, 76; cf. Snell, 2011, 18.
[157] Walker and Dick, 1999, 55–122. See more on this in Chapter 5.
[158] Cf. Winter, 1989; 1992; 1997; Selz, 1997, 167–213; Sallaberger, 1999, 152–53; Machinist, 2006; Brisch, 2013, 39–40.

4

Metallic Bodies and Deification by Ingestion

Material Embodiment in Hittite Anatolia

PREFATORY REMARKS

The Present Chapter

Between the eighteenth and thirteenth c. BCE, the so-called Hittites inhabited the land of Anatolia, or modern-day Turkey. This mysterious people grew from a small city-state in the centre of the region to a powerful empire who ruled the eastern and northeastern sides of the Mediterranean.[1] At the height of their reign, the Hittites exercised control over a large portion of what is now Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. They were such a formidable force that even the mighty Egyptian pharaoh, Ramesses II, was unable to conquer them. In addition to military prowess, their early use of iron likely gave them advantages in battle. It also informed certain beliefs about the nature of the cosmos and the self, as we see in this chapter.

There is evidence that the Hittites had some influence on Syro-Palestine during the biblical period (e.g., Gen 23.3–20; 26.34; 36.2; Num 13.29; Josh 9.7; 11.19).[2] Cultic objects and practices among the Canaanites and Israelites seem to have had ties to those prevalent in Hittite culture. Moreover, the influence of Hittite culture on the Greek world is undeniable. As M. Bachvarova has shown, certain Greek traditions had their origins in the Hittite capital of Hattusa.[3] But the Hittites did not just

[1] On the Hittites, see esp. Bryce, 1998; 2004; Burney, 2004; Collins, 2007; Schwemer, 2017.
[2] See e.g., Forrer, 1936; Kempinski, 1979; Moyer, 1983; McMahon, 1992, 3.231–33; Barrick, 2008, 59–61.
[3] Bachvarova, 2016.

influence others. They were, reciprocally, deeply influenced by those around them. In discussing the religion of the Hittites, M. Hundley refers to them as 'collectors' of a number of Indo-European, Hattic, Luwian, Syrian and Mesopotamian traditions.[4] G. Beckman is right that this eclecticism makes the Hittites rather difficult to study.[5]

Scholars have put forth several important works on Hittite anthropology. A. Kammenhuber's examination of Hittite anthropological terms remains perhaps the most important study on the subject to date.[6] In her encyclopaedic treatment, she discusses the many Hittite terms for different aspects of the human. Kammenhuber is not concerned specifically with divine aspects of the self. However, she does reveal that humans were like gods because both were composed of the same parts. Building on Kammenhuber's study, P. Taracha notes that in particular both humans and gods possessed a 'body' (Hitt.: *tuekka-*; Sum.: NÍ.TE) and a 'soul' (*ištanza(n)-*; ZI).[7] There was a correspondence between humans and gods, though precisely what this was remains to be seen. Furthermore, scholars recognise that the Hittites believed the king would undergo post-mortem deification. However, Beckman demonstrates that the king could share in the divine nature in the present life as well.[8]

In this chapter, I seek to gain insight into Hittite conceptions of the self. Although the Hittites had around 70 terms to speak of the human, a simple inventory of such terms offers little by way of a clear portrait of humanity's relationship to the divine. Human nature is rather more elusive among the Hittites than among their Egyptian and Mesopotamian counterparts. Nevertheless, evidence seems to indicate that the Hittites believed humans had some share in the divine state.

The Sources

In examining the Hittites, I focus on sources derived from Anatolia that scholarship associates with Hittite culture. In addition to the collections of Hittite material known as *Catalogue des textes hittites* (CTH)[9] and the *Keilschrifturkunden aus Boghazköi* (KUB), Hittitologists have put forth a

[4] Hundley, 2014, 176.
[5] See e.g., Beckman, 1993–1997, 564–72; 2004a; 2004b; 2007; Haas, 1994; Hutter, 1997.
[6] Kammenhuber, 1964; 1965. [7] Taracha, 2009, 158. [8] Beckman, 2012.
[9] See online at www.hethport.uni-wuerzburg.de/CTH. Unless otherwise noted, primary texts are taken from CTH online, and they are quoted in the form in which they appear on that website.

number of valuable publications of primary texts in English.[10] The reader will also benefit from consulting the recent essay by D. Schwemer, who traces the last century of study of Hittite civilisation and offers a great number of resources.[11]

HUMANITY AND DIVINITY IN HITTITE ANATOLIA

Hittite Conceptions of the Human

It should be useful to begin as we did in previous chapters by looking at Hittite cosmogony and anthropogeny. As we have seen, near eastern anthropology was rooted in traditions surrounding human origins. Unfortunately, unlike in Egypt and Mesopotamia, in Hittite Anatolia we have yet to find a complete cosmogony among the extant sources. One can only hope that scholars discover a Hittite cosmogony if in fact one exists.

After a look at this difficult but valuable source, I shall examine some of the terms that pertain to the self. As noted already, there are far too many in Hittite nomenclature to be of use to our study. However, those few that do shine light on human nature demand our attention, and I shall discuss these briefly.

A Hittite Cosmogony?

Although difficult to read, one ritual contains a version of what resembles a Hittite anthropogeny. The tablets on which the ritual is written are quite poorly preserved. Furthermore, while human origins play an important role in the ritual, the text is still a ritual. Thus, it only briefly mentions the deities responsible for humanity's creation. Given these difficulties, I can only make tentative suggestions as to what it might reveal about Hittite anthropology. But what the text does indicate is quite fascinating indeed.

The ritual was to take place on a riverbank, hence its title, 'A River Ritual with a Mythology on the Creation of Humanity'.[12] During the ritual, participants would dig a pit into the riverbank and offer a pig in sacrifice to the so-called Gulš-deities. Upon receiving the sacrifice, the gods would then decide whether or not to grant health, strength and

[10] See e.g., Beckman, 1983; 1996; Hoffner, Jr., 1998; 2009; Singer, 2002; de Roos, 2007.
[11] Schwemer, 2017.
[12] On which, see Otten and Siegelová, 1970; Haas, 1994, 179–80; Taracha, 2010.

longevity to the client. As scholars have noted, these deities appear in other invocations for health and protection (e.g., CTH 434.4).[13]

Early in the ritual, the priest would recall the moment the cosmos began (CTH 434.1, lines 8–12). In those days, the gods 'made separation' (*šarra*) between 'heaven' (*nepiš*) and 'earth' (*tēkan*) and between the 'upper gods' (*nuza šarāzziuš* [DINGIR^{MEŠ}]) and the 'lower gods' (*katteriešmaza* DINGIR^{MEŠ}, lines 8, 9, 10). The primordial days of creation, when only the gods existed, would here be brought into the present, as it were. Those foundational moments would provide the mythical framework for the ritual, and with these praises the priest would both call upon the deities' power and attempt to gain their favour. The priest would then speak to the deified river as that which cleanses and gives life (lines 13–17).

Humanity held a central place in the mythological framework underlying this ritual. We see this in the opening moments, when the priest would address the goddesses Gulš and Maḫ as 'those who create humanity' (*antuḫšan kuiēš šamnieškanz[i]*, line 17). But beyond simple evidence as to the importance of humanity in the cosmos, the language here may provide insight into how the Hittites imagined the goddesses to have created humans in the first place. H. Otten and J. Siegelová observe that the term 'create' (*šamnāi-*) refers elsewhere to the act of divine creation (e.g., CTH 345.i.3.1).[14] Thus we read in the prayer to the Sun-god, for example: 'you made me, you created me' (*zikmuiaš zikmu šamnaeš*, KUB 30.10 Rs. 12).[15] However, there appears to be more taking place here than simply an act of general divine creation. Based on the way the text describes the process, the goddesses did not just 'create' and bring everything into being in an instant. Rather, they appear to have put some effort into shaping or fashioning their human creations. The sense we get is that the creator goddesses gave shape to humanity the way they are said elsewhere to have 'fashioned the shape of Gilgameš, the great gods' (^{d}GILGAMEŠ-*un* ALAM-*an* … *šamnéerma* / *šallauš* DINGIR.MEŠ-*uš*, KUB 8.57 Vs. 4).[16]

But in this particular ritual, there is reason to understand the term *šamnāi* in an even more specific way. The verb signifies the act of fashioning, to be sure. However, I tend to think that in this anthropogeny, it

[13] Güterbock, 1951, 153; Otten and Siegelová, 1970, 32–33.
[14] Otten and Siegelová, 1970, 38.
[15] Text/trans. from Schwemer, 2015, 355, 357; cf. Otten and Siegelová, 1970, 38.
[16] Text CHD vol. Š, 125; trans. Puhvel, 2017, 99.

specifically depicts the goddesses as having 'forged' humans the way a metal worker would have forged a metal object in fire (e.g., Bo 3371, 6–12; KBo 8.102, 7–8; 17.46, 28; 22.224 Vs. 2).[17] Indeed, it is plausible to think that the Gulš-deities 'forged' humans like a sacred object (e.g., Bo 2931 IV 10).[18] This would resemble what we observe among the Mesopotamians and Israelites. In Mesopotamian lore, the gods did not just 'create' humans, but they 'fashioned' (see Akk.: *eṣēru*; Sum.: ḪUR) them like a craftsman would have fashioned a cult object. Likewise, the Israelites imagined YHWH as having 'created' (ברא) and 'shaped' (יצר) the first human from the dust of the earth. And Egyptians envisioned Khnum as actually shaping the human body from a lump of clay on his potter's wheel. There was great concern among the ancients to understand not just *that* their gods created humans, but *how* they went about doing so. It is thus not difficult to think that, like their neighbours, the Hittites also imagined their gods to have 'forged' the human like a primordial craftsman. They did not just create humans, but they went to great lengths to craft them as an artisan crafting, in this case, a metal image.

There is another reason why I think the Hittites thought of humanity's creation within the framework of metal work. Evidence for what I am suggesting may be found in the way the myth depicts the human body. In the following line, we find a reference to the 'human body' (*antuḫši* . . . NÍ. T[E], CTH 434.1 line 18). While the text is quite broken, we have enough evidence to know that it contains an anthropogeny, and there is additional reason to be certain that *šamnāi* refers to an act of 'forging'.

We do not get explicit information about the source or substance from which the deities forged the human body. However, in addition to the language of 'forging', there is reason to think that the deities used metal-rich soil to do so. Several items point us in this direction. To begin with, for the Hittites, iron had cosmological significance. As Siegelová and H. Tsumoto observe, the universe was composed of a divine metal substance.[19] Ü. Yalçın points out that the heavens/sky was often called 'iron sky' (AN.BAR-*aš nepiš*).[20] Thus we read about the 'sky of iron' (*ne-e-pi-iš* AN.BAR-*aš*, KUB 33.34 obv. 9).[21] When they encountered meteoric iron, Hittites imagined it to have fallen from the sky as if a

[17] See Puhvel, 2017, 99. [18] Otten and Siegelová, 1970, 38.
[19] Siegelová and Tsumoto, 2011, 276; cf. Siegelová, 1984, 91–100; Güterbock and Hoffner, 1989, 449–50.
[20] Yalçın, 1997, 184; cf. Güterbock and Hoffner, 1989, 449, 453.
[21] Text/trans. Güterbock and Hoffner, 1989, 453.

chunk of the upper realm had broken off and plummeted to earth. What is more, as J. Puhvel has shown, gods' images were frequently constructed out of iron.[22] Hence, they commonly designated statues and images as 'image[s] of iron' (ALAM AN.BAR).[23] V. Cordani insists that in many cases, iron was used instead of stone or wood in statue production.[24] Taracha notes that the soul may have had a metallic nature, as Hittites depicted the souls of both gods and humans 'in symbolic form as objects of precious metal'.[25]

As Yalçın observes, Hittites had a high view of 'iron' in particular (Sum.: AN.BAR; also Hitt.: *hapalki-*).[26] They knew that their Anatolian ancestors were among the first peoples to produce iron as early as the third mill. BCE.[27] In many ways, they viewed iron as the most important metal because of its strength, its beauty and its rarity. Due to its strength, iron gave them advantages in battle. Due to its beauty, it also gave them advantages in commerce. We do not know much about what the cosmos was made of, though we have reason to think that Hittites imagined it along these lines, as being fundamentally metal at its core. When we understand Hittite attitudes towards iron, it makes sense to think that they understood the gods to have 'forged' the cosmos out of this celestial material. This is why they used it to forge images of their gods from iron. After all, why would the gods want to inhabit bodies made of anything other than this divine substance.

Within this framework, the Hittites found it quite natural to speak of the creator goddesses as having forged the human body out of the material of the earth. For they were well aware of where precious materials like iron ultimately came from: the metal ores of the earth. Indeed, the material of which the heavens were made were actually found within and could thus be taken from the material deposits in the earth. And it was this same material earth from which the creator deities created the human body. Rather than merely stating that their gods 'shaped' the human from clay like a potter, which would have resonated especially in places like Egypt where clay played a key role in society, the Hittites therefore maintained that their gods in fact forged the human from metal-rich soil. Far more than mere clay, Hittites of Anatolia knew that it was specifically such metal-rich soils that were critical to their life and existence as a people. This cosmological and pedological evidence certainly gives us reason to see the body as having had a metallic nature in Hittite thought.

[22] Puhvel, 1991, 116–17, 393. [23] Puhvel, 1991, 393. [24] Cordani, 2016, 172.
[25] Taracha, 2009, 158. [26] Puhvel, 1991, 116. [27] Yalçın, 1997; Cordani, 2016.

Additionally, the link between the river setting of the ritual might also be suggestive of the way the Hittites understood the human's ontological constitution. The 'River Ritual' of course took place on the banks of a river, a location that also had ties to iron. Not only were the Hittites among the first to produce iron, but they understood where to find the best iron ores. Importantly, iron produced from ores taken from river soil in northern Anatolia had high nickel content. Iron from this region was widely known to be rustproof and of high quality.[28] We do not know precisely at which river the 'River Ritual' was performed. However, this text was discovered at Büyükkale in the ancient Hittite city of Boğazköy in northern Anatolia. It is possible that the ritual was performed at one of the rivers from which these high nickel mineral ores were drawn. When ritual participants recalled the moments the Gulš-deities created the first humans, they may well have imagined them to have drawn the primordial substance from this rich river soil and, like a divine metalworker, to have forged these high-quality metals into the shape of the human body. Having come from the cosmic material, the body would thus have been fundamentally metallic as well.

Hittite anthropogeny resembles other near eastern myths that depict gods shaping the human body from a basic substance. However, the Hittite text overlaps in other ways with Mesopotamian myths in particular. For example, in the Sumerian *The Song of the Hoe*, the gods 'separate' (Sum.: bad) divine from nondivine to create two separate spheres of existence (cf. *Enuma Eliš*).[29] Likewise, in this Hittite account of creation, the gods 'split' (*šarrir*) the singular sphere into separate spheres of being (CTH 434.1, line 9; cf. CTH 345.i.3.1; cf. KUB 33.106 Rs. III lines 40–42, 52–54). Moreover, in both the Akkadian Atraḫasīs (I.247) and the Hittite 'River Ritual', a mother goddess brings humanity into existence.[30] In light of these commonalities, we have reason to think that the Hittites imagined human origins along the same lines as their Mesopotamian neighbours. But as we have seen, there were some fundamental differences, particularly with regard to what the human body was made of.

We do not have access to a full Hittite cosmogony or anthropogeny. However, even from this broken ritual, we gain some insight into assumptions about the basic constitution of the human body. We can be somewhat confident that they viewed the body as fundamentally metallic in

[28] Yalçın, 1997, 184. [29] Otten and Siegelová, 1970, 37.
[30] Otten and Siegelová, 1970, 38.

nature. We also get some sense of the general anthropogenic framework within which Hittites thought about human origins. They saw a correspondence between both humans and gods *and* humans and the cosmos. This will become important as we take a closer look at the terms the Hittites used to speak about key aspects of human nature.

Body and Soul in Hittite Thought

As noted previously, the Hittites used many terms to describe the different aspects of the self. However, as Taracha has shown, humans resembled the gods specifically because both possessed a 'body' (*tuekka-*) and a 'soul' (*ištanza[n]-*).[31] Based on their shared make-up, there was a kinship between the two categories of beings.

Since we have already made some observations about the body, let me offer a few more at this point from sources outside of the 'River Ritual'. Hittites seem to have held the body in high esteem, perhaps because it was inseparable from the soul. There was no sense in which the body and soul were dualistically separate from one another.[32] The latter inhabited the former, but both interacted with one another in intimate ways. Kammenhuber notes the way gods would act upon the body in ways that would impact the soul.[33] B. Christiansen argues that the soul's well-being was dependant on the purity of one's body.[34] Purity was especially important in the context of the royal figure. Because of his unique relationship to the divine and mortal worlds, the king's purity was critical both for his own well-being and for that of his land and people.[35]

In addition to the body, the self consisted of a lesser-material soul.[36] Whereas the body and soul were intimately bound together, the soul enjoyed some autonomy.[37] Thus insomnia was caused by a soul that was unable to remain still in the body (KUB 4.47 obv. 2). Likewise, the Hittites believed that when Telipinu would get angry, his 'soul . . . [would become] a blazing fire' (ZI=ŠU . . . *pāḫḫur*, KUB 17.10 iii 21–22). The soul could also experience impurity, disorder, joy, satisfaction and other emotions and reactions (e.g., KUB 6.45 i 25–ii 26).[38] But unlike the body, which would eventually decay, the soul lived on in the afterlife (see esp. KUB 43.60 i 28–30; CTH 457.7.1).

[31] Taracha, 2009, 158. [32] Kammenhuber, 1965, 215.
[33] Kammenhuber, 1965, 184–91. [34] Christiansen, 2013.
[35] Kammenhuber, 1965, 192; Miller, 2013, 33; Wilhelm, 1999.
[36] Kammenhuber, 1964, 154–208. [37] Kammenhuber, 1964, 172.
[38] Kammenhuber, 1964, 170–76.

Not much is said about the nature of the soul, other than that it would live on in the afterlife. I offer some thoughts below on the potentially liquid nature of the soul. Regardless of what it actually was, the human and god's soul were ontologically the same. As we read:

> (21') UN-*aš* DINGIR^{MEŠ}-*aš-ša* ZI-*an-za ta-ma-a-iš ku-iš-ki UL* ⌜*ki*⌝*-i-pát ku-it UL* (22') ZI-*an-za-ma* 1-*aš-pát* ... (28') ZI DINGIR-*LÌ-ma ta-ma-a-iš ku-iš-ki.*
>
> (21') Is the mind [lit.: 'soul'] of man and (that) of the gods somehow different? No! (And) in regard to this very (matter)? No! (22′) The mind [lit.: 'soul'] is indeed one and the same ... (28') And is the spirit [lit.: 'soul'] of a deity somehow different? (CTH 264 §2' 21'–22', 28', text/trans. Miller, 2013, 248–49)[39]

This instruction is directed towards the temple personnel. Nevertheless, the remark about the nature of the soul (ZI) is important. J. Miller's translation is useful for drawing the connection between the human and deity's soul. However, A. Taggar-Cohen's rendering of ZI consistently as 'soul' makes this connection explicit.[40] By virtue of their soul, humans somehow shared in the same state of the gods. Although a deity's soul was more powerful, the text makes explicit that the nature of the soul was the same regardless of whose it was (e.g., KUB 33.68 ii 1–2).[41]

Hittitologists have debated the etymology of *ištanzan-* ('soul') for some time.[42] The debate tends to surround the Hittite term's Indo-European root. As several scholars have noted, the Hittite term *ištanzan-* resembles the term for 'stele' or 'altar' (*ištanana-*; ZAG.GAR.RA). This is true of the respective Luwian terms as well (*tanit-*; *danit-*; *tanisa-*).[43] As F. Giusfredi has convincingly shown, both *ištanzan-* and *ištanana-* likely originated from the same Indo-European root *$*steh_2$-* ('to put, place').[44]

Hittites seem to have imagined a link between physical cult objects and the human soul. Perhaps the link originated from funerary traditions, where the soul and stele became one when the former came to inhabit the latter. This is precisely what we find in the Kuttamuwa Stele.[45] Whereas Egyptians, Mesopotamians and Israelites saw a link between the human *body* and the cult object, the Hittites saw a link between the human *soul* and the cult object. This presents us with a rather more

[39] See also Neu, 1968, 166, whom Miller also cites; Taggar-Cohen, 2014, 33–34.
[40] Taggar-Cohen, 2014, 33. [41] Kammenhuber, 1964, 170–76.
[42] See Puhvel, 1984, 468–71; Melchert, 2003a, 129–39.
[43] See Kloekhorst, 2008, s.v. *ištanzan*. [44] Giusfredi, 2016.
[45] See Melchert, 2010. Cf. Hutter, 1993; Hawkins, 2000, 445–47.

difficult situation. It is easy to understand how an immaterial soul could inhabit a material stele. It is quite another to think of the soul and the stele sharing in the same type of physicality.

Perhaps Hittites conceived of the 'soul' like Homer, who considered it less a specific part of the self and more like the self in toto (Hom., *Il.* I.3, 4). Rather than using the Greek term ψυχή of the 'soul', Homer used the term θυμός. For him, the soul was that aspect of the self that imparted life to the body. It was not here or there but dispersed throughout the body. Likewise, when the Hittites thought of the 'soul' (*ištanzan-*), they envisioned that aspect of the self that permeated and therein imparted life to the physical body. When they thought of the 'stele' (*ištanana-*), they then imagined a firm (hence **steh*$_2$-) object that had been brought to life by the human or deity inside it. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to see how Homer perhaps derived his ideas about the soul from his Anatolian predecessors. This would not be the only idea for which he owed the Hittites credit.

Kinship with the Gods

Evidence about human nature is difficult to find in the Hittite sources. However, we can see that by virtue of their possession of a body and soul, humans existed in kinship with both the cosmos and the gods. Here as in Egypt and Mesopotamia, the 'individual' was not just viewed in kinship to its social group. Rather, it was also bound to the cosmos and the gods, and it could not be understood apart from these.[46] The body shared in the metallic nature of the cosmos, while the soul was also quasi-material in nature. What is more, the human soul shared in the same ontological state as the deity's soul. It not only had the same experiences and abilities as the deity's soul, but it was apparently composed of the same stuff as well. Given the links between the body, soul and other embodied space, it will be important now to explore Hittite conceptions of divine embodiment in cult objects.

Hittite Conceptions of the Divine

With a basic idea about the human in hand, I shall now look at Hittite conceptions of the divine. Among the Hittites, one finds a broad idea of what is and what is not divine. Hundley provides a helpful analysis of Hittite conceptions of the divinity of both living beings and inanimate

[46] Snell, 2005b.

objects.[47] But understanding this is not always easy in Western circles. As Hundley writes, 'The Hittite divine world is characterized by a remarkable diversity, including seemingly inanimate objects like the hearth with no apparent individuation as well as the human-like rulers of the universe'.[48] When we 'allow the Hittite data to speak for itself', we can see that Hittite conceptions of the divine were more inclusive than ours. The 'divine category' was fluid enough to include a sacred object *and* a member of the pantheon.[49]

Hundley offers two thoughts that are helpful in how we understand *divinity* in Hittite thinking. First, he observes the ways the Hittites identified what they believed to be divine. They, of course, identified gods using the Sumerian dingir (= ^{d}).[50] But there were less explicit ways by which they did so. For example, to worship such an object was a way of indicating that one considered it divine.

Second, Hundley notes a number of different inanimate objects that took on divine properties and statuses.[51] These range from celestial bodies such as the sun, moon and stars to many other 'mundane' elements in nature.[52] Mountains, rivers, springs, seas, winds, clouds, plants, stones and metals could participate in the divine state. Some elements, including metals in particular, were even so divine that they threatened the standing and power of the great gods themselves.[53]

The Deification of Material Objects

Like their neighbours, the Hittites believed that otherwise mundane, nondivine material objects could become divine. They could become what Hundley calls a 'receptacle' for a deity.[54] As he explains:

> As in Mesopotamia, [so also in Hittite Anatolia] a deity's cult image(s) in the temple served as a locus of divine presence, which could be served, addressed, and appealed to as the otherwise distant deity itself.[55]

Similarly, B. Collins shines light on the place of divine embodiment in Hittite iconography.[56] On this matter, she makes two especially important claims. One, she recognises the centrality of the material image in the temple.[57] The cult object was the reason for which the building existed. It was the image that, in essence, made the building deified space in the first place.

[47] Hundley, 2014. [48] Hundley, 2014, 177. [49] Hundley, 2014, 177.
[50] Hundley, 2014, 177. [51] Hundley, 2014, 177–78. [52] Hundley, 2014, 178.
[53] Hundley, 2014, 178. [54] Hundley, 2014, 193. [55] Hundley, 2014, 193.
[56] Collins, 2005. [57] Collins, 2005, 13.

Two, Hittites believed in the reality of the divine manifestation or embodiment within the cult object.[58] The deity was alive in the statue, and the statue in effect became the deity in bodily form. The statue was thus 'clothed, fed, bathed (usually prior to a ritual service), entertained' and treated as if it were the deity itself.[59]

Embodiment in Cult Objects

Some cult objects represented a given deity in appearance, while others retained their natural form.[60] It will be important to look at each type of embodied space, beginning with anthropomorphic images first.

Hittites thought of cult objects as divine embodied space. In fact, they spoke of the divine image as the physical 'body' (*tuekka-*; NÍ.TE) of a deity on earth. An important reference to the image as a body comes in a prayer text that I. Singer believes may have been composed by Ḫattušili III (ca. 1267–1237 BCE).[61] In this prayer, the petitioner beseeches the Storm-god of Nerik to attend a festival.[62] He calls upon the deity to come from wherever he is – heaven and earth, sunrise and sunset – 'to the place where your body and soul are' (*tuel* NÍ.TE ZI=KA-*ya kuedani pé-di eḫu*, CTH 386.1 = KUB 36.90 obv. 21–22, trans. Singer; cf. CTH 372.9 ii 16–28; 373.2 obv. 6–10).

The Storm-god enjoyed a somewhat omnipresent constitution. However, he also possessed a specific 'body' (NÍ.TE), which was his cult statue in the temple in Nerik.[63] Here one would find the deity's 'soul' (ZI), which resided within the deity's statue-body at Nerik. The deity's image was his physical body, and in his fluidity, he could be both *out there* in creation and *right here* in Nerik in body and soul.

We find another such reference in the 'Prayer of Arnuwanda and Asmunikal to the Sun-goddess of Arinna about the Ravages of the Kaska' (CTH 375; KUB 31.124).[64] Singer explains that the prayer was prayed to the Sun-goddess after the Kaska tribes destroyed several cult centres.[65] Early on, the royal couple remind the gods how well they have always cared for the divine cult (CTH 375 §1'–10' [1.A i 1'–1.B i 17]). Here we read:

[58] Collins, 2005, 13. [59] Collins, 2005, 13. [60] Collins, 2005.
[61] Singer, 2002, 106. [62] Singer, 2002, 106.
[63] Cf. Taracha, 2009, 102. On this god, see Green, 2003, 142–43.
[64] Singer, 2002, 40. See also Ünal, 1991, 799–802; Haas, 2006, 255.
[65] Singer, 2002, 40.

§4' [I.A i 9'–13'] *nu=š*[*ma-aš* É.DINGIR]^{MEŠ}*-KU-NU na-aḫ-ša-ra-at-ta-an ki-iš-ša-an UL* [*ku-iš-ki t*]*i-ya-an ḫar-ta* nu=z(a) šu-me-en-za-an *Š*[*A* DINGIR^{MEŠ}] *āš-šū* KÙ.BABBAR GUŠKIN *BI-IB-RI*$^{ḪI.A}$ TÚG$^{ḪI.A}$ *an-ze-el i-wa-ar* EGIR-*an UL ku-iš-ki kap-pu-u-wa-an ḫar-ta*

§5' [I.A i 14'–18'] *nam-ma* ⌈*šu*-me⌉*-en-za-an* DINGIR^{MEŠ} *-aš ku-e* ALAM$^{ḪI.A}$ *- KU-NU ŠA* KÙ.BABBAR GUŠKIN *nu-uš-ša-an* ⌈*ku*⌉-e-da-ni DINGIR-*LIM -ni ku-it tu-e-ek-ki-iš-ši an-da ú-ez-z* [*ap*] *a-an* DINGIR^{MEŠ} *-ša ku-e Ú-NU-TE*^{MEŠ} *ú-ez-za-pa-an-ta na-at an-z* [*ee*] *l i-*⌈*wa*⌉ *-ar* EGIR *-pa Ú-ul ku-iš-ki ne-u-wa-aḫ-ḫa-a*[*n ḫar-t*]*a*[66]

§4' [I.A i 9'–13'] No [one] had ever shown more reverence to your [rites(?)]; no one had ever taken care of your divine goods – silver and gold rhyta, and garments – as we have.

§5' [I.A i 14'–18'] Furthermore, your divine images of silver and gold, when anything had grown old on some god's body, or when any objects of the gods had grown old, no one had ever renewed them as we have. (CTH 375 §4'–5' [I.A i 9'–18'], trans. Singer, 2002, 41)

The 'divine image' (Sum.: ALAM) is called the deity's 'body' (Hitt.: *tuekka*), the physical space in which the deity dwells. Interestingly, Hittites saw no problem with the idea of a deity's body wearing out. This was simply what happened to physical bodies, whether divine, human or other. It was thus a privilege to care for those bodies when they did wear out. The caretakers' efforts enabled the gods to remain in bodily form among their people (cf. KUB 17.21 i 19–20).[67]

Just as the physical body provided a dwelling space for the human's 'soul', so also the divine image provided a dwelling space for the deity's 'soul'. There was a direct correspondence between the role of the human body and the role of the divine statue. Both were a type of space in which the otherwise disembodied presence could reside.

Gods also inhabited another type of object called a *šena-* ('statuette', 'effigy', 'substitute'; cf. *ešri-*).[68] Collins explains that the term *šena-* 'generally refers to smaller, but also exclusively anthropomorphic figurines or statuettes'.[69] These statuettes tended to be at the centre of magical rituals. As an 'effigy', a *šena-* was created to look like a deity so that it might contain the deity's 'essence'. It served as a 'terminal' or 'substitute' for the deity, enabling it to be present in physical form.[70]

Such cult objects were linked ontologically to the gods they represented. The *šena-* was therefore not merely a 'symbolic representation'

[66] Text Rieken et al (ed.), hethiter.net/: CTH 375.1 (TX 2016-01-15, TRde 2017-08-09).
[67] Hoffner, Jr., 1996, 256. [68] Collins, 2005, 20. [69] Collins, 2005, 20.
[70] Collins, 2005, 20.

but instead an 'embodied double'. Like the *tuekka-*, the *šena-* served as the physical space in which a deity's soul could reside. Much like physical objects used in sympathetic magical rituals, the material object could bear the deity's presence in such a way that one could beseech or physically manipulate it in the hopes of obtaining a favour.[71]

Embodiment was possible in non-anthropomorphic cult objects as well. Whereas the *šena-* resembled the deity within it, the *ḫuwaši-* (Sum.: ^{NA4}ZI.KIN, 'cult stele') did not. In a secular sense, *ḫuwaši-*s were large stones used as boundary markers. However, the same object was also used in cultic settings. Here *ḫuwaši-*s took the form of large cult stelae that were placed throughout Anatolia and served as divine bodies.[72]

*ḫuwaši-*s were especially prevalent in open-air sanctuaries outside the cities. However, T. Bryce notes that they were also placed inside temple sanctuaries (CTH 636; KUB 20.99).[73] *ḫuwaši-*s were likely in use during pre-historic times, when divine representations took much simpler forms.[74] Given the tendency of the Hittites to subsume primitive beliefs in their own cult, such a suggestion is certainly reasonable. Furthermore, whereas *šena-*s were small enough to carry in processions outside of the temples, *ḫuwaši-*stones were large and immovable.[75] They were intended to remain in place for the duration of their cultic life, much like the standing stones that pepper the Syro-Palestinian landscape.[76]

Like the anthropomorphic representations, *ḫuwaši-*s were also treated as living gods (e.g., KUB 7.5 iv 12–16; CTH 525.0; KBo 20.90). In fact, Bryce observes that *ḫuwaši-*s were 'treated exactly the same way as a statue of the god'.[77] This is evident in one text, where we read, 'Whatever cities of Arma-Tarhunta (there are), they stand her [Ištar] as a stele [^{NA4}ZI.KIN = *ḫuwaši*] behind each of them' (*nu* URU.DIDLI.$^{HI.A}$ *kuiēš kuiēš* [Š]*A* $^{m.d}$SIN.^{d}U *n=an=kan ḫūmanti=ya=pat* EGIR-*an* ^{NA4}ZI.KIN [*t*] *ittanuškanzi*, KUB 1.1 iv 71–73, my trans.).[78] The hope here is that Ištar might take her place in each cult centre inside the physical body

[71] See Collins, 2005, 20–21.

[72] On Hittite *ḫuwaši-*s and various stelae, see e.g., Popko, 1978, 123–26; Dietrich, Loretz and Mayer, 1989; Hutter, 1993, 91–95, 103–04; Collins, 2005, 26–27; Cammarosano, 2015. Cf. *uliḫi-*s, or fine wool threads.

[73] Güterbock, 1983, 215, whom Collins cites; Bryce, 2004, 156; Collins, 2005, 26–27.

[74] Cf. Cammarosano, 2015, 25–26.

[75] Collins, 2005, 28.

[76] See our discussion of these in Chapter 5. Scholars continue to discuss the relationship between Hittite, Canaanite and Israelite standing stones. See e.g., Götze, 1957, 168–69; Gurney, 1977, 36–37; Hutter, 1993; Popko, 1993; Collins, 2005, 26.

[77] Bryce, 2004, 156.

[78] Cf. Puhvel, 1991, 194.

(^{NA4}ZI.KIN or *ḫuwaši*) awaiting her arrival. Because gods actually lived inside *ḫuwaši*-s, Hittites would present offerings and pray to them as if they were speaking directly to the deity (see KBo XX 4 i 2; KUB 2.3 ii 32–34; 53.8 Rs. 9).[79]

After looking at these cult objects, it is worth stepping back and looking more generally at how the deity's presence inhabited such spaces. In this regard, the term *šiuniyatar-* shines critical light on Hittite beliefs about divine embodiment.[80] *Šiuniyatar-* is an abstract form of *šiuni-* ('divine', 'deity') and is generally translated 'divine image'[81] or 'divine manifestation'.[82] Hundley explains that, during the Empire period (ca. 1380–1200 BCE), *šiuniyatar-* would designate the 'specific concrete manifestation, the cult image, understood to be a perceptible manifestation of deity on earth'.[83] Through the material *šiuniyatar-*, the deity (*šiuni-*) could manifest itself 'in a manner that could be perceived by the human senses'.[84] Moreover, when they did manifest themselves in such a way, they did so without diluting their power or presence.[85] Instead, the more bodies a deity inhabited, the more his or her presence and potency increased.

P. Goedegebuure further clarifies the relationship between the deity and its cult body. She understands *šiuniyatar-* as 'the godhood, the divine nature of a deity, the set of properties and manifestations in the earthly realm that identifies a deity as a supernatural being instead of a human, the numen'.[86] The sources do not distinguish between the deity's presence and the object it embodied (e.g., CTH 386.1 = KUB 36.90 obv. 21–22). This is because the deity and its body were one and the same. Collins likewise asserts, 'the application of the word *šiuniyatar-* to a representation implies that, anthropomorphic or otherwise, the representation was imbued with the divine essence, i.e., that the deity was present'.[87] It refers not simply to the 'divine image' but to the 'fully fused statue plus godhead'.[88]

M. Cammarosano likewise argues that the cult object 'did not turn into the cult image until the god settled into it'.[89] Cammarosano explains that in a well-known ritual, the Goddess of the Night 'is asked to preserve its "person" (NÍ.TE, Hittite *tuekka-*), but to "divide" (*šarra-*)

[79] Özgüç and Özgüc, 1949, 69–72 and pls. viii–x; Darga, 1969, 16, with pls. i, ii (whom Collins [2005, 26n48] cites); Puhvel, 1991, 438–41; Collins, 2005, 28–29.
[80] Collins, 2005, 21. [81] Collins, 2005, 21. [82] Hundley, 2013, 324.
[83] Hundley, 2013, 324. [84] Hundley, 2013, 324. [85] Hundley, 2013, 325.
[86] Goedegebuure, 2012, 420. [87] Collins, 2005, 21. [88] Collins, 2005, 21.
[89] Cammarosano, 2018, 60.

its divinity (*šiuniyatar*) in order to settle (also) into the new statuette'.[90] As the text reads:

> Honoured deity! Preserve your being, but divide your divinity! Come to that new house, too, and take yourself the honoured place'. (CTH 481 §22 = KUB 29.4 iii 26–27, trans. Miller, 2004, 209)[91]

The clear implication here is that the goddess could install her 'divinity' (*šiuniyatar-*) in more than one location at once. All the while, she retained her singular 'being' (so Miller), 'person' (so Cammarosano), 'embodiment' (so CAD)[92] or, as I have translated it, 'body'. It is clear that the goddess was not being asked to 'divide' (*šarra-*) herself to the point that she was no longer two separate entities. She always remained a singular deity, even though her essence went on to inhabit multiple spaces. Once her 'soul' settled into the new statue, the goddess' presence only increased, as she had yet another body through which to extend her reach.

The Human As Embodied, Heterotopian Space

Hittite gods could reside in material objects simultaneously. All the while, they retained their unique identities and potency. As intriguing as theology is, my concern is how this helps us understand Hittite anthropology.

We have begun to see the functional and ontological correspondence between the human and the cult object. There was a direct connection between the 'body' and 'statue' (*tuekka-*), on the one hand, and the 'soul' (*ištanzan-*) and stele (*ištanan-*), on the other. Functionally, the human body (*tuekka-*) was the physical space housing the soul until that body died. After that, the soul (*ištanzan-*) would journey elsewhere, perhaps taking up residence in a 'stele' (*ištanan-*). Likewise, the cultic body (*tuekka-*, *ḫuwaši-*, *šena-*) was the physical space housing the deity's soul (*ištanzan-*), again, until that body decayed. After that, the deity's soul would install itself in another cultic body. Ontologically, both gods and humans had a soul that could take up residence in a physical body.

It will be useful to make some theoretical observations on what we have seen to this point. When we consider what we have found within the framework of divine embodiment, we begin to gain insight into Hittite conceptions of the self. Hittite ideas surrounding human nature cannot be

[90] Cammarosano, 2018, 60.
[91] Quoted in Cammarosano, 2018, 60.
[92] CAD vol. P: 6.

understood apart from their ideas about the cosmos. The human is a by-product of the very material of which the cosmos was made. When we think of the Hittite universe, we see that they imagined two distinct spheres of existence. After all, the gods separated the divine from the nondivine at the outset. However, we do not get the sense that the two spheres ever became entirely separate from one another. Heaven and earth, god and human, divine and nondivine existed in proximity to one another. It was difficult to tell where the line was between the two. If the cosmos was a single space, it was truly heterotopian, in that it consisted of two radically different types of space.

Having been created from the cosmic material, the human was a living extension of the cosmos. Like the cosmos from which it came, the self was also a heterotopia. Thus, both the universe and the self consisted of a physical aspect and a spiritual or disembodied aspect. The earth was the physical aspect of the cosmos, while the body was the physical aspect of the self. Both were composed, on a fundamental level, of the same metallic substance.

But the cosmos also had a spiritual or disembodied dimension. This was where the gods lived and operated when they were not embodied within a physical space. When they wanted to interact with creation, they would install themselves either within geological or meteorological elements or within cult objects. In both cases, they would make themselves present in powerful ways in real space and time.

Like the cosmos, the human self also had a spiritual or disembodied aspect. This came in the form of its soul. Incidentally, the soul of the human was no different from that of a deity. Both enjoyed the same traits, and both had the same desire, namely, to inhabit a physical body. The human inhabited the human body, while the deity's soul inhabited a cult object. When this happened, the space that was otherwise a singular space became a truly heterotopian space. It was a space comprising two different aspects, or two different types of space.

Unlike in Egypt, Mesopotamia and Israel, in Anatolia there is no mention of humans as the 'image of God/gods'. However, both images and humans were functionally and ontologically related to one another. The body and soul were not dualistically separate. Instead, humans were a monism, a fusion of earthly body and divine soul. With two parts whose constitutions intermixed so much that they could not be distinguished from one another, the human had some share in the divine nature even in the present life. In what sense is difficult to know. But one particularly intriguing Hittite ritual would seem to provide insight into the nature of this relationship.

THE ROYAL SELF AS EMBODIED SPACE

The Divinity of the Hittite Monarch

Like their Egyptian and Mesopotamian neighbours, the Hittites believed that the king had a special relationship to the divine.[93] Scholars do not fully agree on what this means.[94] However, it is generally accepted that the king enjoyed a special relationship to the gods by virtue of his royal and priestly office.

The King As a God after Death

The Hittites' limited view of the king's divinity was likely related to broader Hittite views of the political authority of the king. As T. Ishida explains, the Hittites did not view the king as having absolute power the way their Egyptian and Mesopotamian neighbours viewed their rulers. In fact, it was not until the middle of the second mill. BCE when Hittites began to accept that the king was divinely elected.[95]

Regardless of the king's nature during his life on earth, he knew he would become a god *after* death.[96] Hittite funerary inscriptions regularly claim that the royal figure had 'become a god' (Hitt.: DINGIR^{LIM}*-iš kiš-/ kikkiš-*) in the afterlife.[97] Death was the moment when the ruler underwent apotheosis and 'became a god'.[98] At that moment, the king also inherited superhuman powers. In order to ensure that his spirit did not wreak havoc on the living, survivors would thus pray to him and seek to appease him as they did other gods.[99]

The Monarch As the Manifestation of the Gods

Beckman argues that the Hittite king enjoyed a share in the divine even before death.[100] While he did not become an elevated member of the pantheon until after death, he still had some share in the divine existence while alive. As Beckman explains:

> When a monarch died, his survivors said that he 'had become a god' (*šiuniš kiš-*). This turn of phrase clearly indicates that up until that moment, he had occupied a status other than that of a deity. Yet a number of iconographic representations of

[93] See Hazenbos, 2003, 201–03.
[94] See Götze, 1957, 89–91; Gurney, 1958; Hazenbos, 2003, 201n82.
[95] Ishida, 1974, 17. [96] Collins, 2007, 97. [97] See Hutter-Braunsar, 2001.
[98] For primary texts, see e.g., Hutter-Braunsar, 2001, 272–75.
[99] Collins, 2007, 97. See also Kassian, Korolëv and Sidel'tsev, 2002, 46–47; Martín, Echavarren and Medina, 2013, 178–79.
[100] Beckman, 2012.

Hittite rulers from the Empire period show them wearing the horns that across the cultures of the ancient Near East mark those who bear them as divine.[101]

It is well established that the living king 'occupied a different status other than that of a deity'. But it is also possible for him to have had some share in the divine while still alive, even if to a lesser degree than the true gods. This was true in Egypt and Mesopotamia, so it would not be a surprise to find it in Hittite Anatolia as well.

Beckman notes that in Hittite images dating to the thirteenth c. BCE, we find two types of representations that seem to indicate a belief in the divinity of the king. One type of representation depicts the king as resembling the Hittite Storm-god. Like the Storm-god, the king dons the helmet, kilt and weapon one would take into battle. Beckman refers to this as the 'helmeted' (*kurutauwant-*) mode.[102] King Mursili III (d. 1268 BCE) appears in one such representation, in which he wears the short kilt and peaked cap commonly worn by the Storm-god and other warrior-gods.[103] Likewise, in another relief, king Tudḫaliya IV (1237–1209 BCE) sports the horns of divinity and bears the title 'King of the World' (CTH 107 [RS 17.159]).[104] When seeing this representation of Tudḫaliya IV, it is hard not to think about the infamous Akkadian god-king, Narām-Sîn, who depicted himself in warrior-mode, wearing horns on his head, and who likewise called himself 'King of the Four Quarters'.

However, there are important differences between the kings and gods. For example, Beckman notes that 'the weapon brandished by the former is most often a mace, in keeping with the traditional Syro-Anatolian iconography of this figure'.[105] The king seems to have imitated the gods physically, but it was made clear in these images that he was not actually a true god just yet.

The second type of representation depicts the king not as a warrior but as a priest. Beckman refers to this type of representation as the *luppan-nauwant-* mode, or that of 'wearing a close-fitting cap'.[106] The *lupanni-*cap was one of the primary pieces of the king's garb. This is evident in the following text:

> [...]x TÚGNÍG.LÁM.MEŠ LUGAL-*UTTI waššiyanzi wašš*[*iyanzi=ma* ...] 1-*NUTUM* TÚGGÚ.È.A *HURRI* 1 TÚGE.ÍB 1 TÚG*lu*[*panni* ... M]EŠ 1-*NUTUM* TÚGGADA.DAMMEŠ 1-*NUTUM* KUŠE.SIR [...]

[101] Beckman, 2012, 605.
[102] Beckman, 2012, 606.
[103] See van den Hout, 1995, 568–70; Beckman, 2012, 606.
[104] On which, see Nougayrol, 1956, 126–27; Hutter-Braunsar, 2001, 266–67; Martín, Echavarren and Medina, 2013, 179.
[105] Beckman, 2012, 606.
[106] Beckman, 2012, 606.

> They dress [. . .] with the fine garments of kingship, they dre[ss . . .] with a Hurrian tunic, an E.ÍB garment, a *lu*[*panni*-cap, . . .] a pair of leggings, a pair of shoes [. . .]. (KUB 42.98 i 10'–12', text/trans. Mouton, 2018, 4)[107]

As A. Mouton observes, the *lupanni*-cap was among the 'fine garments of kingship'.[108]

Mouton discusses another source in which the *lupanni*-cap is found. In this ritual text, an individual would become a living substitute for the king in an attempt to prevent him from dying. In order to become his substitute, the individual would put on the royal-priestly garb otherwise worn by the king. In this moment, death would be transferred to the substitute king, and the king would live. As we read:

> [*kā*]*ša=wa kāš* LUGAL-*uš ŠUM* LUGAL-*UTTI=ya=w*[*a*]*=kan kēdani* [*tehhun* TÚG LU]GAL-*UTTI=ya kēdani waššiyanun* [TÚG]*lupannin=a=wa=kan kēdani šiyan*[*u*]*n*.
>
> '[S]ee! This one (is) the king. [I have placed] the name of kingship on this one and I have dressed this one with the [vestment] of kingship! I have placed the *lupanni*-cap on this one! (KUB 24.5++ Ro 20'–22', text/trans. Mouton, 2018, 4)[109]

This text provides insight into two important items. One, the king would wear the *lupanni*-cap when serving as priest. Here he was engaged in a life-saving ritual in which death would bypass him and find the substitute king, who was recognisable *as* the king because he was dressed in the king's clothes.

Two, the royal clothing had intrinsically mimetic power. On the one hand, to dress like a king was to claim a share in his selfhood. By wearing the king's clothes in the context of this ritual, the substitute king would *become* the de facto king and assume the death that would otherwise have found its way to the true king. The king's clothing thus had power beyond its elaborate appearance.

On the other hand, by dressing like the gods, the royal figure could claim a share in their nature. Thus, during a festival celebrating the prince, the royal figure would dress himself as if he were a deity:

> *mān lukkatta nu=za* DUMU.LUGAL TÚG DINGIR-*LIM* [*šarā*] *waššiēzzi* KUŠE.SIRHÁ BABBAR-*TIM šarkuzi*.
>
> When it is the next day, the prince wears the deity's vestment (and) he puts on white shoes. (KUB 56.35 lines 1–2; cf. Bo 3649 iii 1'–2', text/trans. Mouton, 2018, 4)

[107] Cf. Kümmel, 1967, 31. [108] Mouton, 2018, 4. [109] Cf. Kümmel, 1967, 10–11.

Likewise, during a festival in Nerik:

> *mān lukkatta* URU*Nerikki haššanzi* LUGAL-*uš=za* TÚG DINGIR-*LIM* TÚGGÚ.È.A *aduplit=a* [*w*]*aššiyazi išhuzzin=a=za=kan* [*i*]*šhuzziyaizzi* [TÚG*ka*]*ttiluri*xxxv *ŠA* DINGIR-*LIM* [*kal*]*muš* KUŠE.SIRHÁ [*šark*]*ueyazi*
>
> When, on the next day, they open in Nerik, the king [w]ears the deity's vestment(s), (namely) a tunic and an *adupli*-garment, and he puts on a belt. He [pu]ts on the [*ka*]*ttiluri*-[garment] of the deity, (his) [li]tuus (and his) shoes. (KUB 58.33 iii 24'–31', text/trans. Mouton)[110]

Both texts explicitly call the royal figure's clothing 'the deity's vestment' (TÚG DINGIR-*LIM*). Underlying these accounts is an assumption about the mimetic nature of divine and royal clothing. Just as the substitute king would become the king when wearing his garments, the king would likewise undergo deification when wearing the deity's garments. The texts themselves do not explain the metaphysical process that occurred when the king dressed like the gods. But based on the way the substitute king could become the king, it is not implausible to think that, at least during this festival, the king temporarily became a deity in the flesh, sharing in part in the ontology of the gods.

Beyond the texts, Hittite images also seem to indicate a belief in the mimetic nature of the royal clothing. Beckman points out instances in which the king would wear the same clothes as the gods he worshipped. We find this portrayal in a relief of king Muwattalli II (d. ca. 1272 BCE), in which the royal figure wears the priestly garb typically worn by the Sun-god.[111] Likewise, several stelae depict Tudḫaliya IV wearing a full-length robe, large hoop earrings and the priestly headgear commonly found in depictions of the Sun-god.[112] As the high priest, the Hittite king kept order between heaven and earth, between the gods and his people.[113] These representations assert a correspondence between the king and the Sun-god, such that the worshipper was to mimic the appearance of the divine worshippee.

On a relief at Fraktin, we find a similar depiction not only of the king but of the queen as well. Here Ḫattušili III (r. ca. 1267–1237 BCE) and his wife Puduḫepa worship the Storm-god and Sun-goddess.[114] Intriguingly,

[110] Mouton, 2018, 4. See also Haas, 1970, 260–63; Taggar-Cohen, 2006, 423–24.
[111] Beckman, 2012, 607. On Muwatalli II and Tudhaliya IV, see Klock-Fontanille, 2001, 295. Cf. Götze, 1947.
[112] Beckman, 2012, 607; cf. Götze, 1947; Neve, 1987.
[113] Beckman, 2012, 606–07; cf. Götze, 1947.
[114] Beckman, 2012, 606. See Otten, 1975, 21.

Puduḫepa resembles the goddess almost exactly, to the point that she 'presents a mirror image of the goddess she worships'.[115] She stands equal in size and dressed like her divine counterpart. By all appearances, Puduḫepa has become a physical similitude of the goddess she encounters.

At Acemhöyük, we find a similar image on a stamp seal impression.[116] On the right is a seated goddess, and on the left is a standing worshipper. Between the two stands a tall obelisk – probably a *ḫuwaši*.[117] In the scene, the standing figure offers a libation to the seated figure in what appears to be an act of worship. We know that the seated figure on the right is a goddess, a true deity. But the identity of the standing figure on the left is not as clear. Y. Heffron suggests that, based on the fact that he is wearing a horned, conical headdress, the figure is most likely another deity.[118] However, it seems more plausible to think of this figure not as a true god but as a deified royal figure who is presenting an offering to the goddess. That he dons the divine headdress need not indicate that he is an actual god. Rather, in this setting it might indicate that he is a deified human. The stele is then, in keeping with what we saw previously, the portal through which the human has gained entry into the goddess's world and made offerings to her. Upon entering her space, he has come to participate in her divine nature, even if he did not remain in this state once he leaves.

These representations seem to point to a belief about the royal figure's potential for divinity. In entering the divine space to worship, the monarch came to share in the divine nature. Yet while he or she could participate in the divine nature, he or she could not become a true deity just yet. As Beckman observes, in these images 'the Sun-god is always depicted beneath the winged solar disk, an attribute that never accompanies the king'.[119] Monarchs could participate in the divine nature. But even when they did, they could not become full deities until after they died.

The fact that the monarch could only enjoy a partial share in the divine nature during the present life raises another question. Might it be possible that the king or queen could become divine only during certain ritual events? This appears to be the case, especially given that all of the textual and iconographic examples we have cited are clearly concerned with

[115] Beckman, 2012, 609.
[116] van Loon, 1985, 9, pl. Xb; Heffron, 2016, 34. Cf. Dunand, 1954, 644–52, 878, pls. 21–32.
[117] Heffron, 2016, 34.
[118] Heffron, 2016, 34.
[119] Beckman, 2012, 607, quoting Güterbock, 1993, 225–26. Cf. Bittel, Boessneck and Damm, 1975, pl. 57; Güterbock, 2002, 49–50.

ritual events. Rather than walking around fully infused with the divine presence, perhaps the king or queen only experienced divine change during moments of direct contact with the gods or with the divine sphere.

We might consider the relief of queen Puduḫepa at Fraktin in this light. Perhaps the scene depicts a queen who is otherwise mortal outside of the worship setting but who has become deified upon entry into the deity's sanctuary. When we look closely at the image on the relief, we notice that the queen is not only presenting an offering to the deity. Rather, she is partaking in what appears to be a moment of commensality. Having taken on the appearance of the goddess, Puduḫepa now enjoys the sacred meal with the deity. She encounters the deity as one who now shares in the life of the one with whom she occupies the sacred table.

This interpretation of the Fraktin relief has its difficulties, to be sure. Especially notable is that the two figures do not appear to be ingesting any food or drink during their encounter. Thus, we cannot say for certain that this is truly a shared meal. However, such a suggestion is conceivable especially given that, as N. Özgüç points out, images of human worshippers and gods drinking together are common in Hittite iconography.[120] In fact, Heffron observes that Hittites would even construct shrines in their homes so that they could participate in ritual meals with their 'divine guests'.[121]

This certainly appears to be what is taking place in the Kültepe seal (KT.n/k 1833B).[122] This particular seal depicts a standing worshipper and seated deity stretching their cups towards each other 'as though clinking them', while a 'stream of flowing liquid connects the two cups'.[123] During these private worship services, the worshippers would not just make offerings to their divine guests. They would instead participate in the meal with them.

The Fraktin relief does not depict the moment in the meeting when the human and deity actually dine together. However, it does present the makings of such a narrative. Over the sacred altar, the queen would appear to commune with the goddess not as a human but as one of her own kind. While she is temporarily no longer simply human, she is not fully divine, either. After all, she still presents the meal to the goddess and not vice-versa. Nevertheless, in mimicking the deity's likeness, the queen

[120] Özgüç, 2006, pl. 54; cf. Beckman, 1983, 117.
[121] Özgüç, 2006, pl. 54; Heffron, 2014, 169–70.
[122] Özgüç, 2006, pl. 54; Heffron, 2014, 169–70. [123] Heffron, 2016, 170.

has become like her, and she can now proceed to enjoy her dining experience with the goddess.

É. Durkheim's thoughts on sacrificial meals certainly seem to ring true of Hittite conceptions of the ritual meal. He makes three points that shine light on what we have seen. One, as an event centred on food or drink, the libation ritual is unquestionably a type of meal.[124] Two, partaking in meals together creates 'a bond of artificial kinship among the participants'.[125] Three, the very ingestion of food is a transformative process, in which the ingestant 'constantly remakes the substance of the body'.[126]

Durkheim's remarks on sacrificial meals align with what we have seen so far. During certain rituals, humans could undergo deification upon entry into the divine world. No one, not even kings or queens, could become permanently deified in the present life. However, for the duration of the ritual meal, one could enjoy the divine existence. What Durkheim calls 'alimentary communion' seems to explain what is happening between the queen and the goddess in the Fraktin relief.[127] During the meal, the queen is able to enjoy a taste of the existence of her divine counterpart. But beyond that, it also moves us towards understanding an item we have now uncovered but need to discuss further: the motif of theophagy ('god eating') in Hittite thought.

Commensality, Union and Spatiality

The Hittite king and queen could enter divine space and share a meal with the gods. This encounter would lead to the monarch's temporary deification. But is there any evidence that helps us understand what this interaction would *do* to the royal self? By looking at a curious Hittite motif, we may get an answer to the question *in what sense* the royal self could participate in the divine state when he or she encountered the gods.

Mixture between the King and the Gods

The Hittites had a phrase that had to do with one's ability 'to drink a god'.[128] Thus Hittite sources regularly assert the phrase:

[124] Durkheim, 1995, 340–41. Here Durkheim is referencing Smith, 1894, lectures VI and XI, for whom ancient (Israelite) and modern sacrifice has more to do with communion with the divine than penance for one's sins.

[125] Durkheim, 1995, 340–41. [126] Durkheim, 1995, 340–41.

[127] Durkheim, 1995, 340–41.

[128] See the classic study by Kammenhuber, 1971, though I reach different conclusions from hers.

taknaš ^{d}UTU-*un ekuzi*

He drinks the Sun-goddess of the Earth. (KUB 30.23 iii 19, text/trans. Heffron, 2016, 165)

And again, we find a similar statement:

$_{3}$-*ŠU ekuzi* ^{d}Kataḫḫan ^{d}UTU ^{d}LAMMA LUGAL

He drinks thrice: the goddess Kataḫḫa, the Sun-god and the Protective Deity of the King. (IBoT 1.29 obv. 27, text/trans. Heffron, 2016, 165)

Scholars offer different interpretations of this language. Some see it as lacking any mystical or metaphysical meaning. Following Puhvel, C. Melchert argues that the phrase refers to drinking 'to the honour of a deity'.[129] Goedegebuure understands the language in terms of toasting the gods.[130] O. Soysal likewise regards it along the lines of drinking to (dative) or toasting (accusative) a deity, as in the phrase, 'He drinks to the Storm-god' (*ANA* ^{d}IŠKUR *ekuzi*).[131]

However, there are problems with this non-mystical interpretation. Soysal makes a strong argument against a metaphysical interpretation. One, he insists that the Hittite phrase derives from a Hattian original that supports an interpretation along the lines of drinking to or toasting a deity. Unfortunately, no original has yet to be found in any Hattian source.[132]

Two, Soysal accepts that the Hittites could 'drink' the soul of a deceased human.[133] Thus, he views the funerary practice of *šalliš waštaiš* as based on a belief that people could actually ingest the soul of their loved one (see e.g., KUB 30.15 obv. 19).[134] But he does not believe that the same was true of the deity's soul.[135] He insists instead that 'drinking a god' and 'drinking someone's soul' were seen as categorically distinct.

But Heffron points out that there is no reason to make a distinction between drinking a soul and drinking a deity. While Heffron agrees that 'a differentiation of meaning can be made between drinking a god and drinking a human soul', he adds that 'an absolute categorical distinction to altogether separate the two acts is unwarranted'.[136] Such a distinction becomes even less tenable when we consider that 'both phrases are constructed in an identical manner', and 'both describe the act of drinking

[129] Melchert, 1981; and see Puhvel, 1957, 31–33. [130] Goedegebuure, 2008.
[131] Soysal, 2008, 45; cf. 2010. [132] Also noted by Goedegebuure, 2008, 67.
[133] Soysal, 2008, 46. [134] Heffron, 2016, 179. [135] Soysal, 2008, 46.
[136] Heffron, 2016, 180.

a supernatural entity'.[137] What is more, we established earlier that the human soul and the deity's soul were exactly the same ontologically. Even if there were some differences between the two drinking experiences, there is no categorical or metaphysical difference between the substance being ingested. H. Güterbock may be correct that some scholars have other reasons for reading this expression as anything *other than* theophagy.[138]

Several items suggest that a metaphysical or mystical transaction would occur during rituals at which humans and gods drank together.[139] First, the nature of the vessels involved in the ritual is suggestive of this. A number of sources refer to the vessel from which the participants would drink as a ^{d}GAL.ZU (Hitt.: *zeri*, 'cup'; Akk.: *kāsu*, 'cup').[140] The dingir affixed to the term indicates of course that this particular cup had a share in the divine nature. Heffron notes that some references to these vessels actually associate the Sun-goddess with the sacred cup, perhaps indicating what Hittites meant by the expression 'to drink a deity'.[141] They may have believed that the cup could become the embodiment of the Sun-goddess, and thus that she was the 'deity' they were ingesting. Other references do not associate the cup with a particular deity, though in such instances the cup might have been a deity in its own right.[142] In either case, one can easily see the connection between drinking *from* the vessel and actually drinking the deity *which is in the vessel*. The ^{d}GAL.ZU cup certainly provides some insight into Hittite beliefs about the divine nature of sacred vessels.

Another vessel called the BIBRU might shine additional light on beliefs about divine embodiment more broadly. The BIBRU was a specific type of vessel shaped like an animal or part of an animal, or less frequently a god or human.[143] Bull- or stag-shaped BIBRU vessels were commonly used during Hittite drinking rituals.[144] Given the association between animals and gods in the ancient world, it is likely that animal-shaped vessels were zoomorphic embodiments of the gods they represented.[145] Thus, in drinking from a bull-shaped vessel, for example, one could 'drink the deity'. This seems to be the meaning behind a text identified by Güterbock, which refers to 'the king, standing outside (the gate?), [who] drinks the

[137] Heffron, 2016, 180.
[138] Güterbock, 1998, 121. See also Heffron, 2008, 167; Patton, 2009, 50.
[139] See also Rosenkranz, 1973; Patton, 2009, 50. [140] Heffron, 2016, 164–85.
[141] Heffron, 2016, 179. [142] Heffron, 2016, 171. [143] Heffron, 2016, 172–77.
[144] Heffron, 2016, 175–76. [145] See Collins, 2002, 314, cited by Heffron, 2016, 176.

Bull Šeri and the Bull Ḫurri from a horn' (LUGAL-*uš* GUB-*aš aškaz* ^{GUD}*Šerin* ^{GUD}*Ḫurrin* SÍ-*az ekuzi*; cf. KUB 24.123 ii 42; KUB34.123 ii 34).[146]

Just because the vessel was a divine body does not answer how a person could 'drink a deity' simply by drinking from a deified cup. After all, the participant did not actually ingest the cup. Rather, they drank the liquid within it. This is where the two principal parts of the deity that we discussed already would appear to factor into how we are to understand this Hittite phenomenon. As we saw previously, gods had a body and a soul. Whereas the vessel was clearly intended to serve as the deity's body, where was its soul in all of this? The soul appears to have been infused into the liquid inside the vessel. The deified vessel was thus the embodied space within which the deity's soul could install itself just like it did within *tuekka*-s, *ḫuwaši*-s and *šena*-s.

When the liquid entered the vessel, the two became the deity in toto. The deity's body (vessel) and deity's soul (liquid) became physically present in real time and space, and participants could encounter the divine in the cult vessel. When participants drank the liquid from the vessel, they drank the deity's soul in liquid form. Since they understood the vessel as an embodied form of the deity, it really does not matter if one translates the phrase as 'to drink a deity' or 'to drink the cup of a deity'. In either case, the human worshippers were imbibing the essence, the soul, of the deity-embodying liquid inside the vessel.

Like *tuekka*-s, *ḫuwaši*-s and *šena*-s, this vessel thus served as a material body for the otherwise disembodied deity. It provided a physical body for the god and a means through which one could encounter the god in real time and space. To drink from one of these bodies would thus be to drink the god that it had become.

I noted earlier that the soul had a quasi-material nature. Perhaps Hittites thought of it as having a liquid-like constitution. After all, they believed they could 'drink' the souls of gods and dead humans. In this light, it is intriguing to find remarks about the waning soul that 'steadily drips away to another place' (*ištanzaš=miš tamatta pēdi zappiškizzi*, KUB 30.10 rev. 15). Elsewhere, the petitioner beseeches the gods: 'may you, o gods, pour out his soul like water!' (ˈ*nu-wa*ˀ*-kán a-pé-e-el* ZI-*an* DINGIR^{MEŠ} *ú-wi*$_5$*-te-na-aš i-wa-ar ar-ḫa la-a-aḫ-ḫu-wa-tén*, CTH 265, text/trans. Miller, 2013, 82–83). It is easy for modern interpreters to see these remarks as purely metaphorical. But in the context of the ritual

[146] Text/trans. Güterbock, 1998, 127, cited by Heffron, 2016, 176n58.

engagement with the soul that we are seeing, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Hittites thought of the soul as having a liquid nature.

Evidence as to the nature of the union that occurs between the royal figure and the gods can be found in an Old Hittite ritual text.[147] The ritual is insightful because it centred on a meal-experience between the Hittite king (Labarna) and the Sun-god. As we shall see, the notion of union or mixture was not merely part of the ritual but central to it.

The ritual was designed to bring healing to the monarch. Throughout the ritual, the priest beseeched the gods to heal the king and ward off any evil or curses. Near the middle of the ritual, the king would then ingest a mixture of drinks intended to make the healing a physical reality. But as we will see, the ritual drink contained much more than healing medicines, and it did more than just heal the king of an illness.

We pick up at the moment the king was to ingest the drink and enter into a new state of proximity with the gods:

> §10' *ši-u-na-an* ^{d}UTU-*ú-i* 76 *mar-nu-wa-an ma-a-an ši-e-eš-šar-* ⌈*ra*⌉ *at -da> ku-la- * at * -ta-ti* 77 *iš-ta-za-na-aš-mi-iš ka-ra-az-mi-iš-* ⌈*ša*⌉ 1-*iš ki-ša-at* 78 *ka-a* UD-*at* 40 ^{d}*ši-ú-na-an* 41 ^{d}UTU-*aš la-ba-ar-* [_ _ _] *iš-ta-za-na-aš-mi-it ka-ra-az-za-mi-iš-ša* 1 *-iš ki-ša-ru* [K]AŠ.GEŠTIN-*iš ma-a-an wa-al-ḫi-ia-an-za an-da ku la-am-ta-ti.*[148]
>
> §10' O Sun-god of the Gods, as the *marnuwan*-drink and beer have mixed and their mind/soul and bodies have become one, may on this day the mind/soul and the interior/body of the Sun-god of the Gods and of the Labarna become one as beer that has been mixed with the *walḫi* drink! (CTH 458.10.1 §10' 75–79; A ii 18–22, my trans.)

By pouring two drinks together, the king demonstrated the way he would 'mix' (Hitt.: *lam-*) with the Sun-god (cf. KUB 29.1 ii 42–46). Just as the two liquids intermixed with one another, so also the king and the deity intermixed with one another *within the bounds of the king's body* (CTH 458.10.1 §10' 75–79).[149] Indeed, the deity would enter the king's body through the liquid. According to the following section (§11), the Sun-god and king became so thoroughly intermixed that they were no longer two separate beings:

[147] Beckman, 2012, 608.

[148] Text Fuscagni (ed.), Hethiter.net/: CTH 458.10.1 (TX 13.10.2014, TRe 05.02.2013) at www.hethport.uni-wuerzburg.de. Also quoted in Beckman, 2012, 608. On this text, see e.g., Kammenhuber, 1964, 166–67; Groddek, 2008, 170; Akdoğan, 2010, 71.

[149] See Beckman, 2012, 608.

§11 80 [i] *š-ta-an-za-na-aš-mi-iš ka-ra-az-za-me-iš-ša ši-ú-na-a* [*n* _ _ _] 81 [*l*] *a-ba-ar-na-aš-ša iš-ta-an-za-na-aš-me-et ka-ra-az-m* [e-_ _][150]

§11 And their soul (*ištanzan-*) and their inner body/innards (*karat-*) have become one – [the Sun-god] of the gods and of the [L]abarna – their soul [and] their senses have also become one. (CTH 458.10.1 §11 80–81; A ii/iii 23–25, my trans.)[151]

Puhvel offers an alternative reading of this text that may add to our understanding of what is taking place.[152] He insists that what others reconstruct to read *an<da> kulamtati* might be better understood as *anku lamtati*.[153] In the latter case, the adverb *anku* ('fully', 'quite', 'really', 'absolutely', 'unconditionally') would elevate the nature of the union between the king and the deity.[154] Like the drink and beer, which 'have been *fully* mixed', the king and the deity 'have become one'.[155] Puhvel's reading is certainly intriguing, though either reconstruction makes the same point. Through the act of theophagy, the king would enter into complete union in body and soul with the deity.

The Sun-god and king mixed together like the *marnuwan*-drink and beer. We are certainly inclined to envision the two liquids blending together in a thorough yet semi-permanent manner.[156] This is important because the mixture between the *marnuwan*-drink and the beer corresponds to that between the human and the Sun-god. Like (lit.: *maan*, 'like', 'as') the liquids, the king and the Sun-god have literally 'become one'.

Moreover, the language of the ritual suggests that this union was not merely spiritual but total-body in nature. The king's 'inner part' (*karat-*) and 'soul' (*ištanzan-*) blended thoroughly with the essence of the Sun-god, all within the bounds of his physical body. Inside the king, the two beings 'became one'. As Beckman states, at this moment 'the Hittite monarch and the major gods of the state were consubstantial'.[157] According to P. Houwink ten Cate, this text recalls the king's desire to 'become like "the Sun God of the Gods" in both mental attitude and physical appearance'.[158] O. Gurney likewise writes:

[150] Text Fuscagni (ed.), hethiter.net/: CTH 458.10.1 (TX 13.10.2014, TRe 05.02.2013) at www.hethport.uni-wuerzburg.de.
[151] Kammenhuber, 1964, 166–67. [152] Puhvel, 2017, 73–74.
[153] Puhvel, 2017, 73–74. [154] Puhvel, 2017, 73–74.
[155] Puhvel, 2017, 73–74; cf. Houwink ten Cate, 1987, 24.
[156] On the concept of 'blending', see Chapter 6. [157] Beckman, 2012, 608.
[158] Houwink ten Cate, 1987, 24.

[The text] expresses the wish that the spirit of the Hittite monarch should become mystically fused with that of the sungod: As *maruwant-* (a type of beer) and *siessar* (beer) have blended for the Sun God of the Gods, while their soul and their body (viz. their essence and their substance) have become one, may they, the soul and the body of the Sun God of the gods and of the Labar[nas], (in the same manner) become one here (on earth)![159]

Upon drinking the deity's essence, the king's physical body became the spatial meeting point between human and divine.[160] As a commixture of human and divine, the king became the deified body of the Sun-god on earth. He came to embody the divine such that his entire being melded with the Sun-god and he truly became royal embodied space.

Beckman speaks about the relationship between the royal figure and the gods in terms of a consubstantial union.[161] Puhvel likewise refers to the Hittite expression as analogous to the Eucharist.[162] Indeed, the Eucharist serves as a helpful heuristic for understanding what we have observed among the Hittites. According to certain strands of Christian tradition, the Eucharistic elements become the body and blood of the risen Christ. They may maintain their natural appearance as bread and wine, but in reality, as Christ's real presence enters the material elements, they *are* Christ in flesh and blood.

The parallels between what I see taking place in the Eucharist and the Hittite ritual are quite clear.[163] First, in both cases, the material objects are constructed from natural, otherwise profane elements in creation. However, after they pass through the proper rites, the elements become supernatural. Even though they retain their natural physical appearance, the food and/or wine becomes embodied space.

Second, the mixture between the two bodies is highly transformative. It results not just in a mixture between the human and the material elements, but it leads to the human's transformation. When ingesting the elements, the Hittite king could take in the *real presence* of the gods, which then altered his entire constitution to the point that he too became divine. This was true in Hittite thought just as in Christian thought. It is hard not to speak about this in terms of theophagy. After all, to ingest the embodied liquid was to ingest the god embodying it. To ingest the liquid

[159] Gurney, 1958, 117, quoted by Houwink ten Cate, 1987, 24.
[160] Cf. Oettinger, 1979, 525–26; Puhvel, 2001, 50–51; Beckman, 2012, 608–09.
[161] Beckman, 2012, 608. [162] Puhvel, 1957, 31–33.
[163] But these same conceptions of divine embodiment would seem to help shine some light on those of the early Church as well.

was to invite the divine into one's body, where it would transform the human space into divine space, even if only for a short time.[164]

The Hittites and Canaanites were no strangers to each other. In particular, Hittites and Canaanites thought of the king's divinity in similar ways. Like their Anatolian neighbours, Canaanites believed that the king became a god only in the afterlife (see KTU 1.113).[165] Ugaritic funerary rituals suggest that after they died, kings would obtain the status of a lower deity (KTU 1.161; cf. KTU 1.15; CTH 450).[166] Given these shared ideas, it is no surprise that we find evidence of deification-by-ingestion in Canaan as well.

It is unclear whether or not Canaanites viewed the monarch as having a share in the divine nature in the present life. However, scholars have identified one Ugaritic source that might suggest that the king could become deified at least momentarily before death.[167] N. Wyatt calls this text, 'An Intercessory Prayer to Rapiu and other Deities' (KTU 1.108 [=UDB 1.108]).[168] The precise genre of the source is uncertain, but it is either a prayer or a hymn to the Canaanite gods.[169]

The relevance of this source lies in what it indicates about the king's relationship with the gods and deified kings. Of course, at the centre of the ritual is a fascinating remark about the monarch 'drinking' (with) the gods he has invited to his feast. Beginning with the *recto*, the text reads as follows:

May Rapiu, King of Eternity, drink [wi]ne,
yea, may he drink, the powerful and noble [god],
the god enthroned in Athtarat,
the god who rules in Edrei,
whom men hymn and honour with music
on the lyre and the flute,
on drum and cymbals,
R 5 with castanets of ivory,
among the goodly companions of Kothar.
And may Anat the power<ful> drink,
the mistress of kingship,
the mistress of dominion,
the mistress of the high heavens,

[164] I deal with the notion of divine ingestion, or theophagy, in early Judaism in Putthoff, 2014; 2017, chs. 2, 5 and 6.
[165] Wyatt, 2002, 399–403; cf. Gray, 1949; 1952; Pope, 1977; Pardee, 2002, 199–200.
[166] See Hutter-Braunsar, 2001, 271.
[167] See e.g., Dietrich, Loretz and Sanmartín, 1976; del Olmo Lete, 1999, 185. See also Pope, 1981, 172–73.
[168] Wyatt, 2002, 395–98.
[169] See del Olmo Lete, 1999, 186–87; Wyatt, 2002, 395–96; 2010, 49–50.

[the mistre]ss of the earth.
And may Anat fly,
may the kite soar [in] the hig<h> [heav]ens,
(who) ate the calf of El,
R 10 drinking [ ] from the horn.
And may the god [ ] drink,
the god who subdued the calf of El.
[ ] the god Shad.
May the King [of Eternity] hunt . . .
[ ] . . .
[ ] . . .
R 15 [ ] Reshef
(bottom of tablet missing)
V [ ] . . .
[ ] . . .
[ ] interced with Baal
V 20 [your achievement, Rapiu King [of Eternity]
your [ ], your efficacy, your] intercession.
[With the] of Rapiu, King of Eternity,
with the strength of [Rapiu] King of Eternity,
with his help, with [his] p[ower],
by his rule, by his splendour
among the Sa[viou]rs of the underworld.
V 25 May your strength, your help, your power, your rule, your splendour, be in the midst of Ugarit, throughout the days and months and the gracious years of El.
(trans. Wyatt, 2002, 395–98)

D. Pardee insists that during this ritual the petitioner would invite the Canaanite gods to a feast.[170] At the feast, *Rapiu* would then ask *Ba'lu* to transfer the divine powers of the deceased kings who have become gods in the afterlife to the current living king.[171] The gods and kings would then imbue the living king with their divine presence.[172] Empowered by the gods' essence, the living king could then rule the land powerfully.

In both the Canaanite and Hittite rituals, kings became deified by drinking gods. It is difficult to know the precise Sitz im Leben behind either of the ritual texts. However, as we saw already, Hittite gods could inhabit wine and therein be ingested during ritual meals. The same was

[170] Pardee, 2002, 192–95; cf. del Olmo Lete, 1999, 184–92; Wyatt, 2002, 395–98. For further study, see e.g., Virolleaud, 1968, 551–57; de Moor, 1969; 1987, 187–90; Dietrich, Loretz and Sanmartín, 1975; Caquot, 1976; Dietrich and Loretz, 1989.

[171] Pardee, 2002, 192–95; cf. Suriano, 2010, 153–54. On the feasting *Rapa'ūma*, see KTU 1.22. On epithets used of dead and deified kings (and heroes), see del Olmo Lete and Sanmartín, 2003, 60, 195, 314, 892–93; Rahmouni, 2008.

[172] del Olmo Lete, 1999, 191; Pardee, 2002, 192–95.

likely true in Canaan. As M. Smith observes, Canaanites believed that any ritual object associated with the cults could participate in the divine state.[173] This was true of images, statues, temples, vessels and other cult objects elsewhere in the Ancient Near East.[174]

It is not implausible that the 'Prayer to Rapiu' depicts wine as embodied space. Through the ritual invitation, the king appears to have invited his deified predecessors and other gods to make themselves present in the sacred wine. Just as Christians believe Christ deifies the Eucharistic wine, the Canaanite gods could deify the king's wine as well. The wine would then become the liquefied body of the gods being invoked.

The wine became the medium through which the gods entered the king's body. Upon ingesting the wine, he came to share in the divine nature, even before death. He did not appear to remain divine, given that this ritual was likely repeated more than once. But at least temporarily, the Canaanite king could enjoy a share in the divine nature while on earth. Such a tradition is not without parallel in the biblical world. I have argued that similar traditions can be found in Jewish literature at least as early as the Second Temple period.[175] It is not implausible that such ideas were in circulation throughout the Ancient Near East long before these Jews arrived on the scene.

Divine embodiment in Canaanite thought was strikingly similar to what we observed among the Hittites. Rather than embodying hard stone, wood or metal, the gods could also install themselves in ceremonial food or drink. They could inhabit material bodies, only of a lesser rigid sort of material than we are accustomed to seeing.

The King As the Junction between Divine and Mortal

In his body, the Hittite king could become the physical manifestation of the divine on earth. As ruler and priest, his self space was akin to living statue space, in that within him the gods entered the realm of humanity, and in him, humanity could encounter the gods. As Beckman insists, the royal figure was the 'linchpin of this universe', as the two spheres of being intersected within his or her body.[176] We saw previously the way the standing stone functioned as a portal through which humans could enter divine space. Likewise, the king and queen would seem to have become the physical centre of the cosmos, and in his or her bounded bodily space humanity and divinity came together.[177]

[173] Smith, 2001, 77. [174] Walker and Dick, 1999, 71.
[175] Putthoff, 2014; 2017, 57–60. [176] Beckman, 2012, 608.
[177] Cf. Borsch, 2007, 89–131, esp. 104.

In all of this, the Hittite monarch still never became a true deity in the present life. He or she could unite with the gods, share a physical space with them and even manifest them on earth. But the king or queen did not become one of them until the afterlife. With that said, the royal figure may not have been a true deity, but he or she was no mere human, either. As Beckman aptly states:

> This association with the divine world, far closer than that enjoyed by any other human being in Ḫatti, implied that to a certain extent the Hittite monarch partook of the purity and numinous nature of the gods, with the accompanying privileges and restrictions.[178]

The ruler's participation in the divine state was unquestionably ontological in nature. A king or queen may not have been a proper deity on earth, but he or she nevertheless had a unique share in the divine nature.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Hittites believed that the human self resembled the deity's self in key ways. In particular, both humans and gods had bodies and souls. The human body was the embodied space of the soul, just as cult objects were embodied spaces for the gods' souls. Like their near eastern neighbours, the Hittites imagined the human to be a composite of nondivine and divine aspects. The physical space of the body, according to the lone anthropogeny we have found, perhaps comprised the same fine metal of which the cosmos was made. From this primordial metallic substance, the gods forged the human body to serve as the physical dwelling space of the soul – which was itself the same in every way as the gods' souls.

By and large, the royal figure did not have an elevated share in the divine nature just because he or she was the monarch. He or she could become a deity in the afterlife, but this had no bearing on his or her existence in the present life. However, during certain rituals, the monarch could physically unite with the gods. Through various means that included, on the one hand, dressing like the gods and entering their sacred precincts, or on the other hand, ingesting the deified food or drink, the royal figure could experience a share in the divine nature even during the present life. This was not permanent, but it was real, and for the time being, the king or queen became the physical manifestation of the gods on earth.

[178] Beckman, 2012, 608–09.

5

YHWH and His Theomorphic Body

The 'Image of God' in Israelite Anthropology

PREFATORY REMARKS

The Present Chapter

As the home of the Israelites, Syro-Palestine was small in size but enormous in importance.[1] Geographically, it served as the most important trade route of the Fertile Crescent. With the *Via Maris* passing through, Syro-Palestine was a primary cultural, political and economic link between Egypt in the southwest, Anatolia in the northwest and Mesopotamia (and beyond) in the east. It also had prime coasts for embarking on sea trade and travel. Historically, Syro-Palestine was also significant, as it was the home of the Israelites (and Judahites) responsible for the Hebrew Bible. It is no surprise that this small region is among the most storied lands in the Ancient Near East.

Sometime near the beginning of the second mill. BCE, the Hebrew Bible recalls, Abraham uprooted his family and relocated from Ur in Mesopotamia to Syro-Palestine or Canaan. After establishing himself and growing a rather large family, his people would find themselves in Egypt. Many of these 'Israelites' would live in Egypt until the thirteenth c. BCE, while many would remain in Canaan during this period. Eventually, the Israelites would reunite in Canaan and establish themselves over

[1] I am aware that much of the history of the 'biblical people' occurred outside of Syro-Palestine. I also understand that there is a difference in academic nomenclature between 'Israelites' and 'Judahites'. However, for the sake of simplicity, I use the designation 'Israelites' to refer to the historical people whose story is found in the Hebrew Bible and in the archaeological records of the region now known as Syro-Palestine or Israel.

the next several centuries. Around the tenth c. BCE, they became a relatively powerful people in the region. But they would meet their match at the hands of the neo-Assyrians in the eighth c. BCE and the neo-Babylonians in the sixth c. BCE, at which point their overlords took them into captivity. The Achaemenid Persians would allow the Israelites (i.e., Judahites or Judaeans) to return to their homeland and to rebuild the Temple that the Babylonians had razed to the ground. The texts and artefacts on which I focus purport to reveal Israelite beliefs and traditions about the human self primarily from the earlier period in Israelite history.

According to Gen 1.26–27 and 2.7, the human had a unique relationship to the divine. Given the correspondence between God and humanity in these texts, in order to understand Israelite anthropology, we must first gain a better appreciation of their theology. Specifically, we need to have a better understanding of YHWH's fluid constitution. As B. Sommer argues, the Yahwists (J) and Elohists (E) believed that YHWH could take up residence within multiple bodies simultaneously without ever losing his potency.[2] M. Hundley adds that the Priests (P) viewed YHWH likewise.[3] But instead of claiming that God could embody these other material bodies, P claims YHWH instead inhabited in a different type of body, namely, the divine 'glory' (Heb.: כבוד).

Second, we must understand the implications of this debate on humanity as the 'image of God' (צלם אלהים). C. McDowell argues that the human was God's physical representation on earth. However, she does not see humanity's relationship with the divine as one of embodiment but instead one of kinship.[4] However, S. Herring contends that as the 'image of God', the human was a living embodiment of YHWH.[5] Just as a god would create an image and install itself within it, YHWH created the human so that he might reside within it on earth.

In this chapter, I shall investigate the biblical צלם אלהים in an attempt to understand Israelite conceptions of the self. While my focus is not on the Israelites' theology per se, having an understanding of their view of YHWH will be critical for better understanding their anthropology. Because the Bible depicts the human as a cult object, we shall first look at traditions surrounding his embodiment in material objects. After this, we will look at the biblical claims about the human as God's image in an attempt to gain insight into divine aspects of Israelite anthropology.

[2] Sommer, 2009. [3] Hundley, 2015. [4] McDowell, 2015.
[5] Herring, 2013, 87–127; cf. Schüle, 2005.

The Sources

For evidence of early Israelite beliefs about the self, I rely both on material evidence from Syro-Palestine and on the Hebrew Bible. In certain instances, having a knowledge of the provenance of a text will be helpful in providing us with a better comparative framework for that text's portrait of the self. However, because my study is not focused on tracing historical developments in Israelite thought, I only address matters related to the hypotheses as to how the Hebrew Bible was formed when necessary.[6]

HOUSES AND POLES IN ANCIENT ISRAEL

Fluidity and Embodiment in Israelite Theology

In this section, I try to get a sense of Israelite conceptions of divine embodiment. It will be important not only to understand that YHWH *could* reside in earthly bodies but also what this looked like. Furthermore, it will be useful to gain a fuller appreciation of how widespread such beliefs about YHWH were and what types of bodies he could inhabit. Again, my goal is ultimately to understand how this theology informs Israelite anthropology. As noted already, understanding how YHWH could embody physical spaces provides a conceptual framework within which to examine the 'image of God' (צלם אלהים).

YHWH in Heaven and on Earth

The Bible depicts YHWH as dwelling either in heaven or on earth. For example, Ps 9.11 declares that YHWH 'dwells in Zion'. David refers to 'God in Zion' (אלהים בציון, Ps 65.1). Asaph beseeches God to remember 'mount Zion, wherein you have dwelt' (הר-ציון זה שכנת בו, Ps 74.2). And everyone knew that YHWH lived in Zion in Jerusalem (e.g., Pss 76.2; 84.7; 99.2; 102.21; Isa 8.18; 10.12; 18.7; Jer 8.19; Joel 3.16, 17, 21; Amos 1.2; Zech 8.3).

However, other texts plainly locate YHWH in the heavens. For example, the psalmist declares, 'Our God is in the heavens' (ואלהינו בשמים, Ps 115.3). Elsewhere we learn, 'YHWH is in his holy temple. YHWH's throne is in heaven' (Ps 11.4; cf. 103.19). Likewise, Isaiah and Ezekiel portray God on

[6] On the Documentary Hypothesis, see e.g., Gertz, Schmid and Witte, 2002; Dozeman and Schmid, 2006; Baden, 2007; 2012; Katz, 2012.

his throne in heaven (Isa 6; Ezek 1). Post-exilic declarations become even more clear, declaring YHWH to reside in the heavens alone (Isa 63.15; 66.1).

In addition to being in one location, YHWH also lived in *both* spaces simultaneously. Thus, the psalmist calls upon YHWH to send help both from his sanctuary at Zion (מקדש ומציון, Ps 20.2) *and* from his holy heaven (משמי קדשו, v. 6). Discussing this psalm, Sommer explains:

> This psalm is not sloppy or vague in the way it imagines God; rather, the psalmist, following a pattern of thought found elsewhere in the ancient Near East, believes that God could be physically present in an earthly location and a heavenly one as well.[7]

According to Ps 20, YHWH inhabited at least *two* locations at once – the heavens and the Temple at Zion. Other texts similarly assert that YHWH 'is God in heaven above and on the earth below' (יהוה הוא האלהים בשמים ממעל ועל-הארץ מתחת, Deut 4.39; cf. Josh 2.11; 1 Kgs 8.23). Likewise, in his prayer to YHWH at the dedication of the Temple, Solomon shifts seamlessly between speaking of the deity in heaven and speaking of the Temple as his new home. In the same prayer, Solomon asks if YHWH would indeed dwell on earth (1 Kgs 8.27a) and declares that not even the highest heavens can contain him (v. 27b). He calls upon YHWH to hear his prayers 'in heaven your dwelling place' (v. 30b), but he also understands that God can hear them from Jerusalem (vv. 29, 30a).

Albeit brief, this survey of the biblical texts is critically important. The biblical evidence suggests that YHWH lived both in the heavens and on earth at the same time. In this regard, he was not unlike other near eastern gods who lived in heaven and in sacred locations on earth simultaneously.

The implications of our findings so far are paramount. A god could reside in two spaces at once because it had a fluid ontological constitution. Without such fluidity, the god would be limited to one space at any given moment. Interestingly, the Hebrew Bible never depicts YHWH as *incapable* of being in two places at once. Even in the exilic and post-exilic literature, YHWH could transcend any and every earthly locale. The underlying belief was that YHWH's people need not worry that his earthly house no longer existed. Instead, they could be confident that he was alive in his *true* temple in heaven. From there he reigned not over a particular location but over the entire cosmos.

[7] Sommer, 2009, 44.

YHWH Here and There

If YHWH inhabited *two* spaces at once, is it possible that he could inhabit even more than that at the same time? According to biblical and archaeological evidence, YHWH could manifest himself in localised forms in different locations simultaneously.

As we saw in previous chapters, deities could manifest themselves in localised forms in different locations. To talk about this phenomenon, the ancients would employ a specific formula that we have not yet examined. For example, the Mesopotamian Esarhaddon Prism makes reference to 'Ištar of Arbela' (^{d}*Ištar ša* ^{URU}*Arba'-iṣlu*; Nin. A I.6; cf. K 4310) and 'Ištar of Nineveh' (^{d}*Ištar ša* ^{URU}*Ni-nu-a*; Nin. A I.10; KAV 49).[8] At Ugarit, we find reference to 'Baal of Aleppo' (*b'l ḫlb*, RS 24.643 [=KTU 1.148] line 26) next to 'Baal of Zaphon' (*b'l ṣpn*, line 27; cf. RS 24.284 [=KTU 1.130]).[9] In northwest Semitic sources, we find a handful of similar references. One Aramaic text refers to 'Hadad of Sikan' (הדדשכן, Fekherye, line 1), another Ugaritic text refers to 'Asherah of Tyre' (*aṯrt ṣrm*, KTU 1.14 iv 35, 38) and a Phoenician text references 'Ashtart of Kition' (*'štrt kt*, *KAI* 37A.5).[10]

To depict a deity in a localised form, one would follow what scholars call the 'DN of GN' or 'DN in GN' formula.[11] The deity's name was thus associated with the particular place he or she inhabited. This way of talking about the gods was ubiquitous in the biblical world. And as J. Hutton argues, this syntactic construction was present among the Israelites as well.[12]

In 2 Sam 15, we find what appears to be a presentation of YHWH as a singular deity who can allocate himself into localised manifestations. The text reads:

ויהי מקץ ארבעים שנה ויאמר אבשלום אל־המלך אלכה נא ואשלם את־נדרי
אשר־נדרתי ליהוה בחברון׃
כי־נדר נדר עבדך בשבתי בגשור בארם לאמר אם־ [ישיב כ] (ישוב ק) ישיבני
יהוה ירושלם ועבדתי את־יהוה׃

7 At the end of four years Absalom said to the king, 'Please let me go to Hebron and pay the vow that I have made to the Lord.

[8] See esp. Pongratz-Leisten, 1994; Sommer, 2009, 13–24; Hutton, 2010, 182; Allen, 2015, 141–99.

[9] Pardee, 2002, 15, 23, 29 *et passim*; Hutton, 2010, 182; Allen, 2015, 200–37.

[10] See Hutton, 2010, 183 for texts, references and further discussion. But see McCarter, 1987, on whom Hutton relies.

[11] Where DN = 'Divine Name' and GN = 'Geographical Name'. See e.g., Hutton, 2010, 183; Allen, 2015, 86, 142–53.

[12] Hutton, 2010, 183.

> 8 For your servant made a vow while I lived at Geshur in Aram: If the Lord will indeed bring me back to Jerusalem, then I will worship the Lord in Hebron'. (2 Sam 15.7–8, NRSV)

According to this account, Absalom seeks to fulfil a vow to worship 'YHWH in Hebron' (יהוה בחברון, 2 Sam 15.7).[13] The syntax of this depiction of YHWH follows the 'DN in GN' construction we saw previously. How one interprets this depiction, of course, depends on how one understands the *bet* (ב) in the phrase 'in Hebron' (בחברון).

At first glance, the NRSV makes it seem as though Absalom plans to go 'to Hebron' to fulfil his vow to the Lord. Unfortunately, the Hebrew does not support this reading. The text lacks the prepositional 'to Hebron' (i.e., ל/אל־חברון) necessary for this interpretation to work. Perhaps it is more plausible to read בחברון adverbially. In this case, we would take the text as saying that Absalom made his vow 'while in Hebron'. However, P. McCarter argues that this interpretation does not work, because the text makes it clear that Absalom made this vow while he was 'in Geshur in Syria' (בגשור בארם, v. 8).[14] Perhaps 'in Hebron' (בחברון) is the place where Absalom intends to 'worship/serve' (ועבדתי) YHWH. This would make sense, were it not for the fact that the grammar simply does not support this reading. The reference to Hebron comes in v. 7 while the verb does not come until much later in v. 8.

Alternatively, one could take this as a reference to Absalom's desire to worship 'YHWH (once he arrived) in Hebron'. If so, then S. Allen is correct that 'in Hebron' (בחברון) should be understood as modifying 'and I will fulfil' (ואשלם, v. 7).[15] Thus Absalom plans to worship YHWH and thereby fulfil his vow 'in Hebron'. Allen insists that, although David had already relocated his capital from Hebron to Jerusalem, Absalom preferred to worship YHWH in Hebron because he had familial ties to its local cult.[16] But this suggestion seems unconvincing. Not only is there no evidence of Absalom's preference for the cult of Hebron over that of Jerusalem, but the simplest interpretation would be to take 'in Hebron' as modifying its nearest antecedent: 'YHWH'.

Therefore, 'in Hebron' (בחברון) does not appear to refer to a location per se. Rather, it seems to be the surname, as it were, of a specific manifestation of YHWH, whose full name is 'YHWH in Hebron'. It is this manifestation of YHWH whom Absalom intended to worship. It

[13] Donner, 1973, 45–50; Sommer, 2009, 39.
[14] McCarter, 1987, 141.
[15] Allen, 2015, 300.
[16] Allen, 2015, 301.

is plausible that while Absalom vowed to worship 'YHWH in Hebron', others equally loyal to YHWH simply worshipped him via another localisation whom they called, for example, 'YHWH in Zion' (יהוה בציון, Ps 99.2). Absalom understood that 'YHWH in Hebron' need not make himself available in Jerusalem, since 'YHWH in Zion' was already there.

The evidence for this fluid conceptualisation of YHWH in the biblical text is far from conclusive. One of the difficulties in these texts is that we do not find multiple references to 'YHWH of/in GN' in the same contexts. However, the situation is quite different in the archaeological evidence, where references to multiple YHWHs appear side by side.

Evidence for an Israelite belief in YHWH's fluidity can be found in three inscriptions from Kuntillet Ajrud.[17] Excavated in the mid-1970s, Kuntillet Ajrud is a ninth–eighth c. BCE site in the eastern Sinai, near Israel's southwestern border. Debate over the nature of the site continues today. Z. Meshel views it as a religious centre for travellers along this busy trade route,[18] while others regard it as a desert way station.[19] Following B. Schmidt, Hutton sees the site as a combination of the two.[20] Regardless of its precise function, the site shines important light on Israelite ideas about YHWH's nature. Allen is correct that the discovery of Kuntillet Ajrud has changed the way scholars think about YHWH.[21] Precisely what we are to make of this evidence remains to be seen.

There are many intriguing features of Kuntillet Ajrud. However, the inscriptions that mention 'YHWH of/in GN' are of utmost importance. On pithos A, we find the name 'YHWH of Samaria' (שמרן יהוה) in an inscription that reads:

> אמר א [--]ה [--]ך אמר ליהל [יו] וליועשה ול [---]ברכת אתכם ליהוה שמרן ולאשרתה
>
> Says [PN]: Say to Yahil[yaw] and to Yaw'asa and to [PN . . .] I hereby bless you by YHWH of Samaria and by his Asherah. (*HI* KAjr 18, trans. Hutton, 2010, 190)[22]

We then find four inscriptions that mention the name 'YHWH of Teman' (יהוה תמן and יהוה התמן).[23] One plaster inscription reads:

[17] On Kuntillet Ajrud, see e.g., Beck, 1982, 42–44; Dever, 1984, 26–27; Dijkstra, 2001; Vriezen, 2001; Zevit, 2001, 403.
[18] Meshel, 2012; cf. 1979; 1992, 103a–09a; 1993.
[19] Hadley, 1993, 115; cf. Lemaire, 1984; Hadley, 1987; Keel and Uehlinger, 1998, 247.
[20] Schmidt, 2002; Hutton, 2010, 187–89. [21] Allen, 2015, 248.
[22] Cf. Sommer, 2009, 44. [23] Hutton, 2010, 190–91.

[---] ארך ימן וישבעו [---] ינתו [י]הוה תימן ולאשרת[ה] [ו]היטב יהוה התי[מן---]

. . . longevity, and may they be sated . . . be granted by [Y]HWH of Teman and by [his] Ashera[h and] may YHWH of (the) Te[man] favor . . . (*HI* KAjr 14, trans. Hutton, 2010, 191).

Pithos B then contains two inscriptions, the first of which reads:

ברכתך ל[י]	I hereby bless you by [Y]
הוה תמן	HWH of Teman
ולאשרתה. . .	and by his Asherah. . .

(*HI* KAjr 19.5–7, trans. Hutton, 2010, 191).

The second inscription on pithos B then reads:

ד]יהוה התמן ודאשרתה

. . . by YHWH of (the) Teman and by his Asherah . . .. (HI KAjr 20.1, trans. Hutton, 2010, 191)

'YHWH of Samaria' was worshipped in Samaria in the north, while 'YHWH of Teman' was worshipped either in southern Israel more generally or in Edom in particular.[24]

The question is: What do these inscriptions indicate about Israelite beliefs concerning YHWH's nature? Do they refer to more than one deity called YHWH? Or do they refer to a single deity called YHWH who simply manifested himself in multiple places? Or maybe we are asking the wrong question here. What if the Israelites did not imagine YHWH using the categorical distinctions that are important to us as interpreters? It seems that some of the ambiguity in these inscriptions stems from their reluctance to define YHWH in such precise terms. That the Israelites imagined YHWH in localised forms is virtually undeniable from the evidence at Kuntillet Ajrud, especially when viewed alongside the biblical material. However, it is possible that those who created these inscriptions as well as those who made use of them in worship were entirely disinterested in questions about divine fluidity or fragmentation. Their only concern was to worship a localised manifestation of YHWH even as they were far from home.

Allen seems correct that the evidence does not allow us to know as much about YHWH's nature as we can about other ancient gods.[25]

[24] See Hutton, 2010, 192. [25] Allen, 2015, 273, 308, 316.

However, Hutton makes a good point that 'the juxtaposition of the two small-scale manifestations of Yahweh in the bench room bespeaks the fundamental fluidity between such fragmentary local manifestations'.[26] Perhaps Sommer's claim that these inscriptions 'seem to refer to local manifestations of Yhwh' is the best conclusion we can draw from the evidence.[27]

But this ambiguity is important for our purposes. Even as late as the eighth c. BCE, the Israelites were still relatively uncertain about fleshing out theological matters like these. YHWH had the same fluid constitution that other near eastern deities enjoyed. They seem to have agreed about that. He could live in multiple locations at the same time and still remain a single deity – hence the *Shema*'s claim that 'YHWH is our God, YHWH is one' (Deut. 6.4).[28] But beyond that, it is hard to know much else about YHWH's constitution.

The Kuntillet Ajrud inscriptions are important for another reason. As noted previously, all four of the inscriptions refer to 'YHWH and his *asherahs*'.[29] The geographic surnames 'of Samaria' and 'of Teman' suggest that YHWH could manifest himself in multiple locations. But the reference to the *asherahs* may point more specifically to a belief in divine embodiment.

The term *asherah* has led to much debate.[30] Whereas a number of the biblical references are to the goddess Asherah (e.g., 1 Kgs 18.19; 2 Kgs 23.4), others refer simply to the cult object (e.g., 1 Kgs 14.23; 2 Kgs 17.10).[31] In any case, the Israelites' relationship with *asherahs* was complicated.

What we are interested to know is what YHWH's relationship with the *asherahs* actually was. In particular, could he inhabit them like other gods could inhabit cult objects? Scholars like Sommer and Herring have found this to be the case.[32] According to 2 Kgs 9–10, Jehu sought to rid the land of the illicit cult practices of Ahab and Jezebel (cf. 1 Kgs 16).[33] Interestingly, the biblical writers clearly took issue with the 'house of Baal' (בית הבעל) in Samaria and Ahab's *asherah* (1 Kgs 16.32, 33). They have made it clear that Ahab aroused YHWH's anger more than any

[26] Hutton, 2010, 204. [27] Sommer, 2009, 39.
[28] On which, see Moberly, 1990; Hutton, 2010; Allen, 2015, 248–59.
[29] Sommer, 2009, 44.
[30] For helpful overviews, see e.g., Day, 1986; 1992, 485–86; Wyatt, 1999; Wiggins, 2007.
[31] Hadley, 2000, 54–77; Larocca-Pitts, 2001, 171–85; Day, 2002, 52–59; Sommer, 2009, 44–45; Herring, 2013, 63–67.
[32] Sommer, 2009, 44–45; Herring, 2013, 63–67. [33] Herring, 2013, 63–67.

other Israelite king before him (v. 33). However, S. Olyan notes that even the biblical writers never associated the *asherah* with Baal's temple.[34] This is made evident by the fact that although Jehu destroyed Baal's temple and murdered everyone inside, he did *not* destroy Ahab's *asherah* (2 Kgs 10.18–27).[35] What is more, according to 2 Kgs 13.6, that same *asherah* was still standing even after Jehu's death. H. Saggs maintains that during this time, *asherahs* were 'regarded by the worshippers as part of the cult of Yahweh, not of a separate deity Baal'.[36] K. Vriezen likewise insists that Israelites had no problem with placing *asherahs* in the Jerusalem Temple (e.g., 2 Kgs 21.7; 23.4, 7).[37] The fact that the biblical writers found it necessary to pen such strong language against Ahab's *asherahs* (2 Kgs 16.32, 33) or against 'planting a sacred pole or a tree beside an altar of YHWH' (Deut 16.21) indicates, as Vriezen states, 'that this actually did happen'.[38]

Sommer insists that many Israelites did not have a problem with implementing *asherahs* in their worship of YHWH.[39] By the eighth–seventh c. BCE, Asa, Hezekiah and Josiah worked hard to put a stop to this (1 Kgs 15.12–13; 1 Kgs 18.4; 2 Kgs 23.4–15). But as Herring writes, these reforms 'bear witness to the persistent use, if not previous legitimacy, of this representation in the Judean cult'.[40] Before and after this period, many Israelites engaged with the Canaanite cult object not in the worship of Asherah but of YHWH himself.[41]

Surely we would expect some Israelites to have had some loyalty to the goddess Asherah and to have made use of *asherahs* in worshipping her. However, by the time the Israelites entered Canaan, the cult of the Canaanite deity had already begun to die out. After reaching its peak in the Late Bronze Age, Asherah's cult was all but dead by the Iron Age. O. Keel, C. Uehlinger and T. Frymer-Kensky observe that Asherah's decline in prominence was part of a larger movement that saw a number of near eastern goddess-cults lose ground to male god-cults.[42] Whereas Asherah's cult had all but vanished from the Syro-Palestinian landscape by the turn of the first mill. BCE, wooden poles and trees called *asherahs* remained a critical part of the cults of this region. By and large, the

[34] Olyan, 1988, 6. [35] Herring, 2013, 63–64.
[36] Saggs, 1978, 23, cited by Herring, 2013, 64. [37] Vriezen, 2001, 73.
[38] Vriezen, 2001, 73. [39] Sommer, 2009, 45–46. [40] Herring, 2013, 64.
[41] Olyan, 1988, 9; Herring, 2013, 64–65.
[42] Keel and Uehlinger, 1998, 128–31; cf. Olyan, 1988, 36; Frymer-Kensky, 2009, 70–80.

Israelites were thus not engaged in the worship of the goddess when they used these cult objects. Rather, they merely adopted this Canaanite cult object into their own ritual worship of YHWH. As they believed YHWH to have 'taken over cultic objects associated with Asherah's cult', the Israelites saw no problem with employing the wooden *asherah* in worshipping their own god.[43]

This situation has important implications for how we interpret the references to YHWH's *asherahs* at Kuntillet Ajrud. As noted already, all four inscriptions refer to a blessing 'by YHWH of Samaria[44] and by his *asherah*' (e.g., ליהוה שמרן ולאשרתה, *HI* KAjr 18). Based on the chronological evidence, the likelihood that the reference is to Asherah and not the *asherah* pole is slim. The Canaanite deity Asherah had fallen out of prominence by the time these inscriptions were in use in the eighth c. BCE. These are thus not evidence of a belief surrounding YHWH and his consort Asherah, but instead of a belief about YHWH's divine nature.

This suggestion seems even more plausible when we consider the term *asherah* from an etymological perspective. According to W. Albright, the term אשרה likely means 'holy place' or 'sanctuary'.[45] He insists that the term has its roots in the Akkadian *ašil/ertu*, *ešertu*, *išil/ertu* and *ašru*, the Phoenician'*štrt* and Ugaritic *štrt*.[46] All of these refer to something of a sanctuary or special chamber used for housing cult images. Scholars generally agree that this meaning underpins the Hebrew term אשרה as well.

This meaning of אשרה becomes especially intriguing within the framework of Israelite views on divine embodiment. Specifically, we can see why they would have viewed something called, literally, a 'sanctuary' (אשרה) as a fitting cult space in which their own deity might reside. They would have found them all across the land of Syro-Palestine, so it would have made for a sort of pre-made cult body within which they might worship their god, YHWH. This suggestion becomes quite certain when we consider that the Israelites also believed that YHWH could embody another type of object also tied to the temple and sanctuary, namely, the 'house of God' (בית אל). That is, they made use of two items – the 'sanctuary' (אשרה) and the 'house of God' (בית אל) – which, despite their names, were not actually buildings in every instance. They were instead small, cult objects that served the same function as those buildings by the

[43] Sommer, 2009, 46–47.
[44] Or Teman, as in *HI* KAjr 14; 19.5–7; 20.1. See Hutton, 2010, 191.
[45] Albright, 1925; cf. Day, 1986. [46] See esp. Park, 2010.

same name, namely, to provide a house for their god. I will discuss the 'house of God' shortly. Sommer's assessment seems correct. These inscriptions refer not to Asherah but to the actual *asherah* poles – those miniature 'sanctuaries' or 'holy spaces' – situated in Samaria and Teman. As he states:

> The two 'asherahs mentioned in the Kuntillet Ajrud pithoi were almost certainly located in the sanctuaries of Yhwh in Samaria and Teman, respectively. These inscriptions, then, probably assume that the'asherah is sacred to Yhwh rather than to any other deity.[47]

Upon their emergence as a nation in Syro-Palestine, the Israelites took over the *asherahs* from their neighbours.[48] But they did not use them to worship Asherah the goddess. Rather, they used them to worship YHWH in embodied form. As Sommer again explains:

> In light of the evidence presented in the previous chapter, it becomes clear that the'*asherah* mentioned on these inscriptions may have been regarded as an incarnation of Yhwh comparable to the *ṣalmu* in Mesopotamia and the betyl and *maṣṣebah* among Canaanites and Arameans.[49]

The references to 'of Samaria' and 'of Teman' give us insight into YHWH's ability to manifest himself in different geographical locations. But the references to 'his *asherahs*' give us insight into how he could manifest himself in those locations. He did not simply reside there in some ethereal, disembodied manner – 'in spirit', as we might say today. Rather, he was physically there, ready to bestow blessings, in *asherahs* in Samaria and Teman.

From what we have observed, we can make some basic claims about YHWH. First, like his fellow near eastern deities, YHWH also enjoyed a fluid ontological constitution. He lived both in heaven and in multiple earthly locations at the same time. Second, YHWH could inhabit cult objects in real time and space. Even though he lived in heaven, he also lived in cult objects on earth, including ones previously inhabited by a different deity.

Houses of God in Ancient Israel

We have seen how YHWH could inhabit different spaces at the same time. As a deity, he needed a home on earth, a residence where

[47] Sommer, 2009, 47. [48] Cf. Kline, 1977. [49] Sommer, 2009, 47.

worshippers might encounter him.[50] This is precisely where he lived: in a 'house of God' (בית אל).

YHWH and His House

From early on, YHWH desired to live among his people in a physical dwelling.[51] He thus issued the command:

ועשו לי מקדש ושכנתי בתוכם

> And have them construct a sanctuary for me, and I shall dwell among them. (Exod 25.8, my trans.)

The portable sanctuary was YHWH's place of residence while he journeyed with the Israelites throughout the wilderness.[52] In this portable structure, YHWH lived among humans, manifesting himself through his 'glory' (כבוד).

The Tabernacle was YHWH's home until the reign of king Solomon, who constructed the First Temple in Jerusalem. This was a pivotal moment in Israel's life. At the climax of the dedication ceremony, the glory of YHWH entered the sanctuary of his new, permanent 'house' (בית) in a dazzling display of fire and smoke (2 Chron 7.1–7). This monumental structure became the physical 'house' for Israel's deity, YHWH's permanent home on earth.[53]

The view of the temple literally as a deity's 'house' was common in the Ancient Near East.[54] In Mesopotamia, the same terms were used for 'temple' that were used for 'house' (Sum.: É; Akk.: *bītu*). The Hittites referred to a temple as a 'divine house' (Hitt.: *É* dingir) or 'ritual house' (*É karim(n)i-*). Egyptians referred to the temple as a 'palace' or 'house' (Egyp.: pr), 'chapel' or 'shrine' (r-pr), or the 'divine mansion' (Hwt-nTr). Given the common belief in the temple as a divine residence, it is no surprise that YHWH's temple was also called a 'house of God' (בית אל). It was none other than the physical space in which he had chosen to live while on earth.

YHWH's Other Type of House

Interestingly, YHWH also lived at different points in Israelite history in a different type of 'house' (בית). This other type of house was also known as

[50] Sommer, 2009, 28. [51] See the treatment of Terrien, 1978, esp. 161–226.
[52] Cf. references to the house and temple of Yhwh at Shiloh: Jdgs 18.31; 1 Sam 1–3; Jer 41.5.
[53] Cf. Terrien, 1978, 161–226. [54] See Pitkänen, 2004, 25–67; Hundley, 2013.

a 'house of God' (בית אל; Grk. βαίτυλος).[55] Intriguingly, this 'house of God' was not an actual building but instead a standing stone or pillar.[56] Even still, this pillar functioned the same way as the Jerusalem Temple, as it was a physical residence for Israel's god.[57]

Three pieces of evidence indicate that YHWH actually lived in these 'houses of God' (בית אל) like he did in the Jerusalem 'house of God' (בית אל). First, there were many similarities between Hittite and Syro-Palestinian and Israelite standing stones.[58] Israelite houses of God resembled Hittite *ḫuwaši*-s physically in that they lacked the design of other types of cult objects.[59] Furthermore, both stood in sanctuaries, often (though not always) in locations where official temples were unavailable. C. Graesser is correct that the lack of design and inscriptional evidence makes these houses of God difficult.[60] However, this is also one of the primary reasons for trying to understand them alongside Hittite *ḫuwaši*-s. As we saw in Chapter 4, *ḫuwaši*-s were embodied spaces in which the Hittite gods could install themselves on earth.

Second, as J. Skinner and G. Moore observed over a century ago, Philo of Byblos (ca. 64–141 CE) provides evidence as to the meaning of these artefacts.[61] Philo calls these Canaanite cult objects 'animated stones' (λίθοι ἐμψυχοι), as they were viewed as stones that had been infused with the souls of the gods (Euseb., *Praep. evang.* 1.10, 23).[62] There was also a deity known throughout this region called Baitulos (βαίτυλος = 'house of God'), who was the son of Ouranos (οὐρανός = 'heaven'; Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 1.10.16).[63] Regardless of the precise relationship between the deity called Baitulos and the houses of God, Philo's account is important for what it reveals about the nature of these stone objects. In Syro-Palestine, a deity could install him- or herself in a stone house of God. In these stone objects, the divine was not only present, but it would actually bring them to life.

[55] Sommer, 2009, 29. [56] For a general treatment, see e.g., Röllig, 1999.
[57] See Gaifman, 2008, 51–54.
[58] The view of the stone as a/the deity has been debated since the early twentieth century. See e.g., Jirku, 1921, 158–60; Kittel, 1925; Baudissin, 1925; Eissfeldt, 1930; Hyatt, 1939; Koenen, 2003, 81–86; Gomes, 2006, 7–9.
[59] See Götze, 1957, 168–69; Graesser, 1972, 47; de Pury, 1975, 425; Gurney, 1977, 36–37; Baumgarten, 1981, 202; Hutter, 1993; Popko, 1993; Collins, 2005, 26. And see Chapter 4.
[60] Graesser, 1972, 35. [61] Moore, 1903; Skinner, 1910, 378–79.
[62] See Millar, 1993, 13; Sommer, 2009, 28.
[63] Ribichini, 1999, 157–59; Sommer, 2009, 28.

Third, Israelites and their Syro-Palestinian neighbours worshipped a deity called בית אל with some frequency. J. Gomes points out that in the fifth c. BCE, the Jewish colony of Elephantine worshipped a god called בית אל (doc. TAD A2.1; p. 22; p. TAD B7.2).[64] K. van der Toorn notes the Syrian inscription which mentions a deity called אשמביתאל.[65] J. Hyatt observes that Esarhaddon's (d. 669 BCE) treaty with the king of Tyre mentions a god called ^{d}*ba-a-a-ti-* DINGIR.MEŠ, K. 3500 r. ii line 6).[66] The phrase 'house of G/god' was a personal name in several regions of the biblical world. It is not unreasonable to think that 'house of God' was not just the name of the building in which a god lived but also the personal name of the god who lived in a certain type of cult object.[67] In reference to ancient standing stones, van der Toorn thus insists, 'these stones were more than just representations of the deities; they were the manifestations of the gods themselves and the very incarnation of the sacred'.[68] This portrayal of the house of God is not just observable among Israel's neighbours. Rather, we find an early tradition that identifies Israel's own god by this well-known epithet.

Genesis 28–35 contains a well-known account in which the בית אל stands at the centre. Tired on his journey from Beersheba to Haran, Jacob lay down to rest for the night (Gen 28). That night, with a stone as his pillow, he dreamt of a stairway stretching to heaven with angels ascending and descending on it. During the dream, God appeared to him and gave him a promise. Jacob decided to commemorate the event by marking the spot with the stone on which he had slept. So he set up the 'standing stone' (מצבה) and anointed it with oil (Gen 28.18). Afterward, he named the place accordingly: בית אל (v. 19).[69]

Modern readers tend to interpret this account metaphorically. For example, J. McKeown insists that Jacob merely established a memorial to celebrate his encounter with YHWH.[70] Because Israelites were deeply aniconic, Jacob's act was nothing more than commemorative. Instead of adopting their neighbours' models, Jacob and his ancestors actually avoided any potentially Canaanite forms of worship. While this line of thought makes sense to us today, it would not have made sense to ancient Israelites.

[64] van der Toorn, 1992; 2016; Gomes, 2006, 8–9. [65] van der Toorn, 1992, 86.
[66] Hyatt, 1939, 82. [67] Eissfeldt, 1930, 1–30.
[68] van der Toorn, 1997, 1; cf. Hess, 2007, 116–17; Sommer, 2009, 28.
[69] Cf. Allen, 2015, 282.
[70] E.g., McKeown, 2008, 142; cf. Kessler and Deurloo, 2004, 179.

It seems quite easy to see the link between Jacob's 'house of God' and those above. Jacob erected an otherwise normal stone as a memorial to God. But in order to make the stone sacred, he anointed it with oil (v. 18). We do not know what this anointing entailed, but it was likely part of a vivification ritual akin to those that Hittites performed on *ḫuwaši*-s and Mesopotamians performed on statues. In anointing the stone, Jacob did not simply make it sacred, but he made it ready for YHWH to install himself within it. Because he understood it not just as a symbol of God but as God himself, he could give it the name בית אל. His Syro-Palestinian contemporaries would easily have recognised the stone as his god's new body, and thus as the god himself.

God would appear to Jacob on yet another occasion (Gen 31.13), this time revealing himself as follows:

אנכי האל בית-אל אשר משחת שם מצבה אשר נדרת לי שם נדר

The Hebrew in this line presents the interpreter with an exegetical challenge. Was God telling Jacob that he was actually *in* the stone? If this is the case, then we might translate the line:

I (YHWH) am the God *of* Bethel, where you anointed the pillar (at the place) where you made a vow to me.

Or was God referring to himself as *The God (called) Bethel*? If so, then we might translate the line:

I (YHWH) am the God (called) Bethel, the pillar which you anointed there (at the place) where you vowed to me.[71]

In either case, YHWH and the stone were ontologically connected.[72] As the physical object he inhabited, the stone became God in a physical way. This suggestion finds substantiation in Gen 33.20, where we read:

ויצב-שם מזבח ויקרא-לו אל אלהי ישראל

There [in Shechem] he erected an altar and called it El-Elohe-Israel.

The association between the object and the original does not get any clearer than it does here. Jacob literally named the altar 'El, the god of Israel' (אל אלהי ישראל). Later in history, Gideon would also construct an altar to YHWH 'and he called it "YHWH who is peace"' (ויקרא-לו יהוה שלום, Jdgs 6.24).[73] The implication is clear: like other near eastern gods, YHWH

[71] Jacob sets up another stele and anoints it with wine and oil yet again in Gen 35.14–15.
[72] On the debate, see e.g., Gaifman, 2008, 49–54. [73] Sommer, 2009, 52.

could also install himself with physical objects, which could then legitimately be called houses of God.[74]

YHWH could take up residence within physical bodies and make himself available in real space and time. Like other gods, even YHWH could turn a mundane stone into a house. While he deserved a Temple, he did not require one. For he could inhabit any physical space, so long as it had undergone the proper initiation.

YHWH and His Bodies

My point in the preceding discussion has been to establish a particular Israelite theological belief that directly impacts how we understand their anthropology. Like other gods, YHWH enjoyed a fluid ontology. As such, he could reside in multiple types of space simultaneously without ever losing his singular identity as YHWH. As an otherwise disembodied god, he could manifest himself in 'many bodies located in sundry places in the world'.[75] Cult objects of various types and sizes – from monumental temples to large standing stones to wooden poles and trees – served as physical spaces of residence for YHWH.

THE 'IMAGE OF GOD' AS THE EMBODIED SELF

The 'Image of God' in the Hebrew Bible

We have taken note of a number of cult objects that YHWH could embody. However, we have yet to examine the most important type of embodied space in Israelite thought, namely, the divine 'image' (lit.: צלם). Interestingly, only one such Israelite 'image' could legitimately represent YHWH. Thus W. Brueggemann's remark rings true, 'there is one way in which God is imaged in the world and only one: humanness'![76] We know from the previous sections that YHWH could inhabit a variety of cult objects. The question now is, when the Israelites thought of the human as the 'image/statue of God' (צלם אלהים, 1.27; 9.6; cf. 1.26; 5.3), did they imagine it as another one of YHWH's bodies on earth?

We have ample reason to examine Gen 1.26–27 along with 2.7 within the framework of divine embodiment.[77] To begin with, Gen 1.26–27

[74] See Graesser, 1972, 47; de Pury, 1975, 425; Baumgarten, 1981, 202. And see Chapter 4.
[75] Sommer, 2009, 1. [76] Brueggemann, 1982, 32.
[77] While Gen 2.7 does not mention the 'image', it is part of the larger anthropogeny of the book and is therefore inseparable from 1.26–27.

overtly identifies the human as a type of cult object. As we have seen, deities would install themselves within precisely this type of cultic body. Further still, Gen 1–2 articulates a rather well-developed Israelite anthropogeny. We can thus safely assume that these texts offer some insight into Israelite beliefs about the cosmos, humanity and human nature. After all, this is simply what near eastern anthropogenies do. As an anthropogeny that depicts the human as a cult object resembling its deity, Gen 1–2 is therefore prime terrain on which to explore Israelite conceptions of human nature.

Scholarly Views on the 'Image of God'

Debate over the meaning of the 'image of God' (צלם אלהים) continues today.[78] Two main interpretive categories can be found among the literature: one is ontological in nature and the other non-ontological. The ontological interpretation itself divides into two primary camps. On the one hand, is the spiritual or rational interpretation. Since ancient times, Jews like Philo and Christians like Irenaeus, Augustine, Aquinas and J. Calvin have interpreted the image of God within a philosophical or theological framework.[79] These thinkers argue that, with a spiritual aspect unique among created beings, the human had a set of rational faculties that made it like God. The soul was thus the aspect of the self that shared in the divine, hence the reason Scripture calls humans the image of God.

On the other hand, is the physical interpretation. P. Humbert maintains that the image of God has less to do with the human soul or spirit and more to do with the human body.[80] He argues that references to images always emphasise their physical resemblance to the original. The same is true in Genesis, he argues, which asserts that humanity was God's image in that it resembled him physically. H. Gunkel also insists that as God's image, humans resembled the deity in bodily form.[81] He argues that this idea was in circulation before the Priestly writers. While he does

[78] For general treatments and bibliography, see esp. Barr, 1968–1969; Miller, 1972; Matthews, 1987, 164–72; Jónsson 1988; Hamilton, 1990, 131–39; Sarna, 1991, 3–15; Middleton, 2005, 1–34; Schellenberg, 2011; Walton, 2011; 2009; Herring, 2013.

[79] On which, see Delitzsch, 1888–1889, 100; Ramsey, 1950, 250; Cairns, 1953, 110; Hall, 1986, 92–9; Louth, 2001, 27–37, 50–53; Middleton, 2005, 18–19; Herring, 2013, 88–89.

[80] Humbert, 1940; cf. Koehler, 1948; Loretz, 1967; and see Herring, 2013, 89–90.

[81] Gunkel, 1964, 112.

not exclude the spiritual, Gunkel thus insists that it is in their physical body that humans resemble God.[82]

From a more theological perspective, S. McFague also advocates for a physical interpretation of the image of God.[83] Not only does McFague see the human as God's body, but she sees the world likewise. Her understanding of the image of God rests on a panentheistic view of creation, which states that God permeates the entire cosmos.[84] C. Deanne-Drummond also views the biblical image of God within an ecological framework.[85]

While this physical interpretation is far from the consensus view, it has led to a more balanced interpretation of the biblical expression. G. von Rad is correct that, if anything, we need not make too sharp a distinction between the spiritual and physical aspects of the human.[86]

The non-ontological interpretation likewise divides into two primary camps. On the one hand, some see the image of God in relational terms. M. Luther sees the expression as a statement about humanity's unique relationship with God.[87] While he agrees that there were ontological aspects that distinguished humans from other creatures, it was their special relationship with God that separated them from others. This relationship was broken by sin, but in Christ humans could return to God. K. Barth views the image of God in a similar manner. However, for him the expression was not just about the individual's relationship with God. Rather, it concerned humanity's relationship with one another and with God.[88] Among biblical scholars, C. Westermann follows this line of interpretation.[89]

On the other hand, there are those who see the biblical expression in functional terms. Herring explains that such scholars emphasise 'humanity's dominion over the earth and animals' per God's directive in Gen 1.26, 28.[90] As God's vice-regent, 'humanity is the image of God in that it is given authority and power to act, or to function, like God'.[91] For many, this mandate serves as the framework for interpreting the rest of the textual unit as primarily royal in nature.[92]

Within this framework, H. Holzinger was the first modern scholar to insist on a functional interpretation of the image.[93] He was soon followed

[82] Gunkel, 1964, 112. [83] McFague, 1982; 1987; 1993. [84] McFague, 1993, 47–55.
[85] Deanne-Drummond, 2014. [86] von Rad, 1961, 56. [87] See Bell, 2005, 162–63.
[88] Barth, 1958, 219–20. [89] Westermann, 1984, 150–54.
[90] Herring, 2008, 480–94. [91] Herring, 2008, 480. [92] Middleton, 2005, 24–25.
[93] Holzinger, 1898, 12.

by J. Hehn,[94] who established the connection between near eastern kings and the biblical image of God. After some years of relative silence from this camp, H. Wildberger would argue in the 1960s that the human resembled the Egyptian king in particular, and in this regard was to carry out God's rule on earth as his royal representative.[95] W. Schmidt insisted that, like other near eastern kings, not just pharaohs, humans were God's image in that they were to be his 'governor' on earth.[96] Many others have since continued to develop this line of thought, including W. Gross, J. Levenson, M. Welker, D. Clines, P. Bird, M. Kline, B. Anderson, W. Bruegemann, A. Hoekema and J. Middleton.[97] This line of interpretation has become the prevailing view. Noting this situation, Middleton rightly states that 'the last thirty years of the twentieth century saw the royal interpretation of the *imago Dei* come virtually to monopolize the field'.[98]

The interpretation of the image of God that I advocate I call the embodied interpretation. My view of the image prioritises the ontological but includes the functional as well. While this interpretation is not new, it remains in need of further development. Scholars like Herring and Schüle recognise that the image in this context related to the deity or king both functionally and ontologically.[99] If ancients believed an image could contain the god's spiritual presence, then perhaps this is what the biblical writers also meant when they described humanity as a divine image.

If the Israelites agreed with their neighbours that gods could install themselves in physical objects, this must inform our interpretation of the claims made in Gen 1–2. After all, the human is literally called an image of God. Therefore, I shall ask, when Israelites thought about the human as the image of God, what did they imagine this to look like ontologically? How did they envision the relationship between humanity and divinity, between the self and God?

Overview of the Biblical 'Image of God'

I should begin by making some general observations on the צלם in the biblical texts. The צלם is quite rare in the Hebrew Bible, even though it is of tremendous significance both in biblical and post-biblical thought.[100] On its occurrences in the Bible, G. Wenham summarises:

[94] Hehn, 1915, 36–52. [95] Wildberger, 1965. [96] Schmidt, 1983 [1968], 198.
[97] Clines, 1968; 1974; Kline, 1970, 83; Anderson, 1975, 27–45; Bird, 1981; Gross, 1981; Brueggemann, 1982, 32; Hoekema, 1986, 73; Levenson, 1994, 112–18; Welker, 1999, 60–73; Middleton, 2005, 289.
[98] Middleton, 2005, 29. [99] See Schüle, 2005, 5–7; Herring, 2013.
[100] See Vriezen, 1943.

Of its 17 occurrences, 10 refer to various types of physical image, e.g., models of tumors (1 Sam 6:5); pictures of men (Ezek 16:17); or idols (Num 33:52); and two passages in the Psalms liken man's existence to an image or shadow (Ps 39:7; 73:20). The other five occurrences are in Gen 1:26, 27; 5:3; 9:6.[101]

The term צלם specifically designates the human in Gen 1.26, 27 (2x). In 5.3 it refers to Seth, who is born 'in/as his [Adam's] likeness, according to his image' (בדמותו כצלמו). Later, God tells Noah that humans must not kill other humans, because 'in/as the image of God (בצלם אלהים) he made humankind' (9.6).[102]

The Aramaic צלם carries the same meaning as the Hebrew.[103] In the Aramaic portion of Daniel, the writer describes his vision of a monstrous 'image' or 'statue' (צלם) of either Nebuchadnezzar or his deity (Dan 2–3).[104] What we find in this account is a very specific type of צלם that takes the form of a gigantic 'statue', referred to some 17 times here (Dan 2.31 [2x], 32, 34, 35; 3.1, 2, 3 [2x], 5, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18). In every instance but one (3.19), צלם designates the 'statue' that towers over the Babylonians and strikes fear into its onlookers.

The few biblical references to the צלם have generated thousands of years of debate.[105] However, many of these debates have taken place within a Greek philosophical framework, which has led interpreters away from the ancient framework within which the Israelites originally imagined the human as the divine image. We must keep in mind that in the original biblical account we find neither *imago Dei* (Latin) nor ἐικών τοῦ θεοῦ (Greek) but the Hebrew צלם אלהים. This may seem so patent as to be patronising to the reader. But it is critically important to keep in mind. In order to try to avoid some of the pitfalls that come from using the later terms, I shall therefore speak of it using the biblical designation צלם אלהים. After all, the text is difficult enough to understand as it is.

The Human Self As the Divine 'Image' (Gen 1.26–27)

The first biblical references to the human creature as the צלם are found in the Priestly work of Gen 1.26–27:[106]

[101] Wenham, 1987, 29.
[102] See the helpful discussion on these texts in Garr, 2003, 117–77.
[103] See Jastrow, 1982, 1284–85; Smith, 1999, 480.
[104] All 17 times the LXX translates צלם with εἰκών.
[105] See Jobling, 1977; Fossum, 1985; McKeown, 2008, 277–83.
[106] See esp. Sawyer, 1974; Herring, 2013, 87–127. And for more general works, see Köhler, Baumgartner and Stamm, 1996, 1028a; Wildberger, 1997; Stendebach, 2010.

ויאמר אלהים נעשה אדם בצלמנו כדמותנו וירדו בדגת הים ובעוף השמים
ובבהמה ובכל־הארץ ובכל־הרמש הרמש על־הארץ
ויברא אלהים את האדם בצלמו בצלם אלהים ברא אתו זכר ונקבה ברא אתם

26 Then God said, 'Let us make humankind in our image (בצלמנו), according to our likeness (כדמותנו); and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth'.
27 So God created humankind in his image (בצלמו), in the image of God (בצלם אלהים) he created them; male and female he created them. (NRSV)

Some basic grammatical observations are in order. The צלם in v. 26 carries the first-person plural possessive suffix (ינו-: lit.: 'our [image]'). Likewise, the corresponding term 'likeness' is also in the first-person plural possessive (כדמותנו: lit.: 'our likeness'). The second צלם appears in v. 27a, where it carries the third-person singular possessive suffix (ו-: lit.: 'his [image]'). The designation צלם אלהים ('image of God') then appears in v. 27. What is more, all three instances carry the *bet* prefix (ב-: 'in', 'as'). The importance of these grammatical elements will become clear as we turn to look at this text more closely.

YHWH and His Celestial Entourage

The first item to be considered is YHWH's use of the plural pronouns in v. 26. In short, while his language has caused confusion for later interpreters, it is fundamentally near eastern.[107] His language conjures the image of a creator deity, surrounded by a celestial entourage, about to bring his creative process to its climax.[108] This image would make perfect sense in the near eastern world. In Mesopotamian cosmogonies, the heavenly world was already populated by the time humanity came into being. Even Egyptian cosmogonies, which boasted of a creator who was initially alone, claimed that other deities had come into existence by the time humanity entered the scene.

Nevertheless, the possibility that God was not alone when he created humankind presents certain difficulties that have led Jewish[109] and Christian[110] interpreters to look for alternative readings of Gen 1.26.[111] The only interpretation that might make some sense in a historical rather than theological context is what some interpreters call a 'plural of majesty' (*pluralis maiestatis*). As a king, this camp insist, YHWH was referring not to himself *and others* but only to himself (v. 26). W. Garr

[107] Garr, 2003, 21.
[108] Gunkel, 1901, 101; Brandon, 1963, 151; Ahlström, 1963, 49–50; Wenham, 1987, 28.
[109] See Jervell, 1960, 75. [110] Somers, 1955; Wilson, 1957; Armstrong, 1962, 39–40.
[111] See Garr, 2003, 17–21 for extensive bibliography.

points out that this resembles a number of plural nouns used of God (e.g., Gen 1; Dt 10.17; Hos 12.1; Prov 9.10; 30.3; Ps 136.3).[112] So there is some precedent for interpreting Gen 1.26 in this way. However, YHWH here employs a possessive plural pronoun, not a noun, and as Garr observes there is no attestation of a majestic plural pronoun in the entire Hebrew Bible.[113] As G. Hasel states, 'there is no linguistic or grammatical basis upon which the "us" can be considered a plural of majesty'.[114] What is more, Levenson insists that there is no evidence of such language being used in the biblical world. As he writes, 'it is important to remember that the "royal we" was not part of the vocabulary of kings or individual gods in the ancient Near East'.[115]

In the Ancient Near East, it was assumed that by the time the gods created humans, other gods also existed in heaven. The Israelites imagined those primeval moments of creation the same way. The Priestly writers were monotheists, but they were ancient near eastern monotheists. When they conceived of the primordial moments of creation, they imagined a deity who was not alone. They may have imagined him as the chief God among gods or as the only true god among a host of beings we would call 'angels'.[116] Regardless, in making use of what M. Smith calls the 'traditional language' of their world,[117] these writers imagined YHWH as making a declaration to those around him: 'Let *us* make humankind in *our* image, according to *our* likeness' (v. 26).

The World As a Temple in Genesis 1

The second item to be considered is the way the Priestly narrative depicts YHWH's creation as a cosmic temple. The writers thought of 'the ideal or protological world, the world viewed *sub specie creationis* . . . as a macro-temple, the palace of God'.[118] In the Ancient Near East, the temple was a microcosm – literally, 'a miniature world'.[119] We saw the correspondence between the cosmos and the temple in Mesopotamian cosmogonies.[120] Hundley observes this reality in Egyptian temples as well.[121] But the Israelites also viewed the temple as a microcosm of the world, and reciprocally, they viewed the world as a macro-temple.[122]

[112] Garr, 2003, 19–20. [113] Garr, 2003, 20. [114] Hasel, 1975, 64.
[115] Levenson, 1994, 158n14, quoted in part by Garr, 2003, 20.
[116] See Levenson, 1994, 5; Garr, 2003, 21.
[117] Smith, 2001, 90. For examples, he refers to Gen 3.22; 11.7; Isa 6.8.
[118] Levenson, 1994, 86. [119] Levenson, 1994, 86.
[120] See Chapter 3. See also Turner, 1977, 35–36.
[121] Hundley, 2013, 30; cf. Bryan, 1992. [122] Hurowitz, 1992.

The temple was a special type of space within which divine and nondivine could intersect.[123]

In Gen 1, YHWH looks like a god building a type of temple that might serve as his divine residence. As J. Walton remarks, 'Genesis 1 is framed in terms of the creation of the cosmos as a temple in which Yahweh takes up his repose'.[124] The biblical account follows a widely attested seven-day pattern, over the course of which a monarch would construct a temple for a deity or deities. Thus the famous Mesopotamian god-king Gudea (r. 2144–2124 BCE) followed this seven-day pattern when he built a temple for Ningirsu and Bau (E3/1.1.7.CylB).[125] Likewise, when YHWH created the cosmos, he followed this well-known pattern. In doing so, he was not just creating the world, but he was creating for himself a temple – a space where he could live as he would later do in the Jerusalem Temple.

The function of the cosmos in Gen 1 is also analogous to that of near eastern temples. As we saw previously, temples housed gods the way palaces housed monarchs. In the same way, other cosmogonies depict the cosmos as a type of space in which the gods might dwell that was different from what they had previously known. Both cosmos and temple were viewed as composite spaces, the intersection between divine and nondivine. When he built the temple to Ningirsu and Bau, Gudea's intent was to provide the deities a sacred 'resting place'.[126] This was to become their home on earth. Similarly, YHWH created the cosmos so that he might have a place to 'rest' (שבת, Gen 2.2, 3).[127] The world was to become his new home, and it was unlike anything he had ever known before. The true climax of the biblical cosmogony comes when YHWH takes his 'rest' (שבת). While he would later command the Israelites to build for him a tabernacle (and temple) modelled after the cosmos (Exod 25–31),[128] in these early days of creation, the cosmos served as his home.

Before the god could take up residence in his new house, whether temple or cosmos, he or she would establish 'functionaries' who would 'make the temple/world operational'.[129] Such functionaries included attendants who would take care of the temple and ensure that the rituals remained on schedule. Again, YHWH kept with this model, taking

[123] Turner, 1977, 26. [124] Walton, 2007, 197.
[125] Walton, 2007, 197–99. On the Gudea Cylinders, see esp. Edzard, 1997, 68–101; Jacobsen, 1987, 386–446.
[126] Walton, 2007, 197. [127] Walton, 2007, 197. [128] See Levenson, 1994, 82–86.
[129] Herring, 2013, 107.

several days to fill his cosmic temple with functionaries who would keep his home in order.

The most important such item to be placed in the temple was the deity's 'image' (Sum.: ALAM; Akk.: *ṣalmu*; Heb.: צלם). Through the image, gods would install themselves in their temples and take up residence therein. Once the image was constructed and placed in the temple, priests would initiate it. At that moment, the god would enter the cult object and take up rest in the new 'house' (e.g., Sum.: É; Akk.: *bītu*; Heb.: בית). The moment the deity came to rest in the image marked the climax of the near eastern temple-building ceremony.

I will discuss the nature of the image shortly. But it is important to see the way this cult object fits within the seven-day temple-building schema of Gen 1. At the climax of the ceremony, a Mesopotamian god would enter its image and take rest in the temple. Here again, according to Gen 2.2, 3, the climax of YHWH's week-long ceremony was when he entered his image and took rest in his cosmic temple.

But this is where Gen 1 diverges from other near eastern cosmogonies. Elsewhere, attendants would ensure that the temple processes continued according to plan. They would also ensure that the god's image – and hence the deity him- or herself – was taken care of. However, according to Gen 1.26, 28, YHWH created his 'image' (צלם) to fulfil the role of *both* the cult object *and* the temple attendants. In this regard, the functional interpretation of the image of God is quite consistent with the embodied interpretation that I suggest be taken more seriously.

According to Gen 1–2, YHWH created the human not only as his image but also to be his temple attendant. This cult object was to be his body *and* to maintain order in his cosmic temple (vv. 26, 28).[130] It was to work in the temple as an embodiment of the deity himself. Just as near eastern kings or gods expanded their reach through their images,[131] YHWH also created his image to bear his presence and expand his reach on the earth.[132]

The biblical anthropogeny is deeply rooted in its near eastern context. Herring summarises Gen 1 when he writes:

[130] See esp. Fisher, 1965; Clifford, 1984; Levenson, 1988, 10n30.

[131] Amenhotep III and Ramesses II are famous for doing this in Egypt, and Naram-Sîn appears to do the same in Mesopotamia.

[132] von Rad, 1972, 60; cf. Otto, 1971; Dion, 1982, 151–53; Millard and Bordreuil, 1982; Dohmen, 1983; Ockinga, 1984; Westermann, 1984, 153.

Genesis 1 describes creation in terms of temple building and consecration. Both Genesis 1 and these building/dedication ceremonies describe the installation of temple appurtenances, priestly personnel, various lower gods, and the entrance of the 'image' of the god into the temple, often over multiple days. It is within this cultic and ritual literary environment that we encounter the Hebrew term צלם and the description of humanity as צלם אלהים. (Gen. 1:26–27)[133]

Given the overall cultic framework within which the Priestly writers were operating, we have impetus to understand the צלם the same way we understand other near eastern cult images. We have reason to think of the human as a type of embodied space, within whom YHWH chose to install himself.

The 'Image' (צלם) and 'Likeness' (דמות)

According to the Priestly account, YHWH crafted the 'image' (צלם) according to his 'likeness' (דמות).[134] Scholars debate the relationship between צלם and דמות.[135] The term דמות appears a number of times in Priestly writings (Gen 1.26; 5.1, 3; Ezek 1.5, 10, 13, 16, 11, 16; 8.2; 10.1, 10, 21, 22; 23.15). According to Gen 1.26, God created humanity in his image 'according to our likeness' (כדמותנו). A recap of 1.26 then comes in 5.1, which sets the context for a discussion of Adam and his lineage (תולדת). This text does not state that God created humanity 'in his image', as in 1.26, but instead 'in his likeness' (בדמות). In 5.3 we then learn that Adam bore a son 'in his likeness, according to his image' (בדמותו כצלמו) called Seth.

The key to any interpretation of דמות in Gen 1.26 is to understand that it cannot be separated from צלם. While the meaning of צלם has proven difficult for interpreters, its physical nature becomes undeniable when combined with דמות. In a near eastern context, the idea of a material cult object (צלם) that shared in the physical form (דמות) of a god made perfect sense.[136] The physicality of this cult object is especially clear when we consider the relationship between the Semitic צלם (Heb.) and *ṣalmu* (Akk.). As Garr writes, 'not only is the Akkadian expression, *ṣalmu* "image", perfectly cognate to its later, Hebrew relative. *Ṣelem* and *ṣalmu* also share a number of "functional equivalencies"'.[137] He adds that the '*ṣalmu* provides an unusually compelling and detailed correlate to the biblical "image"'.[138] Like an Akkadian *ṣalmu*, a צלם was a specific type of cult object that resembled the god who created it (vv. 26–27).

[133] Herring, 2013, 108; cf. Smith, 2010, 127. [134] Cf. Herring, 2013, 87–127.
[135] See esp. Garr, 2003, 117–77. [136] Wildberger, 1965. [137] Garr, 2003, 137.
[138] Garr, 2003, 137.

The צלם in Gen 1 receives a particularly theomorphic form, as it is explicitly identified as being made 'according to' (כ) the physical appearance of its creator. In this light, Humbert's interpretation of צלם as a physical statue – an *effigie extérieure* – makes best sense in a near eastern framework.[139] Or as Garr writes, 'humanity, then, is (like) a theophany'.[140]

Scholars try to avoid interpreting the צלם and דמות in such physical terms. P. Davies asserts that this reluctance to 'allow that the god has a shape that is the same as a human one' is 'inspired by the presence of a theological agenda'.[141] However, in the ancient world, gods had bodies. Thus, an image would naturally have been understood as a physical representation of a god (or king). Seeing the image in Gen 1.26–27 in physical terms simply made the most sense.

C. Crouch argues that 'all the creative manoeuvring around the apparent physicality' of the biblical image 'was effectively arrested by the discovery of' the bilingual Aramaic-Akkadian inscription on a statue of king Hadd-Yith'i from Tell Fekheriye.[142] In the inscription, the Aramaic terms צלמא ('image') and דמותא ('likeness') appear next to one another.[143] Garr argues that both צלמא and דמותא refer to the physical statue of the king.[144] Crouch also maintains that both terms refer 'to the unequivocally physical statue in question'.[145] And M. Stol insists that 'these words are not synonyms in this inscription: *dmwt* pictures or reproduces somebody or something, and *ṣlm* is the object representing him or it'.[146] Crouch adds that, in the wake of this discovery, scholars agree more and more that in Gen 1.26–27, צלם and דמות refer to the physical aspect of the human creature.[147]

When paired together, these terms communicate a rather clear idea. One term (צלם) refers to the cult object YHWH created. YHWH created a 'statue' from the earth (2.7, see The Divine Earth-human). The other term (דמות) refers to the form or shape of the cult object.[148] In this sense, it was, as Garr calls it, a 'theophany'.[149] For YHWH created the 'statue' to resemble him physically.

[139] Humbert, 1940, 157, but see 153–65; cf. Smith, 1988, 426–27.
[140] Garr, 2003, 117. [141] Davies, 1995, 251. [142] Crouch, 2010, 6.
[143] On which, see Millard and Bordreuil, 1982; Dohmen, 1983; Greenfield and Shaffer, 2001, 217–24.
[144] Garr, 2003, 121; cf. 2000. [145] Crouch, 2010, 7. [146] Stol, 2000, 150.
[147] Crouch, 2010, 7; cf. Dohmen, 1983.
[148] See Gunkel, 1917, 112; Angerstorfer, 1984; Lohfink, 2000, 31; Humbert, 2010, 158–59.
[149] Garr, 2003, 117.

As YHWH expected his image to participate in his rule over the earth (Gen 1.26, 28), he knew that it had to look like him. This was true of any ruler or god. Thus, if Ramesses II or Narām-Sîn wanted to expand his presence throughout the earth, he would establish images that looked like himself. This was the only way onlookers would know which god-king was watching them.[150] Likewise, YHWH created the image to resemble him physically, for he fully intended it to be the visible manifestation of him in the world, his cosmic temple.

It is safe to say that צלם and דמות are not synonyms, even if they are closely related.[151] One indicates what YHWH created to represent him (צלם), while the other indicates the shape (דמות) of the object once it was finished.[152] The צלם was none other than a statue that physically represented the creator deity, after whom it derived its physical shape (דמות). Bird's suggestion that the Priestly writers did not claim precisely *in what sense* the human resembles God is true in some sense.[153] But this may be because their Yahwist predecessors had already addressed this issue, as we shall now see.

The Divine Earth-Human (Gen 2.7)

The next reference to the creation of the human self is found in the Yahwist work of Gen 2.7. Whereas there is no specific mention of a צלם here, the Yahwists hardly envisioned human origins any differently. In fact, their account provides further detail about how YHWH actually constructed the human image. As A. Schüle observes, they were well aware of 'the multi-stage process of the making of a divine statue'.[154] As we read in Gen 2.7:

> וייצר יהוה אלהים את האדם עפר מן האדמה ויפח באפיו נשמת חיים
> ויהי האדם לנפש חיה
>
> then the Lord God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living being. (NRSV)

It is easy to see why the Priestly writers did not repeat the details of the Yahwists' account. This short description provides incredible insight into humanity's creation and human nature.

[150] Cf. Brueggemann, 1982, 32.
[151] Contra e.g., Collins, 2006, 62. But see Niskanen, 2009.
[152] Angerstorfer, 1984.
[153] Bird, 1981, 139–40; cf. Barr, 1960; 1968–1969; 1972–1973.
[154] Schüle, 2017, 39–40.

It is also easy to see why the biblical redactors placed this alongside the Priestly account.[155] The Priests portrayed YHWH's creation of the world as if he were building himself a temple. They, of course, mentioned certain aspects of the statue inside the cosmic temple, which we discussed already. But they found that the Yahwists had already explained *how* YHWH created his statue (here in 2.7). They realised that the Yahwist account provided insight into specific aspects of the human-image that they did not need to restate any differently.

Fashioning the Statue

In addition to calling YHWH by name (i.e., 'YHWH God'), the Yahwists' account offers important detail about how YHWH constructed the human and what he used to do so.[156] For one thing, he used 'dust of the ground' (עפר מן-האדמה) to give the human its basic shape. As we saw in earlier chapters, ritual texts often provide detail about the material used to construct cult objects. Craftsmen were to follow precise orders in choosing materials from which to construct gods' bodies, just as gods were deliberate about the material they used to create the human body. The Yahwists have followed this custom, depicting YHWH as having created the human from the material stuff of the earth. Not surprisingly, like their Egyptian, Mesopotamian and Hittite neighbours, the Israelites believed that the human body was ontologically related to the material cosmos. Earth-stuff was the fundamental ingredient from which YHWH crafted the human body.

Additionally, whereas P states simply that YHWH 'created' (ברא) the human (1.27), J states that he 'formed' (יצר) it from the earthly material (2.7, 8). Cognates of the Hebrew יצר include the Ugaritic *yṣr*, Phoenician *yṣr*, Akkadian *eṣēru* and the Sumerian ḪUR ('to draw, form, determine'). These terms were often used in cultic settings similar to what we find in Gen 1–2. This is especially true of the Akkadian *eṣēru*, which was used of craftsmen who would make 'reliefs' (*uṣṣuru*) or statues as effigies of the gods or kings they resembled.[157] Like these cognates, יצר conveys the picture of a craftsman carefully shaping an object into form (Exod 32.4).[158] When the Yahwists imagined the human's first moments of existence, they envisioned YHWH as a skilled craftsman giving shape to the lump of earth until it resembled him and his divine council.

[155] For extensive discussion, see McDowell, 2015, 178–202. [156] Schüle, 2017, 39–40.
[157] For examples, see *eṣēru* in *CAD*, vol. 4 (E): 346–49.
[158] As well as the thing that one makes (2 Sam 17.28; Ps 2.9: 'earthen [יוצר] vessels').

Here again, it is hard not to see the physical nature of humanity's resemblance to God.[159]

Vivifying the Statue

Prior to its vivification, the statue was just a lump of clay that resembled the god who created it.[160] The Yahwist account therefore, fittingly, describes how YHWH brought this inanimate statue to life (Gen 2.7). Clearly, the Priestly writers and/or final redactors of the Hebrew Bible understood that this Yahwist account filled in details that would have taken place prior to YHWH's installing himself in his cosmic temple to rest (2.2, 3). However, instead of inserting it into the Priestly narrative, perhaps interrupting the flow of Gen 1.1–2.3, they chose to attach it as an addendum. Regardless of where it is in the narrative, it provides critical detail about human origins and human nature.

As many scholars have observed, J's account of how YHWH vivified the human is strikingly similar to the Mesopotamian *Mīs Pî* ('Mouth-Washing', Sum.: KA.LUḪ.Ù.DA) and *Pīt Pî* ('Mouth-Opening', Sum.: KA.DUḪ.Ù.DA) rituals.[161] To a lesser degree, the biblical account is also reminiscent of the Egyptian *wpt-r* ('Opening of the Mouth') ritual.[162] For the sake of brevity, I shall focus on comparisons between Gen 2.7 and the Mesopotamian ritual at this point.

Most references to the Mesopotamian rituals date to the seventh and sixth c. BCE, with another reference dating to the ninth c. BCE.[163] However, the rituals were in use as early as the Ur III period (2113–2006 BCE).[164] In Egypt, the *wpt-r* ritual was in use even earlier, likely during the Old Kingdom (2575–2150 BCE).[165] Among biblical writers, Ezekiel was familiar with the ritual, and he would make explicit references to it (16.63; 19.21).[166] Likewise, the Yahwists were aware of these rituals and the beliefs underlying them. How they adopted it in their own account is indeed intriguing, as we see shortly.

[159] Humbert, 1940, 155–56, 162.
[160] See Wildberger, 1965; Loretz, 1967; Mettinger, 1974.
[161] See esp. McDowell, 2015, 117–77. And see her refs on pp. 15–20. See also Matson, 2013.
[162] See McDowell, 2015, 43–116, for an excellent discussion of the Mesopotamian and Egyptian rituals.
[163] Walker and Dick, 1999, 58–68; cf. Weidner, 1959–1960, 138.
[164] Walker and Dick, 1999, 58.
[165] For excellent discussion, see McDowell, 2015, 85–108, and see her sources.
[166] See Kennedy, 1991, 233–35; cf. Dick, 1999, 1–54.

When Mesopotamians created an 'image' or 'statue' (*ṣalmu*) of a god or king, they performed a set of rituals in order to bring it to life. The ceremony during which they performed these rituals was held at the grand opening of a newly constructed temple. After the statue was situated in the temple, attendants would prepare it for the deity's arrival. The *Mīs Pî* and *Pit Pî* rituals were among the final steps in this process.[167] At the completion of these rituals, the deity could alas descend from heaven and install him- or herself in a new physical body (*ṣalmu*) in the midst of his or her new house (Sum.: É; Akk.: *bītu*). As I. Winter explains, at that moment the inanimate statue became 'animated, the representation not standing for but actually manifesting the presence of the subject represented'.[168]

The *Mīs Pî* ritual sanctified the *ṣalmu* and prepared it to become the deity's physical body. The *Pīt Pî* ritual then opened the *ṣalmu*'s mouth and invited the deity to install him- or herself inside:

19 *ina* u_4*-mu an-na-*|||*a*||| *iz-zi-*[*za-n*]*im-ma*
20 *a-na ṣalmi*(alam) *an-na-a šá ina maḫri*(igi)*-ku-nu iz-za-az-zu*
22 *pâ*(ka)*-šú a-na ma-ka-le-e uznī*(geštu)$^{min!}$*- šú a-na né-eš-me-e liš*$^{!}$(EŠ)-||| *šá* |||-kin

19 this day here be present and in grand style determine destiny
20 for this statue that stands before you!
22 Let its mouth be disposed for eating and its ears for hearing!
(IM 124645 lines 19, 20, 22, text/trans. Al-Rawi and George, 1995, 226–27)[169]

And again:

> [*ṣa*$^{!}$*-lam*$^{!}$] *an-nu-u ina la pi-it pi-i qut-ri-in-na ul iṣ-ṣi-in a-ka-la ul ik-kal me-e ul i-šat*
>
> This statue cannot smell incense, drink water, or eat food without the 'Opening of the Mouth'. (STT 200:43; PBS 12/1 No. 6 1–2, text/trans. Walker and Dick, 1999, 114)[170]

Berlejung insists that, although the *ṣalmu* was already divine before the god entered it, it was not yet *alive*.[171] M. Dick explains that at that moment, the *ṣalmu* became 'the main conduit of divine self-disclosure', and the 'divine [became] efficaciously present' in the cult object.[172]

[167] Walker and Dick, 1999, 71.
[168] Winter, 1992, 17, quoted also by Walker and Dick, 1999, 57.
[169] See also Sommer, 2009, 19–24; Walker and Dick, 2001, 149; 1999, 55–122.
[170] Cf. Ebeling, 1931, 155; Walker and Dick, 2001, 151.
[171] Berlejung, 1998, 177, noted in Dick, 2005, 52n47.
[172] Dick, 2005, 43, 67, respectively.

During these rituals, the priests would then speak to the *ṣalmu* as if they were speaking to the god itself.[173]

At the culmination of these rituals, the *ṣalmu* became the living embodiment of the deity.[174] The object became, as Z. Bahrani states, a 'doubling or multiplication' of the otherwise disembodied god within it.[175] This moment marked the climax of the temple-building ceremony. After all the work had been completed, the god could finally take his or her place in a new house, in a new body, and make him- or herself available to humans therein.

When YHWH created the world to be his cosmic temple, he followed a common seven-day pattern to do so. On the sixth day, he crafted his statue, and all that remained was for him to install himself within it and bring it to life.[176] Like other gods, he entered into his statue through the openings in its face. Hence, he breathed his own breath into the human's 'nostrils' (אף), at which point it became a 'living self' (נפש חיה, 2.7).

It is hard to deny the similarity between the biblical account and the Mesopotamian rituals. In the *Mīs Pî* and *Pit Pî* rituals, the deity would install him- or herself into the statue, and at that moment the statue would become the living embodiment of that deity. This is precisely what happened in Eden when God breathed into Adam. According to Gen 2.7, YHWH imparted his divine breath to the statue, and at that moment the statue sprang to life.

The Yahwist account does not follow the Mesopotamian rituals in every respect. Unlike in the *Mīs Pî* and *Pīt Pî* rituals, in Gen 2.6 there is no priest to help bring the statue to life. Instead, the deity does it all by himself. Furthermore, in infusing the statue with his 'breath of life' (נשמת חיים), YHWH resembles the Egyptian deities a bit more closely than he does Mesopotamian deities. As we saw previously, Egyptian deities likewise brought the human to life by infusing it with their 'breath of life' (*ṯ3w ʿnḫ*).[177]

Prior to that moment, the statue was just a symbol, and YHWH had not yet taken his place in creation. But with the divine air coursing through its bounds, the cult object became a living, breathing embodiment of its divine creator. To borrow B. Collins' terminology, this was the moment when the statue experienced 'animation' or 'activation' and

[173] Orlin, 2016, 221–24. [174] Sommers, 2009, 12. [175] Bahrani, 2003, 135.
[176] See Herring, 2013, 121; McDowell, 2015, 203–10.
[177] On which, see Williams, 1969, 93–94; Hoffmeier, 1983, 47; Walton, 1989, 33; Lichtheim, 2006, 215; Wilkinson, 2017, 152–53.

became, in the Yahwists' own words, 'a living *self*' (נפש חיה).[178] This was truly a 'transubstantiating' moment, in which the divine presence infused the statue and brought it to life.[179]

In spite of their differences, Gen 1.26–27 and 2.7 complement each other quite well. YHWH's creation of the human as the צלם אלהים (1.26–27), shaping of the human out of the dust of the earth and vivifying it with his own breath (2.7) are part of the same ancient Israelite story. Each account is consistent with the other. The later Priestly writers simply chose to leave out what the earlier Yahwists had already stated.

The Self As the Embodied Deity

In the light of what we saw previously, the biblical anthropogeny reveals more than a series of fascinating theological and historical elements.[180] It also sheds important light on the intrinsic divinity of the self. Within the framework of divine embodiment, we see the way YHWH embodied the human self – his own statue– just like he did the *asherahs* and בתי אל.

The Earthly Nature of the Physical Body

The physical body did not share in the divine nature the way YHWH's breath did. Its shape represented YHWH's shape, and in this way mimicked God physically. But because it came from the earth, the body was earthly in nature. But this raises the question, what does it mean that the body shared in the earth's nature?

Interestingly, early Jews and Christians imagined Adam to have shared in YHWH's radiant 'glory' (כבוד, e.g., 1QS iv 23; CD iii 20; $1QH^a$ iv 15; *Tg. Ps-J*, *Neof*, *Onq*., *Fr. tg*. Gen 3.21; *Gen Rab*. 20.12; Rom 3.23; 6.23).[181] The sources in which this idea is found were written later, of course. However, the Israelites may also have imagined the first human as sharing in a radiant nature. If this is true, they would not have been alone. Indo-European traditions surrounding the first human had long depicted the primordial humans in such a way. Such depictions in fact were quite widespread among Israel's neighbours to the east, the Persians, who themselves had drawn on much earlier Indo-European traditions.

[178] Collins, 2005, 29; Herring, 2008, 180–94; 2013, 87–127.
[179] Jacobsen, 1987, 29; Dick, 2005, 43–67; Herring, 2008, 482.
[180] See Creager, 1974; Cook, 1975; Horowitz, 1979.
[181] See Gottstein, 1994, 182; Fletcher-Louis, 2002; Golitzin, 2003.

According to one Persian tradition, Ahura Mazdā created Gayōmard as the primal human from whom the human race would emerge.[182] Just as YHWH created Adam from the material earth, Ahura Mazdā likewise 'created Gayōmard, with the "Gav" out of the earth' (*GBd* 1a, 13, trans. Anklesaria, 1956).[183] The *Gav* was, of course, the primordial bull, but its connection with the earth points to the correspondence between the earth and the human body. What is more, Gayōmard's 'material body' was enormous in size and 'shining as the Sun' (*GBd* 1a, 13, trans. Anklesaria, 1956).[184] There was a correspondence between Gayōmard's 'material body' and the primeval earth, both of which shone with sun-like radiance. Both the human and the earth existed in radiant glory in their earliest days, that is, before the onslaught of Aŋra Mainiiu, whose hijacking of Ahura Mazdā's good creation would eventually lead to Gayōmard's death (*GBd* 4.24–4.a.1).[185]

The parallels between this ancient myth and Gen 1–3 are hard to miss. In both, the creator god created the human from the earth in divine-like appearance (Gen 1.26–28; 2.7; *GBd* 1a, 13), only to have his pristine creation cast into darkness by an evil intruder (Gen 3; *GBd* 4.24–4.a.1). It would be beyond the evidence to say that the biblical writers drew directly from the Persian myth. But it is intriguing to think that, when they imagined humanity's nature in those primeval days of creation, perhaps they imagined it along the same lines as their Indo-European and Persian predecessors.

In another Persian tradition, the first human and king was known by the name of Yima (see *Vd.* 2; *Yt.* 19).[186] Like Adam, Yima was to fulfil God's directive to rule and expand the earth (*Vd.* 2.1–19; *Vd.* 4–6; DNa.).[187] Interestingly, Persians remembered the first human not just by what he did. They were also keen to talk about how he looked. They actually referred to him as Yima Xšaitah (Av.: *yimō xšaitō*), or 'Radiant Yima' (*Vd.* 2.20, 21).[188] Islamic scholar Al-Bīrūnī (943–1048 CE) comments on a tradition in circulation before his lifetime that claimed that Yima (Jam) had always been known for his sun-like radiance.[189] Thus one day, Al-Bīrūnī recalls, the primordial human 'rose . . . like the sun, the

[182] See Williams, 1985; Cereti, 2015, 269–71. On the antiquity of Gayōmard traditions, see e.g., Yarshater, 1983, 416.
[183] See Daryaee, 2003, 339–49. [184] Shaked, 1987. [185] Widengren, 1969.
[186] On Persian kingship, see e.g., Kuhrt, 1984, 156–60; Silverman, 2012, 70–75; 2015, 1–6; 2016; 2017, 35.
[187] Cf. Kent, 1961, 138; Herrenschmidt, 1976; Skjærvø, 2005, 80; Silverman, 2017, 35.
[188] Skjærvø, 2011, 23; Grenet, 2015, 133. [189] Al-Bīrūnī, 1879.

light beaming forth from him, as though he shone like the sun'. He was so bright that 'people were astonished at the rising of two suns, and all dried-up wood became green' (lines 12–20; cf. *Vd.* 2.10).[190] Yima's 'luminosity' (*raocah*, *Vd.* 2.10) derived from his divine *x^{v}arənah* or *xwarrah* – an ancient Persian idea akin to that of 'glory' (כבוד) in Hebrew.[191]

I am not suggesting that there was a direct relationship between Israelite and Persian anthropogenies. However, it is notable that more than one near eastern tradition depicts the primordial human *and* the earth from which it came as shining radiantly like the sun. Egyptians viewed the *benben*, the primordial land from which the human body would emerge, as sun-like in appearance. Mesopotamians imagined the Dur-an-ki, from which the deities created the human body, in the same way. The Hittites thought of the metallic deposits from which the human body was forged as having a brilliant, metallic appearance. And we have now seen that the Persians likewise envisioned the first human's body and the earth-material of which it was made to have radiated like the sun. It is reasonable to think that the Israelites were also aware of these ancient traditions when they imagined what Adam and the primal earth looked like.

The Divine Presence within the Statue

Glorious or not, the original 'statue of God' became a living manifestation of the divine when YHWH brought it to life. Once he infused the statue, it became something new. It was no longer a mere 'symbolic representation'. But it became an 'embodied double', a physical manifestation of the god inside it.[192] It became an embodiment of YHWH in his cosmic temple and an extension of his rule on earth.

Before YHWH breathed into the statue, human and god were separate. God existed, to be sure, but the self did not. The statue was still just a body, and a body alone does not make a self. However, when God breathed into the statue, then it became 'a living self' (לנפש חיה, Gen 2.7). The deity entered the space of the statue and not only gave it life but transformed it into a composite of divine and nondivine.[193] God and human commixed in a single space for the first time ever. Within that bounded space, God and his theomorphic statue united to form the human self. Just as YHWH could inhabit Jacob's בית אל and Israel's

[190] Al-Bīrūnī, 1879, 202. [191] See my discussion of this idea in Chapter 6.
[192] Bahrani, 2003, 171; Herring, 2008, 482–83.
[193] Bahrani, 2003, 171; Herring, 2008, 483.

asherahs, here he came to inhabit the human-image. He imparted his 'breath of life' (נשמת חיים) into the statue's 'nostrils' (עפר), establishing himself in his cosmic temple where he might rest at last.

For the Israelites, the self was literally a composite of the earth (עפר מן-האדמה) and God (נשמת חיים, Gen 2.7). The material from which God crafted the statue's body was external to himself, so it does not appear to have been divine. However, he brought the statue to life from his own breath, his own life-giving essence. It was this, the god's living essence, from which humanity derived its share in the divine state. We can conclude, then, that the human self – צלם אלהים / נפש חיה (1.27) (2.7) – was neither purely physical nor purely immaterial, and neither purely divine nor purely nondivine. It was both and all at the same time.[194]

The Ontological-Functional Interpretation of the Image

As we have seen, the consensus among biblical scholars is to offer a functional interpretation of the 'image of God' in Gen 1–2. In a well-known statement, von Rad writes:

> Just as powerful earthly kings, to indicate their claim to dominion, erect an image of themselves in the provinces of their empire where they do not personally appear, so man is placed upon earth in God's image as God's sovereign emblem.[195]

von Rad is correct to a certain point. YHWH did establish the human-image to indicate his 'claim to dominion' over the earth. However, Gen 1–2 makes clear that this image was much more than a propaganda piece. Propagandistic images were established in locations where they were visible to onlookers. Rulers wanted everyone who saw them to know who was in charge. Thus in Egypt and Mesopotamia, rulers placed images of themselves in distant locations for this reason. Similarly, in these cultures the king was the 'image of God/gods' in the sense that he carried out the divine rule on earth on behalf of the gods.[196] The image therefore carried out an important function. It extended the rule of the gods or kings in locations where they were physically absent.

Indeed, the royal flavour of Gen 1 cannot be missed. YHWH is the divine king who issues decrees and who has commissioned his 'image' to carry out his rule on earth on his behalf. However, the narrative is also fundamentally cultic in nature. It concerns the way YHWH built his

[194] So von Rad, 1961, 56. See also Herring, 2013, 90–91.
[195] von Rad, 1972, 60.
[196] See refs in Lambert, 1957–1958, 50–51; Clines, 1968, 83–85; Bird, 1981, 141–42; Middleton, 2005, 108–22.

cosmic temple and established his image inside it. In this sense, it is not about a king establishing an image of himself in a remote region of his empire, as von Rad claims. Rather, it is about a god establishing his image in his temple.

As we have seen, images in temples were always cultic before they were propagandistic. They may have declared to worshippers who was in charge, and they may have extended the rule of the god on earth. But because they were situated inside temples, they were not primarily intended to be seen by the masses. Instead, they were to be worshipped as if the deity were inside them. In this regard, they *functioned* as the *physical body* of the god or ruler they represented and not just a *symbol* or *extension* of the god's rule.

In this light, the functional interpretation of Gen 1–2 is incomplete without the embodied interpretation. Schüle is correct that there was both a functional and a cultic aspect of the image.[197] A deity would never establish his or her image in a temple as a mere 'representational copy'. Rather, the image was always intended to be the 'embodied double' of a deity who was very much present. The image became a living embodiment of the deity inside. Contrary to Levenson's argument, the human was not just 'God's royal stand-in'.[198] It was not to go out on behalf of the distant god as an ambassador in a foreign land acting on behalf of the king back home. Instead, the 'image' was the bearer of the presence and power of the divine in God's cosmic temple.

This is precisely what YHWH created his image to be and do. It was not simply a symbol of or participant in his rule in distant lands. Rather, it was his cult body and his temple attendant, in which he might reside and through which he might maintain order within his cosmic temple. As Herring explains:

> This is not, first and foremost, royal ideology, wherein humanity is given the title and role of king over the earth. It is more drastic than that: humanity is given the place primarily occupied by the statues of the gods in the ancient Near East and secondarily by kings and other temple officials.[199]

Far from a stand-in for God, the human-image in Gen 1–2 was an incarnation of a deity who was very much present in his cosmic temple in this, his very own (human) physical body.

[197] Schüle, 2005, 5–7. [198] Levenson, 1994, 116, cf. 114. [199] Herring, 2008, 494.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Israelites conceived of the deities and the self like their neighbours. They believed that deities enjoyed a fluid nature that enabled them to inhabit cult objects and reside among humans on earth. As it did for their neighbours, this theology deeply influenced Israelite anthropology.

The Israelite self was a composite of divine and nondivine. It was a commixture of earth and god, a space comprising dust from the ground and the divine presence of God. Whereas their neighbours thought of the royal self as having an elevated share in the divine nature, the Israelites imagined that *all humans* retained a share in this divine nature. By virtue of their descent from the first human (Gen 5.1–3), all humans enjoyed a share in God's nature, for he had created them to be none other than his צלם אלהים on earth.

6

Divinity for All

The Godlike Self in Graeco-Roman Thought

PREFATORY REMARKS

The Present Chapter

Greece did not emerge as a dominant player in the near eastern and Mediterranean world until around the early centuries of the first mill. BCE.[1] As the Hittite and Egyptian powerhouses were on the decline, the Greeks rose in prominence. They would thrive politically and culturally, with certain moments of difficulty, of course, through the Classical period (fifth–fourth c. BCE) and Hellenistic period (323–146 BCE). Meanwhile, to the west the Romans emerged around the mid-eighth c. BCE in the Italian Peninsula.[2] They would not become a formidable political force until the third c. BCE, but by the mid-second c. BCE, they were able to defeat the mighty Greeks and quickly expand their reach across the ancient world. By the first c. BCE, Rome had become the dominant force of antiquity and would remain so well into the Common Era. However, even after losing political independence to the Romans in 146 BCE, Greek influence had already left its mark on virtually every aspect of the ancient world. The so-called Graeco-Roman world was therefore just that: a world in which both Greek and Roman influence could be felt wherever one went.

[1] On ancient Greece, see e.g., Latacz, 1994; Rowe and Schofield, 2000; Boardman, Griffin and Murray, 2001; Cartledge, 2002; Demand, 2006; Pomeroy, Burstein, Donlan and Roberts, 2009.

[2] On ancient Rome, see e.g., Cornell, 1995; Coulston and Dodge, 2000; Rosenstein, 2006; Scheidel, Saller and Morris, 2007; Erdkamp, 2013.

Scholars have long been interested in questions surrounding Greek and Roman beliefs about deification. We thus have clear impetus to explore Graeco-Roman thought in search of insights about ancient conceptions of human nature. Greek and Roman interest in human nature and in humanity's relationship with the divine was important in two intellectual domains. In the religo-political sphere, there was a concern as to in what sense rulers and heroes related to the divine. The relationship between Greek and Roman ideas on deification was complex, though the latter appear to have adopted many of the beliefs of the former.[3]

There are two opposing views as to whether or not the deified ruler could obtain a share in the divine *state* in the present life, or if he could merely inherit a stake in the divine *status*. I. Gradel argues that Romans did not believe the deified ruler to have taken on a new divine state.[4] Deification, he insists, had nothing to do with the 'absolute divinity' or 'divine nature' of the ruler.[5] Rather, it was about his 'relative divinity' or 'divine *status*, and the absolute power it entailed in relation to the worshippers'.[6] The ruler was not considered to have taken on a new 'nature' – or to have become a member of a different 'species' – but instead a new status.[7] Upon being deified, the ruler was deemed worthy of the divine worship, which Gradel calls 'the highest possible honour known in antiquity, expressing a maximum status gap between the recipient and the worshippers, but it made no gods in the absolute – and irrelevant – sense'.[8] Worshippers did not see the ruler as having assumed a new (divine) nature. Instead, Gradel insists, 'it merely granted divine status to the honor and in relation to the worshippers'.[9]

Gradel's work on the Romans is convincing on many fronts. However, D. Levene maintains that Romans did think of the deified ruler as sharing in the divine nature rather than merely in an exalted status.[10] He maintains that, contrary to Gradel's claims, Romans viewed deities and humans as 'being of different "species"'.[11]

One of the differences between the two approaches has to do with the sources each scholar uses to gain an appreciation for ancient views on deification. Gradel elects to focus on non-philosophical, cultic sources, insisting that these represent the ideas of the broader populace.[12]

[3] See briefly Garnsey and Saller, 1987, 164–66. [4] Gradel, 2002.
[5] Gradel, 2002, 148. See also Clauss, 1999, 30–31. [6] Gradel, 2002, 148.
[7] Gradel, 2002, 26, 29. [8] Gradel, 2002, 29. [9] Gradel, 2002, 29.
[10] Levene, 2012. [11] Levene, 2012, 43. [12] Gradel, 2002, 30; Levene, 2012, 44.

However, Levene argues that philosophical sources nevertheless provide insight into ancient beliefs, even if they were primarily written and utilised in elite circles. We find in these sources evidence to suggest that many Romans actually did assume an 'absolute boundary between human and divine'.[13] In the light of his findings, Levene challenges Gradel 'to explain how the notion of an absolute division appeared so readily and so widely in different philosophical schools if it did not form a standard part of the Roman thought-world'.[14] Levene asserts that the 'evidence strongly supports the assertion of humans and gods being conceived by the Romans as being in separate categories'.[15]

This had a direct bearing on Roman attitudes towards the deified ruler. According to Levene, deification among the Romans effected 'a physical transformation' in the ruler.[16] It was 'a quasi-physical process' by which the ruler came to share in the divine nature even in the present life.[17] Through this process, he became an entirely different 'kind' of being, having changed 'quasi-physical[ly]' from a human to a deity.[18] And yet, even though he came to participate in their nature, the ruler did not inherit all of the qualities of the true deities in heaven.[19]

In the philosophical and scientific sphere, there was a broader interest in non-royal humanity's relation to the divine. In an important study, J. Lenz examines the widespread belief in the deification of the philosopher. He insists that this idea was around long before the Neoplatonic philosophers on whom scholars often focus.[20] He further argues that philosophers believed in the divine potential of *all* humans – especially philosophers – and not just rulers and heroes. Rather than having to perform heroic acts, non-royal humans could become deified through contemplation and asceticism.[21]

A number of other scholars have demonstrated the influence of these ideas on early Jewish and Christian anthropology. Particularly relevant are scholars interested in Jewish and Christian beliefs about theosis, apotheosis or deification.[22] In the light of these discussions, this chapter serves as a link between studies on the self in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean and early Judaism and Christianity.

[13] Levene, 2012, 45. [14] Levene, 2012, 45. [15] Levene, 2012, 50.
[16] Levene, 2012, 63. [17] Levene, 2012, 63. [18] Levene, 2012, 49–50.
[19] E.g., Levene, 2012, 66–67. [20] Lenz, 2007. [21] Lenz, 2007, 61–62.
[22] See e.g., Gorman, 2001; 2009; Russell, 2006; Blackwell, 2011; Litwa, 2012; Rabens, 2016; Putthoff, 2017, 16, 136–37, 224.

In this chapter, I examine Graeco-Roman beliefs about the relationship between the human self and the divine. I begin by looking at issues surrounding the ruler cult and seek to understand the ontological implications inherent in beliefs about rulers. Because my interest is in ancient conceptions of human nature rather than in the exceptional nature of the ruler per se, I do not spend much time discussing Graeco-Roman royal figures. In previous chapters, I had to discuss the royal self in more depth, since there was significantly less material on which to draw conclusions about human nature more broadly. However, the case is quite the opposite among the Greeks and Romans.

As historians have long observed, the first mill. BCE saw a shift from the 'Mythical Age' to the 'Axial Age'.[23] During this period, thinkers began more explicitly to write about matters that pertained to *all* humans. In particular, there was greater emphasis on the 'individual', and writings on this matter became less mythical in nature – like those in previous chapters. Instead, writers began to pen their thoughts in treatises in which they would address such issues deliberately. It is not likely that all of a sudden they began to think differently about the self. Rather, it is more likely that they 'ratified moves toward an emphasis on the individual that had been going on for a long time in their cultures'.[24] Greek and Roman thinkers in particular put so much thought into such matters that we have ample sources to explore without having to devote so much attention to the nature of the ruler.

Additionally, there is enough dispute about whether or not Greeks and Romans believed rulers could share in the divine nature that I simply do not have space to address all of the complexities of this debate here. The fact is that Greek and Roman scientists and philosophers have left us an enormous amount of direct, deliberate discussion of such matters.

After looking very briefly at the divinity of Alexander the Great, I thus explore the Graeco-Roman scientific and philosophical treatments of matters related to metaphysics, physics and anthropology. Such an analysis shall afford us a better understanding of ancient Greek and Roman conceptions of human nature from as early as the seventh–sixth c. BCE to around the first c. CE.

[23] Jaspers, 1968; Snell, 2005b, 366–68. [24] Snell, 2005b, 368.

The Sources

In contrast to what we saw in previous chapters, the sources for this chapter are rather easy to identify and access.[25] Sources from the Greek and Roman world come predominantly in the form of texts. Because these influenced so much of the biblical writers of the New Testament and the Church Fathers, scholars have collected and preserved them quite well. Online sources like *Perseus Digital Library* are also indispensable in such a study.[26]

RULER DEIFICATION IN THE CLASSICAL PERIOD

Divine Honours for Heroes and Rulers

During the Classical period, a number of rulers and heroes received divine honours akin to those bestowed upon the gods.[27] Alexander the Great received such honours, being recognised as divine seemingly during his own lifetime. He may even have propagated his own divinity while he was still alive, though we cannot know this for sure. Regardless, he would lay a foundation for later rulers, including Julius Caesar (Suet. *Caesar* 76, 88; Dio 44.4–6; 47.18)[28] and Augustus Caesar (63 BCE–14 CE), to declare to the world that they had obtained transcendence.[29] But the important question for us is, *in what sense* did Greeks and Romans imagine emperors could become divine? What was the relationship between the ruler on earth and the deities in heaven?

I do not plan to solve the debate about Graeco-Roman conceptions of the emperor's divinity. However, it should be helpful to consider the role that geography played in how rulers were viewed in the Greek and Roman world. We know that different attitudes towards the monarch's nature were found at different times and places in the ancient world. We thus cannot take a one-size-fits-all approach to the question of the ruler's ontology. While the emperor might have been understood one way in Rome, this does not mean he was understood the same way in other places in the ancient world. With this in mind, I briefly discuss Alexander the Great, whose situation helps us understand that a ruler who was viewed as having achieved an elevated *status* in one location could

[25] See Walbank, 1984. [26] See www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper.
[27] Chaniotis, 2003, 434; cf. Farnell, 1921, 17. [28] Orlin, 2007, 69.
[29] Chaniotis, 2003, 435; Goldsworthy, 2014, 236.

easily have been viewed as having obtained a share in the divine *nature* in another location.

Alexander the Great

Alexander III (356–323 BCE), better known as Alexander the Great, took the throne as king of Macedon at the age of twenty.[30] His impact on the Mediterranean is hard to exaggerate. By the time of his death, he would extend the reach of the kingdom that his father had already expanded significantly. Through a continuous military campaign, Alexander would establish himself as ruler over one of the largest empires in the world.

Alexander's Claims to Divinity

Several elements from the records about Alexander suggest that he believed he had a share in the divine nature. Or if he did not actually believe this, he at least knew how to convince others of this.[31] I. Worthington insists that Alexander's desire to surpass his father 'at all costs' led to his 'eventual and genuine total belief in his own divinity'.[32] A. Bosworth maintains that, while Alexander did not initially view himself as a god, as 'the son of Zeus', he eventually came to 'view himself as a god in his own right'.[33]

One of the more important claims that Alexander made had to do with his ancestry.[34] Through his mother, he belonged to the Molossian house of Epirus, while through his father, he belonged to the Argead house of Macedonia (e.g., Plut., *Alex*. 2.1; *Mor*. 334D; Diod. *Bibl*. 17.1.5; Just. 7.1; Hyg. *Fab*. 123; Pind. *Nem*. 4.51–53.). These houses were known to have had a divine ancestry: the former being descendants of Achilles and the latter of Heracles.[35]

But Alexander thought he had a more direct link to the great god Zeus. As Bosworth notes, early in his reign, 'Alexander became convinced that he was more than the distant progeny of Zeus by heroic ancestors and

[30] On Alexander, in addition to the sources throughout the footnotes, see esp. Bosworth, 1988; Stoneman, 1997; Heckel and Tritle, 2009; Roisman, 2012.

[31] On Alexander's divinity, see e.g., Balsdon, 1950; Badian, 1981; Stoneman, 1997, 81; Nawotka, 2003; Worthington, 2004, 31; 2012, 319–56; Dreyer, 2009, 218. See also the valuable study of Christian Habicht, 1970.

[32] Worthington, 2004, 301. [33] Bosworth, 1988, 278.

[34] On Alexander's lineage, see e.g., Fredricksmeyer, 2003, 256; Worthington, 2004, 36–37; Badian, 2006, 245; Carney, 2006, 5.

[35] See Wilcken, 1967, 56; Hammond, 1980, 14–17; Green, 1991, 40.

was in some sense the actual son of the god'.[36] Plutarch of Chaeronea (ca. 46–ca. 120 CE) recalls that on the night before Philip II and Olympias were married, the gods impregnated Olympias with a fiery thunderbolt (Plut., *Alex*. 2.2–3.9). Debate remains as to when this birth tale came into being and whether it was during (so Rufus, 4.7.23–28) or after Alexander's lifetime.[37] Either way, it suggests that to Greeks in Alexander's day, deification had to do with both status and ontology. Tradition thus depicts Alexander as a descendant of the gods, and thus as a god-king in his *natural* condition.

In addition to these birth legends, Alexander acted in ways that suggest that, if he did not believe he was divine by birth, he became divine through his successes.[38] Arrian of Nicomedia (86/89–ca. 146/160 CE) insists that Alexander had a deep 'yearning' (πόθος) to do what the heroes of old never accomplished (*Anab*. 4.28.4).[39] He thus imitated heroes like Achilles and Heracles, whom he saw as his ancient relatives (e.g., Diod. *Bibl*. 4.38; Arr. *Anab*. 1.4.5, 1.11.7, 2.5.9, 2.18.1, 2.24.5, 3.6.1, 5.29.1-2, 7.16.8; Curt. 3.12.27, 4.2.2, 4.4.13; Diod. *Bibl*. 17.4.1, 17.95.1, 17.117.1-2; Just. 12.7.12.).[40] In this regard, Alexander may have believed that he had experienced deification later in life, perhaps akin to the way Ramesses II or Narām-Sîn had done before.

Indeed, Alexander's relationship with the Egyptians was an important factor in how he viewed himself. Tradition has it that, during his visit to the Egyptian oasis city of Siwa, Alexander confirmed that his *true* father was not Philip II but Zeus Ammon (see Pind. *Pyth*. 4.16; Just. 11.11.9-10; Diod. *Bibl*. 17.51.2-4; Curt. 4.7.25-32; Plut., *Alex*. 27.3-6).[41] Apparently, he intended to visit his true father, Zeus (Ammon), during this excursion.[42] But he ended up pursuing something far more important: recognition by those around him that he was a true pharaoh.[43] After all, he was the son of the greatest gods in the Egyptian and Greek pantheons: the Egyptian Amen-Ra and the Greek Zeus. In fact, Alexander

[36] Bosworth, 1988, 282; cf. Chaniotis, 2003, 435.
[37] See Stoneman, 2004; 2010; 2012, 16; Worthington, 2004, 31; Carney, 2006, 92.
[38] Fredricksmeyer, 2007. [39] Carney, 2000, 275; Worthington, 2004, 37.
[40] Edmunds, 1971, 373; Bosworth, 1988, 281–88; Fredricksmeyer, 2003, 262–64; Cartledge, 2004, 221; Fox, 2004, 443; Worthington, 2004, 274; Stoneman, 2010, 48.
[41] See Collins, 2014, 63.
[42] Wilcken, 1967, 122; Fredricksmeyer, 1974; 1990; Brunt, 1976, 467–80; Hammond, 1980, 125; Badian, 1981, 45–46; Bosworth, 1988, 281–82; Green, 1991, 272; Stoneman, 1997, 50; Fox, 2004, 456.
[43] Kuhlmann, 1988, 154–56.

seems to have believed that he had a special connection with the sun-god Amen-Ra/Helios in particular (Diod., *Bibl.* 17.54.5), further confirming his affinity for Egyptian conceptions of the king. As sovereign ruler in the style of the pharaoh, Alexander naturally expected those around him to treat him as a god (Plut., *Alex.* 33.1; *Mor.* 219d; Ael., *VH.* 2.19; Just. 11.11.11; Curt. 4.7.28).[44] By the end of his life, he would also receive for himself altars, statues and shrines, offerings and sacrifices, a priesthood and civic tribes.[45]

This marked an important moment in his life. In Egypt, the pharaoh had long been viewed as an embodiment of the gods on earth. After Alexander conquered Egypt, the Egyptians placed him among the ranks of the pharaohs.[46] Upon seeing this first hand, Alexander may well have come to understand himself in this same way. As Bosworth writes, 'to have assumed divine attributes Alexander must have believed that he shared divinity: not only son of Ammon but in some sense Ammon incarnate'.[47]

Regardless of whether Alexander truly saw himself in this manner or not, Egyptians would have seen him as an embodied god-king. This was clearly the case only a short time after his death (e.g., Ael., *VH.* 5.12; Strabo 14.1.22; Athen. 251b; Arrian, *Anab.* 7.23.2).[48] The coins of Alexander as Zeus-Ammon are suggestive of his divine reputation. Minted by king Lysimachus of Thrace (r. 305–281 BCE), the coins depict Alexander wearing the horns of divinity alongside a reference to his visit to Siwa. Several coins minted around the time of his death depict Alexander with horns of divinity long associated with the divine nature in the ancient world.[49]

The evidence about Alexander's view of himself as a god or how others viewed him during his lifetime is difficult to interpret. In Egypt, he was viewed as a pharaoh, and it is likely that Egyptians saw him as having a share in the divine nature. Elsewhere, we still cannot be sure. However,

[44] For discussion, see esp. Fredricksmeyer, 1990, 312; Bosworth, 1996, 131–32; Hamilton, 2002, 71–73. Some maintain that Alexander never made this demand: e.g., Wilcken, 1967, 210–12; Hammond, 1980, 253; Green, 1991, 452; Stoneman, 1997, 79, 99; Cartledge, 2004, 224–25; Worthington, 2004, 279–81.

[45] Chaniotis, 2003, 435.

[46] Wilcken, 1967, 114; Fredricksmeyer, 2000, 146; 2003, 271–72; Fildes and Fletcher, 2004, 52–55.

[47] Bosworth, 1988, 287.

[48] Bowden, 2013, 74–75; cf. Badian, 1981, 55–59; Cartledge, 2004, 225; Fox, 2004, 439. But see the rejection of such claims to divinity in Polyb. 12.12b.3.

[49] See the images in Bieber, 1965.

the situation in Persia might have been quite different from what it was elsewhere in his empire. In Persia, Alexander took note of one particular act that became important in how he saw himself and how he wanted others to see him. The act was known as προσκύνησις.

Alexander's Demand for προσκύνησις

προσκύνησις was a form of worship for which Alexander gained a greater appreciation when he saw it in use in Persia. He knew about it from the Greeks, but he did not implement it into his own repertoire until he entered Persia. His reluctance to adopt it of himself before this may have been because Greeks reserved προσκύνησις for the gods, and many viewed it as an illegitimate act when performed for anyone but a god (Diog. Laërt., *Vit. phil.* 6.37–38; Arist. *Rhet.* 1361a; Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.35–36; Arr. *Anab.* 2.12.6, 4.12.2; Diod. 17.37.5; Curt. 8.5.22; Plut. *Alex.* 74.2).[50] However, Alexander saw something in προσκύνησις in Persia that compelled him once and for all to adopt it of himself.

Scholars have long acknowledged the significance of Alexander's adoption of προσκύνησις. J. Balsdon's remark from 1950 still rings true today: 'All modern historians of Alexander are agreed' that Alexander's attempt to introduce προσκύνησις to his empire is 'of vital importance for the consideration of his claim – or supposed claim – to divinity'.[51] However, there is debate about what he intended to communicate by this. A. Bosworth argues that through προσκύνησις, Alexander sought to establish himself as divine monarch.[52] But Fredricksmeyer disagrees and insists that this could not have been Alexander's intent, because 'for the Persians, the king is not a god'.[53] According to Fredricksmeyer, 'the act did not mean worship [to the Persians] but was a gesture of obeisance to an absolute potentate'.[54] He goes on to add, 'to the Greeks and Macedonians, proskynesis had always meant or suggested divine worship, and although by now they certainly understood that this was not what it meant to the Persians, the notion persisted'.[55]

Fredricksmeyer here identifies the critical issue, namely, the nature of the Persian king. By insisting that προσκύνησις be directed towards himself, Alexander sought to declare himself, in essence, a Persian-style king. But what was the Persian king? Was he a god who had a share in the divine nature? Or was he, as Fredricksmeyer argues, merely the gods'

[50] On this issue, see also Cartledge, 2004, 222–23. [51] Balsdon, 1950, 371.
[52] Bosworth, 1996, 109–10. [53] Fredricksmeyer, 2003, 274.
[54] Fredricksmeyer, 2003, 274. [55] Fredricksmeyer, 2003, 275.

appointed ruler on earth? This is the critical question that I want to pursue for the moment.

Whatever Persians thought of their king, that is what Alexander wanted his empire to think about him as well. Fredricksmeyer admits that in Alexander's native culture, προσκύνησις was viewed as an act of worship only to be directed towards the gods. I suggest that Persians also believed that their king likewise had a share in the divine nature, and this was precisely how Alexander wanted others to see him. Therefore, understanding the nature of the Persian king has a direct bearing on understanding what Alexander believed – or wanted his empire to believe – about his own nature.

Alexander As a Persian-Style God-King

In Chapter 5, I showed the way ancient Persians imagined the first human to have enjoyed a fiery nature. More importantly, he was not just the first human, but he was the first king. All Persian kings were descendants of that first, primordial human and monarch.

While Persians believed that all humans shared in the fiery constitution of the first human in trace amounts, the king shared in what they called *xᵛarənah* or *xwarrah* to a far higher degree (see esp. *Yt.* 19.25–44).[56] As W. Malandra writes, 'whoever wished to rule legitimately had to be graced by possession of xwarənah'.[57] Although absent from the Achaemenid inscriptions, *xᵛarənah* appears as a loan word in several remote languages, including Khotanese (*pharra*), Sogdian (*prn*) and Kushan-Bactrian (ΦΑΡΡΟ).[58] It is hard to doubt that the idea was in circulation amongst Persians during the Achaemenid period, if not much earlier.

I noted in Chapter 5 that *xᵛarənah* was akin to 'glory' (כבוד) in Hebrew tradition. As G. Gnoli explains, 'in traditional interpretations "glory", "splendour", "luminosity" and "shine", connected with sun and fire, were considered the primary meanings of the term *farr(ah)*, *xᵛarənah*'.[59] Rooted in the Old Persian word *farnah-* and Middle Persian *farr/farrah*, *xᵛarənah* is related to the Iranian word for 'sun' (*xᵛar/n*). But more than

[56] On *xᵛarənah*, see Shahbazi, 1974; 1980; Hintze, 1994, 26–27; Lubotsky, 1998, 479–88; Gnoli, 1999; Soudavar, 2003, 96–101. On *Zamyād Yašt*, see Hintze, 1994; Humbach and Ichaporia, 1998.

[57] Malandra, 1983, 88. [58] Malandra, 1983, 88.

[59] Gnoli, 1999; cf. Hintze, 1994, 26–27.

just 'sun' or 'light' (Pahl.: *rošn*), *x^{v}arənah* was 'a magic force or power of luminous and fiery nature'.[60]

Gnoli gives several examples in which *x^{v}arənah/xwarrah* appears.[61] *Yasna* 10.127 identifies *x^{v}arənah* with the 'blazing fire' that went before Mithra riding on his chariot. *Arda Wiraz Namag* 14.16 states that *x^{v}arənah* 'burn[s] without interruption'. *Zādspram* 3.82 claims that *xwarrah* (=*x^{v}arənah*) 'resides in the Wahrām fire, as a householder (reigns) over his house' (*mehmanih andar Wahram ataxs ciyon kadag-xwaday abar xanag*).[62] *Zadspram* 5.1 asserts that at his birth, Zoroaster's *xwarrah* descended from heaven and manifested itself 'in the form of fire' (*pad ataxs ewenag*, cf. 8.8).[63] Most importantly, the gods in heaven, including Ahura Mazdā himself, were actually made of *x^{v}arənah* (*Yt.* 19.10, 15, 35; cf. *Dadistan i denig*, 1, 25, 35–36).

Persians imagined the king's constitution to resemble that of the deities. Having a share in the divine *x^{v}arənah*, the king was thus a 'constituent of divine and human nature'.[64] However, while the king had a divine nature, he was not a full god on earth. P. Skjærvø observes that the Achaemenid reliefs regularly depict the king lifting his hands towards Ahura Mazdā, who hovers above in the winged disk.[65] In this light, M. Gvelesiani maintains that although the Achaemenid king was not 'worshipped as a god', he was still 'more than a man'.[66] Contrary to Fredricksmeyer's claim, the Persian king was 'divine' and perhaps 'equal to the gods', even if he was never a full deity on earth.[67]

The Persian king was not just the god-appointed ruler of the cosmos. He was an embodied god on earth. His divine nature was far greater than that of regular humans. When Alexander saw the way the Persians viewed their king, he wanted it for himself. Hence his adoption of προσκύνησις. προσκύνησις was the perfect propagandistic tool by which Alexander could demonstrate both to the Persians and to the broader Greek world that he was now their god-king, the divine-human ruler of the cosmos and an embodied god on earth.

In an empire that included vastly different cultures, Alexander knew that he had to communicate using the language and gestures of each culture he entered. In Egypt, he became a pharaoh, and he asserted himself as the embodiment of the great god Amen-Ra on earth. In Persia,

[60] Gnoli, 1999; cf. MacKenzie, 1971, 72. [61] Gnoli, 1999.
[62] Text/trans. Gnoli, 1999. [63] Text/trans. Gnoli, 1999. [64] Gnoli, 1999.
[65] Skjærvø, 2014, 179–80; cf. Briant, 2008, 259–62, whom Skjærvø also cites.
[66] Gvelesiani, 2008, 176. [67] Gvelesiani, 2008, 176.

he became a king in the style of the Achaemenid ruler, and he declared himself worthy of the act of προσκύνησις. This told everyone from Persia to Babylon to Egypt to Greece and beyond that he was the sovereign god-king on par with the gods in heaven. And until his death, he let his prowess in battle do the rest of the talking.

THE DIVINE NATURE OF ALL HUMANS

Divinity among the Presocratics

It is difficult to know much about the divine nature of the self in the context of the ruler cults. The case is rather different when we get to the philosophers and scientists, whose interest in such matters extends at least as far back as the age of the Presocratics.[68] For these thinkers, the self's ontological condition was highly important. They did not believe that participation in the divine was only available to rulers or heroes. Rather, they thought it was available to *all* humans. With that assumption in hand, they sought to understand *in what sense* the human self could or did participate in this state even in the present life.

The Presocratics would thrive just before and during the lifetime of Socrates (ca. 469–ca. 399 BCE). While they were interested in philosophy, including metaphysics, they were also interested in physics, or the workings of the natural world. They were as much scientists as philosophers, and they were interested in how regular humans could or did share in the life of the gods.[69]

The idea that divinity was intrinsic to the human self indeed pervades Presocratic thought. Pythagoras of Samos (ca. 570–ca. 495 BCE) believed that the human 'soul' (ψυχή) had a share in the immortal state of the divine.[70] From the same period, though not technically considered a 'Presocratic', Pindar (ca. 522–ca. 443 BCE) maintained that humans naturally had 'some likeness to immortals in mighty mind or nature' (Pind., *Nem.* 6.4–5).[71] Euripides (ca. 480–ca. 406 BCE) pressed this notion even further, declaring, 'The mind (νοῦς) belonging to us is in each person a god' (Eurip., *Fr.* 1007).[72] Thales of Miletus (ca. 624–ca 546

[68] Lenz, 2007, 48; Snell, 2005b, 367.

[69] On the Presocratics, see e.g., Mourelatos, 1974; Kirk, Raven and Schofield, 1983; Curd and Graham, 2005.

[70] Lenz, 2007, 51. See Taylor, 1986, sec. 33.

[71] Quotation from Lenz, 2007, 51.

[72] As reported by Cic., *Tusc. Disputant.* 1.65. Quotation from Lenz, 2007, 51 (and see his n. 17).

BCE) believed that, because water was a divine substance that permeated the cosmos, 'all things [including humans] are full of gods' (Arist., *De anima* 411a7–8; cf. Cic., *De Nat. Deor.* 1.10.25; cf. Plato, *Leg.* 899b).[73] Anaximenes of Miletus (ca. 585–ca. 528 BCE) held a similar idea, yet not of water but of air. For him, air was the divine element of which everything was made (Cic., *De Nat. Deor.*, 1.10.26).[74]

Empedocles on the Self

As a physician, philosopher and poet, Empedocles (ca. 495–ca. 435 BCE) was among the earliest thinkers to deal with these matters forthrightly.[75] He is best known for his cosmogony, but his poetic insights into the nature of the self are particularly critical for our study (Diog. Laërt., *Vit. phil.* 8.57–77).

What Empedocles believed about humanity's divine nature derived from his ideas about the δαίμων. According to Empedocles, a δαίμων was a contaminated god who had somehow entered the human realm. Trapped within the human body, this material δαίμων aspired to return to its home in heaven (fr. 59; 115).[76] A δαίμων was a manifestation of the god Love that had been contaminated by Strife (Emped., fr. 115; cf. fr. 59).[77] With the δαίμων inside, the human was truly a physical embodiment of the divine on earth.[78] This was not entirely a good thing, as the two desired to be freed from this union. But if they worked hard enough, they could figure out how to get along, as it were. If they could work together and avoid contamination, they could, theoretically, break free from one another (fr. 147).[79]

[73] For texts, see Graham, 2010, 34–35, 41.
[74] Graham, 2010, 86–87.
[75] Lenz, 2007, 49–51.
[76] See e.g., Nestle, 1906; Detienne, 1959; Reiche, 1960; Long, 1974; Primavesi, 2005. See also Diels and Kranz, 1960; Kirk, Raven and Schofield, 1983, 236; Inwood, 2001. On the nature of the δαίμων, see Cornford, 1912; Raven, 1957; O'Brien, 1969, 328–34; Kahn, 1971.
[77] O'Brien, 1969, 334.
[78] Lenz, 2007, 50–51. See also Plutarch, *Table Talk* 734f–735b; Sextus, *Against the Professors* 9.19; Olympiodorus, *Philebus* 242; Joannes Catrares, *Hermippus* 1.16.122. For primary texts, see Graham, 2010, 612–13. On the concept of the δαίμων more broadly, see esp. Long, 2012, 152–54; Greenbaum, 2016.
[79] See O'Brien, 1969, 334; Kingsley, 2003, 58, cited by Lenz, 2007, 51. Cf. Laks, 1999, 252.

Empedocles' Embodied δαίμων

For most humans, this union was not desirable. However, Empedocles saw his own possession of a δαίμων as quite a good thing. As an embodiment of the δαίμων, he believed he was a god on earth and that he should be treated as such.[80] As we read:

> Ye friends, who in the mighty city dwell
> Along the yellow Acragas hard by
> The Acropolis, ye stewards of good works,
> The stranger's refuge venerable and kind.
> All hail, O friends! But unto ye I walk
> As god immortal now, no more as man (ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός),
> On all sides honored fittingly and well,
> Crowned both with fillets and with flowering wreaths.
> When with my throngs of men and women I come
> To thriving cities, I am sought by prayers,
> And thousands follow me that they may ask
> The path to weal and vantage, craving some
> For oracles, whilst others seek to hear
> A healing word against many a foul disease
> That all too long hath pierced with grievous pains.
>
> (fr. B112; text/trans. Leonard, 1908)

Empedocles boasted of his own transcendence, pointing to the way he walked about like a god and the way mortals would consult him for his divine abilities. Another fragment then adds:

> ἀλλὰ τί τοῖσδ' ἐπίκειμ' ὡσεὶ μέγα χρῆμά τι πράσσων, εἰ θνητῶν περίειμι πολυφθερέων ανθρώπων;
>
> Yet why urge more, as if forsooth I wrought
> Some big affair – do I not far excel
> The mortals round me, doomed to many deaths? (fr. B113; text/trans. Leonard, 1908)

Whereas 'mortals' were doomed to many deaths, Empedocles was not subject to the ills of mortality. After all, he was a god on earth.

If we take Hippolytus of Rome's (170–235 CE) statement about Empedocles' god seriously, then we may have some insight into Empedocles' nature. In his *Refutatio*, Hippolytus declares that Empedocles' 'god is the intelligent fire' (Hipp., *Ref.* 1.3.1; cf. Emped., fr. A31). This is an intriguing depiction, and when we view it within the framework of

[80] See Lenz, 2007, 50; Kingsley, 2003, 58. See also Diog. Laërt. *Vit. phil.* 8.61, 69 in Graham, 2010, 331, 337, 404, 405.

Empedocles' cosmology, we can see that fire was the most powerful element in creation. In fact, it was in the sphere of fire where God lived.[81] Did Empedocles believe that his body was composed of divine fire? We cannot be sure. However, given what we know about the inseparability of the δαίμων from the self, it seems safe to suggest that Empedocles believed that some part(s) of him*self* – his δαίμων – perhaps shared in this fiery substance.

Divinity and Spatiality in Presocratic Thought

The early scientists and philosophers were not interested in the power and achievements by which the ruler could *obtain* divinity. Instead, they wanted to know more about the divinity that was intrinsic to *all* selves. More than mere power and achievement, they thought that divinity was inherently spatial and deeply ontological. In their natural condition, humans had a share in the divine state in the sense that some aspect of the divine realm – the soul (ψυχή), mind (νοῦς) and/or δαίμων – actually inhabited the human body. In this regard, the Presocratics saw the self as a heterotopian space, as it was made of multiple aspects that interacted together within the bounds of the body. In a real way, divine and non-divine shared this single bounded space together. This way of thinking about the self was important to the early Greek thinkers. But it would undergo extensive development in the thinking of those who followed.

HUMANITY'S DIVINE NATURE FROM PLATO TO THE STOICS

Plato

A student of Socrates and the instructor of Aristotle, Plato (ca. 428–ca. 347 BCE) is among the most influential thinkers in Western tradition.[82] Plato inherited a rich philosophical and religious tradition both from Socrates and the Presocratics. Like his predecessors, Plato was also interested in the relationship between the human self and the divine state. As Lenz states:

> Plato, in the context of early Greek religion and contemplative spirituality, makes the idea of deification – or the participation of human beings in the divine nature – open to all through personal contemplation and the development of the soul.[83]

[81] See Drozdek, 2016, 77–79.
[82] On Plato, see e.g., Kraut, 1992; Benson, 2009; Fine, 2011.
[83] Lenz, 2007, 47.

Plato was not just interested in the relationship between the mortal and divine. Rather, he wanted to know how otherwise regular humans could or did participate in the divine nature.

Body and Soul

Plato believed that the self consisted of a mortal body and a divine soul. He then divided the soul into two parts: the rational and the irrational. The rational part of the soul, the mind (νοῦς), was most like God in the sense that it possessed the highest degree or grade of divinity (Plato, *Tim.* 41c, 44d, 45a, 69d, 72d, 76b, 88b, 90c; cf. Arist., *De anima* III.5, 430a7–23; Xen., *Mem.* 1.4.17).[84] This was good, but there was a problem. The mind's divinity was not active but latent. It was *there* deep inside the self, but in its natural condition it lay imprisoned beneath the surface of the body. Hence Plato's slogan σῶμα σῆμα: 'the body is a tomb' of the soul (*Gorgias* 493a).[85]

Because of its contact with the body, the mind could not realise its intrinsic divinity. As J. Armstrong states, 'in the *Phaedrus* our pre-mortal souls are said to have seen the Forms "because we were pure and unmarked by this thing we are carrying around now, which we call a body, imprisoned like an oyster in its shell"' (*Phaedr.* 250 c 4–6).[86] Prior to its imprisonment in the body, the soul was free to gaze upon what was really real. But it lost this blissful freedom when it entered the body, at which moment its divine reality became dormant. It was there, and it was a real part of human nature, but it did not exist in reality. It existed instead in potentiality. Only through great discipline (ασκήσις) and effort could the mind overpower the restraints of its bodily container and free itself to soar the heavens, make contact with God and realise the divinity that it possessed all along.[87]

Assimilation to God

Part of the self was divine in its natural condition, but it also had the potential for a greater share of the divine nature.[88] Plato would address this matter on two notable occasions. In the *Theaetetus*, we read of a

[84] Putthoff, 2017, 78. [85] Lenz, 2007, 52; cf. de Vogel, 1986a; 1986b; 1986c.
[86] Armstrong, 2004, 173.
[87] See the section Assimilation to God for my discussion of Plato, *Theaet.* 176a–b.; Lenz, 2007, 52.
[88] This portion of my argument is drawn and adapted from Putthoff, 2017, 96–99. See there for fuller discussion of these matters in relation to Philo of Alexandria and Galen of Pergamon.

dialogue between Socrates, Theaetetus and Theodorus. In the digression of sections 172a–177c, Socrates explains to Theodorus that evil would harass the body as long as it remained in its current condition. Only through 'assimilation to God' could a person overcome the perpetual evil plaguing the body and escape to the divine existence.[89] As we read in the *Theaetetus*:

> φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν
> and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible. (*Theaet.* 176a–b; cf. Arist., *Nic. Eth.* 10.7; Plot., *Enn.* 1.2; text/trans. Fowler, 1966)[90]

Assimilation (ὁμοίωσις) was the key to breaking free of the 'mortal nature' (θνητὴν φύσιν) and realising the self's true potential (*Theaet.* 176c). It was certainly not easy. It would come only after a lifetime of arduous movement towards this state via contemplation (θεωρία) and bodily discipline (ασκήσις). But once achieved, assimilation would be well worth the effort (e.g., *Gorg.* 523a–527e; *Phaedo* 113d–115a; *Rep.* 614a–621d; *Phaedr.* 248c–249c; *Tim.* 90a–92c; *Laws* 904c–905c). According to Plato, 'assimilation' (ὁμοίωσις) would lead to the 'escape' (φυγή) of the 'mind' (νοῦς) from the bonds of the 'mortal nature' (θνητὴν φύσιν) and entry into the divine realm, where it could exist in the godlike state.[91] As B. McGinn writes:

> Plato views the true human subject, or soul, as a searcher always restless short of permanent possession of the Absolute Good which beatifies. Such possession is achieved through θεώρια, or contemplation, which is the fruit of an ascending purification (καθάρσις, ασκήσις) of both love and knowledge and which reaches its goal when νους, the divine element in the soul, is assimilated to its supernal source.[92]

Plato conceived of God as νοῦς – he was mind par excellence.[93] For the mind to assimilate to God was for it to unite with him, become like him and share in his divine constitution. A.-J. Festugiere insists that Plato was influenced in his thinking on this matter by the earlier Greek tragedians.[94] As one who would himself retreat from the public life, Plato encouraged others to do the same. As Festugiere explains:

> Since the earth is bad why not leave it? Why not fly to the place where the gods dwell, share their life and be happy like them? That is the original sense of this

[89] Putthoff, 2017, 96. See the excellent treatment of 'becoming like God' in Plato and Stoicism in Reydams-Schils, 2017, 142–58. Cf. Sedley, 1997; 1999; Annas, 1999; van den Berg, 2003; Armstrong, 2004; Baltzly, 2004; van Kooten, 2008; Lanzillotta, 2013.

[90] Text/trans. of Plato's works are from, Fowler, 1966. This text is quoted also in Lanzillotta, 2013, 71–81; Putthoff, 2017, 97.

[91] Putthoff, 2017, 97. [92] McGinn, 2004, 25.

[93] Armstrong, 2004, 174. See also Menn, 1995. [94] Festugiere, 1954, 34.

φυγη or flight to the gods, of this ὁμοίωσις or assimilation to the gods. It is a desire of escape, it is the homesickness for heaven, it is the aspiration to lose oneself, to pass from this world, into the unsounded depths of divine peace.[95]

But there is another aspect to Plato's doctrine of deification-via-escape. 'Escape' (φυγή) was not simply to flee from all things to do with the world, nor was it completely to deny one's body of all desires. Rather, it was to abandon those natural (bodily) tendencies that were destructive both to oneself and to society. As Armstrong states, 'becoming like god need not involve unremitting flight from the world'.[96] Instead, it 'involves knowledge of the Good itself, but unlike that ideal, the good human life involves the application of one's knowledge to the world of change'.[97]

In its natural condition, the body, like society, existed in disharmony. Only by denying the body of its naturally destructive and disharmonious impulses could the mind (νοῦς) overcome the body and assimilate to God, thereby bringing positive change to the world. Deification in Plato's thinking had implications that extended well beyond the self's own good.

On a second occasion, this time in his *Timaeus* – his account of the creation of the world – Plato would again take up the issue of assimilation to God.[98] Towards the end of *Timaeus*, we find a summary of Plato's anthropogeny and anthropology (89d–92c).[99] The human mind was in reality *not of this world*. It was 'not an earthly but a heavenly plant' that desired deep down to 'raise' the self 'towards our kindred in the heaven' (*Tim.* 90a–b). The means by which the mind could do this was, again, through difficult contemplative efforts. Through the exercise of the mind, the latently divine mind could enter before God and become like him. According to Plato:

> He who has seriously devoted himself to learning and to true thoughts, and has exercised these qualities above all his others,
>
> 90c must necessarily and inevitably think thoughts that are immortal and divine (φρονεῖν μὲν ἀθανατα καὶ θεῖα), if so be that he lays hold on truth, and in so far as it is possible for human nature to partake of immortality (ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται), he must fall short thereof in no degree; and inasmuch as he is for ever tending his divine part (θεῖον) and duly magnifying that daemon (δαίμων) who dwells along with him, he must be supremely blessed (διαφερόντως εὐδαίμονα εἶναι). And the way of tendance of every part by every man is one – namely, to supply each with its

[95] Festugiere, 1954, 21. [96] Armstrong, 2004, 175–76.
[97] Armstrong, 2004, 175–76.
[98] See Runia, 1986; Finkelberg, 1996; Sedley, 1997; Carone, 2004; Annas, 2006; van Kooten, 2008.
[99] My arguments here follow those I put forth in Putthoff, 2017, 97–99.

own congenial food and motion; and for the divine part within us (ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖῳ) the congenial motions

90d are the intellections and revolutions of the Universe. These each one of us should follow, rectifying the revolutions within our head, which were distorted at our birth, by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the Universe, and thereby making the part that thinks like unto the object of its thought, in accordance with its original nature (τῷ κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξωμοιῶσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν), and having achieved this likeness attain finally to that goal of life which is set before men by the gods as the most good both for the present and for the time to come. (ὁμοιώσαντα δὲ τέλος ἔχειν τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίου πρός τε τὸν παρόντα καὶ τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, *Tim.* 90b–d; text/trans. Fowler, 1966)

By realigning one's mind to the workings of the cosmos, one could make 'the part that thinks like unto the object of its thought'. In other words, the mind would assimilate to that about which it thinks. To think about God in the proper way would lead to assimilation to him. Of course, the entire self could not share in this experience, at least not in the present life. Only the inner part could become like God, while the body remained in its mortality.

The Self As Space

It is important to note the way Plato imagined the self in spatial terms. For him, the human self was not just an entity existing *in* space, but it was itself a bounded space. More than that, it was a heterotopian space comprising two different aspects or types of space. In his thinking, the body was the space in which the soul and mind lived.

Spatiality played a critical role in determining the self's nature. The state of the mind was determined by the space with which it was in contact. Thus, as long as it remained in contact with the body, the mind would remain in its sub-divine state and fail to enjoy the benefits of its intrinsic divine potentiality. It could therefore participate in the existence of the space with which it was in closest proximity.

The realisation of divinity was the result of becoming free of this bodily space. Thus 'escape' (φυγή) came through 'contemplation' (θεωρία), during which the mind could break free of the body and enter heaven, where it would encounter God directly and thereupon 'assimilate' to him (Plato, *Tim.* 90b–d; *Theaet.* 176a–c). As Lenz writes, 'the ultimate reward for disembodied reason is noetic *vision*. Contemplation [θεωρία] of regions above the heavens, the so-called *noētos topos*, or place accessible to the intellect, can occur for blessed souls just as it does for the gods'.[100]

[100] Lenz, 2007, 53; cf. Putthoff, 2017, 96–99.

When the mind encountered God in his space, it became like him, coming to share in his ontological state. As long as the divine part of the self remained in contact with the mortal part, it could never be free to realise its full divine potential. But by engaging one's whole self in contemplation and discipline, the mind could make contact with God and realise the divinity that it had possessed all along.

Aristotle

Plato's famous student and the tutor of Alexander the Great, Aristotle (384–322 BCE), challenged his instructor on a number of points. Among these were his thoughts on the human self, his reasoning for which was rooted in his conception of the cosmos.[101] Aristotle rejected Plato's division between form and matter.[102] He believed that everything, with the exception of the unmoved mover, was a composite of form and matter alike. He saw the human self likewise as a composite of form and matter, or of what we might call self-ness (i.e., form) and its material parts (i.e., matter). According to Aristotle, the form of the self and the physicality of the self were inseparable.[103]

As a biologist, Aristotle was more concerned with the constitution of the human than Plato. He saw the human as an animal, but because of its superior φύσις ('nature'), it *was* and *could do* much more than other animals (e.g., *Hist. Anim.* 487a28; 488a27; 505b28; *Part. Anim.* 643b5; 669b3; 686a25). The way the physical body functioned and behaved was a by-product of the type of φύσις it had. Just as Aristotle did not see a sharp separation between the human form and matter, he also believed that human 'nature' (φύσις) could not ultimately be distinguished from the human body.

But he further distinguished animals (including humans) according to their end, or *Telos*. For Aristotle, the human was superior to other animals not only because of its superior 'nature' but also because of the particular *Telos* towards which it moved throughout life, namely, 'happiness' (εὐδαιμονία, *Part. Anim.* II.10, 656a4). Once again, Aristotle could not drive a sharp distinction between humanity's *Telos* and human

[101] On Aristotle, see e.g., Barnes, 1995; Shields, 2012.

[102] See Adkins, 1970, 170–73. On Aristotle's view of the human self, see e.g., Hartman, 1977; Bolton, 1978; Barnes, 1979; Shields, 1988; 2009; Heinaman, 1990; Annas, 1995; Granger, 1996; Frey, 2007.

[103] Adkins, 1970, 176–77.

'nature'. After all, the particular *Telos* towards which the human was moving was in part a result of its unique φύσις.

Among the other attributes unique to humans was their intrinsic participation in the divine state. As Aristotle writes:

τοιοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος· ἢ γὰρ μόνον μετέχει τοῦ θείου τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων ζῴων, ἢ μάλιστα πάντων.[104]

Now such an animal is man. For of all living beings with which we are acquainted man alone partakes of the divine, or at any rate partakes of it in a fuller measure than the rest. (*Part. Anim.* II.10, 656a8–9; text/trans. Ross and Smith, 1927–1952)[105]

Aristotle's claim is quite remarkable: the human self in fact 'partakes of God' (μετέχει τοῦ θείου). Even if only in its φύσις, the human self was indeed *divine*, and as such it could achieve a much higher end or *Telos* than all other creatures. Aristotle calls this end εὐδαιμονία.

εὐδαιμονία is critically important in Aristotle's understanding of human nature. Like Plato, Aristotle conceived of the self in spatial terms. Both believed that the mind (νοῦς) resided inside the body, and both insisted that it naturally had a share in the divine state. Having come from the divine realm and entered the body, the mind came to live within a relatively small bounded space (*De anima* 3.5, 430a7–23).[106] Thus, while Aristotle believed that the mind was divine naturally, he agreed with Plato that it was dormant. However, Aristotle argued that the goal of human life was not necessarily for the mind to realise some latent state of divinity, as Plato had argued. Instead, it was to strive towards εὐδαιμονία, or literally the possession of a good δαίμων inside (*Nic. Eth.* 10.7).[107] According to Aristotle:

Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level: not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him that is divine (ἀλλ' ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει); and by as much as this something is superior to his composite (σύνθετος) nature, by so much is its activity superior to the exercise of the other forms of virtue. If then the intellect is something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect divine in comparison with human life (εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον

[104] Greek texts of Aristotle, *De Partibus Animalium*, are from Peck and Forster, 1937, unless otherwise noted.

[105] See Adkins, 1970, 171. Trans. of Aristotle, *De Partibus Animalium*, are from Ross and Smith, 1927–1952, unless otherwise noted.

[106] See Nagel, 1972; Ackrill, 1975; Lenz, 2007, 55.

[107] Texts/trans. of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* are those of Rackham, 1926, unless otherwise noted.

βίον.). Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man's thoughts and a mortal the thoughts of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality (lit.: ἀθανατίζειν), and do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest thing in him (κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ); for though this be small in bulk, in power and value it far surpasses all the rest.

It may even be held that this is the true self of each, inasmuch as it is the dominant and better part; and therefore it would be a strange thing if a man should choose to live not his own life but the life of some other than himself. (*Nic. Eth.* 10.7.8–9, 1177b26–33; cf. Soph., *Ant.* 1348–53; text/trans. Rackham, 1926)

Two ideas stand out here. First, Aristotle understood the human as a 'composite' (σύνθετος) entity. Its highest quality belonged to its divine part, the mind (νοῦς). Interestingly, this divine aspect lay 'in' or 'within' (ἐν) the human body. Thus, the self was a composite space comprising divine and nondivine parts. The inner part, which was inseparable from the body, was intrinsically divine (*De anima* 1.1, 403a3–25),[108] and because it could 'partake' (μετέχω) in the nature of God, this divine part was the 'true self'. The truest part of the self was therefore not found in human mortality but instead its divinity.

Second, Aristotle assumed that although it was divine, this part of the self was not naturally 'immortal' (ἀθάνατος). Immortality could only be achieved through contemplation (θεωρία). The teleological state of the human self could only occur when, through contemplation, one opened oneself up to the entry of a *good* δαίμων. At this point, the human could become not just happy (εὐδαιμονία) but immortal (ἀθάνατος) as well.[109] While the mind was naturally divine, its being bound to the body prevented it from realising the full potential of this state. Even though it was not naturally immortal, once it would 'fix' or 'attach' (μετέχω) itself to the divine through contemplation (θεωρία), it could become immortal.[110]

The Epicureans

Like Plato and Aristotle, the Epicureans also believed that divinity was available to normal, non-royal humans. They too argued that the human self enjoyed an intrinsic aspect of the divine world even in its natural condition. However, they seem to have thought that in reality only the

[108] See Frede, 1992. See also Hicks, 1907; Ross, 1961; Charles, 1984; Polansky, 2007; Burnyeat, 2008; Shields, 2016.

[109] Lenz, 2007, 55.

[110] See Nagel, 1972, 252–59; Lenz, 2007, 55; Petrovic and Petrovic, 2016, 179.

devout philosopher had the ability to realise this state (e.g., Epic., *Ep. Men.* 135).[111]

The Epicureans were named after their founder, Epicurus (341–270 BCE, Lucr., *De rer. nat.* 3.228, 294–95).[112] As an atomist, Epicurus maintained that the cosmos comprised tiny pieces of matter called 'atoms'. An ἄτομος was literally something that was un-cuttable, hence ἄ-τομος. It was the basic building-block of everything in existence.[113] For the Epicureans, everything was composed of matter, thus everything had a *material* nature – material in the strongest sense of the word.[114]

Epicureans placed their founder among that rare group of humans who had attained an elevated share in the divine state while still alive. Thus, Lucretius (ca. 99–ca. 55 BCE) boasted about the famous Epicurus,[115] declaring unequivocally that Epicurus 'was a god, a god' (*deus ille fuit, deus*, Lucr., *De rer. nat.* 5.8)![116] Lucretius believed that Epicurus' discoveries were on par with Ceres and Bacchus (5.13–21) and his heroism superior to that of Hercules (5.22–42).[117] He believed that Epicurus was so successful only because he possessed a 'divine mind' (*divina mens*, 3.12–15).[118] In Lucretius' words:

> *nam simul ac ratio tua coepit vociferari*
> *naturam rerum divina mente coorta*
> *diffugiunt animi terrores, moenia mundi*
> *discedunt. totum video per inane geri res.*
> *apparet divum numen sedesque quietae*
>
> For as soon as your reason begins to shout out
> the nature of things, originating from your divine mind,
> the fears of the mind flee away, the walls of the world
> depart, I see things done throughout the whole void.
> The power of the gods appears and their peaceful palaces.
> (Lucr., *De rer. nat.* 3.14–19; trans. Lovatt, 2013, 93)[119]

[111] Lenz, 2007, 57.

[112] For discussion, see Sharples, 1996, 33–43, 59–66; Betegh, 2006; Lenz, 2007, 57; Morel, 2009.

[113] On ancient atomism, see esp. Furley, 1967; 1987; Pyle, 1997; Sedley, 2008.

[114] There is some debate about the apparent atheism of Epicurus. But evidence seems to suggest that at the very least he assumed there to be a distinction between the divine and nondivine, whatever precisely this might mean. On this issue, see esp. Obbink, 1989; Mikalson, 1998, 124–25.

[115] See de Lacy, 1948. On Lucretius, see e.g., Algra, Koenen and Schrijvers, 1997.

[116] Quotation from Lenz, 2007, 58; cf. Sedley, 2007, 62–63.

[117] Lovatt, 2013, 100–01.

[118] On this text, see Fratantuono, 2015, 164–65.

[119] Cf. Kenney, 2014, 76. Text of Lucr., *De rer. nat.* is from The Latin Library, online at www.thelatinlibrary.com/lucretius.html, unless otherwise noted.

Because of Epicurus' *divina mens*, Lucretius thought that he too could potentially gaze into the realm of the gods like his hero (Lucr., *De rer. nat.* 3.28–30). As D. Kennedy writes:

> Lucretius characterizes the impact of Epicurean ideas as a vertiginous experience, with a view stretching to infinity above our heads to the universe as a whole, and downwards below the human scale to the microscopic level of atoms and void. But it is more than a vertiginous experience, for he says that at this he is seized with 'a sort of divine delight, and a shuddering, that by your [Epicurus'] power, nature thus stands so manifestly laid open and uncovered in every part'. ([*De rer. nat.*] 28–30)[120]

Epicurus' divinity was akin to that attributed to the gods. Consequently, Lucretius insisted that the insights his hero had given humanity enabled others to experience the powers and beings and places beyond the grasp of ordinary sight.[121]

Lucretius' reference to Epicurus' *divina mens* raises an important couplet of questions. What might it mean that Epicurus had a divine mind? And how did such a mind relate to the other components of the self?[122] In the third book of his *De rerum natura*, we gain insight into Lucretius' thoughts on the relationship between the mind, soul and body. First, while the mind and soul were inseparable, each related to the body in a different way. The atoms of the mind were located in the chest region, while those of the soul were 'scattered' (*dissero*) throughout the entire body. In Lucretius' estimation:

Nunc animum atque animam dico coniuncta teneri
inter se atque unam naturam conficere ex se,
sed caput esse quasi et dominari in corpore toto
consilium, quod nos animum mentemque vocamus.
idque situm media regione in pectoris haeret.

> Now I say that mind and soul are held in union one with the other, and form of themselves a single nature, but that the head, as it were, and lord in the whole body is the reason, which we call mind or understanding, and it is firmly seated in the middle region of the breast.
>
> (*De rer. nat.* 3.136–40; trans. Bailey, 1947)

The components that comprised the inner part of the self – the 'mind' (*mens*), the 'rational soul' (*animus*) and the 'soul' (*anima*) – were 'held in union' (*coniuncta teneri*) with each other. By means of their proximity to

[120] Kennedy, 2007, 380. [121] Lovatt, 2013, 93–100; Kenney, 2014, 76.
[122] Konstan, 1973; Furley, 1989.

one another, they formed a singular substance (*unam naturam conficere*). They united within the 'body' (*corpus*) the way two cities connect at their borders. Interestingly, even though both inhabited the body, the 'rational soul' (*animus*) was in the chest, while the 'soul' (*anima*) was dispersed throughout the entire 'body' (*corpus*):

> here then [in the chest] is the understanding and the mind. The rest of the soul, spread abroad throughout the body. (*cetera pars animae per totum dissita corpus*, *De rer. nat.* 143–44; trans. Bailey, 1947)

While the mind and soul were inseparable, they were not identical. This is evident both in their different locations in the body and in their different functions. Being dispersed throughout the body, the soul was intermixed with the atoms of the body, which allowed it (or causes it) to influence the body in different ways. However, because the mind was located in the chest, it acted as a central command over both the soul and body alike.

As an atomist, Lucretius imagined all of the atoms comprising the self as bodily or material in nature. Thus, the *mens*/*animus* and *anima* were every bit as *bodily* as is the *corpus* itself. In fact, Lucretius had some intriguing thoughts about the nature of the mind:

> *Is tibi nunc animus quali sit corpore et unde constiterit pergam rationem reddere dictis. principio esse aio persuptilem atque minutis perquam corporibus factum constare.*
>
> Now of what kind of body (*corpus*) this mind (*animus*) is, and of what parts it is formed, I will go on to give account to you in my discourse. First of all I say that it is very fine in texture, and is made and formed of very tiny particles. (*De rer. nat.* 177–80; trans. Bailey, 1947)

Lucretius was concerned with what 'kind of body' (*quali sit corpore*) the mind (*animus*) was made of. He thought of it as very fine bodies (*minutis perquam corporibus factum constare*) that differed in kind or quality from those that constituted the soul and body. The nature of the mind was of a far higher quality than that of the rest of the self. It was of the finest type of body, the rarest kind, finer even than that of which the rest of the soul was made. As a type of body, the mind possessed a corporeality that Plato would have denied.

As for the nature of the rest of the soul (*anima*):

> *ergo animam totam perparvis esse necessest seminibus nexam per venas viscera nervos, qua tenus.*
>
> the whole soul is made of very tiny seeds, and is linked on throughout veins, flesh, and sinews (*De rer. nat.* 216–17; trans. Bailey, 1947).

According to Lucretius, the *anima* (soul) was not localised like the mind but dispersed throughout the physical body. In Lucretius' anthropology, the bodies (*corpora*) of the *anima* took the form of tiny seeds that were interconnected to the *bodies* (*corpora*) that made up the human body (*corpus*). The term *dissero* ('scatter', 'sow') indicates that the seed-bodies of the *anima* permeated the body (*corpus*) like seeds scattered across the ground (Lucr., *De rer. nat.* 143). Lucretius envisioned the self's constitution as a thoroughly physical space in which various sorts of tiny bodies interconnected with one another. As a physical space, the body was interpenetrated by the soul, whose own particular type of atoms pervaded the body from one boundary to the next like seeds on the ground.

Lucretius believed that the rational soul (*animus*), mind (*mens*) and soul (*anima*) had a share in the divine state, though each to a different degree. Thus, both the mind and soul were equal in many respects inside the bounds of the body. However, as the *more divine* of the three, the mind could transcend this finite space and enter the realms 'beyond the walls of this world' (*De rer. nat.* 2.1044–45; 3.15–19; cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 247c; 248a; 249c; Philo, *Gig.* 61).[123] Lucretius was confident that if anyone had achieved this state while still on earth, it was Epicurus (*De rer. nat.* 1.79; 3.321).[124]

This is where Lucretius' understanding of deification is truly fascinating. For him, achieving the divine state was not only *possible* in this life, but *only in this life* was it even possible. If both soul and body intermingled with one another within a singular space, and if the body and soul/mind needed each other to survive, there could be no such thing as an immortal soul that outlived the body (*De rer. nat.* 3.323–24; cf. 2.700).[125] Once the human body died, so did all that was attached to it, soul and mind alike.

The Stoics

Founded by Zeno of Citium (335–263 BCE), Stoicism emerged in Athens around the turn of the fourth c. BCE.[126] It remained one of the more influential schools of thought in the Greek and Roman world well into the

[123] And see Buchheit, 2007, 108–10.
[124] Lenz, 2007, 57–58.
[125] Sharples, 1996, 59–60.
[126] On Stoicism, see e.g., Inwood, 2006; Inwood and Gerson, 2008; Sellars, 2016.

Common Era. Like those we have discussed to this point, Stoics were also interested in questions about humanity's relationship to the divine.[127]

The Fiery Substance of the Soul

In grappling with questions about the nature of the soul/mind, Zeno and his disciple Cleanthes (331–232 BCE) concluded that everything in the cosmos emerged from a common substance. Like the cosmos, they insisted, the soul/mind was also composed of a fiery substance (Diog. Laërt., *Vit. phil.* 7.1–160). Interestingly, Zeno arrived at his conception of the cosmos with the help of Heraclitus (ca. 535–475 BCE), according to whom the universe was made of a divine artisan-fire from which all that exists came into being (Cic., *De Nat. Deor.* ii.9–22; iii.14). Zeno imagined the divine fire as God, who pervaded everything in the cosmos on some level, but this was especially true of the human soul (Diog. Laërt., *Vit. phil.* 7.148). In fact, Zeno believed that the human soul was made of the same blazing fire as the sun (Cic., *De Nat. Deor.* ii.15).

In the middle of the third c. BCE, Chrysippus of Soli (ca. 280–207 BCE) would elucidate his Stoic predecessors' thoughts. He would expand in particular on their ideas about the nature of the soul. As a good Stoic, Chrysippus also believed that the soul was made of a highly refined, fiery, airy substance. He called this πνεῦμα, and he believed that the entire cosmos was held together by this stuff. As that which permeated the cosmos, πνεῦμα was the fundamental substance of which both the human soul and the 'world soul' were made (Cic., *De Nat. Deor.* iii.14).

Like the Epicureans, the Stoics also believed that everything in existence had a *corporeal* nature, including πνεῦμα. They argued that everything had at least some amount of πνεῦμα within it (*SVF* 2.439–462).[128] This meant that the soul was as corporeal as the visible body and as everything else in creation. Granted, πνεῦμα appeared in different quantities and qualities depending on where it is found. For example, in rocks πνεῦμα existed only in trace amounts – only enough to hold them together. But in humans, it appeared both in its greatest concentration and in the finest grade. The human, of course, consisted of components that were not made of πνεῦμα. However, given the nature of πνεῦμα that existed within it, the human was fundamentally and proportionally *more divine* than anything else in the cosmos.

[127] See esp. Long, 1982; cf. 2017; von Staden, 2000; Putthoff, 2017, 76–91.
[128] Cf. Tieleman, 2014. See also Engberg-Pedersen, 2017a.

The Fragment of God Within

The superior grade of the πνεῦμα inside humans led Stoics to believe that the self truly carried around a fragment of God within themselves.[129] Seneca actually called this the 'God within' (Sen. *Ep.* 41.1).[130] Epictetus spoke of the mind as that 'part' (μόριον) and 'fragment' (ἀπόσπασμα) of God inside (*Diatr.* 1.14.6; 2.8.2; cf. Origen in *SVF* 2.1051). According to Epictetus:

> ἀλλὰ τὰ φυτὰ μὲν καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα οὕτως ἐνδέδεται τοῖς ὅλοις καὶ συμπέπονθεν, αἱ ψυχαὶ δ' αἱ ἡμέτεραι οὐ πολὺ πλέον; [6] ἀλλ' αἱ ψυχαὶ μὲν οὕτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα, οὐ παντὸς δ' αὐτῶν κινήματος ἅτε οἰκείου καὶ συμφυοῦς ὁ θεὸς αἰσθάνεται;[131]
>
> But are plants and our bodies so bound up and united with the whole, and are not our souls much more? and our souls so bound up and in contact with God as parts of Him and portions of Him; and does not God perceive every motion of these parts as being his own motion connate with himself? (*Diatr.* 1.14.5–6; trans. Long, 1890)

In Epictetus' thinking, the soul was 'bound up with' (ἐνδέω)[132] and 'united with' (συνάπτω/συναφής) the cosmos and with God himself. The soul was especially privileged, as it was that piece of God that lived within all humans (cf. Epicur. *Fr.* 329).

This Stoic concept resembles what we find in the writings of Alexandrian Jewish philosopher Philo Judaeus. Philo thought about the mind and soul as follows:[133]

> For among created things, that which is holy is, in the universe, the heavens, in which natures imperishable and enduring through long ages have their orbits (καθ' ὃν αἱ ἄφθαρτοι καὶ μακραίωνες φύσεις περιπολοῦσιν); in man it is mind, a fragment of the Deity (ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ νοῦς, ἀπόσπασμα θεῖον ὤν), as the words of Moses in particular bear witness, 'He breathed into his face a breath of life, and man became a living soul'. (Gen 2.7, Philo, *Somn.* 1.34)

Because the νοῦς was an ἀπόσπασμα ('fragment') of God, its 'essence' (οὐσία) and 'nature' (φύσις) mimicked God's own essence and nature. Thus, for Philo, the νοῦς was 'the divinest part of us' (τὸ θειότατον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, Philo, *Det.* 29).

[129] See also Inwood, 2017, 264. This, of course, is not limited to the Stoics. But the physicalist nature of their view makes theirs a rather intriguing case study in the present discussion.
[130] Cf. Litwa, 2012, 210–11; Opsomer, 2017, 300n15.
[131] Text of Epictetus, *Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae* from Schenkl, 1916.
[132] Or 'entangled in' (Homer, *Il.* 2.111); 'possessed by' (Jos., *AJ* 8.2.5).
[133] See Putthoff, 2017, 76–91.

But Epictetus would describe the human's relationship with God in a different way:

> [Zeus] has placed by every man a guardian, every man's Daemon (δαίμων), to whom he has committed the care of the man, a guardian who never sleeps, is never deceived. [13] For to what better and more careful guardian could He have intrusted each of us? When then you have shut the doors and made darkness within, remember never to say that you are alone, [14] for you are not; but God is within, and your Daemon is within. (ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς ἔνδον ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ὑμέτερος δαίμων ἐστίν, *Diatr.* 1.14.12–14; trans. Long, 1890; cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 95; Ovid, *Fasti* 6.5)

Not only was the self 'united' with God and his world, but it was also indwelt by a protective δαίμων. With this divinity inside, humans were carrying God around inside themselves.[134] The human may not have had, for example, the great power of Zeus, but with the δαίμων inside it did participate in the divine existence (*Diatr.*, 1.14.11).

These texts do not tell us in what sense the human was united with the divine. However, elsewhere the Stoics actually put a lot of thought into how gods could or did inhabit the human body. But they were also concerned with understanding the relationship between the soul and body.[135]

Stoic Concepts of Mixture

To conceptualise this relationship, the Stoics constructed a framework within which they were able to explore the way different entities interacted with one another. This framework consisted of three categories of 'mixture'. These categories helped them to see what would happen when different entities were mixed together.[136] Not only did this help them better understand non-human interactions, such as the way different liquids interacted with each other. But it also helped them better understand the way the soul and body, and humans and gods, interacted with one another ontologically.

'Mixture' designates a process in which multiple entities contact or interact with one another to form a single unit. It occurs when two otherwise singular, bounded entities interact with each other to the point

[134] Lenz, 2007, 59; cf. Putthoff, 2017, 76–78.

[135] Long, 1982; cf. von Staden, 2000; Putthoff, 2017, 76–91.

[136] I present these same categories and much of the same information in Putthoff, 2017, 79–81. Because these prove helpful not only in understanding Stoic conceptions of the self but those of others as well, it will be useful to look at these matters here.

that the two become one.[137] In ancient Stoic thought, everything in the cosmos mixed together in one of three ways. The three categories the Stoics put forth in an attempt to conceptualise these ontological relationships find their fullest expression in the work of Chrysippus of Soli (ca. 280–ca. 207 BCE), who expanded on the work of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism.[138]

The Stoics referred to the first category of mixture in terms of 'juxtaposition' (παραθέσις). Juxtaposition designates the singular entity that one creates by mixing, for example, two different colours of marbles together. While the two components (red and blue marbles) interact to form a new unit (red-blue pile of marbles), the ontological boundaries of the one (red marbles) never actually give way to the other (blue marbles). Upon close inspection, the ostensibly singular entity (bowl of marbles) remains, in reality, a simple combination of two distinct parts.

In juxtaposition, the bodies that form the mixture remain individually bounded against one another. Their borders remain unaffected, so that each individual particle remains itself, retaining its own ontological identity. The shape and form and identity of each marble thus remains unchanged, even though as a unit the two colours of marbles form something new – a single bowl of marbles.

This type of mixture certainly seems to apply to situations in which a god resides *inside* a temple but never permeates the actual structure itself. In a temple, a god's presence would fill the empty space of the sanctuary as smoke in a room. In some cases, it could interact with the physical bounds of the temple in different ways. In Israel, YHWH lived in his temple without, it appears, actually *embodying* its precincts the way he embodied other cultic bodies, including 'houses of God' (בתי אל), *asherahs* and humans. However, in Mesopotamia the gods actually did permeate the temple precincts the way they did other cult objects. In such instances in which a deity permeated the walls of the temple instead of merely inhabiting the empty space inside it, it entered into a different type of relationship with the physical object. Stoics thought of this interaction in terms of either fusion or blending.

The second category of mixture is called 'fusion' (σύγχυσις). As I. Hadot insists, fusion 'designates a mixture of different elements that is so perfect that the new body thus constituted possesses completely new

[137] Long, 1974, 159–60; Todd, 1976, 21–88; Mansfeld, 1983, 306–10; Simons, 1987, 218; Wood and Weisberg, 2004; Putthoff, 2017, 79–81.

[138] See esp. Gould, 1970, 7–17; von Staden, 2000; Ferguson, 2003, 355; Putthoff, 2017, 80.

qualities'.[139] When fusion between two or more entities – or bodies – occurs, annihilation of the constituent (individual) bodies leads to the creation of an entirely new one. The two parts become a singular whole.

The process of fusion is similar to that by which alloys come into being. When a mixture of one metal with another metal or a metal with other elements occurs, the reaction is the creation of a new metallic compound, an alloy. The component parts that constitute the compound no longer exist in their original states but now share in the whole of the alloy. L. Brisson helpfully explains that when fusion occurs:

> the components are reciprocally modified and form a new unity, which is indissoluble; they cannot therefore be separated without being destroyed . . .. On a logical level, the parts of a definition are so closely connected that the disappearance of one of the elements entails the disappearance of the unity they constitute.[140]

In contrast to other categories of mixture, fusion is permanent. It comes into being by way of the annihilation of the elements that form it.

Clearly, the relationship between two groups of marbles is not one of fusion. There is no permanence, and the boundaries of each entity do not change. In fusion, boundaries disappear in such a way that there is no evidence that the components of the new entity were ever anything else.

The third category of mixture is called 'blending' (κρᾶσις).[141] Blending is something of a middle ground between juxtaposition and fusion. A. Long and D. Sedley explain:

> 'Blending' resembles 'fusion' in that the constituents are related to one another 'through and through' and not merely at their surfaces. But it differs from 'fusion' and resembles 'juxtaposition' in that its constituents retain all their original properties in the mixture and can be separated out again.[142]

Stoics imagined iron and fire or soul and body as examples of blending.[143] In such mixtures, the tiny component parts of each entity were 'mutually coextended through and through' such that 'all the constituents of the blend are completely present in any part of it'.[144]

In expanding on the views of Chrysippus, Alexander of Aphrodisius (ca. second–third c. CE) insisted that blending occurs when

> certain substances and their qualities are mutually extended through and through, with the original substances and their qualities being preserved in such a mixture.

[139] Hadot, 2015, 50. [140] Brisson, 2010, 277.
[141] See also Todd, 1976, 98–101; Dunderberg, 2010; Trostyanskiy, 2016.
[142] Long and Sedley, 1987, 293. [143] See Long and Sedley, 1987, 293.
[144] Long and Sedley, 1987, 293.

For the capacity to be separated again from one another is a peculiarity of blended substances, and this occurs only if they preserve their own natures in the mixture.[145]

In blending, the component parts mix together in such a way that the new entity *appears* to be a permanent fusion. It is virtually impossible to distinguish between one of its components and another. However, certain events or procedures can enable one to separate the different parts from one another. This is not easy, but it is possible. An example of a blending might be the way water interacts with a sponge. The two appear to form a singular entity. The boundaries between the two parts are virtually impossible to see with the naked eye. But the reality is that the water can be separated from the sponge so that the two become, once again, separate entities. In this regard, their original ontological properties never change. All that changes is their proximity to one another.

The Blended Self

Stoics saw the relationship between the pneumatic soul/mind and the body in terms of a blending. Rather than filling the body as a liquid in a container, the soul pervaded the entirety of the body, inwardly and outwardly, such that not a single space in the body was without some portion of the soul.[146] In Stoic anthropology, πνεῦμα was not localised in the body as it was in Platonic anthropology. It was not something that only existed in the head or chest region, for example. Rather, it permeated the entire body as water in a sponge, to use our previous example.[147]

According to Chrysippus, the soul and body interpenetrated one another to make a blending (*SVF* 2.473).[148] In the words of Alexander:

The soul, although it has its own subsistence, just as the body that contains it does, pervades the entire body, and yet in the mixture with it it preserves its own substance; for there is no part of a body possessing a soul that is without a share in soul. The nature of plants is similar, and also the cohesion in those things that are held together by cohesion. (*SVF* 2.473)[149]

[145] Text taken from Long and Sedley, *Hellenistic Philosophers*, §48c. Cf. Nolan, 2006, 169; Putthoff, 2017, 81.

[146] Putthoff, 2017, 81–82. [147] Putthoff, 2017, 76–91.

[148] Cf. Ramelli, 2009, 45; Putthoff, 2017, 82.

[149] Quoted in Ramelli, 2009, 45; cf. Putthoff, 2017, 82. On Alexander of Aphrodisias, see Long, 1974, 159–60; Todd, 1976, 21–88; Mansfeld, 1983, 306–10; Flannery, 1995, xix–xxiv; Wood and Weisberg, 2004, 681–706.

Alexander understood Chrysippus' notion of the mind-body relationship as if the two parts wholly interpenetrated one another such that 'no part of a body possessing a soul ... is without a share in the soul'. Hierocles (second c. CE) thought of the self in this way as well:

> One must consider that the soul is not enclosed in the body as in a bucket, [5] like liquids surrounded by jars, but is wondrously blended and wholly intermingled, so that not even the least part of the mixture fails to have a share in either of them.
> (text/trans. Ramelli, 2009, 10–11)

In Stoic thought, the soul lived *throughout* and not merely *in* the body. It was dispensed throughout the body 'but not as in a bucket' (οὐδὲ ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ, *SVF* 2.797).[150]

As a 'blending' (κρᾶσις), the mind and body shared a space like water and wine when mixed together.[151] Even though mixing water and wine creates a singular entity, the component parts of water and wine always retain their original ontological properties. Under the right circumstances, the two can theoretically be separated again.[152]

The human self was a blending of mind and body, a truly heterotopian space. The divine part (mind) interpenetrated the nondivine part (body) from border to border. The mind was not restricted to any particular region of the body. It did not inhabit the head or chest as water in a bucket. Rather, it pervaded the entire bounds of the bodily space like water in a sponge. It looked like a fusion, an alloy, but it was not. After all, the boundaries between the parts were never destroyed, even if they existed in such close proximity to one another that it appeared that way. With great effort, or under the right circumstances, the soul and body could be separated from each other, so that the two could return to their individual existences.

This description makes sense especially when we consider the way πνεῦμα permeated the universe in Stoic cosmology. It was found everywhere and within everything, and nowhere in the cosmos existed without it. Likewise, nowhere in the body was without some amount of πνεῦμα. In fact, nowhere in the *entire cosmos* was without some amount of πνεῦμα. Thus, as a microcosm of the cosmos, πνεῦμα saturated the human body from border to border.[153]

[150] Cf. Putthoff, 2017, 84.
[151] See esp. Gould, 1970, 7–17; Ferguson, 2003, 355; von Staden, 2007, 79–116.
[152] Sambursky, 1959, 14–15; Long, 1974, 159–60; von Staden, 2000, 79–116; Putthoff, 2017, 80–85.
[153] Cf. Posidonius' view according to Scholia in Lucani Bellum Civile, Pars I, *Commenta Bernensia*, ix.578, in Kidd, 1999, fr. 100 on p. 159.

For the Stoics, the cosmos was a heterotopian space comprising an infinite number of different spaces. One of these was the human body, which itself was, as a microcosm of the world, a heterotopian space. For them, the human self was a bounded space that was invariably linked to the broader space of the cosmos, and like the universe it too comprised two different sorts of materials. It had a body, an outward part, made of a particular type of substance, and it was filled with an inner part – a soul and/or mind – that comprised divine πνεῦμα.[154] The material of which the outer part of the self was made was not divine, while the stuff of which the inner part was made *was*. The latter was in fact the very substance of which God was made. By virtue of its share in this substance, the human existed in a state of 'kinship' (συγγένεια) with God (Philo, *Opif.* 77; Epict., *Diatr.* 1.9.11). It was naturally like God, in other words, because God was part of it.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The examination of Greek and Roman conceptions of the self has proven quite important. In the context of the ruler cults, participation in the divine state was restricted to kings. However, we learn little about the ontological aspects of the deification process in this context. In the case of Alexander the Great, it seems likely that he viewed himself as having a share in the divine nature. But even if he did not, he certainly wanted others to think of him in that way. It is likely that he was understood according to the local conceptions of rulers in different regions of his empire. In Egypt and in Persia in particular, he declared himself as a god-king on par with the pharaohs and Achaemenid kings.

In contrast to the ruler cults, the scientific and philosophical thinkers emphasised the divinity of all humans. The Greek and Roman thinkers generally agreed that, in its natural condition, the human self had an intrinsic share in the divine nature, specifically in its inner parts. But some also seem to have believed that under the right circumstances the self had the potential for an even greater share in the divine nature.

[154] Sharples, 1996, 66–67.

7

Conclusion

Gods and Humans, Gods in Humans

PREFATORY REMARKS

The Present Chapter

I have spent the last several chapters exploring conceptions of the human self in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean. My goal has been to understand ancient beliefs about, in particular, divine aspects of the human in its natural condition. I begin my conclusion with a chapter-by-chapter summary of what we have seen. After this, I will move towards a more synthetic analysis of near eastern and Mediterranean ideas about the self. I will also offer some thoughts on the implications of my study.

Chapter 2 – Egypt

In Chapter 2, I explored Egyptian conceptions of human nature. I argued there that Egyptians viewed the human as embodied space that shared in the divine state even in its natural condition. In Egypt, the cosmos was thought to have emerged out of the deities responsible for creating it. Egyptians embraced a form of panentheism, as deities inhabited every aspect of the cosmos.

This cosmology had a direct impact on their anthropology. Having been created from the divine clay of which the earth was made, the human body enjoyed a trace or latent share in the divine. The physical space of the self thus existed in kinship with the material cosmos from which the deities created it. Inside the body, the soul-aspects likewise shared in this state, as these were the same as those of the deities. Just as the deities embodied the elements of the cosmos, sacred temples and ritual images, the divine presence embodied the human self.

The self's divine-human nature took on a whole new meaning in the context of the pharaoh – reaching perhaps its greatest expression during the 18th and 19th Dynasties. While the regular human shared in trace amounts of the divine, the pharaoh enjoyed a far more substantial stake in the divine nature. With a share in the deities' fluid nature, the pharaoh could, like the gods, reside in multiple bodies (images, statues, etc.) at the same time. He or she could be in one location in person and in other locations in physical representations bearing his or her likeness.

Chapter 3 – Mesopotamia

In Chapter 3, I examined Mesopotamian conceptions of human nature. I argued there that Mesopotamians viewed the human as a composite nondivine-divine space. Having been created from the blood, spittle and spirit of the slain deities, the physical body participated in the divine nature. The physical body was a mixture of clay and various aspects of the slain deities. For some Mesopotamians, participation in the divine state was not wholly positive. The aspect that influenced the primordial deities to rebel in heaven in fact formed part of the body's constitution. Thus, humanity's propensity to disrupt the ordered cosmos stemmed from its share in this aspect of the divine nature.

The human was also conceived as a microcosm of the cosmos and the temple. As a microcosm of the cosmos, the temple was originally created to be the meeting point between divine and nondivine. Likewise, the deities created the human self as a physical space in which they could install themselves. The human was thus a physical embodiment of the divine on a general level, just like the temple, and like the cosmos before that.

Divine embodiment in a human context was clearest in the context of the royal self. At certain times in Mesopotamian history, the king was thought to have participated in the divine nature to the point that, like true deities, he could install himself within multiple bodies at the same time. While he could never become a true deity himself, he could take up residence in images and statues of himself and thereby manifest himself in temples and/or expand his rule in locations where he was not present in person.

Chapter 4 – Hittite Anatolia

In Chapter 4, I investigated Hittite conceptions of human nature. I argued there that the Hittites imagined the human to have mimicked the deities

on multiple levels. In the context of regular humanity, Hittites believed that both humans and deities possessed bodies and souls. Whereas the human soul inhabited the human body, deities' souls could inhabit any number of cult objects. Because the nature of the human soul was the same as that of a deity, it enjoyed a share in the divine state even in its natural condition.

The Hittites had especially intriguing ideas about the actual constitution of the body and soul. Like their neighbours, they understood the body to have come from the material of the earth. However, the Hittites seem to have imagined it as a particular type of metal-rich soil. They depicted the creator deities as forging the body from high-quality primordial iron – the same iron that comprised the heavens. Furthermore, the Hittites seem to have envisioned the soul as having had a liquid constitution. For this reason, they thought that they could actually drink the souls of humans and deities during ritual meals.

The Hittites also had slightly different views of the monarch. They did not believe that the king or queen enjoyed a permanent share in the divine nature until the afterlife. In the present life, royal figures could experience temporary moments of deification and empowerment. This occurred during ritual meals, when the royal figure would dress like the gods, enter their space or drink them into his or her body. The monarch could participate in the divine state in the present life, even if only for a few moments.

Chapter 5 – Israel

In Chapter 5, I inspected ancient Israelite conceptions of human nature. I argued there that YHWH enjoyed the same fluid constitution of other near eastern deities. As such, he could install himself within multiple cult objects on earth simultaneously, whilst always retaining his individual identity. While Israelites were largely aniconic, they did recognise one such 'image' as a legitimate theomorphic cult object – or object that resembled YHWH in appearance. That was the human self. Israelites believed that God created the body to resemble him physically. Thus, even though the body shared in the nondivine nature of the material of the earth, it nevertheless resembled YHWH in form.

The Israelites imagined the human to have had a share in the divine nature spiritually. Upon breathing his essence into the human-image, God not only brought it to life but infused it with his own presence. He installed himself within it as he would do in other cult objects like 'houses

of God' and *asherahs*. According to the Israelites, the self was literally a composite of earth and deity, a commixture of nondivine and divine.

YHWH created the cosmos as his temple residence. Inside this temple, he installed all sorts of appurtenances, including lights, vegetation, sea creatures, land animals, temple attendants and a cult statue that would serve as his physical body in his new house. Upon installing himself within the human statue, YHWH both deified it and commissioned it as his temple attendant. In this physical image, he therefore manifested himself in his temple and expanded his rule throughout creation. In Israelite anthropology, the human self was thus a physical embodiment of the divine presence and a vessel through which God would maintain order in his cosmic temple.

Chapter 6 – Greece and Rome

In Chapter 6, I considered Greek and Roman conceptions of human nature. Greeks and Romans had wide-ranging views on humanity's relation with the divine. However, in philosophical and scientific circles, it was common to find talk of humanity's intrinsic share in the divine nature even in its natural condition. Certain groups thought of the self as a space comprising different material bodies, some nondivine and some divine. Others imagined it as a space comprising material and immaterial parts, the former being mortal and the latter having a latent share in the divine state. There was thus general agreement that, regardless of the nature of the different parts or aspects of the self, the human enjoyed some share in the divine nature.

Many seem to have imagined some rulers to have had an exalted ontology. Unfortunately, the evidence is simply not conclusive. Alexander the Great certainly seems to have embraced for himself certain near eastern and Mediterranean traditions about the deified state of the ruler. He even appears to have tried to convince others of his divine nature. However, without devoting significantly more space to the ruler's nature, I cannot argue definitively for such a view.

In any case, Greeks and Romans quite widely thought that the regular human self participated in the divine state. The human's share in divinity might only have been in the form of divine potentiality, as it lay beneath the surface of the mortal body in the present life. It also did not manifest itself in superhuman feats as it did in rulers and heroes. Nevertheless, this divine aspect of human nature was as real as any other aspect of the self.

THE RESULTS OF OUR STUDY

Syntheses – Gods in Space

Gods did not take up space in their disembodied state. They were not necessarily immaterial, but they were not fully material either. Thus, they did not take up space like other *bodies* could do. This is why they needed and desired to inhabit bodies. By installing themselves within material spaces, they could cause things to happen on earth. They could inhabit the elements of the physical world and thereby bring about changes in weather, cause the rivers to flood or crops to grow. They could inhabit the celestial bodies and give humanity a framework for keeping time and thus maintaining order in the world. These cosmic bodies gave the gods a way to live in the world and interact with humanity in an embodied manner. Without these, they could not, in reality, manifest themselves among humans, and in return humans could not carry out their desires on earth.

In addition to these cosmic spaces, the gods inhabited another type of body as well: cultic bodies. Cult objects were an even more immediate way by which the gods could live among humankind. Images of all types provided the gods spaces in which they might live in much closer proximity to their creatures. There were many different types of cult objects. Some took more natural shapes and served as larger physical bodies for the gods. Others were theomorphic and actually looked like the gods (were imagined to have) looked. But they all served the same purpose: to be the physical space in which an otherwise disembodied god or goddess might live amongst humans.

As interpreters, we are concerned to know *exactly* what this meant to the ancients. We want to know if they always thought that their gods were actually present in reality in their images. Or we want to know, if the ancients did not always think this, when they thought this to be true and when they did not.

To be sure, there were instances in which they were completely convinced that a deity was fully present in his or her image. This was especially true in cases in which the image had undergone a particularly powerful vivification process. They knew that the god was there, and they knew they were to approach that physical cult object as if they were standing in the real presence of that god.

However, there were other instances in which this was not so clear. They knew images had the ability to serve as bodies for the gods. They also knew that gods needed – and desired to have – physical bodies.

But they did not always know which image was embodied by a god and which ones were empty. They did not always know which images were 'representational copies' of a god who was absent and which were truly 'embodied doubles' of a god who was very much present. This, I think, was part of the mystique of the divine image in the first place. As panentheists, the ancients knew that gods were everywhere and in virtually everything in the cosmos. So why, they figured, could they not also have been in their images?

This mystique is also why kings would establish images of themselves. They understood that, regardless of what the people actually believed about the images, many people would see them as embodiments of the royal-divine presence anyway. They worked well as propaganda, and for the same reason they worked well for religious or cultic purposes. Royal images also reified the belief in kings and queens as deities. Or at least as humans who had come to share in the divine nature on a higher level than everyone else.

This brings us to the third type of body that gods inhabited: human bodies. The gods did not just live in cosmic bodies or cultic bodies, but they also lived in humans. In most of the cultures we looked at, royal figures had a share in the divine that transcended all others. Their divinity was evident in their power and success on earth. Some must have thought that it was also evident in the rulers' physical bodies – whether in the form of a radiant aura, a sexy physique or something else is difficult to know. What the ancients were certain of is, again, that no one really knew which ruler was a deity and which was not.

Even in those times in near eastern history when the evidence is silent, it still seems safe to say that a wide number of the ancients continued to believe that their kings and queens were gods and goddesses on earth. There are cases in which the rulers themselves declared themselves gods, and in such cases we can be more confident in how we interpret the situation. But even in those instances in which the kings or queens did not, as it were, pull a Ramesses II or a Narām-Sîn, many of their subjects would still have viewed them as gods incarnate. And everyone seemed quite fine with this situation. Gods and rulers seemed happy with this arrangement, and so did everyone else.

Perhaps the most intriguing matter of my exploration has to do with regular, non-royal human nature. The ancients saw a correspondence between cosmic and cultic spaces, between cultic and human spaces, and between gods and humans. All spaces were heterotopian in that all had some share of divine and nondivine at the same time. And gods and humans resembled one another in that both possessed disembodied parts

(soul-aspects) and physical bodies. Therefore, like the cosmos, which housed the gods in general and the divine essence in particular, and like images, which housed the gods' presences in highest concentration, the human body was also a type of space in which gods in particular or the divine essence more broadly might take up residence. The divine actually existed within the infinitesimal, feeble bounds of the human body. And this was not just true of kings' and queens' bodies. But it was true of *all* human bodies. Just as gods and humans lived in the cosmos together, so also the gods lived within humans, in their natural condition, even in the present life. In humans, gods actually took up space in the cosmos.

Implications – What Happens Next

The obvious limitation of this monograph is its attempt to analyse such a wide range of sources within a single volume. One could easily expand each chapter into its own volume. However, investigating these sources alongside one another has provided a clearer portrait of ancient conceptions of humanity's share in the divine nature. No doubt many of my claims will be met with reluctance, as well should any argument that seeks to read old sources and subjects afresh. Indeed, further engagement and research needs to be done on each of the cultures that I explored in this work.

In spite of certain limitations, key implications of my study are worth noting at this point. The idea of divine embodiment is important in understanding ancient conceptions of God/gods. However, it is equally important in understanding ancient conceptions of the human self. In this volume, I have demonstrated the pervasiveness of such beliefs in near eastern and Mediterranean anthropologies. Elsewhere, I have shown that similar ideas were also prevalent among early Jews. There I observed such notions in multiple varieties of early Jews, from the Diaspora to the Jewish homeland, and from the second c. BCE to the eighth c. CE. While I did not seek to establish a direct link between ancient near eastern and early Jewish anthropologies, it is hard to imagine that the latter developed apart from the former. My study is therefore valuable for understanding the near eastern roots of early Jewish ideas about God/gods and humans. And it will prove useful for specialists in those areas who are nevertheless interested in examining potential links between these two worlds which scholars, unfortunately, often hold at arm's length from one another.

For the same reasons, my study has implications for research into Christian origins. Christian origins scholarship tends to focus on the Second Temple and Hellenistic period(s), and rightly so, since these are

Christianity's most immediate milieu. Unfortunately, there is little consideration of the near eastern influences on the more immediate world of early Christians. Traditions that came before the third or second c. BCE are not given proper consideration in conversations about potential influences on the thinking of Jesus, Paul and the earliest Christians.

To be sure, Hellenism had an expansive reach in the near eastern and Mediterranean world. However, it is not unreasonable to think that ideas pervasive prior to the spread of Hellenism were still quite prevalent in the first c. CE. Even today, Plato, Augustine and other ancient thinkers maintain a heavy influence on how we view the world. It is not unreasonable to think that traditions prevalent in the second mill. BCE were still salient two thousand years later, at the time early Christianity emerged on the scene. Furthermore, scholars widely accept that the earliest Christians relied on the 'Bible' and 'biblical' traditions that had been in circulation for some two millennia before they came into being. It seems plausible that early Christians might also have been aware of the near eastern traditions that shaped their Bible and the biblical traditions as well. My study moves us a step closer towards understanding early Christianity (and Judaism) within a very complex and very ancient near eastern and Mediterranean world. In particular, it provides those interested in early Christian anthropology some insight into the way the biblical peoples and others in their world viewed the human self. My forthcoming study on Pauline anthropology will approach the Apostle's writings through this framework.

Additionally, my study has implications for the fields of theology and theological anthropology. Those interested in early Christian ideas on the nature of the self as it relates to God and Christ now have an even *more ancient* set of sources with which to converse. It is common for scholars to end their search backwards in history at the Church Fathers or the New Testament, dipping occasionally into the Hebrew Bible. However, I have provided the theological anthropologist with fresh ideas on beliefs about humanity's divine nature from as early as the third mill. BCE.

My examination has special implications for biblical anthropology. It is not hard to see why the Israelites saw the image as a fitting depiction of the human self. The ancients already saw a spatial correspondence between the image and the human. They understood that gods could inhabit both types of space. It was easy for them, then, to take the conception of the monarch or cult object as a divine image and apply it to the human more broadly. In many ways, however, the Israelites did not see the monarch as more special than other humans. By the time the

Priestly writers penned their writings, Israel had already experienced the extreme highs and extreme lows of kingship. But when the Yahwists formulated their thoughts on the matter – or dare we say, inherited these traditions from their own ancestors – the Israelites had yet to have a king. Thus, they did not see the king as their deity's cult object the way their neighbours viewed their own kings. Rather, they saw all humans as having been crafted into the divine image. And it should be emphasised, the human was without question the *only* theomorphic image that the Israelites accepted.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As a space comprising some aspect of the divine, the human was not merely human after all. It was, in the ancient imagination, an embodiment of the divine, a living creature who shared in the divine state of the deities in heaven. Human nature was in fact human-divine nature, as the human enjoyed an intrinsic share in the divine. This state was not only the possession of deities or monarchs. Rather, it was available to *all* humans. While the ancients considered the royal figure to have been more divine than everyone else, they still accepted that everyone else nevertheless shared in the divine, even if on a different level. The fact is that the peoples of the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean were able to delight in the reality that, even in their transience, even in their brokenness, even in their mortality, the gods lived inside them, and because of this, they had a share in the life and existence of the gods in heaven. Instead of *Gods and Humans in the Ancient Near East*, perhaps I should have called this book *Gods in Humans in the Ancient Near East*.

Bibliography

Abelson, J. (1912) *The Immanence of God in Rabbinical Literature*. London: Macmillan.

Abitz, F. (1984) *König und Gott Die Götterszenen in den agyptischen Königsgräbern con Thutmosis IV bis Ramses III*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

Abrahams, I. (1908) 'Some Rabbinic Ideas on Prayer', *Jewish Quarterly Review* 20, pp. 272–93.

Abusch, T. (1998) 'Ghost and God', in Baumgarten, A. I. (ed.) *Self, Soul and Body in Religious Experience*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 363–83.

(2002) 'Sacrifice in Mesopotamia', in Baumgarten, A. I. (ed.) *Sacrifice in Religious Experience*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 39–48.

Ackrill, J. L. (1975) *Aristotle on Eudaimonia*. London: Oxford University Press.

Adam, K. P., Friedrich, A., and Wazana, N. (ed.) (2012) *Law and Narrative in the Bible and in Neighbouring Ancient Cultures*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Adkins, A. W. H. (1970) *From the Many to the One*. London: Constable.

Ahlstrom, G. W. (1963) *Aspects of Syncretism in Israelite Religion*. Leiden: Brill.

Akdoğan, R. (2010) *Hethitische Texte in Transkription*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

Albertazzi, L. (1996) 'Formal and Material Ontology', in Poli, R., and Simons, P. M. (eds.) *Formal Ontology*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 199–332.

Alberti, A. (1985) 'A Reconstruction of the Abū Salābīkh God-List', *Studi Epigrafici e Linguistici* 2, pp. 3–23.

Albright, W. F. (1925) 'The Evolution of the West-Semitic Divinity 'An-'Anat-'Attâ', *The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures* 41, pp. 73–101.

Al-Bīrūnī, Abū Rayḥān Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad (1879) *The Chronology of Ancient Nations*. Sachau, C. E. (ed./transl.). London: William H. Allen and Co.

Alesse, F. (ed.) (2008) *Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy*. Leiden: Brill.

Alexander, P. S. (1991) 'The Family of Caesar and the Family of God', in Alexander, L. C. A. (ed.) *Images of Empire*. Sheffield: JSOT Press, pp. 276–97.

(2006) *The Mystical Texts*. London: T & T Clark.
Algra, K. A., Koenen, M. H., and Schrijvers, P. H. (eds.) (1997) *Lucretius and His Intellectual Background*. Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Allen, J. P. (1988) *Genesis in Egypt*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
(2001) 'Ba', in Redford, D. B. (ed.) *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt*. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 161–62.
(2013) *A New Concordance of Pyramid Texts*. Providence: Brown University Press.
(2015) *The Ancient Egyptian Pyramid Texts*. 2nd ed. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.
Allen, S. L. (2015) *The Splintered Divine*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Alliot, M. (1979) *Le culte d'Horus à Edfou au temps des Ptolémées*. Beyrouth: Librairie du Liban.
Al-Rawi, F. N. H., and George, A. R. (1995) 'Tablets from the Sippar Library V', *Iraq* 57, pp. 225–28.
Amiet, P. (1976) *L'art d'Agadé au Musée du Louvre*. Paris: Réunion des Musées nationaux.
Andrés-Toledo, M. Á. (2015) 'Primary Sources', in Stausberg, M., Vevaina, Y. S.-D., and Tessmann, A. (eds.) *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Zoroastrianism*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 519–28.
Andrews, H., and Roberts, L. (eds.) (2012) *Liminal Landscapes*. London: Routledge.
Angerstorfer, A. (1984) 'Hebräisch *dmwt* und aramäisch *dmw(t)*', *Biblische Notizen* 24, pp. 30–43.
Anklesaria, B. T., and Bode, D. F. A. (1956) *Zand-Ākāsīh*. Bombay: Published for the Rahnumae Mazdayasnan Sabha.
Annas, J. (1995 [1986]) 'Aristotle on Memory and the Self', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 4, pp. 99–117.
(1999) *Platonic Ethics, Old and New*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
(2006) 'Recent Work on Plato's Timaeus', *Studia Philonica Annual* 18, pp. 125–42.
Anthes, R. (1959) 'Egyptian Theology in the Third Millenium B.C.', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 18, pp. 169–212.
Anthony, F. B. (2017a) *Foreigners in Ancient Egypt*. London: T & T Clark.
(2017b) 'The Pharaoh's Magic: Imagery and Diplomacy in the Late Bronze Age', *The Ancient Near East Today* 5. www.asor.org/anetoday/2017/08/pharaohs-magic.
Aristotle (1926) *Aristotle in 23 Volumes*. Vol. 19. Rackham, H. (transl.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Armstrong, G. F. (1962) *Die Genesis in der alten Kirche*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Armstrong, J. M. (2004) 'After the Ascent: Plato on Becoming Like God', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 26, pp. 171–83.
Arnold, D. (1999) *Egyptian Art in the Age of the Pyramids*. London: Harry N. Abrams.
Aruz, J., and Wallenfels, R. (eds.) (2003) *Art of the First Cities*. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art.

Assmann, J. (1984) *Ägypten*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
(2001) *The Search for God in Ancient Egypt*. Lorton, D. (transl.). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
(2003) 'Einwhonung', in Hofmann, T. and Feucht, E. (eds.) *Menschenbilder, Bildermenschen*. Norderstedt: Books on Demand, pp. 1–14.
(2005) *Death and Salvation in Ancient Egypt*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Aster, S. Z. (2012) *The Unbeatable Light*. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag.
(2015) 'Ezekiel's Adaptation of Mesopotamien "Melammu"', *Die Welt des Orients* 45, pp. 10–21.
Azargoshasb, M. F. (transl.) (1999) *Gathas*. San Diego: Council of Iranian Mobeds of North America.
Bachvarova, M. R. (2016) *From Hittite to Homer*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Badawy, A. (1978) *The Tomb of Nyhetep-Ptah at Giza and the Tomb of 'Ankhm'ahor at Saqqara*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Baden, J. S. (2007) *J, E, and the Redaction of the Pentateuch*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
(2012) *The Composition of the Penteteuch*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Badian, E. (1981) 'The Deification of Alexander the Great', in Dell, H. J. (ed.) *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honour of Charles F. Edson*. Thessaloniki: Institute of Balkan Studies, pp. 27–71.
(2006) 'Alexander the Great between Two Thrones and Heaven', in Worthington, I. (ed.) *Alexander the Great*. 1st ed. London: Routledge, pp. 245–62.
Bahrani, A. (2003) *The Graven Image*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Bailey, C. (transl.) (1947) *Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex*. 3 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baines, J., and Malek, J. (2000) *Cultural Atlas of Ancient Egypt*. Rev. ed. New York: Facts on File.
Balsdon, J. P. V. D. (1950) 'The "Divinity" of Alexander', *Historia* 1, pp. 363–88.
Baltzly, D. C. (2004) 'The Virtues and "Becoming like God"', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 26, pp. 297–321.
Barclay, J. M. G. (1996) *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora*. Edinburgh: T & T Clark.
(2011) 'Stoic Physics and the Christ-event', *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 33, pp. 406–14.
(2015) *Paul and the Gift*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Barker, M. (1998) 'Beyond the Veil of the Temple', *Scottish Journal of Theology* 51, pp. 1–21.
Barnes, J. (1979) 'Aristotle's Concept of Mind', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 72, pp. 101–14.
Barnes, J. (ed.) (1995) *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Barr, J. (1960) 'Theophany and Anthropomorphism in the Old Testament', *Vetus Testamentum Supplements* 7, pp. 31–38.
(1968–1969) 'The Image of God in the Book of Genesis', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 51, pp. 11–26.

(1972–1973) 'Man and Nature', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 55, pp. 9–32.
Barrick, W. B. (2008) *BMH as Body Language*. London: T & T Clark.
Barth, K. (1958) *Church Dogmatics III/1*. Edinburgh: T & T Clark.
Bartholomae, C. (1905) *Die Gathas des Awesta*. Strassburg: Trübner.
Barton, S. C. (2008) *Resurrection*. London: Continuum.
Barton, S. C., Stanton, G., and Houlden, J. L. (eds.) (1994) *Resurrection*. London: SPCK.
Baudissin, W. W. G. (1925) 'El Bet-el (Genesis 31,13; 35,7)', in Budde, K., and Marti, K. (eds.) *Vom Alten Testament*. Giessen: A. Töpelmann, pp. 1–11.
Baumgarten, A. I. (1981) *The Phoenician History of Philo of Byblos*. Leiden: Brill.
Baumgarten, A. I. (ed.) (1998) *Self, Soul and Body in Religious Experience*. Leiden: Brill.
(2002) *Sacrifice in Religious Experience*. Leiden: Brill.
Beck, P. (1982) 'The Drawings from Horvat Teiman (Kuntillet "Ajrud")', *Tel Aviv* 9, pp. 42–44.
Becking, B. (ed.) (2013) *Reflections on the Silence of God*. Leiden: Brill.
Beckman, G, and Lewis, T. J. (eds.) (2006) *Text, Artifact, and Image*. Providence: Brown Judaic Studies.
Beckman, G. (1983) *Hittite Birth Rituals*. 2nd rev. ed. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
(1996) *Hittite Diplomatic Texts*. Hoffner, Jr., H. A. (ed.). Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.
(1997) 'Mythologie A. II. Bei den Hethitern', in Ebeling, E., Meissner, B., Weidner, E., von Soden, W., Edzard, D. O., and Streck, M. P. (eds.) *Reallexikon der Assyriologie und vorderasiatischen Archäologie*. Vol. 8. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 564–72.
(2004) 'Sacred Times, Sacred Places', in Johnston, S. I. (ed.) *Religions of the Ancient World*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 259–64.
(2005) 'Pantheon. A. II. Bei den Hethiter', in Ebeling, E., Meissner, B., and Streck, M. P. (eds.) *Reallexikon der Assyriologie und vorderasiatischen Archäologie*. Vol. 10. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 308–16.
(2007) 'Religion B. Bei den Hethitern', in Ebeling, E., Meissner, B., and Streck, M. P. (eds.) *Reallexikon der Assyriologie und vorderasiatischen Archäologie*. Vol. 11. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 333–38.
(2010) 'Temple Building among the Hittites', in Boda, M. J., and Novotny, J. R. (eds.) *From the Foundations to the Crenellations*. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, pp. 71–89.
(2012) 'The Horns of a Dilemma, or on the Divine Nature of the Hittite King', in Wilhelm, G. (ed.) *Organization, Representation, and Symbols of Power in the Ancient Near East*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, pp. 605–10.
Bell, L. D. (1985) 'Luxor Temple and the Cult of the Royal Ka', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 44, pp. 251–94.
Belleville, L. L. (1991) *Reflections of Glory*. Sheffield: JSOT Press.
Benson, H. H. (ed.) (2009) *A Companion to Plato*. Malden: Blackwell.
Benzel, K. (2015) '"What Goes in Is What Comes out" – But What Was Already There?', in Pongratz-Leisten, B., and Sonik, K. (eds.) *The Materiality of Divine Agency*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 89–118.

Benzel, K., Graff, S. B., Rakic, Y., and Watts, E. W. (2010) *Art of the Ancient Near East*. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art.

Berman, L. M. (1997) 'Overview of Amenhotep III and His Reign', in O'Connor, D., and Cline, E. H. (eds.) *Amenhotep III: Perspectives on His Reign*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 1–26.

Berman, L. M. (ed.) (1990) *The Art of Amenhotep III*. Cleveland: Cleveland Museum of Art / Indiana University Press.

Bernbeck, R. (2008) 'Royal Deification', in Brisch, N. (ed.) *Religion and Power*. Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, pp. 157–70.

Bertman, S. (ed.) (2003) *Handbook to Life in Ancient Mesopotamia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Betegh, G. (2006) 'Epicurus' Argument for Atomism', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 30, pp. 261–84.

Bezdek, J. C., and Harris, J. D. (1978) 'Fuzzy Partitions and Relations', *Fuzzy Sets and Systems* 1, pp. 111–27.

Bianchi, U. (1978) 'La doctrine zarathoustrienne des deux esprits', in *Selected Essays on Gnosticism, Dualism and Mysteriosophy*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 361–89.

Bieber, M. (1965) 'The Portraits of Alexander', *Greece & Rome* 12, pp. 183–88.

Bienkowski, P., and Tooley, A. M. J. (1995) *Gifts of the Nile*. London: HMSO.

Biggs, R. D. (1969) 'Medicine in Ancient Mesopotamia', *History of Science* 8, pp. 94–105.

(1995) 'Medicine, Surgery, and Public Health in Ancient Mesopotamia', in Sasson, J. M. (ed.) *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*. New York: Scribner, pp. 1911–24.

Bird, P. A. (1981) 'Male and Female He Created Them', *Harvard Theological Review* 74, pp. 129–59.

Bittel, K., Boessneck, J., and Damm, B. (1975) *Das hethitische Felsheiligtum Yazilikaya*. Berlin: Mann.

Blackman, A. M. (1915) *The Temple of Bîgeh*. Cairo: Institut français.

Blackwell, B. C. (2011) *Christosis*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Blankenberg-Van Delden, C. (1969) *The Large Commemorative Scarabs of Amenhotep III*. Leiden: Brill.

Bleiberg, E., and Freed, R. E. (eds.) (1991) *Fragments of a Shattered Visage*. Memphis: Memphis State University.

Boardman, J., Griffin, J., and Murray, O. (2001) *The Oxford Illustrated History of Greece and the Hellenistic World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Böck, B. (2003) 'When You Perform the Ritual of "Rubbing"', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 62, pp. 1–16.

Bodine, J. J. (2009) 'The Shabaka Stone', *Studia Antiqua* 7, 1–21.

Bolshakov, A. O. (1997) *Man and His Double in Egyptian Ideology of the Old Kingdom*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

(2001) *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt*. Vol. 2. Redford, D. B. (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bolton, R. (1978) 'Aristotle's Definitions of the Soul', *Phronesis* 23, pp. 258–78.

Borsch, F. H. (2007 [1967]) *The Son of Man in History and Myth*. Eugene: Wipf & Stock.

Bosworth, A. B. (1988) *Conquest and Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(1996) *Alexander and the East*. London: Clarendon Press.
Bosworth, A. B., and Baynham, E. (eds.) (2000) *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bottéro, J. (2004) *The Oldest Cuisine in the World*. Fagan, T. L. (transl.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Bottéro, J., Finet, A., Roux, G., and Lafont, B. (2001) *Everyday Life in Ancient Mesopotamia*. Nevill, A. (transl.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Botterweck, G. J., and Ringgren, H., (eds.) (1974–present) *Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament*. 8 vols. Willis, J. T., Bromiley, G. W., and Green, D. E. (transl.). Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Bousset, W. (1901) 'Die Himmelsreise der Seele', *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 4, pp. 136–69, 229–73.
Bowden, H. (2013) 'On Kissing and Making Up', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 56, pp. 55–77.
Boyce, M. (1968) 'On the Sacred Fires of the Zoroastrians', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 31, pp. 52–68.
(1975) 'On the Zoroastrian Temple Cult of Fire', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 95, pp. 454–65.
(1979) *Zoroastrians*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
(1982) *A History of Zoroastrianism*. Vol. 2. Leiden: Brill.
(1987) 'ātaš', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. www.iranicaonline.org/articles/atas-fire.
(1996 [1975]) *A History of Zoroastrianism*. Vol. 1. Leiden: Brill.
Boys-Stones, G. R. (2001) *Post-Hellenistic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bradford, A. S. (1992) *Philip II of Macedon*. London: Praeger.
Brand, P. J. (2007) 'Veils, Votives, and Marginalia', in Dorman, P., and Bryan B. M. (eds.) *Sacred Space and Sacred Function in Ancient Thebes*. Chicago: Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, pp. 51–84.
Brandon, S. G. F. (1963) *Creation Legends of the Ancient Near East*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Breasted, J. H. (1901) 'The Philosophy of a Memphite Priest', *Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde* 39, pp. 39–54.
(1906) *Ancient Records of Egypt*. Vol. 2. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
(1933) *The Dawn of Conscience*. New York: Scribner.
(1972 [1902]) *Development of Thought and Religion in Ancient Egypt*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Briant, P. (2008) *Histoire de l'Empire perse de Cyrus à Alexandre*. Paris: Fayard.
Brinthaupt, T. M., and Lipka, R. P. (ed.) (1992) *The Self*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Brisch, N. (2006) 'The Priestess and the King', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 126, pp. 161–76.
(2013) 'Of Gods and Kings', *Religion Compass* 7, pp. 37–46.
Brisch, N. (ed.) (2008) *Religion and Power*. Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago.

Brisson, L. (2010) 'A Criticism of Numenius in the Last Columns (XI–XIV) of the *Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides*', in Turner, J. D., and Corrigan, K. (eds.) *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage*. Vol. 1. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, pp. 275–82.

Brooke, G. J. (1985) *Exegesis at Qumran*. Sheffield: JSOT Press.

Brooke, G. J., Najman, H., and Stuckenbruck, L. T. (eds.) (2008) *The Significance of Sinai*. Leiden: Brill.

Brown, F., Driver, S. R., and Briggs, C. A. (1979) *The New Brown-Driver-Briggs-Gesenius Hebrew and English Lexicon*. Peabody: Hendrickson.

Brown, P. (1988) *The Body and Society*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Brueggemann, W. (1982) *Genesis*. Atlanta: Westminster John Knox Press.

Brunner, H. (1964) *Die Geburt des Gottkönigs*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

Brunt, P. A. (1976) 'The Visit to Siwa', in Brunt, P. A. (transl.) *Arrian: Anabasis of Alexander*. Vol. 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 467–80.

(transl.) (1976) *Arrian: Anabasis of Alexander*. Vol. 1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bryan, B. M. (1992) 'Designing the Cosmos', in Kozloff, A. P., Bryan, B. M., Berman, L. M., and Delange, E. (eds.) *Egypt's Dazzling Sun*. Cleveland: Cleveland Museum of Art, pp. 73–115.

Bryce, T. (1998) *The Kingdom of the Hittites*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

(2004) *Life and Society in the Hittite World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buchheit, V. (2007) 'Epicurus' Triumph of the Mind', in Gale, M. R. (ed.) *Lucretius*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 104–31.

Budge, E. A. W. (1920) *An Egyptian Hieroglyphic Dictionary*. London: John Murray.

Burney, C. A. (2004) *Historical Dictionary of the Hittites*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.

Burnyeat, M. (2008) *Aristotle's Divine Intellect*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

Busink, T. A. (1980) *Der Tempel von Jerusalem von Salomo bis Herodes*. Leiden: Brill.

Byers, A. J. (2017) *Ecclesiology and Theosis in the Gospel of John*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Caird, G. B. (1980) *The Language and Imagery of the Bible*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.

Calvo, T., and Brisson, L. (eds.) (1997) *Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Press.

Caminos, R. A. (1956) *Literary Fragments in the Hieratic Script*. Oxford: Griffith Institute at the University Press.

Cammarosano, M. (2015) 'The Location of the Cult Stelae in the Light of the Hittite Cult-Inventories', in Petrosyan, A., and Bobokhyan, A. (eds.) *The Vishap Stone Stelae*. Erevan: Gitut'yun hratarakch'ut'yun, pp. 224–32.

Caquot, A. (1976) 'La tablette RS 24.252 et la question des 'Rephaïm ougaritiques', *Syria* 53, pp. 295–304.

Caquot, A., Hadas-Lebel, M., Riaud, J., and Nikiprowetzky, V. (eds.) (1986) *Hellenica et Judaica*. Leuven: Peeters.

Carney, E. D. (2000) 'Artifice and Alexander's History', in Bosworth, A. B., and Baynham, E. (eds.) *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 263–85.
(2006) *Olympias*. London: Routledge.
Carone, G. R. (2004) 'Creation in the "Timaeus"', *Apeiron* 37, pp. 211–26.
Carrithers, M., Collins, S., and Lukes, S. (eds.) (1985) *The Category of the Person*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cartledge, P. (2002) *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Ancient Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(2004) *Alexander the Great*. London: Macmillan.
Carus, P. (2010 [1904]) 'Naram-Sin's Stele', *The Open Court* 1904. opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/ocj/vol1904/iss9/8.
Cassin, E. (1968) *La Splendeur divine*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Cawkwell, G. L. (2006) 'The Deification of Alexander the Great', in Worthington, I. (ed.) *Alexander the Great*. 1st ed. London: Routledge, pp. 263–72.
Cereti, C. G. (2015a) 'Gayomard' *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. www.iranicaonline.org/articles/gayomard.
(2015b) 'Myths, Legends, Eschatologies', in Stausberg, M., Vevaina, Y. S.-D., and Tessmann, A. (eds.) *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Zoroastrianism*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 259–72.
Cereti, C. G., Maggi, M., and Provasi, E. (eds.) (2003) *Religious Themes and Texts of Pre-Islamic Iran and Central Asia*. Weisbaden: Reichert.
Chaniotis, A. (2003) 'The Divinity of Hellenistic Rulers', in Erskine, A. W. (ed.) *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Malden: Blackwell, pp. 431–45.
Charles, D. (1984) *Aristotle's Philosophy of Action*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Charlesworth, J. H., and Evans, C. A. (eds.) (1993) *The Pseudepigrapha and Early Biblical Interpretation*. Sheffield: JSOT Press.
Chassinat, É. (1892) *Le temple d'Edfou*. Vol. 1. Cairo: Institut français d'archélogie orientale du Caire.
(2009) *Le temple d'Edfou*. Vol. 5. Cairo: Institut français d'archélogie orientale du Caire.
Christensen, M. J., and Wittung, J. A. (eds.) (2008) *Partakers of the Divine Nature*. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic.
Ciraolo, L., and Seidel, J. (eds.) (2002) *Magic and Divination in the Ancient World*. Leiden: Brill.
Clifford, R. J. (1984) 'Cosmogonies in the Ugaritic Texts and in the Bible', *Orientalia* 53, pp. 183–204.
(1994) *Creation Accounts in the Ancient Near East and the Bible*. Washington, DC: Catholic Bible Association.
Clines, D. J. A. (1968) 'The Image of God in Man', *Tyndale Bulletin* 19, pp. 53–103.
(1974) 'The Etymology of Hebrew *ṣelem*', *Journal of Northwest Semitic Languages* 3, pp. 19–25.
(1998) *On the Way to the Postmodern*. Vol. 2. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.
Cohen, S., and Hurowitz, V. A. (1999) ' חקות העמים הכל הוא (Jer 10:3) in Light of Akkadian Parṣu and Zaqīqu Referring to Cult Statues', *The Jewish Quarterly Review* 89, pp. 277–90.

Collins, A. (2014) 'Alexander's Visit to Siwah', *Phoenix* 68, pp. 62–77.
Collins, B. J. (2005) 'A Statue for the Deity', in Walls, N. H. (ed.) *Cult Image and Divine Representation in the Ancient Near East*. Boston: American Schools of Oriental Research, 13–42.
(2007) *The Hittites and Their World*. Leiden: Brill.
Collins, C. J. (2006) *Genesis 1–4*. Phillipsburg: P & R Publishing.
Collins, J. J., and Fishbane, M. (eds.) (1995) *Death, Ecstasy, and Other Worldly Journeys*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Coogan, M. D., and Smith, M. S., (eds./transl.) (2012 [1978]) *Stories from Ancient Canaan*. 2nd ed. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press.
Cook, J. I. (1975) 'The Old Testament Concept of the Image of God', in Cook, J. I. (ed.) *Grace upon Grace*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, pp. 85–94.
Cooper, J. S. (1983) *The Curse of Agade*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
(1990) 'Mesopotamian Historical Consciousness and the Production of Monumental Art in the Third Millennium B.C.', in Gunter, A. C. (ed.) *Investigating Artistic Environments in the Ancient Near East*. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp. 39–52.
(1993) 'Paradigm and Propaganda', in Liverani, M. (ed.) *Akkad*. Padua: Sargon, pp. 11–23.
Cordani, V. (2016) 'The Development of the Hittite Iron Industry', *Die Welt des Orients* 46, pp. 162–76.
Cornell, T. J. (1995) *The Beginnings of Rome*. London: Routledge.
Cornford, F. M. (1912) *From Religion to Philosophy*. London: J. M. Dent.
Cortez, M. (2008) *Embodied Souls, Ensouled Bodies*. London: T & T Clark.
(2010) *Theological Anthropology*. London: T & T Clark.
(2016) *Christological Anthropology in Historical Perspective*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan.
Costaz, S. J., L. (2002) *Dictionnaire Syriaque-Français: Syriac-English Dictionary*. 3rd ed. Beyrouth: Dar El-Machreq.
Coulston, J. C., and Dodge, H. (eds.). (2000) *Ancient Rome*. Oxford: Oxford University School of Archaeology.
Craigie, P. C. (1983) 'Ugarit, Canaan, and Israel', *Tyndale Bulletin* 34, pp. 145–67.
Creager, H. L. (1974) 'The Divine Image', in Myers, J. M., Bream, H. N., Heim, R. D., and Moore, C. A. (eds.) *A Light unto My Path*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 103–18.
Cross, F. M. (1961) 'The Development of the Jewish Scripts, the Bible and the Ancient Near East', in Wright, G. E. (ed.) *The Bible and the Ancient Near East*. Garden City: Doubleday, pp. 133–202.
Culianu, I. P. (1990) *Les gnoses dualistes d'Occident*. Paris: Plon.
Curd, P., and Graham, D. W. (eds.) (2008) *The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Curtis, J., and Simpson, St. J. (eds.) (2010) *The World of Achaemenid Persia*. London: Tauris.
Dalley, S. (1989) *Myths from Mesopotamia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(1998) *The Legacy of Mesopotamia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Darga, M. (1969) 'Über das Wesen *ḫuwaši*-Steines nach hethitischen Kultinventaren', *Revue hittite et asianique* 27, pp. 5–24.
Darmesteter, J. (1965) *The Zend-Avesta*. Vol. 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(1971 [1877]) *Ormazd et Ahriman*. Amsterdam: Oriental Press.
(transl.) (1898) *Sacred Books of the East*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Darnell, J. C. (1997) 'The Apotropaic Goddess in the Eye', *Studien zur altägyptischen Kultur* 24, pp. 35–48.
Daryaee, T. (2003) 'Gayōmard: King of Clay or Mountain?', in Siamak, A. (ed.) *Paitimāna*. Costa Mesa: Mazda, pp. 339–49.
David, A. R. (2000) 'Mummification', in Nicholson, P. T., and Shaw, I. (eds.) *Ancient Egyptian Materials and Technology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 372–89.
(2001) 'Mummification', in Redford, D. B. (ed.) *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt*. Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 439–44.
Davies, B. G. (1997) *Egyptian Historical Inscriptions of the Nineteenth Dynasty*. Jonsered: Åström.
Davies, D. J. (2002) *Anthropology and Theology*. Oxford: Berg.
(2011) *Emotion, Identity, and Religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davies, P. R. (1995) 'Making It', in Carroll, M. D., Clines, D. J. A., and Davies, P. R. (eds.) *The Bible in Human Society*. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, pp. 249–56.
Davila, J. R. (ed.) (2003) *The Dead Sea Scrolls as Background to Postbiblical Judaism and Early Christianity*. Leiden: Brill.
Day, J. (2002) *Yahweh and the Gods and Goddesses of Canaan*. London: Sheffield Academic Press.
de Blois, F. (2000) 'Dualism in Iranian and Christian Traditions', *JRAS* 3, pp. 1–19.
de Genouillac, H. (1923) 'Grande liste de noms divins sumériens', *Revue d'Assyriologie et d'archéologie orientale* 20, pp. 89–106.
de Lacy, P. H. (1948) 'Lucretius and the History of Epicureanism', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 79, pp. 12–35.
de Menasce, J. (1964) *Feux et foundations pieuses dans le droit sassanide*. Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck.
de Moor, J. C. (1969) 'Studies in the New Alphabetic Texts from Ras Shamra II', *Ugarit-Forschungen* 1, pp. 175–79.
(1980) '*El the Creator*', in Rendsburg, G. (ed.) *The Bible World*. New York: KTAV, 171–87.
(1987) *Anthology of Religious Texts from Ugarit*. Leiden: Brill.
(1988) 'East of Eden', *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* 100, pp. 105–11.
de Pury, A. (1975) *Promesse divine et légende cultuelle dans le cycle de Jacob*. Paris: J. Gabalda.
de Rochemonteix, M. (1987) *Le temple d'Edfou I*. Cairo: Institut français d'archélogie orientale du Caire.
de Roos, J. (2007) *Hittite Votive Texts*. Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten.
de Vogel, C. J. (1986) *Rethinking Plato and Platonism*. Leiden: Brill.

de Wit, C. (1958, 1962) *Les inscriptions du temple d'Opet à Karnak*. 2 vols. Bruxelles: Édition de la Fondation égyptologique Reine Élisabeth.
DeConick, A. D. (ed.) (2006) *Paradise Now*. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.
Deimel, A. (1934) *Enuma Eliš und Hexaëmeron*. 2nd ed. Rome: Päpstliches Bibelinstitut.
del Olmo Lete, G. (1999) *Canaanite Religion*. 2nd rev. ed. Bethesda: CDL Press.
del Olmo Lete, G., and Sanmartín, J. (2003) *A Dictionary of the Ugaritic Language in the Alphabetic Tradition, Part 1*. Watson, W. G. E. (transl.). Leiden: Brill.
Delitzsch, F. (1888–1889) *A New Commentary on Genesis*, Taylor, S. (transl.). Edinburgh: T & T Clark.
Demand, N. H. (2006) *A History of Ancient Greece in Its Mediterranean Context*. Cornwall-on-Hudson: Sloan Publishing.
Demarée, R. J. (2011) 'The Commemorative Scarabs of Amenophis III', *Jaarbericht 'Ex oriente lux'* 43, pp. 25–34.
Detienne, M. (1959) 'La "démonologie" d'Empédocle', *Revue des Études Grecques* 72, pp. 1–17.
Dever, W. (1984) 'Asherah, Consort of Yhwh?', *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 255, pp. 26–27.
Dhabhar, E. B. N. (ed.) (1913) *The Pahlavi Rivāyat Accompanying the Dādestān ī dēnīg*. Bombay: Trustees of the Parsee Punchayat funds and properties.
Diakonoff, I. M. (ed.) (1969) *Ancient Mesopotamia: Socio-Economic History*. Moscow: Nauka.
Dick, M. B. (2005) 'The Mesopotamian Cult Statue', in Walls, N. H. (ed.) *Cult Image and Divine Representation in the Ancient Near East*. Boston: American Schools of Oriental Research, pp. 43–67.
Dick, M. B. (ed.) (1999) *Born in Heaven, Made on Earth*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
Diels, H., and Kranz, W. (1960) *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. 3 vols. Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
Dietrich, M., and Loretz, O. (eds.) (1998) *dubsar anta-men, Studien zur Altorientalistik*. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag.
Dietrich, M., and Loretz, O., (1989) 'Rāpiʾu und Milku aus Ugarit', *Ugarit-Forschungen* 21, pp. 123–31.
Dietrich, M., Loretz, O., and Mayer, W. (1989) 'Sikkahum "Betyle"', *Ugarit Forschungen* 21, pp. 133–39.
Dietrich, M., Loretz, O., and Sanmartín, J. (1975) 'Der 'Neujahrpsalm' RS 24.252 (= Ug. 5, S. 551–557 Nr. 2)', *Ugarit-Forschungen* 7, pp. 115–19.
(1976) 'Die ugaritischen Totengeister rpu(m) und die biblischen Rephaim', *Ugarit-Forschungen* 8, pp. 45–52.
Dietrich, M., Loretz, O., Sanmartín, J., and Kisker, H.-W. (1976) *Die keilalphabetischen Texte aus Ugarit*. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener.
Dijkstra, M. (2013) 'Let Sleeping Gods Lie?', in Becking, B. (ed.) *Reflections on the Silence of God*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 71–88.
Dion, P.-E. (1982) 'Image et ressemblance en araméen ancien (Tell Fakhariyah)', *Science et Esprit* 34, pp. 151–53.

Doering, L. (2012) 'Reinheit und Tempel', in Adam, K.-P., Avemarie, F., and Wazana, N. (eds.) *Law and Narrative in the Bible and in Neighbouring Ancient Cultures*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp. 243–62.

Dohmen, C. (1983) 'Die Statue von Tell Fecherije und die Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen', *Biblische Notizen* 22, pp. 91–106.

Donner, H. (1973) 'Hier sind deine Götter, Israel!', Gese, H., and Ruger, H. P. (eds.) *Wort und Geschichte*. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, pp. 45–50.

Dorman, P. F., and Bryan, B. M. (eds.) (2007) *Sacred Space and Sacred Function in Ancient Thebes*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Douglas, M. (2001 [1966]) *Purity and Danger*. London: Routledge.

Dozeman, T., and Schmid, K. (eds.) (2006) *A Farewell to the Yahwist?* Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Dragutinovic, P., Niebuhr, K.-W., Wallace, J. B., and Karakolis, C. (eds.) (2016) *The Holy Spirit and the Church According to the New Testament*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Dreyer, B. (2011) 'Heroes, Cults, and Divinity', in Heckel, W., and Tritle, L. A. (eds.) *Alexander the Great*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, pp. 218–34.

Drozdek, A. (2016) *Greek Philosophers As Theologians*. London: Routledge.

Duchesne-Guillemin, J. (1953) *Ormazd et Ahriman*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.

(1962) *La religion de l'Iran ancient*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Duchesne-Guillemin, J. (ed.) (1984) *Orientalia J. Duchesne-Guillemin emerito oblata*. Leiden: Brill.

Duchesne-Guillemin, J., and Lecoq, P. (eds.) (1985) *Papers in Honour of Professor Mary Boyce*. Leiden: Brill.

Dunderberg, I. (2010) 'Stoic Traditions in the School of Valentinus', in Engberg-Pedersen, T., and Dunderberg, I. (eds.) *Stoicism in Early Christianity*. Peabody: Hendrickson, pp. 220–39.

Durkheim, É. (2001 [1912]) *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. Cosman, C. (transl.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eaton-Krauss, M. (1991) 'Ramesses', in Bleiberg, E., and Freed, R. E. (eds.) *Fragments of a Shattered Visage*. Memphis: Memphis State University, pp. 15–23.

Ebeling, E., Meissner, B., and Streck, M. P. (eds.) (1993–2017) *Reallexikon der Assyriologie und vorderasiatischen Archäologie*. 15 vols. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Eckstein, H.-J., Landmesser, C., and Lichtenberger, H. (eds.) (2011) *Eschatologie – Eschatology*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Edelman, D., Fitzpatrick-McKinley, A., and Guillaume, P. (eds.) (2015) *Religion in the Achaemenid Persian Empire*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Edmunds, L. (1971) 'The Religiosity of Alexander the Great', *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 12, pp. 363–91.

Edwards, I. E. S. (1979 [1947]) *The Pyramids of Egypt*. Harmondsworth: Penquin.

Edzard, D. O. (1997) *Gudea and His Dynasty*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Ego, B., Lange, A., and Pilhofer, P. (eds.) (1999) *Gemeinde ohne Tempel*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Ehrenberg, E. (2008) '*Dieu et mon droit*', in Brisch, N. (ed.) *Religion and Power*. Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, pp. 103–32.
El Hawary, A. (2007) 'New Findings about the Memphite Theology', in Goyon, J.-C., and Cardin, C. (eds.) *Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Egyptologists*. Leuven: Peeters, pp. 567–74.
Eliade, M. (1957) *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries*. New York: Harper & Row.
(1958) *Rites and Symbols of Initiation: Birth and Rebirth*. Trask, W. R. (transl.). London: Harvill Press.
(1959) *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*. Trask, W. R. (transl.). New York: Harcourt Press.
(1961) *Images and Symbols*. Mairet, P. (transl.). New York: Sheed & Ward.
(1964) *Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy*. Trask, W. R. (transl.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
(1965) *The Two and the One*. Cohen, J. M. (transl.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Elior, R. (2004) *The Three Temples*. Louvish, D. (transl.). Portland: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization.
Ellis, M. (ed.) (1977) *Essays on the Ancient Near East in Memory of Jacob Joel Finkelstein*. Hamden: Archon Books.
Emelianov, V. V. (2010) 'On the Early History of *melammu*', in Kogan, L. (ed.) *Proceedings of the Recontre Assyriologique Internationale 53*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, pp. 1109–19.
Engberg-Pedersen, T. (2000) *Paul and the Stoics*. Edinburgh: T & T Clark.
Engberg-Pedersen, T. (ed.) (2001) *Paul beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press.
(2009) 'The Material Spirit', *New Testament Studies* 55, pp. 179–97.
(2010) *Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(2011) 'Paul's Body', *New Testament Studies* 33, pp. 433–43.
Engberg-Pedersen, T. (ed.) (2017a) *From Stoicism to Platonism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(2017b) *John and Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Engberg-Pedersen, T., and Tronier, H. (eds.) (2006) *Philosophy at the Roots of Christianity*. Copenhagen: The Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen Press.
Erdkamp, P. (ed.) (2013) *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Rome*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Erkens, F.-R. (ed.) (2002) *Die Sakralität von Herrschaft*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Erman, A. (1911) 'Ein Denkmal memphitischer Theologie', *Sitzungsberichte der Königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 42, pp. 916–50.
Erskine, A. W. (ed.) (2003) *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Malden: Blackwell.
Farber, G. (1997) 'Sumerian Canonical Compositions', in Hallo, W. W. (ed.) *The Context of Scripture*. Vol. 1. Leiden: Brill, pp. 511–13.

(1999) '"Das Lied von der Hacke", ein literarischer Spass?', in Klengel, H., and Renger, J. (eds.) *Landwirtschaft im Alten Orient*. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, pp. 369–73.
Farber, W. (1983) 'Die Vergöttlichung Narām-Sins', *Orientalia* 52, pp. 67–72.
Farnell, L. R. (1921) *Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Faubion, J. D. (ed.) (1998 [1967]) *Aesthetics*. Vol. 2. Hurley, R. (transl.). London: Allen Lane.
Ferguson, E. (2003) *Backgrounds of Early Christianity*. 3rd ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Festugiere, A. J. (1954) *Personal Religion among the Greeks*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Field, H. (1932) 'Ancient Wheat and Barley from Kish, Mesopotamia', *American Anthropologist New Series* 34, pp. 303–09.
Fildes, A., and Fletcher, J. (2004) *Alexander the Great*. Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Museum.
Fine, G. (ed.) (1999) *Plato* 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, G. (2011) *The Oxford Handbook of Plato*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Finkel, I. L., and Geller, M. J. (eds.) (1997) *Sumerian Gods and their Representations*. Groningen: Styx Publications.
Finkelberg, A. (1996) 'Plato's Method in Timaeus' *American Journal of Philology* 117, pp. 391–409.
Finlan, S. (2007) 'Can We Speak of Theosis in Paul?', in Christensen, M. J., and Wittung, J. A. (eds.) *Partakers of the Divine Nature*. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic Press, pp. 68–80.
Fisette, D. (ed.) (2003) *Husserl's Logical Investigations Reconsidered*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Fisher, L. R. (1965) 'Creation at Ugarit and in the Old Testament', *Vetus Testamentum* 15, pp. 313–24.
Flannery, K. L. (1995) *Ways into the Logic of Alexander of Aphrodisias*. Leiden: Brill.
Fleming, D. E. (2015) 'Seeing and Socializing with Dagan at Emar's *zukru* Festival', in Pongratz-Leisten, B., and Sonik, K. (eds.) *The Materiality of Divine Agency*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 197–210.
Fletcher-Louis, C. (1996) '4Q374', *Dead Sea Discoveries* 3, pp. 236–52.
(1997) *Luke-Acts*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
(2000) 'Some Reflections on Angelomorphic Humanity Texts among the Dead Sea Scrolls' *Dead Sea Discoveries* 7, pp. 292–312.
(2002) *All the Glory of Adam*. Leiden: Brill.
(2015) *Jesus Monotheism*. Eugene: Wipf & Stock.
Fögen, T., and Lee, M. M. (eds.) (2009) *Bodies and Boundaries in Graeco-Roman Antiquity*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Forrer, E. O. (1936) 'The Hittites in Palestine I', *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* 68, pp. 190–203.
Fossum, J. (1985) 'Gen 1:26 and 2:7 in Judaism, Samaritanism and Gnosticism', *Journal for the Study of Judaism* 16, pp. 202–39.

Foster, B. R. (1995) *From Distant Days*. Bethesda: CDL Press.
(2005) *Before the Muses*. 3rd ed. Bethesda: CDL Press.
(2011) 'The Person in Mesopotamian Thought', in Radner, K., and Robson, E. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Cuneiform Culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 117–39.
Foucault, M. (1978) *History of Sexuality*. Vol. 1. Hurley, R. (transl.). New York: Pantheon Books.
(1979) *Discipline and Punish*. Sheridan, A. (transl.). New York: Vintage Books.
(1980) *Herculine Barbin*. McDougall, R. (transl.). New York: Pantheon Books.
(1985) *History of Sexuality*. Vol. 2. Hurley, R. (transl.). New York: Pantheon Books.
(1986) *History of Sexuality*. Vol. 3. Hurley, R. (transl.). New York: Pantheon Books.
(1988) 'Technologies of the Self', in Martin, L. H., Gutman, H., and Hutton, P. H. (eds.) *Technologies of the Self*. London: Tavistock Publications, pp. 16–49.
(1998 [1967]) 'Different Spaces', in Faubion, J. D. (ed.) *Aesthetics: The Essential Works*. Vol. 2. Hurley, R. (transl.). London: Allen Lane, pp. 175–85.
Fox, R. L. (2004) *Alexander the Great*. London: Penguin.
Francis, R. (1911) *Assyrian and Babylonian Letters*. Vol. 10. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Frandsen, P. J. (2008) 'Aspects of Kingship in Ancient Egypt', in Brisch, N. (ed.) *Religion and Power*. Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, pp. 47–73.
Franke, S. (1995) 'Kings of Akkad: Sargon and Naram-Sin', in Sasson, J. M., and Baines, J. (eds.) *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*. Vol. 2. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, pp. 831–41.
Fratantuono, L. (2015) *A Reading of Lucretius' De Rerum Natura*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Frazer, J. G. (1922 [1890]) *The Golden Bough*. London: MacMillan.
Frede, D., and Reis, B. (eds.) (2009) *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Frede, M. (1992) 'On Aristotle's Conception of the Soul', in Nussbaum, M. C., and Rorty, A. O. (eds.) *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 93–107.
Fredricksmeyer, E. A. (1979) 'Divine Honors for Philip II', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 109, pp. 39–61.
(1990) 'Alexander and Philip', *The Classical Journal* 85, pp. 300–15.
(2003) 'Alexander's Religion and Divinity', in Roisman, J. (ed.) *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 251–78.
(2010) 'Alexander the Great and the Kingdom of Asia', in Bosworth, A. B., and Baynham, E. (eds.) *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 136–66.
Freedman, D. N. (ed.) (1992) *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*. New York: Doubleday.
Freund, P. (1965) *Myths of Creation*. New York: W. H. Allen.

Frey, C. (2007) 'Organic Unity and the Matter of Man', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 32, pp. 167–204.
Frey, J., and Levison, J. R. (eds.) (2014) *The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Furley, D. J. (1967) *Two Studies in the Greek Atomists*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
(1987) *The Greek Cosmologists*. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(1989) 'Lucretius the Epicurean', in *Cosmic Problems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 206–22.
Gaidhu, A. (2017) '*Self in Child and Youth Care*'. Toronto: Ryerson University.
Gaifman, M. (2008) 'The Aniconic Image of the Roman Near East', in Kaizer, T. (ed.) *The Variety of Local Religious Life in the Near East*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 37–72.
Gale, M. R. (ed.) (2007) *Lucretius*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gallagher, S., and Shear, J. (eds.) (1999) *Models of the Self*. Bowling Green: Imprint Academic.
Gardiner, A. H. (1925) 'The Autobiography of Rekhmerē', *Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde* 60, pp. 62–76.
Garr, W. R. (2000) '"Image" and "Likeness" in the Inscription from Tell Fakhariyeh,' *Israel Exploration Journal* 50, pp. 227–34
(2003) *In His Own Image and Likeness*. Leiden: Brill.
Garrison, M. B. (2015) 'Fire Altars', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. www.iranicaonline.org/articles/fire-altars.
Geiger, A. (1928) *Urschrift und Übersetzungen der Bibel in Ihrer Abhängigkeit von der innern Entwicklung des Judentums*. 2nd ed. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Madda.
Gelb, I. J., and Kienast, B. (1990) *Die altakkadischen Königsinschriften des Dritten Jahrtausends v. Chr*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
George, A., and George, E. (2014) *The Mythology of Eden*. Lanham: Hamilton Books.
George, A. R. (1992) *Babylonian Topographical Texts*. Louven: Peeters.
(2003) *The Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic*. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gershevitch, I. (1964) 'Zoroaster's Own Contribution', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 23, pp. 12–38.
Gertz, J. C., Schmid, K., and Witte, M. (eds.) (2002) *Abschied vom Jahwisten*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Geyer, J. B. (1987) 'Twisting Tiamat's Tail', *Vetus Testamentum* 37, pp. 164–79.
Gieschen, C. A. (1998) *Angelomorphic Christology*. Leiden: Brill.
Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., and Kahneman, D. (eds.) (2002) *Heuristics and Biases*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Giusfredi, F. (2016) '"Soul" and "Stele" in Hittite and Luwian', *Bibliotheca Orientalis* 73, pp. 297–310.
Given, M. D. (2001) *Paul's True Rhetoric*. Harrisburg: Trinity.
Gnoli, G. (1980) *Zoroaster's Time and Homeland*. Naples: Istituto universitario orientale.

(1984) 'L'évolution du dualisme iranien et le problème zurvanite', *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 201, pp. 115–38.
(1996) 'Dualism' *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. www.iranicaonline.org/articles/dualism.
(1999) 'Farr(ah)', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. www.iranicaonline.org/articles/farrah.
Goebs, K. (2002) 'A Functional Approach to Egyptian Myth and Mythemes', *Journal of Ancient Near Eastern Religions* 2, pp. 27–59.
Goedegebuure, P. M. (2012) '*Hittite Iconoclasm*', in May, N. N. (ed.) *Iconoclasm and Text Destruction in the Ancient Near East and Beyond*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 407–52.
Goguen, J. A. (1969) 'The Logic of Inexact Concepts' *Synthese* 19, pp. 325–73.
Goldberg, A. M. (1969) *Untersuchungen über die Vorstellung von der Schekhina in der frühen rabbinischen Literatur*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Golden, J. M. (2009) *Ancient Canaan and Israel*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goldsworthy, A. K. (2014) *Augustus*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Golitzin, A. (2001) 'Earthly Angels and Heavenly Men', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 55, pp. 125–53.
(2003) 'Recovering the "Glory of Adam"', in Davila, J. R. (ed.) *The Dead Sea Scrolls as Background to Postbiblical Judaism and Early Christianity*. Leiden: Brill.
Gomes, J. F. (2006) *The Sanctuary of Bethel and the Configuration of Israelite Identity*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Gorman, M. J. (2001) *Cruciformity*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
(2009) *Inhabiting the Cruciform God*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Götze, A. (1947) 'The Priestly Dress of the Hittite King', *Journal of Cuneiform Studies* 1, pp. 176–85.
(1957) *Kleinasien*. Munich: C. H. Beck.
(1940) *Kizzuwatna and the Problem of Hittite Geography*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Gould, J. B. (1970) *The Philosophy of Chrysippus*. Leiden: Brill.
Gradel, I. (2002) *Emperor Worship and Roman Religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Graesser, C. F. (1972) 'Standing Stones in Ancient Palestine', *The Biblical Archaeologist* 35, pp. 34–63.
Graham, D. W. (ed./transl.) (2010) *The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grallert, S. (2007) 'Pharaonic Building Inscriptions and Temple Decoration', in Dorman, P. F., and Bryan, B. M. (eds.) *Sacred Space and Sacred Function in Ancient Thebes*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 35–49.
Granerød, G. (2016) *Dimensions of Yahwism in the Persian Period*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Granger, H. (1996) *Aristotle's Idea of the Soul*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Press.
Gray, J. (1949) 'The Rephaim', *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* 81, pp. 127–39.
(1952) '*DTN* and *RP'UM* in Ancient Ugarit', *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* 84, pp. 39–41.
Green, A. (ed.) (1994) *Jewish Spirituality*. Vol 1. New York: Crossroad.

Green, P. (1991) *Alexander of Macedon*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Greenbaum, D. G. (2016) *The Daimon in Hellenistic Astrology*. Leiden: Brill.
Grenet, F. (2015) 'Zoroastrianism in Central Asia', in Stausberg, M., Vevaina, Y. S.-D., and Tessmann, A. (eds.) in *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Zoroastrianism*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 129–46.
Greven, L. (1952) *Der Ka in Theologie und Königskult der Ägypter des Alten Reiches*. Glückstadt: J. J. Augustin.
Groddek, D. (2008) *Hethitische Texte in Transkription*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
Gross, W. (1981) 'Die Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen im Kontext der Priesterschrift', *Theologische Quartalschrift* 161, pp. 244–64.
Gunkel, H. (1917) *Genesis*. 4th ed. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Gurney, O. R. (1958) '*Hittite Kingship*', in Hooke, S. H. (ed.) *Myth, Ritual and Kingship*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 105–21.
(1977) *Some Aspects of Hittite Religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(2006) 'The Veil of the Temple in History and Legend', *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 49, pp. 97–114.
Güterbock, H. G. (1983) 'Hethitische Götterbilder und Kultobjekte', in Boehmer, R. M., and Hauptmann, H. (eds.) *Beiträge zur Altertumskunde Kleinasiens*. Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, pp. 203–17.
(1993) 'Sungod or King?' in Özgüç, N., Mellink, M. J., Porada, E., and Özgüç, T. (eds.) *Aspects of Art and Iconography*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, pp. 225–26.
(2002) *Recent Developments in Hittite Archaeology and History*. Güterbock, H. G., Yener, K. A., Hoffner, Jr., H. A., and Dhesi, D. (eds.). Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
Güterbock, H. G., Hoffner, Jr., H. A., and van den Hout, T. P. J. (1989) *Hittite Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, Volume L–N, fasc. 2 (-ma to miyahuwant-)*. Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago.
Güterbock, H. G., Yener, K. A., Hoffner, Jr., H. A., and Dhesi, S. (eds.) (2002) *Recent Developments in Hittite Archaeology and History*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
Gvelesiani, M. (2008) 'The Notion of Iranian *xvarənah* in Post-Achaemenid Georgian Kingship', *Journal of Persianate Studies* 1, pp. 174–82.
Haas, V. (1994) *Geschichte der hethitischen Religion*. Leiden: Brill.
Habachi, L. (1963) 'King Nebhepetre Menthuhotp', *Mitteilungen des Deutschen archäeologischen Instituts, Abteilung Kairo* 19, pp. 16–52.
(1969) *Features of the Deification of Ramesses II*. Glückstadt: J. J. Augustin.
Habicht, C. (1970) *Gottmenschentum un griechische Städte*. 2nd ed. Munich: C. H. Beck.
Hadley, J. M. (1987) 'Some Drawings and Inscriptions on Two Pithoi from Kuntillet "Ajrud"', *Vetus Testamentum* 37, pp. 180–211.
(2000) *The Cult of Asherah in Ancient Israel and Judah*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hadot, I. (2015) *Athenian and Alexandrian Neoplatonism and the Harmonization of Aristotle and Plato*. Chase, M. (transl.). Leiden: Brill.

Hallo, W. W. (ed.) (1997) *The Context of Scripture*. Vol. 1. Leiden: Brill.
Hallock, R. T. (1969) *Persepolis Fortification Tablets*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Hallonsten, G. (2007) 'Theosis in Recent Research', in Christensen, M. J., and Wittung, J. A. (eds.) *Partakers of the Divine Nature*. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, pp. 281–93.
Hamilton, J. R. (2002) *Plutarch*. 2nd ed. London: Bristol Classical Press.
Hamilton, V. P. (1995) *The Book of Genesis, Chapters 1–17*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Hammond, N. G. L. (1980) *Alexander the Great*. London: Chatto & Windus.
(2002 [1994]) *Philip of Macedon*. London: Duckworth.
Hamori, E. J. (2008) '*When Gods Were Men*', Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Handy, L. K. (1994) *Among the Host of Heaven*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
Hannig, R. (1995) *Großes Handwörterbuch Ägyptisch-Deutsch*. Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern.
Harper, P. O., and Amiet, P. (1992) 'The Mesopotamian Presence', in Harper, P. O., Aruz, J., and Tallon, F. (eds.) *The Royal City of Susa*. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, pp. 159–82.
Harper, P. O., Aruz, J., and Tallon, F. (eds.) (1992) *The Royal City of Susa*. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art Harper.
Harrison, V. (2010) *God's Many Splendored Image*. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic.
Hartman, E. (1977) *Substance, Body and Soul*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hawkins, J. D. (2000) *Corpus of Hieroglyphic Luwian Inscriptions*. Vol. 1. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Hays, H. M. (2002) 'The Worshipper and the Worshipped in the Pyramid Texts', *Studien zur altägyptischen Kultur* 30, pp. 53–67.
(2012) *The Organization of the Pyramid Texts*. Leiden: Brill.
Hays, H. M., and Schenkh, W. (1997) 'Intersection of Ritual Space and Ritual Representation', in Dorman, P. F., and Bryan, B. M. (eds.) *Sacred Space and Sacred Function in Ancient Thebes*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 97–115.
Hayward, C. T. R. (1996) *The Jewish Temple*. London: Routledge.
(2000) 'Philo, the Septuagint of Genesis 32:24–32 and the Name "Israel"', *Journal of Jewish Studies* 51, pp. 209–26.
(2005) *Interpretations of the Name Israel in Ancient Judaism and Some Early Christian Writings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(2010) *Targums and the Transmission of Scripture into Judaism and Christianity*. Leiden: Brill.
Hazenbos, J. (2003) *The Organization of the Anatolian Local Cults during the Thirteenth Century B.C.* Leiden: Brill.
Heckel, W., and Tritle, L. A. (eds.) (2009) *Alexander the Great*. Malden: Blackwell.
Heehs, P. (2013) *Writing the Self*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.
Heinaman, R. (1990) 'Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem', *Phronesis* 35, pp. 83–102.

Helmer, C., McKenzie, S. L., Römer, T. C., Schröter, J., Walfish, B. D., and Ziolkowski, E. (eds.) (2020) *Encyclopedia of the Bible and Its Reception*. Vol. 19. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Henning, W. B. (1951) *Zoroaster*. London: Oxford University Press.
Herodotus (1954) *The Histories*. de Sélincourt, A. (transl.), Burn, A. R. (rev.) Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Herrenschmidt, C. (1976) 'Désignation de l'empire et concepts politiques de Darius I[er] d'après ses inscriptions en vieux perse', *Studia Iranica* 5, pp. 33–65.
(1980) 'La religion des Achéménides', *Studia Iranica* 9, pp. 325–39.
Herring, S. L. (2008) 'A "Transubstantiated" Humanity', *Vetus Testamentum* 58, pp. 480–94.
(2013) *Divine Substitution*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Herzfeld, E. (1936) 'The Iranian Religion at the Time of Darius and Xerxes', *Religions* 15, pp. 20–28.
Hicks, R. D. (1907) *Aristotle, De anima*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Himmelfarb, M. (1993) *Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(2010) *The Apocalypse*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
Hintze, A. (1994) *Der Zamyād Yašt*. Wiesbaden: Reichert.
Hirsch, E., and O'Hanlon, M. (eds.) (1995) *The Anthropology of Landscape*. Oxford: Clarendon.
Hoekema, A. A. (1986) *Created in God's Image*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Hoffmeier, J. K. (1983) 'Some Thoughts on Genesis 1 & 2 and Egyptian Cosmology', *Journal of Ancient Near Eastern Studies* 15, pp. 39–49.
Hoffner, Jr., H. A. (1996) 'From Head to Toe in Hittite', in Coleson, J., and Matthews, V. P. (eds.) *Go to the Land I Will Show You*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, pp. 247–59.
(1998) *Hittite Myths*. 2nd ed. Beckman, G. (ed.). Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.
(2009) *Letters from the Hittite Kingdom*. Beckman, G. (ed.). Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.
Hollenback, J. B. (1996) *Mysticism*. University Park: Penn State University Press.
Holtzmann, H. J. (1897) *Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie*. Leipzig: Mohr Siebeck.
Hooke, S. H. (ed.) (1958) *Myth, Ritual, and Kingship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hopkins, A., and Wyke, M. (2005) *Roman Bodies*. London: British School at Rome.
Hopkins, D. (2005) *Being Human*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
Horn, F. W. (1992a) 'Holy Spirit', in Freedman, D. N. (ed.) *Anchor Bible Dictionary*. Vol. 3. New York: Doubleday, pp. 260–80.
(1992b) *Das Angeld des Geistes*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
(1996) 'Der Verzicht auf die Beschneidung im frühen Christentum', *New Testament Studies* 42, pp. 479–505.
Hornung, E. (1967) 'Der Mensch als 'Bild Gottes' in Ägypten', in Loretz, O. (ed.) *Die Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen, mit einem Beitrag von Erik Hornung*. Munich: Kösel-Verlag, pp. 123–56.

(1982) *Conceptions of God in Ancient Egypt*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Horowitz, M. C. (1979) 'The Image of God in Man', *Harvard Theological Review* 72, pp. 175–206.
Horowitz, W. (1998) *Mesopotamian Cosmic Geography*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
Houtkamp, J. (1991) 'Some Remarks on Fire Altars of the Achaemenid Period', in Kellens, J. (ed.) *La Religion iranienne à l'époque achéménide*. Ghent: Iranica antiqua, pp. 23–48.
Houtman, A., Kadari, T., Poorthuis, M., and Tohar, V. (eds.) (2016) *Religious Stories in Transformation*. Leiden: Brill.
Houwink ten Cate, P. H. J. (1987) 'The Sun God of Heaven and the Hittite King', in van der Plas, D. (ed.) *Effigies dei*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 13–34.
Humbach, H. (1998) *Zamyād Yasht*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
Humbach, H., and Ichaporia, P. (1998) *Zamyād Yasht*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
Humbach, H., Elfenbein, J. H., and Skjærvø, P. O. (eds./transl.) (1991) *The Gathas of Zarathushtra*. Heidelberg: Winter.
Humbert, P. (1940) *Études sur le récit du Paradis et de la chute dans la Genèse*. Neuchâtel: Secrétariat de l'Université.
Hundley, M. B. (2011) *Keeping Heaven on Earth*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
(2013a) *Gods in Dwellings*. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.
(2013b) 'Here a God, There a God', *Altorientalische Forschungen* 40, pp. 68–107.
(2014) 'The God Collectors', *Altorientalische Forschungen* 41, pp. 176–200.
(2015) '*Divine Fluidity?*', in Landy, F., Trevaskis, L. M., and Bibb, B. D. (eds.) *Text, Time, and Temple*. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, pp. 16–40.
Hurowitz, V. A. (1992) *'I Have Built You an Exalted House'*. Sheffield: JSOT Press.
(2002) 'What Goes in Is What Comes Out', in Beckman, G., and Lewis, T. (eds.) *Text, Artifact, Image*. Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, pp. 3–23.
Hutter, M. (1993) 'Kultstelen und Baityloi', in Janowski, B., Koch, K., and Wilhelm, G. (eds.) *Religionsgeschichtliche Beziehungen zwischen Kleinasien, Nordsyrien und dem Alten Testament*. Göttingen: Vanbenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 87–108.
(1997) 'Religion in Hittite Anatolia', *Numen* 44, pp. 74–90.
Hutter-Braunsar, S. (2001) 'The Formula "to Become a God" in Hittite Historiographical Texts', in Abusch, T., Beaulieu, P.-A., Huehnergard, J., Machinist, P., Steinkeller, P., and Noyes, C. (eds.) *Proceedings of the XLVe Recontre Assyriologique Internationale, Part 1*. Bethesda: CDL Press, pp. 267–77.
Hyatt, J. P. (1939) 'The Deity Bethel and the Old Testament', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 59, pp. 81–98.
Inwood, B. (2001) *The Poem of Empedocles*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
(2017) 'The Legacy of Musonius Rufus', in Engberg-Pedersen, T. (ed.) *From Stoicism to Platonism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 254–76.
Inwood, B. (ed.) (2006) *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Inwood, B., and Gerson, L. P. (eds.) (2008) *The Stoics Reader*. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Ishida, T. (1974) *The Royal Dynasties in Ancient Israel*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Isler, S. (1975) *The Gathas of Zarathustra*. Leiden: Brill.
Jacobsen, T. (1946) 'Sumerian Mythology, a Review Article', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 5, pp. 128–52.
(1987) 'The Graven Image', in Miller, P. D., Hanson, P. D., and McBride, S. D. (eds.) *Ancient Israelite Religion*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, pp. 15–32.
(2009) *The Harps That Once*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Jacquette, D. (2002) *Ontology*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University.
Jansen-Winkeln, K. (1994) *Texte und Sprache der 3. Zwischenzeit*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
Jaspers, K. (1968 [1949]) *The End and Goal of History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Jastrow, M. (1982) *Dictionary of the Targumim, Talmud Babli, Yerushalmi and Midrashic Literature*. 2 vols. New York: The Judaica Press.
Jenni, E., and Westermann, K. (eds.) (1997) *Theological Lexicon of the Old Testament*. 3 vols. Biddle, M. E. (transl.). Peabody: Hendrickson.
Jennings, W. (1926) *Lexicon to the Syriac New Testament (Peshitta)*. Gantillon, U. (rev.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Jervell, J. (1960) *Imago Dei*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Jirku, A. (1921) 'Neues keilinschriftliches Materiel zum Alten Testament', *Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* 31, pp. 158–60.
Jobling, D. (1977) 'And Have Dominion . . .', *Journal for the Study of Judaism* 8, pp. 50–82.
Johnson, P. (2006) 'Unravelling Foucault's "different spaces"', *History of the Human Sciences* 19, pp. 75–90.
Johnson, W. R. (1990) 'Images of Amenhotep III in Thebes', in Berman, L.M. (ed.) *The Art of Amenhotep III: Art Historical Analysis*. Cleveland: Cleveland Museum of Art / Indiana University Press, pp. 26–46.
(1997) 'Monuments and Monumental Art under Amenhotep III', in O'Connor, D., and Cline, E. H. (eds.) *Amenhotep III*. Ann Abor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 63–94.
Johnston, S. I. (ed.) (2004) *Religions of the Ancient World: A Guide*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Jones, P. (2005) '*Divine and Non-Divine Kingship*', in Snell, D. C. (ed.) *A Companion to the Ancient Near East*. Malden: Blackwell.
Jónsson, G. A. (1988) *The Image of God*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.
Junker, H. (1911) *Die Stundenwachen in den Osirismysterien, nach den Inschriften von Dendera, Edfu und Philae*. Vienna: Hölder.
(1940) *Die Götterlehre von Memphis (Schabaka-Inschrift)*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
(1957) *Weta und das Lederkunsthandwerk im Alten Reich*. Vienna: Rohrer in Komm.
Kahn, C. H. (1971) 'Religion and Natural Philosophy in Empedocles' Doctrine of the Soul', in Anton, J. P., and Kustas, G. L. (eds.) *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*. Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 3–38.

Kahn, M. (1995) 'Heterotopic Dissonance in the Museum Representations of Pacific Island Cultures', *American Anthropologist* 97, pp. 324–38.
(2000) 'Tahiti Intertwined', *American Anthropologist* 102, pp. 7–26.
Kamil, J. (1976) *Luxor*. 2nd ed. London: Longman.
Kamionkowski, S. T. (2010) '*Introduction*', in Kamionkowski, S. T., and Kim, W. (eds.) *Bodies, Embodiment, and Theology of the Hebrew Bible*. London: T & T Clark, pp. 1–10.
Kamionkowski, S. T., and Kim, W. (eds.) (2010) *Bodies, Embodiment, and Theology of the Hebrew Bible*. London: T & T Clark.
Kammenhuber, A. (1964) 'Die hethitischen Vorstellungen von Seele und Leib, Herz und Leibesinnerem, Kopf und Person. 1.', *Zeitschrift für Assyrologie und Vorderasiatische Archäologie* 56, pp. 150–212.
(1965) 'Die hethitischen Vorstellungen von Seele und Leib, Herz und Leibesinnerem, Kopf und Person. 2.', *Zeitschrift für Assyrologie und Vorderasiatische Archäologie* 57, pp. 177–222, 330–32.
Kampen, N. B., and Bergmann, B. A. (eds.) (1996) *Sexuality in Ancient Art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kanawati, N., and Hassan, A. (1997) *The Teti Cemetery at Saqqara II*. Sydney: ACE.
Kanga, S. N. (2011 [1925]) *'The Gathic Doctrine of Dualism in Aristotle', in Indo-Iranian Studies*. London: Routledge, pp. 163–74.
Kapelrud, A. S. (1979) 'Ba'al, Schöpfung und Chaos', *Ugarit-Forschungen* 11, pp. 407–12.
Kassian, A., Korolëv, A., and Sidel'tsev, A. (2002) *Hittite Funerary Ritual*. Münster: Ugarit Verlag.
Katz, B. Z. (2012) *A Journey through Torah*. Brooklyn: Lambda.
Katz, S. T. (ed.) (1978) *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis. Katz*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Katz, S. T. (2006) *The Cambridge History of Judaism*. Vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kees, H. (1912) *Der Opfertanz des ägyptischen Königs*. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs.
Keidorn, L. A. (1999) 'Abu Simbel', in Bard, K. A. (ed.) *Encyclopedia of the Archaeology of Ancient Egypt*. London: Routledge, pp. 87–90.
Kellens, J. (ed.) (1991) *La Religion iranienne à l'époque achéménide*. Ghent: Iranica antiqua.
Kemp, B. J. (1991) *Ancient Egypt*. London: Routledge.
(2000) 'Soil (including Mud-brick Architecture)', in Nicholson, P. T., and Shaw, I. (eds.) *Ancient Egyptian Materials and Technology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 78–103.
(2015) *Ancient Egypt*. London: John Murray Learning.
Kempinski, A. (1979) 'Hittites and the Bible', *Biblical Archaeology Review* 5, pp. 20–45.
Kennedy, D. (2007) 'Making a Text of the Universe', in Gale, M. R. (ed.) *Lucretius*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 376–96.
Kenney, E. J. (ed.) (2014) *Lucretius*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kent, R. G. (1961) *Old Persian*. 2nd ed. New Haven: American Oriental Society.

Kessler, M., and Deurloo, A. (2004) *A Commentary on Genesis*. New York: Paulist.
Kharlamov, V. (ed.) (2012) *Theosis*. Cambridge: James Clarke & Co.
Khodzhash, S. I., and Berlev, O. D. (1982) *The Egyptian Reliefs and Stelae in the Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts, Moscow*. Leningrad: Aurora Art Publishers.
Kia, M. (2016) *The Persian Empire*. Vol. 2. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.
Kidd, I. G. (transl.) (1999) *Posidonius*. Vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
King, L. W. (1902) *The Seven Tablets of Creation*. 2 vols. London: Luzac and Co.
Kingsley, P. (2003) *Reality*. Inverness: Golden Sufi Center.
Kinnier-Wilson, J. V. (1967) 'Organic Diseases of Ancient Mesopotamia', in Brothwell, D. R., and Sandison, A. T. (eds.) *Diseases in Antiquity*. Springfield: C. C. Thomas, pp. 191–208.
Kirk, G. S., Raven, J. E., and Schofield, M. *The Presocratic Philosophers*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Kitchen, K. A. (1978) *Ramesside Inscriptions*. Vol. 3. Oxford: Blackwell.
(1979) *Ramesside Inscriptions*. Vol. 2. Oxford: Blackwell.
(1982) *Pharaoh Triumphant*. Warminster: Aris & Phillips.
Kittel, R. (1925) 'Der Gott Bethel', *Journal of Biblical Literature* 44, pp. 123–53.
Kleiner, F. S., and Gardner, H. (2017) *Gardner's Art through the Ages*. Vol. 1. 15th ed. Australia: Cengage Learning.
Kleiss, W. (1981) 'Bermerkungen zu achaemenidischen Feueraltären', *Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran* 14, pp. 61–64.
Klengel, H., and Renger, J. (eds.) (1999) *Landwirtschaft im Alten Orient*. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag.
Kline, M. G. (1977) 'Creation in the Image of the Glory-Spirit', *Westminster Theological Journal* 39, pp. 250–72.
Klock-Fontanille, I. (2001) 'Écritures et langages visuels sur les sceaux royaux digraphes de l'empire hittite', in Wilhelm, G. (ed.) *Akten des IV. Internationalen Kongresses für Hethitologie*. Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz, pp. 292–307.
Kloekhorst, A. (2008) *Etymological Dictionary of the Hittite Inherited Lexicon*. Leiden: Brill.
Knudtzon, J. A. (1915) *Die El-Amarna-Tafeln, mit Einleitung und Erläuterungen*. Leipzig: Hinrichs.
Koch, H. (1977) *Die religiösen Verhältnisse der Dariuszeit*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
(1991) 'Zu Religion und Kulten im Achämenidischen Kernland', in Kellens, J. (ed.) *La Religion iranienne à l'époque achéménide*. Ghent: Iranica antiqua, pp. 87–109.
Koenen, K. (2003) *Bethel*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Köhler, L., Baumgartner, W., and Stamm, J. J. (eds.) (1996) 'צלם', in *The Hebrew and Aramaic lexicon of the Old Testament*. Vol. 3. Leiden: Brill, p. 1028a.
Komjathy, L. (2007) *Cultivating Perfection*. Leiden: Brill.
Konstan, D. (1973) *Some Aspects of Epicurean Psychology*. Leiden: Brill.
Korpel, M. C. A. (1990) *A Rift in the Clouds*. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag.
(2016) 'The Adamic Myth from Canaan', in Houtman, A., Kadari, T., Poorthuis, M., and Tohar, V. (eds.) *Religious Stories in Transformation*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 23–35.

Korpel, M. C. A., and de Moor, J. C. (2014) *Adam, Eve, and the Devil*. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press.
Kozloff, A. P., and Bryan, B. M. (eds.) (1992) *Egypt's Dazzling Sun*. Cleveland: The Cleveland Museum of Art/Indiana University Press.
Kramer, S. N. (1961) *Mythologies of the Ancient World*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
Krauss, R. (1999) 'Wie jung ist die memphitische Philosophie auf dem ShabaqoStein?', in Larson, J. A., Teeter, E., and Wente, E. F. (eds.) *Gold of Praise*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 239–46.
Kraut, R. (ed.) (1992) *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Krebernik, M. (1986) 'Die Götterlisten aus Fāra', *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie* 76, pp. 161–204.
Kreyenbroek, P. G. (1993) 'Cosmogony and Cosmology i', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. www.iranicaonline.org/articles/cosmogony-i.
Kronasser, H. (ed.) (1963) *Die Umsiedelung der schwarzen Gottheit*. Vienna: Böhlaus.
Kuhlmann, K. P. (1988) *Das Ammoneion*. Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern.
Kuhrt, A. (1984) 'The Achaemenid Concept of Kingship', *Iran* 22, pp. 156–60.
(2001) 'The Achaemenid Persian Empire (c. 550–c. 330 BCE)', in Alcock, S. E., D'Altroy, T. N., Morrison, K. D., and Sinopoli, C. M. (eds.) *Empires*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 93–123.
(2007) *The Persian Empire*. London: Routledge.
Kværne, P. (1987) 'Dualism in Tibetan Cosmogonic Myths and the Question of Iranian Influence', in Beckwith, C. I. (ed.) *Silver on Lapis*. Bloomington: Tibet Society, pp. 163–74.
Lakey, M. J. (2010) *Image and Glory of God*. London: T & T Clark.
(2018) *The Ritual World of Paul the Apostle*. London: T & T Clark.
Laks, A. (1999) 'Soul, Sensation, and Thought', in Long, A. A. (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 250–70.
Lambert, W. G. (1969) 'Götterlisten', *Reallexikon der Assyriologie* 3, pp. 473–79.
(1992) 'The Relationship of Sumerian and Babylonian Myth As Sen in Accounts of Creation', in Charpin, D., and Joannès, F. (eds.) *La circulation des biens, des personnes et des idées dans le Proche-Orient ancient, XXXVIIIe Rencontre assyrologique international, Paris, 8–10 juillet 1991*. Paris: Éditions Recherche sur les civilisations, pp. 129–35.
(1996) *Babylonian Wisdom Literature*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
(2007) 'Mesopotamian Creation Stories', in Geller, M., and Schipper, M. (eds.) *Imagining Creation*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 15–60.
Lambert, W. G., and Millard, A. R. (1999) *Atra-ḫasīs*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
Lange, A. (ed.) (2011) *Light against Darkness*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Lansing, A. (1936) 'A Commemorative Scarab of Amen-ḥotpe III', *The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin* 31, pp. 12–14.
Lanzillotta, L. R. (2013) 'A Way of Salvation', *Numen* 60, pp. 71–102.

Lapp, G. (1997) *The Papyrus of Nu (BM EA 10477)*. London: British Museum.
Laroche, E. (1971) *Catalogue des textes hittites*. Paris: Klincksieck.
Larson, J. (2007) *Ancient Greek Cults*. London: Routledge.
Laskowska-Kusztal, E. (1984) *Le sanctuaire ptolémaïque de Deir el-Bahari*. Varsovie: Éditions scientifiques de Pologne.
Latacz, J. (1994) *Storia, Poesia e Pensiero nel Mondo Antico. Studi in Onore di Marcello Gigante*. Naples: Bibliopolis.
Leek, F. F. (1972) 'Teeth and Bread in Ancient Egypt', *The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 58, pp. 126–32.
(1973) 'Further Studies concerning Ancient Egyptian Bread', *The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 59, pp. 199–204.
Leeming, D. A. (2004) *Jealous Gods and Chosen People*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lefebvre, H. (1991 [1974]) *The Production of Space*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lehmkühler, K. (2004) *Inhabitatio*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Lemche, N. P. (1991) *The Canaanites and Their Land*. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.
Lenz, J. R. (2008) 'Deification of the Philosopher in Classical Greece', in Christensen, M. J. and Wittung, M. J. (eds.) *Partakers of the Divine Nature*. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, pp. 47–67.
Leonard, W. E. (ed./transl.) (1908) *The Fragments of Empedocles*. Chicago: The Open Court Pub. Co.
Lepsius, R. (1969) *Das Todtenbuch der Ägypter*. Osnabrück: Otto Zeller.
Lesko, L. H. (1991) 'Ancient Egyptian Cosmogonies and Cosmology', in Shafer, B. E. (ed.) *Religion in Ancient Egypt*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 88–122.
Levenson, J. D. (1988) *Creation and the Persistence of Evil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Levine, B. A. (1968) 'The Presence of God in Biblical Religion', in Neusner, J. (ed.) *Religions in Antiquity*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 71–87.
Levine, L. I. (2005) *The Ancient Synagogue*. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Levine, L. I. (ed.) (1999) *Jerusalem*. New York: Continuum.
Levison, J. R. (1994) 'Two Types of Ecstatic Prophecy According to Philo', *Studia Philonica Annual* 6, pp. 83–89.
(1997) *The Spirit in First Century Judaism*. Leiden: Brill.
(2011) 'Paul in the Stoa Poecile', *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 33, pp. 415–32.
Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1985 [1910]) *How Natives Think*. Clare, L. A. (transl.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lichtheim, M. (2006) 'The Memphite Theology', in Lichtheim, M. (ed.) *Ancient Egyptian Literature*. Vol. 1. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 51–56.
Lincoln, B. (1999) *Theorizing Myth*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Lindstrom, L. (1996) '*Mana*', in Bernard, A., and Spencer, J. (eds.) *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology*. London: Routledge, pp. 346–47.
Litke, R. L. (1998) *A Reconstruction of the Assyro-Babylonian God-Lists*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Littman, R., Lorenzon, M., and Silverstein, J. (eds.) (2014) 'With & Without Straw', Biblical Archaeology Review 40. www.baslibrary.org/biblical-archaeology-review/40/2/8.
Litwa, M. D. (2012) *We Are Being Transformed*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
(2013) *Becoming Divine*. Eugene: Wipf & Stock.
(2016) *Desiring Divinity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lohfink, N. (2000) 'Die Gottesstatue', in Keel, O., Staubli, T., and Bickel, S. (eds.) *Im Schatten deiner Flügel*. 2nd ed. Freiburg: Herder, pp. 29–48.
Long, A. A. (1974) *Hellenistic Philosophy*. New York: Scribner.
(1982) 'Soul and Body in Stoicism', *Phronesis* 27, pp. 34–57.
(2012) 'Daimôn', in Press, G. A. (ed.) *The Continuum Companion to Plato*. London: Continnum, pp. 152–54.
(2014 [1993]) 'Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle in the Sixties', in Mourelatos, A. P. D. (ed.) *The Pre-Socratics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 397–425.
(2017) 'Seneca and Epictetus on Body, Mind and Dualism', in Engberg-Pedersen, T. (ed.) *From Stoicism to Platonism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 214–30.
Long, A. A., and Sedley, D. N. (eds./transl.) (1987) *The Hellenistic Philosophers*. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Long, G. (transl.) (1890) *The Discourses of Epictetus*. London: George Bell & Sons.
Loretz, O. (1967) *Die Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen, mit einem Beigrag von Erik Hornung*. Munich: Kösel-Verlag.
Lossky, V. (1967) *A l'image et à la ressemblance de Dieu*. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne.
Louth, A. (ed.) (2001) *Genesis 1–11*. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press.
Lovatt, H. (2013) *The Epic Gaze*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lubotsky, A. (1998) 'Avestan *x^{v}arənah-*', in Meid, W. (ed.) *Sprache und Kultur*. Innsbruck: Institut für Sprachwissenschaft der Universität Innsbruck, pp. 479–88.
Lundquist, J. M. (2008) *The Temple of Jerusalem*. Westport: Praeger.
Machinist, P. (2006) 'Kingship and Divinity in Imperial Assyria', in Beckman, G., and Lewis, T. J. (eds.) *Text, Artifact, and Image*. Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, pp. 152–88.
MacKenzie, D. N. (1971) 'rōšn', in *A Concise Pahlavi Dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 72.
(1993) 'The Fire Altar of Happy *Frayosh', *Bulletin of the Asia Institute* 7, pp. 105–09.
(2002) 'gumēzišn', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. www.iranicaonline.org/articles/gumezisn.
Madan, D. M. (ed.) (1911) *The Complete Text of the Pahlavi Denkard*. Bombay: Ganpatrao Ramajirao Sindhe.
Maderna-Seven, C. (2003) 'Die Grosse Bauinschrift von Abydos', in Assmann, J., and Meyer, S. (eds.) *Egypt – Temple of the Whole World*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 237–82.
Majno, G. (1975) *The Healing Hand*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Malandra, W. W. (ed./transl.) (1983) *An Introduction to Ancient Iranian Religion*. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press.
Mansfeld, J. (1983) 'Zeno and Aristotle on Mixture', *Mnemosyne Fourth Series* 36, pp. 306–10.
Margalit, B. (1981) 'The Ugaritic Creation Myth', *Ugarit-Forschungen* 13, pp. 137–45.
(1989) *The Ugaritic Poem of AQHT*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Mariette, A. (1869) *Abydos Descriptions des fouilles exécutées sur l'emplacement de cette ville*. Paris: A. Franck.
Martín, S. C., Echavarren, A., and Medina, E. F. (2013) *Mediterráneos*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Matthews, K. A. (1987) *Genesis 1–11:26*. Nashville: Broadman & Holman.
Mauss, M. (1950) 'Une catégorie de l'esprit humain: La notion de personne, celle de 'moi' (1938)', in *Sociologie et anthropologie*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, pp. 331–62.
(1985) 'A Category of the Human Mind', in Carrithers, M., Collins, S., and Lukes, S. (eds.) *The Category of the Person*. Halls, W. D. (transl.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–25.
(2005 [1950]) *A General Theory of Magic*. 2nd ed. Brain, R. (transl.). London: Routledge.
McCarter, P. K. (1987) 'Aspects of the Religion of the Israelite Monarchy', in Miller, P. D., Hanson, P. D., and McBride, S. D. (eds.) *Ancient Israelite Religion*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, pp. 137–55.
McDowell, C. L. (2015) *The Image of God in the Garden of Eden*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
McGinn, B. (2004) *The Foundations of Mysticism*. Vol. 1. New York: Crossroad.
McKeown, J. (2008) *Genesis*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
McMahon, G. (1992) 'Hittites in the Old Testament', in Freedman, D. N. (ed.) *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*. Vol. 3. New York: Doubleday, pp. 231–33.
McNaught, A. D., and Wilkinson, A. (eds.) (2006) *International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific.
Melchert, H. C. (2003a) 'Hittite Nominal Stems in *-anzan-*', in Tichy, E., Wodtko, D. S., and Tichy, B. S. I. (eds.) *Indogermanisches Nomen*. Bremen: Hempen, pp. 129–39.
Melchert, H. C. (ed.) (2003b) *The Luwians*. Leiden: Brill.
(2010) 'Remarks on the Kuttamuwa Inscription', *Kubaba* 1, pp. 4–11.
Menn, S. P. (1995) *Plato on God As Nous*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
Mercer, S. A. B. (1952) *The Pyramid Texts*. 4 vols. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.
Merkur, D. (2000) *The Mystery of Manna*. Rochester: Park Street Press.
(2005) *The Psychedelic Sacrament*. Rochester: Park Street Press.
Mettinger, T. N. D. (1974) 'Abbild oder Urbild?', *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* 86, pp. 403–24.
(2013 [1995]) *No Graven Image?* Winona Lake: Eidsenbrauns.
Michalowski, P. (1998) 'The Unbearable Lightness of Enlil', in Prosecký, J. (ed.) *Intellectual Life of the Ancient Near East*. Prague: Oriental Institute, pp. 237–47.

(2008) 'The Mortal Kings of Ur', in Brisch, N. (ed.) *Religion and Power*. Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, pp. 237–47.
Middleton, J. R. (2005) *The Liberating Image*. Grand Rapids: Brazos Press.
Mikalson, J. D. (1998) *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Millar, F. (1993) *The Roman Near East*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Millard, A. R., and Bordreuil, P. (1982) 'A Statue from Syria with Assyrian and Aramaic Inscriptions', *The Biblical Archeologist* 45, pp. 35–41.
Miller, J. L. (2004) *Studies in the Origins, Development and Interpretation of the Kizzuwatna Rituals*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
(2013) *Royal Hittite Instructions and Related Administrative Texts*. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.
Miller, J. M. (1972) 'In the "Image" and "Likeness" of God', *Journal of Biblical Literature* 91, pp. 289–304.
Mirecki, P., and Meyer, M. (ed.) (2002) *Magic and Ritual in the Ancient World*. Leiden: Brill.
Moberly, W. (1990) 'Yahweh is One', in Emerton, J. A. (ed.) *Studies in the Pentateuch*. Leiden: Brill, 209–15.
Moltmann, J. (1974) *Man*. Sturdy, J. (transl.). London: SPCK.
(1985) *God in Creation*. London: SCM Press.
Moorey, P. R. S. (1979) 'Aspects of Worship and Ritual on Achaemenid Seals', in *Akten des VII. Internationalen Kongresses für Kunst und Archäologie, München 1976*. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, pp. 218–26.
Moran, W. L. (1970) 'The Creation of Man in Atrahasis I 192–248', *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 200, pp. 48–56.
Morel, P.-M. (2010) 'Epicurean Atomism', in Warren, J. (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 65–83.
Morray-Jones, C. R. A. (1992) 'Transformational Mysticism in the Apocalyptic-Merkabah Tradition', *Journal of Jewish Studies* 43, pp. 1–31.
(2006) 'The Temple Within', in DeConick, A. D. (ed.) *Paradise Now*. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, pp. 145–78.
Mourelatos, A. P. D. (ed.) (2014 [1993]) *The Pre-Socratics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Moussa, A. M., and Altenmüller, H. (1977) *Das Grab des Nianchchnum und Chnumhotep*. Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern.
Moyer, J. C. (1983) 'Hittite and Israelite Cultic Practices: A Selected Comparison', in Hallo, W. W., Moyer, J. C., and Perdue, L. G. (eds.) *More Essays on the Comparative Method*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, pp. 19–38.
Mujais, S. (1999) 'The Future of the Realm', *American Journal of Nephrology* 19, pp. 133–39.
Munro, P. (1993) *Der Unas-Friedhof Nord-West. I*. Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern.
Murnane, W. J. (1981) 'The Sed Festival', *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Ärchäologischen Instituts, Abteilung Kairo* 37, pp. 369–76.
(1995) *Texts from the Amarna Period in Egypt*. Meltzer, E. S. (ed.). Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

Murphy-O'Connor, J. (1982) *Becoming Human Together*. Dublin: Veritas.
Muscarella, O. W. (2003) 'Seated Statue of Gudea', in Aruz, J., and Wallenfels, R. (eds.) *Art of the First Cities*. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, pp. 428–29.
(2005) 'Gudea or Not Gudea in New York and Detroit', *Source: Notes in the History of Art* 24, pp. 6–18.
Na'aman, N. (2005–2006) *Ancient Israel and Its Neighbors: Interaction and Counteraction*. 2 vols. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
Nagel, T. (1972) 'Aristotle on Eudaimonia', *Phronesis* 17, pp. 252–59.
Nawotka, K. (2003) 'Freedom of Greek Cities in Asia Minor in the Age of Alexander the Great', *Klio: Beiträge zur Alten Geschichte* 85, pp. 15–41.
Nehamas, A. (1999) 'Plato on the Imperfection of the Sensible World', in Fine, G. (ed.) *Plato 1*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 171–91.
Nemeroff, C., and Rozin, P. (1989) 'You Are What You Eat', *Ethos* 17, 50–69.
(1998) 'The Makings of the Magical Mind', in Rosengren, K. S., Johnson, C. N., and Harris, P. L. (eds.) *Imagining the Impossible*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–34.
Nemet-Nejat, K. R. (1998) *Daily Life in Ancient Mesopotamia*. Westport: Greenwood Press.
Nestle, W. (1906) 'Der Dualismus des Empedokles'. *Philologus* 65, pp. 545–57.
Neusner, J. (1989) 'Physics in an Odd Idiom', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 52, pp. 419–29.
Neve, P. (1987) 'Boğazköy-Ḫattusa, Ausgrabungen in der Oberstadt (Note additionnelle von H. Gönnet)', *Anatolica* 14, pp. 47–71.
Nicholson, P. T., and Shaw, I. (eds.) (2000) *Ancient Egyptian Materials and Technology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Noegel, S., Walker, J., and Wheeler, B. (eds.) (2003) *Prayer, Magic, and the Stars in the Ancient and Late Antique World*. University Park: Penn State University Press.
Nolan, D. (2006) 'Stoic Gunk', *Phronesis* 51, pp. 162–83.
Nöldeke, T. (1905) 'Mutter Erde und Verwandtes bei den Semiten', *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 8, pp. 161–66.
Nougayrol, J. (1956) *Le Palais royal d'Ugarit 4*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale.
Nussbaum, M. C., and Rorty, A. O. (eds.) (1992) *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Nyord, R. (2009) *Breathing Flesh*. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.
(2012) 'On (Mis)conceptions of the Body in Ancient Egypt', *Lingua Aegyptia* 20, pp. 165–84.
(2014) 'Permeable Containers', in Sousa, R. (ed.) *Body, Cosmos and Eternity*. Oxford: Archaeopress, pp. 29–44.
(2016) 'Taking Phenomenology to Heart', in Nyord, R., and Kjølby, A. (eds.) *Being in Ancient Egypt*. Oxford: British Archaeological Reports International Series, pp. 63–74.
O'Brien, D. (1969) *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O'Connor, D. B., and Cline, E. H. (eds.) (1997) *Amenhotep III*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

O'Connor, D. B., and Silverman, D. P. (eds.) (1995) *Ancient Egyptian Kingship*. Leiden: Brill.
Obbink, D. (1989) 'The Atheism of Epicurus', *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 30, pp. 187–223.
Ockinga, B. (1984) *Die Gottebenbildlichkeit im Alten Ägypten und im alten Testament*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
Oettinger, N. (1979) *Die Stammbildung des hethitischen Verbums*. Nuremberg: H. Carl.
Oppenheim, A. L. (1943) 'Akkadian *pul(u)ḫ(t)u* and *melammu*', *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 63, pp. 31–34.
(1962) 'Mesopotamian Medicine', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 36, pp. 97–108.
Opsomer, J. (2017) 'Is Plutarch Really Hostile to the Stoics?', in Engberg-Pedersen, T. (ed.) *From Stoicism to Platonism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 296–321.
Orlin, E. (2016) 'Cult Statue', in Orlin, E. (ed.) *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Ancient Mediterranean Religions*. London: Routledge, pp. 221–24.
Orlov, A. A. (1998) 'Titles of Enoch-Metatron in 2 Enoch', *Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha*, pp. 71–86.
(2005) *The Enoch-Metatron Tradition*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
(2006) 'God's Face in the Enochic Tradition', in DeConick, A. D. (ed.) *Paradise Now*. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, pp. 179–93.
(2007) *From Apocalypticism to Merkabah Mysticism*. Leiden: Brill.
(2008) 'In the Mirror of the Divine Face', in Brooke, G. J., Najman, H., and Stuckenbruck, L. T. (eds.) *The Significance of Sinai*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 183–99.
(2011) *Dark Mirrors*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
(2015) *Divine Scapegoats*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Orlov, A. A., and Golitzin, A. (2001) 'Many Lamps Are Lightened from the One', *Vigiliae Christianae* 55, pp. 281–98.
Otten, H. (1975) *Puduḫepa*. Mainz: Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur.
Otto, E. (1971) 'Der Mensch als Geschöpf und Bild Gottes in Ägypten', in Wolff, H. W., and von Rad, G. (eds.) *Probleme biblischer Theologie*. Munich: Kaiser Verlag, pp. 335–48.
Özgüç, N., Mellink, M. J., Porada, E., and Özgüç, T. (eds.) (1993) *Aspects of Art and Iconography*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu.
Özgüç, T., and Özgüc, N. (1949) *Karahöyük hafriyati raporu 1947*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi.
Panaino, A. (2015) 'Cosmologies and Astrology', in Stausberg, M., Vevaina, Y. S.-D., and Tessmann, A. (eds.) *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Zoroastrianism*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 235–57.
Pannenberg, W. (1999) *Anthropology in Theological Perspective*. O'Connell, M. J. (transl.). Edinburgh: T & T Clark.
Pardee, D. (2002) *Ritual and Cult at Ugarit*. Lewis, T. J. (ed.). Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.
Park, S. J. (2010) 'Short Notes on the Etymology of Asherah', *Ugarit-Forschungen* 42, pp. 527–34.

Parpola, S., and Whiting, R. M. (eds.) (1997) *Assyria 1995*. Helsinki: The Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project.
Parrot, A. (1960) *Sumer*. London: Thames & Hudson.
Paulissian, R. (1991) 'Medicine in Ancient Assyria and Babylonia', *Journal of Assyrian Academic Studies* 5, pp. 3–51.
Payne, R. E. (2015) *A State of Mixture*. Oakland: University of California Press.
Perls, F. S. (1971) *Gestalt Therapy Verbatim*. Stevens, J. O. (ed.). New York: Bantam Books.
Petrovic, A., and Petrovic, I. (2016) *Inner Purity & Pollution in Greek Religion*. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettinato, G. (1971) *Das altorientalische Menschenbild und die sumerischen und akkadischen Schöpfungsmythen*. Heidelberg: Winter.
Pinch, G. (2002) *Handbook of Egyptian Mythology*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.
(2004) *Egyptian Mythology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pinto, R.T. (2017) 'The rise of the Cloudworker', Master's Thesis. Coimbra University. Coimbra, Portugal.
Pitkänen, P. (2004) *Central Sanctuary and Centralization of Worship in Ancient Israel*. Piscataway: Gorgias Press.
Plato (1966) *Plato in Twelve Volumes*. Fowler, H. N. (ed./transl.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pleyte, W. (1881) *Chapitres supplémentaires du Livres des Morts 162 à 174*. Leiden: Brill.
Plutarch (2002) *Plutarch*. 2nd ed. Hamilton, J. R. (transl.). London: Bristol Classical Press.
Polansky, R. (2007) *Aristotle's De Anima*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Poli, R. (2003) 'Descriptive, Formal and Formalized Ontologies', in Fisette, D. (ed.) *Husserl's Logical Investigations Reconsidered*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 193–210.
Pollack, S. (1999) *Ancient Mesopotamia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pomeroy, S. B., Burstein, S. M., Donlan, W., and Roberts, J. T. (2009) *A Brief History of Ancient Greece*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pongratz-Leisten, B., and Sonik, K. (2015) 'Between Cognition and Culture', in Pongratz-Leisten, B., and Sonik, K. (eds.) *The Materiality of Divine Agency*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 3–69.
Pope, M. H. (1977) 'Notes on the Rephaim Texts from Ugarit', in Ellis, M. (ed.) *Essays on the Ancient Near East in Memory of Jacob Joel Finkelstein*. Hamden: Archon, pp. 163–82.
(1981) 'The Cult of the Dead at Ugarit', in Young, G. D. (ed.) *Ugarit in Retrospect*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, pp. 159–80.
Popko, M. (1978) *Kultobjekte in der hethitischen Religion (nach keilschriftlichen Quellen)*. Warsaw: University of Warsaw Press.
(1993) 'Anikonische Götterdarstellungen in der altanatolischen Religion', in Quaegebeur, J. (ed.) *Ritual and Sacrifice in the Ancient Near East*. Leuven: Peeters, pp. 319–27.
Posener, G. (1960) *De la divinité du Pharaon*. Paris: Imprimerie nationale.

Posener-Kriéger, P., and de Cenival, J. L. (1968) *Hieratic Papyri in the British Museum, Fifth Series*. London: British Museum.
Potts, D. T. (ed.) (2013) *The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Iran*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Powers, D. G. (2001) *Salvation through Participation*. Leuven: Peeters.
Press, G. A. (ed.) (2012) *The Continuum Companion to Plato*. London: Continnum.
Primavesi, O. (2005) 'Empedocles: Physical and Mythical Divinity', in Curd, P., and Graham, D. W. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 250–83.
Pritchard, J. B. (ed.) (1969) *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Prosecký, J. (ed.) (1998) *Intellectual Life of the Ancient Near East*. Prague: Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Oriental Institute.
Provencal, V. L. (2015) *Sophist Kings*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Puhvel, J. (1984–2017) *Hittite Etymological Dictionary*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
(2017) *Hittite Etymological Dictionary, Volume 10, Words beginning with SA*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Putthoff, T. L. (2014) 'Aseneth's Gastronomical Vision', *Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha* 24, pp. 96–117.
(2017) *Ontological Aspects of Early Jewish Anthropology*. Leiden: Brill.
(2020) 'Mystery' in Helmer, C., McKenzie, S. L., Römer, T. C., Schröter, J., Walfish, B. D., and Ziolkowski, E. (eds.) *Encyclopedia of the Bible and its Reception*. Vol. 19. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Pyle, A. (1997) *Atomism and Its Critics*. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
Rabens, V. (2014) 'Pneuma and the Beholding of God', in Frey, J., and Levison, J. R. (eds.) *The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 293–330.
(2016a) '*The Holy Spirit and Deification in Paul*', in Dragutinovic, P., Niebuhr, K.-W., Wallace, J. B., and Karakolis, C. (eds.) *The Holy Spirit and the Church According to the New Testament*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp. 187–220.
(2016b) *The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul*. 2nd rev. ed. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Rackham, H. (transl.) (1926) *Aristotle in 23 Volumes*. Vol. 19. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ragavan, D. (2013a) 'Entering Other Worlds', in Ragavan, D. (ed.) *Heaven on Earth*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 201–21.
Ragavan, D. (ed.) (2013b) *Heaven on Earth*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Rahmouni, A. (2008) *Divine Epithets in the Ugaritic Alphabetic Texts*. Ford, J. N. (transl.). Leiden: Brill.
Ramelli, I. (2009) *Hierocles the Stoic*. Konstan, D. (transl.). Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.
Rasimus, T., Engberg-Pedersen, T., and Dunderberg, I. (eds.) (2010) *Stoicism in Early Christianity*. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic.

Raven, J. E. (1957) *The Presocratic Philosophers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Redford, D. B. (ed.) (2001) *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt*. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rehfeld, E. L. (2012) *Relationale Ontologie bei Paulus*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Reiche, H. A. T. (1960) *Empedocles' Mixture, Eudoxan Astronomy and Aristotle's Connate Pneuma*. Amsterdam: Hakkert.
Reydams-Schils, G. (2017) '"Becoming like God" in Platonism and Stoicism', in Engberg-Pedersen, T. (ed.) *From Stoicism to Platonism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 142–58.
Ritter, E. K. (1965) 'Magical-expert (=ashipu) and Physician (=asû)', *Assyriological Studies* 16, pp. 299–321.
Roeder, G. (1926) 'Ramses II. als Gott', *Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde* 61, pp. 57–67.
Roisman, J. (ed.) (2014 [2003]) *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*. Leiden: Brill.
Rosenstein, N. S., and Morstein-Marx, R. (eds.) (2006) *A Companion to the Roman Republic*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Ross, W. D. and Smith, J. A. (transl.) (1927–1952) *Aristotle, Parts of Animals*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Ross, W. D. (1961) *Aristotle, De anima*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Roth, A. M. (1995) *A Cemetery of Palace Attendants*. Boston: Department of Ancient Egyptian, Nubian and Near Eastern Art, Museum of Fine Arts.
Rowe, C. J., and Schofield, M. (2000) *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rowland, C., and Morray-Jones, C. R. A. (2009) *The Mystery of God*. Leiden: Brill.
Rozin, P., and Nemeroff, C. (2002) 'Sympathetic Magical Thinking', in Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., and Kahneman, D. (eds.) *Heuristics and Biases*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 206–16.
Ruiz, A. (2001) *The Spirit of Ancient Egypt*. New York: Algora.
Runia, D. T. (ed.) (1990) *Exegesis and Philosophy*. Aldershot: Variorum.
Runia, D. T. (1986) *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato*. Leiden: Brill.
(2001) *Philo of Alexandria*. Leiden: Brill.
(2009) 'The Theme of Flight and Exile in the Allegorical Thought-world of Philo of Alexandria', *Studia Philonica Annual* 21, pp. 133–50.
Ruspini, E. H., Bonissone, P. P., and Pedrycz, W. (eds.) (1998) *Handbook of Fuzzy Computation*. Bristol/Philadelphia: Institute of Physics.
Russell, B. (1923) 'Vagueness', *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* 1, pp. 84–92.
Russell, N. (2006) *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sallaberger, W. (1999) 'Ur III-Zeit', in Sallaberger, W., Westenholz, Å., Attinger, P., and Wäfler, M. (eds.) *Mesopotamien Akkade-Zeit und Ur III-Zeit*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 121–390.
(2002) 'Den Göttern nahe – und fern den Menschen?', in Erkens, F.-R. (ed.) *Die Sakralität von Herrschaft: Herrschaftslegitimierung im Wechsel der Zeiten und Räume*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, pp. 85–98.

Sallaberger, W., Volk, K., and Zgoll, A. (eds.) (2003) *Literatur, Politik und Recht in Mesopotamien*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

Sallaberger, W., Westenholz, Å., Attinger, P., and Wäfler, M. (eds.) (1999) *Mesopotamien Akkade-Zeit und Ur III-Zeit*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Salonen, A. (1968) *Agricultura Mesopotamica nach sumerisch-akkadischen Quellen*. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Kirjapaino Oy Helsinki.

Sambursky, S. (1959) *Physics of the Stoics*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Samuel, D. (2000) 'Brewing and Baking', in Nicholson, P. T., and Shaw, I. (eds.) *Ancient Egyptian Materials and Technology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 537–76.

Sarna, N. M. (1991) *The JPS Torah Commentary*. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society.

Sasson, J. M., and Baines, J. (eds.) (1995) *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*. Vol. 2. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Sawyer, J. F. A. (1974) 'The Meaning of בצלם אלהים ("In the Image of God") in Gen 1–11', *The Journal of Theological Studies* 25, pp. 418–26.

Schäfer, P. (2009) *The Origins of Jewish Mysticism*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Scheidel, W., Saller, R. P., and Morris, I. (2007) *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Scheil, V. (1930) 'Nouvelles statues de Gudea', *Revue d'Assyriologie* 27, pp. 163–64.

Schellenberg, A. (2011) *Der Mensch, das Bild Gottes?* Zürich: Theologischer Verlag.

Schenkl, H. (ed.) (1916) *Epicteti Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae*. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.

Schippmann, K. (1969) 'Die Entwicklung Des Iranischen Feuerheiligtums', in Voigt, W. (ed.) *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Supplementa I, Teil 3: XVII. Deutscher Orientalistentag in Würzburg*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, pp. 1021–31.

(1971) *Die iranischen Feuerheiligtümer*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Schneider, M. (2012a) *Scattered Traditions of Jewish Mysticism*. Los Angeles: Cherub Press, in Hebrew.

(2012b) *The Appearance of the High Priest*. Los Angeles: Cherub Press, in Hebrew.

Schott, S. (1964) *Der Denkstein Sethos' I. für die Kapelle Ramses' I. in Abydos*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Schüle, A. (2005) 'Made in the Image of God', *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* 117, pp. 1–20.

Schwartz, M. (1985) 'The Religion of Achaemenian Iran', in Gershevitch, I. (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Iran*. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 664–97.

Schwarz, H. (2013) *The Human Being*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

Schweitzer, A. (1912) *Paul and His Interpreters*. Montgomery, W. (transl.). London: A & C Black.

(1931) *The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle*. Montgomery, W. (transl.). New York: Crossroad.

Schweitzer, U. (1956) *Wesen des Ka in Diesseits und Jenseits der alten Ägypter*. Glückstadt: J. J. Augustin.
(1956) *Wesen des Ka in Diesseits und Jenseits der alten Ägypter*. Glückstadt: J. J. Augustin.
Schwemer, D. (2015) 'Hittite Prayers to the Sun-god for Appeasing an Angry Personal God', in Jaques, M. (ed.) *Mon dieu qu'ai-je fait?* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 349–93.
(2017) 'Hittitology at the Centennial', in Doğan-Alparslan, D., Schachner, A., and Alparslan, M. (eds.) *The Discovery of an Anatolian Empire*. Beyoğlu-İstanbul: Haziran, pp. 295–303.
Schwöbel, C., and Gunton, C. E. (eds.) (1991) *Persons, Divine and Human*. Edinburgh: T & T Clark.
Scurlock, J. (1995) 'Death and the Afterlife in Ancient Mesopotamian Thought', in Sasson, J. M., and Baines, J. (eds.) *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*. Vol. 3. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, pp. 1883–93.
(2002) 'Soul Emplacements in Ancient Mesopotamian Funerary Rituals', in Ciraolo, L., and Seidel, J. (eds.) *Magic and Divination in the Ancient World*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 1–6.
(2016) 'Mortal and Immortal Souls, Ghosts and the (Restless) Dead in Ancient Mesopotamia', *Religion Compass* 10, pp. 77–82.
Scurlock, J., and Andersen, B. R. (2005) *Diagnoses in Assyrian and Babylonian Medicine*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Sedley, D. N. (1997) '"Becoming Like God" in the Timaeus and Aristotle', in Calvo, T., and Brisson, L. (eds.) *Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias*. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, pp. 327–40.
(1999) 'The Ideal of Godlikeness', in Fine, G. (ed.) *Plato* 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 309–28.
(2008) 'Atomism's Eleatic Roots', in Curd, P., and Graham, D. W. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 305–32.
Segal, A. F. (1994) *Life After Death*. New York: Doubleday.
Sellars, J. (ed.) (2016) *The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition*. London: Routledge.
Selz, G. (1997) 'The Holy Drum, the Spear, and the Harp', in Finkel, I. L., and Geller, M. J. (eds.) *Sumerian Gods and Their Representations*. Groningen: Styx Publications, pp. 167–213.
(1998) 'Über Mesopotamische Herrschaftskonzepte', in Dietrich, M., and Loretz, O. (eds.) *dubsar anta-men, Studien zur Altorientalistik*. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, pp. 281–344.
(2000) 'Der sogenannte "geflügelte Tempel" und die "Himmelfahrt" der Herrscher', in Graziani, S., Cagni, L., Lacerenza, G., and Casaburi, M. C. (eds.) *Studi sul Vicino Oriente antico dedicati alla memoria de Luigi Cagni*. Napoli: Istituto Universitario Orientale, pp. 961–83.
(2008) 'The Divine Prototypes', in Brisch, N. (ed.) *Religion and Power*. Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, pp. 13–31.
Sethe, K. (1908) *Die Altägyptischen Pyramidentexte Pyramidentexte nach den Papierabdrücken und Photographien des Berliner Museums*. Leipzig: Hinrichs.

(1964 [1928]) *Das 'Denkmal memphitischer Theologie'*. Hildesheim: Olms.
Sethe, K. (ed.) (1909) *Urkunden Der 18. Dynastie*. Vol. IV. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs.
Shafer, B. E. (ed.) (1991) *Religion in Ancient Egypt*. London: Routledge.
Shahbazi, A. S. (1974) 'An Achaemenid Symbol I', *Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran* 7, pp. 135–44.
(1980) 'An Achaemenid Symbol II', *Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran* 13, pp. 119–47.
Shaked, S. (1984) 'Iranian Influence on Judaism', in Davies, W. D., and Finkelstein, L. (eds.) *The Cambridge History of Judaism*. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 308–25.
(1987) 'First Man, First King', in Shaked, S., Shulman, D., and Stroumsa, G. G. (eds.) *Gilgul*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 238–56.
(1991) 'Aspects of Iranian Religion in the Achaemenian Period', in Modi, H. N. (ed.) *K. R. Cama Oriental Institute*. Bombay: K. R. Cama Oriental Institute, pp. 90–100.
(1994) *Dualism in Transformation*. London: SOAS.
(1999) 'Quests and Visionary Journeys in Sasanian Iran', in Assmann, J., and Sroumsa, G. G. (eds.) *Transformations of the Inner Self in Ancient Religions*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 65–86.
Shaked, S., Shulman, D., and Stroumsa, G. G. (eds.) (1987) *Gilgul*. Leiden: Brill.
Shalom, M. P., Ben-David, E., and Tov, E. (eds.) (2003) *Emanuel*. Leiden: Brill.
Shaples, R. W., and Sheppard, A. D. R. (eds.) (2003) *Ancient Approaches to Plato's Timaeus*. London: Institute of Classical Studies, University of London.
Sharples, R. W. (1996) *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*. London: Routledge.
Shaw, I. (2000) *The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(2003) *Exploring Ancient Egypt*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shields, C. (1988) 'Soul and Body in Aristotle', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 6, pp. 103–37.
(2009) 'The Priority of Soul in Aristotle's De Anima', in Frede, D., and Reis, B. (eds.) *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 156–68.
(2016) *Aristotle's De Anima*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Shields, C. (ed.) (2012) *The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shulman, D., and Stroumsa, G. G. (eds.) (2002) *Self and Self-Transformation in the History of Religions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Siamak, A. (ed.) (2003) *Paitimāna*. Costa Mesa: Mazda.
Silverman, D. P. (1991) 'Divinities and Deities in Ancient Egypt', in Shafer, B. E. (ed.) *Religion in Ancient Egypt*. London: Routledge, pp. 7–87.
(1995) 'The Nature of Egyptian Kingship', in O'Connor, D. B., and Silverman, D. P. (eds.) *Ancient Egyptian Kingship*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 49–92.
Silverman, J. M. (2014) *Persepolis and Jerusalem*. London: T & T Clark.
(2015) 'Assessing Persian Kingship in the Ancient Near East', in Waerzeggers, C., and Silverman, J. M. (eds.) *Political Memory in and after the Persian Empire*. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, pp. 1–6.

(2016) 'Was There an Achaemenid "Theology" of Kingship?', in Edelman, D., Fitzpatrick-McKinley, A., and Guillaume, P. (eds.) *Religion in the Achaemenid Persian Empire*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp. 172–96.
(2017) 'Achaemenid Creation and Second Isaiah', *Journal of Persianate Studies* 10, pp. 26–48.
Silverman, J. M., and Waerzeggers, C. (eds.) (2015) *Political Memory in and after the Persian Empire*. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature Press.
Simkins, R. A. (1994) *Creator and Creation*. Peabody: Hendrickson.
Simons, P. (1987) *Parts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Singer, I. (2002) *Hittite Prayers*. Hoffner, Jr., H. A. (ed.). Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.
Skinner, J. (1910) *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis*. Edinburgh: T & T Clark.
Skjærvø, P. O. (ed./transl.) (2011) *The Spirit of Zoroastrianism*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Skjærvø, P. O. (2005) 'The Achaemenids and the *Avesta*', in Curtis, V. S., and Stewart, S. (eds.) *Birth of the Persian Empire*. Vol. 1. London: Tauris, pp. 52–84.
(2011) 'Zoroastrian Dualism', in Lange, A. (ed.) *Light against Darkness*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 55–91.
(2014) 'Achaemenid Religion', *Religion Compass* 8, no. 6, pp. 175–87.
Skolnik, F., and Berenbaum, M. (eds.) (2007) *Encyclopedia Judaica*. 22 vols. 2nd ed. Detroit: Macmillan Reference.
Smith, C. (2010) *What Is a Person?* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Smith, J. P. (1998) *A Compendious Syriac Dictionary*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
Smith, M. S. (1988) 'Divine Form and Size in Ugaritic and Pre-exilic Israelite Religion', *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* 100, pp. 424–47.
(2001) *The Origins of Biblical Monotheism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(2016) *Where the Gods Are*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Snell, D. C. (1988) *A Workbook of Cuneiform Signs*. Malibu: Undena.
(1997) *Life in the Ancient Near East, 3100–332 B.C.E.* New Haven: Yale University Press.
(2001) *Flight and Freedom in the Ancient Near East*. Leiden: Brill.
Snell, D. C. (ed.) (2005a) *A Companion to the Ancient Near East*. Malden: Blackwell.
(2005b) 'The Invention of the Individual', in Snell, D. C. (ed.) *A Companion to the Ancient Near East*. Malden: Blackwell, pp. 357–69.
(2011) *Religions of the Ancient Near East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(2013) *Ancient Near East*. London: Routledge.
Soja, E. M. (1996) *Thirdspace*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Somers, H. H. (1955) 'The Riddle of a Plural (Gen 1:26)', *Folia* 9, 63–101.
Sommer, B. (2009) *The Bodies of God and the World of Ancient Israel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sonik, K. (2015) 'Divine (Re)-Presentation', in Pongratz-Leisten, B., and Sonik, K. (eds.) *The Materiality of Divine Agency*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 162–93.

Sørensen, J. (2007) *A Cognitive Theory of Magic*. Lanham: AltaMira Press.
Soudavar, A. (2003) *The Aura of Kings*. Costa Mesa: Mazda.
(2009) *The Great Dedicatory Inscription of Ramesses II at Abydos*. Leiden: Brill.
Speiser, E. A. (1969) 'The Creation Epic', in Pritchard, J. B. (ed.) *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 60–72.
(2011) 'The Creation Epic (Enuma elish)', in Pritchard, J. B. (ed.) *The Ancient Near East*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 28–36.
Spence, L. (2005) *Myths & Legends of Ancient Egypt*. New York: Barnes & Noble Press.
Spiegel, A. D., and Springer, C. R. (1997) 'Babylonian Medicine, Managed Care and Codex Hammurabi, circa 1700 B.C.', *Journal of Community Health* 22, pp. 69–89.
Stalley, R. F. (1996) 'Punishment and the Physiology of the Timaeus', *Church Quarterly New Series* 46, pp. 357–70.
Stanley, I. (1975) *The Gathas of Zarathustra*. Leiden: Brill.
Stausberg, M., Vevaina, Y. S.-D., and Tessmann, A. (eds.) (2015) *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Zoroastrianism*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
Steinert, U. (2012) *Aspecte des Menschseins im Alten Mesopotamien*. Leiden: Brill.
Steinkeller, P. (2003) 'An Ur III. Manuscript of the Sumerian King List', in Sallaberger, W., Volk, K., and Zgoll, A. (eds.) *Literatur, Politik und Recht in Mesopotamien: Festschrift für Claus Wilcke*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, pp. 267–92.
Stendebach, F. J. (2010) 'צלם', in Botterweck, G. J., Ringgren, H., and Fabry, H.-J. (eds.), Stott, D. W. (transl) *Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament*. Vol. 12. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, pp. 386–96.
Stiebing, Jr., W. H. (2016) *Ancient Near Eastern History and Culture*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.
Stökl Ben Ezra, D. (2003) *The Impact of Yom Kippur on Early Christianity*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Stol, M. (1986) 'Blindness and Night-blindness in Akkadian', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 45, pp. 295–99.
(2000) *Birth in Babylonia and the Bible*. Groningen: Styx.
Stone, M. (ed.) (1984) *Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Stoneman, R. (1997) *Alexander the Great*. 1st ed. London: Routledge.
(2004) *Alexander the Great*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.
(2010) *Alexander the Great*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
(2012) *Legends of Alexander the Great*. London: Tauris.
Strack, H. L., and Stemberger, G. (1991) *Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash*. 2nd ed. Bockmuehl, M. (ed./transl.). Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
Stronach, D. (1984) 'Notes on Religion in Iran in the Seventh and Sixth Centuries B.C.', in Duchesne-Guillemin, J. (ed.) *Orientalia J. Duchesne-Guillemin emerito oblata*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 479–90.
(1985) 'On the Evolution of the Early Iranian Fire Temple', in Duchesne-Guillemin, J., and Lecoq, P. (eds.) *Papers in Honour of Professor Mary Boyce*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 605–27.

Stroumsa, G. G. (2003) 'A Nameless God', in Tomson, P. J., and Lambers-Petry, D. (eds.) *The Image of the Judaeo-Christians in Ancient Jewish and Christian Literature*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, pp. 230–44.
Stuckenbruck, L. T. (1995) *Angel Veneration and Christology*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Suriano, M. J. (2010) *The Politics of Dead Kings*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Talon, P. (2005) *The Standard Babylonian Creation Myth Enuma Eliš*. Helsinki: Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project.
Taracha, P. (2009) *Religions of Second Millennium Anatolia*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
Taylor, C. (1989) *Sources of the Self*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Taylor, J. (2003) 'The Third Intermediate Period', in Shaw, I. (ed.) *The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 324–63.
Taylor, J. H. (2001) *Death and the Afterlife in Ancient Egypt*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Taylor, T. (ed./transl.) (1986 [1818]) *Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras*. Rochester: Inner Traditions International.
Te Velde, H. (1982) 'Commemoration in Ancient Egypt', in van Baaren, T. P. (ed.) *Commemorative Figures*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 135–53.
Teall, E. K. (2014) 'Medicine and Doctoring in Ancient Mesopotamia', *Grand Valley Journal of History* 3, pp. 1–8.
Terrien, S. (1978) *The Elusive Presence*. New York: Harper & Row.
Thiessen, M. (2013) 'The Rock Was Christ', *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 36, pp. 103–26.
Thomas, N. W. (1920) 'What is the KA?', *The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 6, pp. 265–73.
Thomassen, B. (2009) 'The Uses and Meanings of Liminality', *International Political Anthropology* 2, pp. 5–28.
(2012) 'Revisiting Liminality', in Andrews, H., and Roberts, L. (eds.) *Liminal Landscapes*. London: Routledge, pp. 21–35.
Thompson, J. (2008) *A History of Egypt*. New York: Anchor Books.
Thunberg, L. (1985) 'The Human Person As Image of God. I', in McGinn, B., Meyendorff, J., and Leclercq, J. (eds.) *Christian Spirituality*. New York: Crossroad, pp. 291–312.
Tieleman, T. L. (2014) 'The Spirit of Stoicism', in Frey, J., and Levison, J. R. (eds.) *The Holy Spirit, Inspiration, and the Cultures of Antiquity*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 291–312.
Todd, R. B. (ed.) (1976) *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics*. Leiden: Brill.
Torrance, A. J. (1996) *Persons in Communion*. Edinburgh: T & T Clark.
Trostyanskiy, S. (2016) *St. Cyril of Alexandria's Metaphysics of the Incarnation*. New York: Peter Lang.
Trümpelmann, L. (1991) *Zwischen Persepolis und Firuzabad*. Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern.
Tuan, Y.-F. (1977) *Space and Place*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Tuplin, C. (1996) *Achaemenid Studies*. Stuttgart: Steiner.
Turner, H. W. (1979) *From Temple to Meeting House*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Turner, J. D., and Corrigan, K. (eds.) (2010) *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage*. Vol. 1. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.
Turner, V. W. (1970) *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual*. 13th ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
(1973) 'The Center Out There', *History of Religions* 12, pp. 191–230.
(1974) *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Turner, V. W., and Turner, E. (1978) *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tylor, E. B. (1958 [1871]) *Primitive Culture*. Vol. 1. New York: Harper & Row.
Ullmann, M. (2002) *König für die Ewigkeit – Die Häuser der Millionen von Jahren*. Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz.
van de Mieroop, M. (1999) *The Ancient Mesopotamian City*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(2011) *A History of Ancient Egypt*. 11th ed. London: Blackwell.
van den Berg, R. M. (2003) 'Becoming like God according to Proclus' Interpretations of the Timaeus, the Eleusinian Mysteries, and the Chaldean Oracles', in Sharples, R. W., and Sheppard, A. D. R. (eds.) *Ancient Approaches to Plato's Timaeus*. London: Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, pp. 189–202.
van den Hout, T. (1995) 'Tuṯalija IV. und die Ikonographie hethitischer Großkönige des 13. Jhs.', *Bibliotheca Orientalis* 52, pp. 545–73.
van der Ploeg, J. P. M., and Delsman, W. C. (1982) *Von Kanaan bis Kerala*. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag.
van der Toorn, K. (1997) 'Worshipping Stone', *Journal of Northwest Semitic Languages* 23, pp. 1–14.
van der Toorn, K., and van Koppen, F. (1999) 'Soil, אדמה', in van der Toorn, K., Becking, B., and van der Horst, P. W. (eds.) *Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible*. 2nd rev. ed. Leiden: Brill, pp. 785–87.
van Gennep, A. (1909) *Les Rites de Passage*. Paris: Emile Nourry.
van Kooten, G. H. (2003) *Cosmic Christology in Paul and the Pauline School*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
(2008) *Paul's Anthropology in Context*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Virolleaud, C. (1968) 'Les nouveaux textes mythologiques et liturgiques de Ras Shamra (XXIV campagne, 1961)', in Nougayrol, J. (ed.) *Ugaritica 5*. Paris: Geunther, pp. 545–606.
Voigt, W. (ed.) (1969) *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Supplementa I, Teil 3*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
von Rad, G. (1961) *Genesis*. Marks, J. H. (transl.). London: SCM Press.
von Staden, H. (2000) 'Body, Soul, and Nerves', in Wright, J. P., and Potter, P. (eds.) *Psyche and Soma*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 79–116.
Vriezen, T. C. (1943) 'La création de l'homme d'après l'image de Dieu', *Oud Testamentische Studiën* 2, pp. 87–105.
Walbank, F. W. (1984) 'Sources for the Period', in Walbank, F. W., Astin, A. E., Frederiksen, M. W., and Ogilvie, R. M. (eds.) *The Cambridge Ancient History*. Vol. 7. Part 1. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–22.
Walbank, F. W., Astin, A. E., Frederiksen, M. W., and Ogilvie, R. M. (eds.) (1984) *The Cambridge Ancient History*. Vol. 7. Part 1. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Walker, C., and Dick, M. B. (1999) 'The Induction of the Cult Image in Ancient Mesopotamia', in Dick, M. B. (ed.) *Born in Heaven, Made on Earth*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, pp. 55–122.
(2001) *The Induction of the Cult Image in Ancient Mesopotamia*. Helsinki: Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project.
Walton, J. H. (1989) *Ancient Israelite Literature in Its Cultural Context*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan.
(2009) *The Lost World of Genesis One*. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press.
(2011) *Genesis 1 As Ancient Cosmology*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
Wardle, T. S. (2010) *The Jerusalem Temple and Early Christian Identity*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Warren, J. (ed.) (2010) *The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Waters, M. (2014) *Ancient Persia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Watson, W. G. E., and Wyatt, N. (eds.) (1999) *Handbook of Ugaritic Studies*. Leiden: Brill.
Weinfeld, M. (1995) 'כבוד', in Botterweck, G. J., and Ringgren, H. (eds.) *Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament*. Vol. 7. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, pp. 22–38.
Wenham, G. J. (1987) *Genesis 1–15*. Grand Rapids: Zondervan.
Werro, N. (2015) *Fuzzy Classification of Online Customers*. Cham: Springer.
West, M. L. (2010) *The Hymns of Zoroaster*. London: Tauris.
(2011) *Old Avestan Syntax and Stylistics*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
(2013) *Hellenica*. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Westenholz, Å. (1999) 'The Old Akkadian Period', in Sallaberger, W., Westenholz, Å., Attinger, P., and Wäfler, M. (eds.) *Mesopotamien Akkade-Zeit und Ur III-Zeit*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 17–117.
Westenholz, J. G. (1997) *Legends of the Kings of Akkade*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
Westermann, C. (1994) *Genesis 1–11*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
Widengren, G. (1965) *Die Religionen Irans*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
(1969) 'The Death of Gayōmart', in Eliade, M., Kitagawa, J. M., and Long, C. H. (eds.) *Myths and Symbols*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 179–93.
Wiggins, S. A. (2007) *A Reassessment of Asherah*. Piscataway: Gorgias Press.
Wilcke, C. (1988) 'König Shulgis Himmelfahrt', *Müncher Beiträge zur Völkerkunde* 1, pp. 245–55.
(2002) 'Vom göttlichen Wesen des Königtums und seinem Ursprung im Himmel', in Erkens, F.-R. (ed.) *Die Sakralität von Herrschaft. Herrschaftslegitimierung im Wechsel der Zeiten und Räume*. Berlin: Akademie, pp. 63–83.
Wilcken, U. (1967) *Alexander the Great*. Richards, G. C. (transl.). London: Norton & Co.
Wildberger, H. (1965) 'Das Abbild Gottes', *Theologische Zeitschrift* 21, pp. 245–59.
(1997) 'צלם', in Jenni, E., and Westermann, C. (eds.), Biddle, M. E. (transl.) *Theological Lexicon of the Old Testament*. Volume 3. Peabody: Hendrickson, pp. 1080–85.

Wildung, D. (1972) 'Ramses, die große Sonne Ägyptens', *Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde* 99, pp. 33–41.
Wilkinson, R. H. (2000) *The Complete Temples of Ancient Egypt*. London: Thames & Hudson.
(2017) *The Complete Gods and Goddesses of Ancient Egypt*. London: Thames & Hudson.
Wilkinson, T. A. H. (1999) *Early Dynastic Egypt*. London: Routledge.
(2005) *The Thames & Hudson Dictionary of Ancient Egypt*. London: Thames & Hudson.
(2007a) *Lives of the Ancient Egyptians*. London: Thames & Hudson.
(2007b) *The Egyptian World*. New York: Routledge.
(2011) *The Rise and Fall of Ancient Egypt*. New York: Random House.
Williams, A. V. (1985) 'A Strange Account of the World's Origin', *Acta Iranica, Papers in Honor of Mary Boyce* 25, pp. 683–97.
(1990) *The Pahlavi Rivāyat Accompanying the Dādestān ī dēnīg*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
Williams, R. J. (1969) *'Some Egyptianisms in the Old Testament', in Studies in Honor of John A. Wilson*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp 93–98.
Wilson, R. M. (1957) 'The Early History of the Exegesis of Gen 1:26', *Studia Patristica* 1, pp. 420–37.
Wilson, H. (1988) *Egyptian Food and Drink*. Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire: Shire.
Wilson, J. A. (1946) 'Egypt', in Frankfort, H., Groenewegen-Frankfort, H. A., Wilson, J. A., Jacobsen, T., and Irwin, W. A. (eds.) *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 31–61.
(1969) 'Egyptian Myths, Tales, and Mortuary Texts', in Pritchard, J. B. (ed.) *Ancient Near Eastern Texts*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 4–6.
Winter, I. J. (1989) 'The Body of the Able Ruler', in Behrens, H., Loding, D., and Roth, M. T. (eds.) *DUMU-E²-DUB-BA-A*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum, pp. 573–83.
(1992) 'Idols of the King', *Journal of Ritual Studies* 6, pp. 13–42.
(1996) 'Sex, Rhetoric and the Public Monument', in Kampen, N. B., and Bergmann, B. A. (eds.) *Sexuality in Ancient Art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 11–26.
(1997) 'Art in Empire', in Parpola, S. and Whiting, R. M. (eds.) *Assyria 1995*. Helsinki: The Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project, pp. 359–81.
(2008) 'Touched by the Gods', in Brisch, N. (ed.) *Religion and Power*. Chicago: The University of Chicago, pp. 75–101.
Wolff, H. W., and von Rad, G. (eds.) (1971) *Probleme biblischer Theologie*. Munich: Kaiser Verlag.
Wood, R., and Weisberg, M. (2004) 'Interpreting Aristotle on Mixture', *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science* 35, pp. 681–706.
Woolley, C. L. (1935) *The Development of Sumerian Art*. London: Faber and Faber.
Worman, N. (2009) 'Bodies and Topographies in Ancient Stylistic Theory', in Fögen, T., and Lee, M. (eds.) *Bodies and Boundaries in Graeco-Roman Antiquity*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 45–62.

Worthington, I. (2004) *Alexander the Great*. London: Pearson.
(2010) *Philip II of Macedonia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Worthington, I. (ed.) (2006) *Alexander the Great*. 1st ed. London: Routledge.
(ed.) (2012) *Alexander the Great*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge.
Worthington, J. D. (2011) *Creation in Paul and Philo*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Wright, N. T. (1992) *The New Testament and the People of God*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
(2003) *The Resurrection of the Son of God*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
Wyatt, N. (2002) *Religious Texts from Ugarit*. 2nd ed. London: T & T Clark.
(2010) *The Archaeology of Myth*. London: Routledge.
Yamamoto, Y. (1979) 'The Zoroastrian Temple Cult of Fire in Archaeology and Literature (I)' *Orient* 15, pp. 19–53.
(1981) 'The Zoroastrian Temple Cult of Fire in Archaeology and Literature (II)', *Orient* 17, pp. 67–104.
Yamazaki, N. (2003) *Zaubersprüche für Mutter und Kind*. Berlin: Achet.
Yardeni, A. (1991) 'Remarks on the Priestly Blessing on Two Ancient Amulets from Jerusalem', *Vetus Testamentum* 41, pp. 176–85.
Yarshater, E. (ed.) (1983) *The Cambridge History of Iran*. Vol. 3(1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Young, G. D. (ed.) (1981) *Ugarit in Retrospect*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
Younger, K. L. (ed.) (2007) *Ugarit at Seventy-Five*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.
Žabkar, L. V. (1954) 'The Theocracy of Amarna and the Doctrine of the Ba', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 13, pp. 87–101.
(1968) *A Study of the Ba Concept in Ancient Egyptian Texts*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Zadeh, L. A. (1965) 'Fuzzy Sets', *Information and Control* 8, pp. 338–53.
(1973) 'Outline of a New Approach to the Analysis of Complex Systems and Decision Processes', *IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics* 3, pp. 28–44.
(2005) 'From Imprecise to Granular Probabilities', *Fuzzy Sets and Systems* 154, pp. 370–74.
Zaehner, R. C. (1972 [1955]) *Zurvan*. New York: Biblo and Tannen.
Zeindler, M., Graf, M., and Mathwi, F. (eds.) (2004) *Was ist der Mensch?* Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
Zevit, Z. (2001) *The Religions of Ancient Israel*. New York: Continuum.
Zgoll, A. (2014) 'Dreams As Gods and Gods in Dreams', in Sjöberg, Å. W., Sassmannshausen, L., and Neumann, G. (eds.) *He Has Opened Nisaba's House of Learning*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 299–314.
Zimmermann, H.-J. (1987) *Fuzzy Sets, Decision Making, and Expert Systems*. Dordrecht: Springer.
(2010) 'Fuzzy Set Theory', *WIREs Computational Statistics* 2, pp. 317–32.
Zizioulas, J. (1985) *Being As Communion*. London: Darton, Longmann and Todd.

Index

Abbild, 11
Abitz, F., 38
Abraham, 14, 48, 118
Absalom, 123
Abu Simbel, 42–44, 46
Abusch, T., 49, 61–62, 64
Abydos, 19, 40
Acemhöyük, 105
Achaemenid, 14, 119, 165–67, 189
Achilles, 161–62
Ackrill, J., 176
Adam, 138, 143, 149–52
Addie, xii
Adkins, A., 175–76
Ahab, 126
Ahura Mazdā, 166
Akdoğan, R., 111
Akkad, 77–78
Akkadian, 12, 50, 52, 59, 63, 66, 68, 77, 90, 102, 128, 143–44, 146
Al-Bīrūnī, 151
Albright, W., 128
Alexander of Aphrodisius, 186
Alexander the Great, 14, 159–60, 175, 189, 193
Alexandria, 171
Algra, K., 178
Allen, J., 23, 27
Allen, S., 123–25
Alliot, M., 34
Al-Rawi, F., 148
Altar, 41, 92, 106, 127, 133, 163
Altenmüller, H., 35
Amar-Sîn, 80
Amen, 17, 21, 42, 162, 166
Amenhotep III, 42, 45, 147
Amen-Ra, 21, 162, 166
Amiet, P., 77–78
Ammon, 162–63
Anat, 114
Anatolia, 2, 12, 84–86, 89, 94, 97, 100, 102, 118, 191
Anaximenes of Miletus, 168
Ancient Near East, 2, 9, 11–12, 53, 116, 118, 130, 140, 158, 190, 198
Anderson, B., 137
Angerstorfer, A., 144–45
Anklesaria, B., 151
Annas, J., 173, 175
anthropology, 8
Anubis, 31
Anum, 81
Anunna, 60
Apsu, 52, 58
Aquinas, 135
Aramaic, 12, 122, 138, 144
Argead, 161
Arinna, 95
Aristotle, 170, 175–77
Armstrong, G., 139
Armstrong, J., 171–73
Arnold, D., 14
Arnuwanda, 95
Arrian, 162–63
Asa, 127
Asherah, 122, 124, 126–29
Ashtart, 122
Ashurbanipal, 52

Asmunikal, 95
assimilation, 171
Assmann, J., 31, 37, 46
Assyrian, 59
Aštar, 78
Aster, S., 75–76
Aten, 41
Athens, 181
Athtarat, 114
Atraḫasīs, 52–53, 59–65, 67–68, 90
Atum, 17, 23–26, 29, 32
Augustine, 135, 197
Augustus Caesar, 160
Awilu, 62, 64–66
Axial Age, 12, 159

ba, 29, 115
Baal, 115, 122, 126
Babylon, 54, 167
Babylonian, 59–60
Bachvarova, M., 84
Badawy, A., 41
Baden, J., 120
Badian, E., 161–63
Bahrani, Z., 149, 152
Bailey, C., 179–80
Baines, J., 42
Balsdon, J., 161, 164
Baltzly, D., 172
Barnes, J., 175
Barr, J., 135, 145
Barrick, 84
Barth, K., 8, 136
Baryshnikov, 79
Bassetki Statue, 77
Baudissin, W., 131
Baumgarten, A., 131
Baumgartner, W., 138
Beck, P., 124
Beckman, G., 85, 101–2, 104–6, 111–12, 116
Beersheba, 132
Bell, L., 17, 34, 36–37, 40, 46, 136
Benson, H., 170
Benzel, K., 71
Berlev, O., 37
Bernbeck, R., 77, 80
Bertman, S., 48
Betegh, G., 178
Bethel, 133
Bible, 1, 14, 39, 118–21, 134, 137, 140, 147, 197
biblical, 137
Bieber, M., 163
Bild, 11
Bilolo, M., 16
Bird, P., 137, 145, 153
Bittel, K., 105
Blackman, A., 35
Blackwell, B., 8, 158
Blending, 186–88
blood, 57
Boardman, J., 156
Bodine, J., 25
body, 17, 72, 74, 91, 150, 171
Boessneck, J., 105
Bolshakov, A., 17, 35, 37
Bolton, R., 175
bond, 68, 70
Bordreuil, P., 142, 144
Borsch, F., 116
Bosworth, A., 161–64
Bousset, W., 7
Bowden, H., 163
Brandon, S., 16, 139
Breasted, J., 24–25
Briant, P., 166
Brisch, N., 75, 80, 83
Brisson, L., 186
Brown, P., 3
Brueggemann, W., 134, 137, 145
Brunner, H., 38, 62
Brunt, P., 162
Bryan, B., 140
Bryce, T., 84, 97
Buchheit, V., 181
Budge, E., 17, 29
building, 50, 85
bull, 109
Burney, C., 84
Burnyeat, M., 177
Burstein, S., 156
Byers, A., 8

Caminos, R., 31
Cammarosano, M., 97–98
Canaan, 114, 116, 118, 127
Canaanites, 84, 114, 116, 129
Caquot, A., 115
Carney, E., 161–62
Carone, G., 173
Cartledge, P., 156, 162–64
Carus, P., 78

Cassin, E., 75–76
celestial, 139
Cereti, C., 151
Chaniotis, A., 160, 162–63
Charles, D., 177
Christ, 8, 113, 116, 136, 197
Christian, 8, 31, 113, 139, 158, 161, 196–97
Christianity, 7, 158, 197
Chrysippus, 182, 185–86, 188
Church Fathers, 8, 160, 197
Cleanthes, 182
Clifford, R., 53, 62, 142
Clines, D., 137, 153
Cohen, M., 81
Cohen, S., 63
Collins, A., 162
Collins, B., 84, 94, 96–98, 101, 131, 149
Collins, C., 145
composite, 37
constituent, 17
contagion, 35
contemplation, 174
Cook, J., 150
Cooper, J., 77, 81
Cordani, V., 89
Cornell, T., 156
Cornford, F., 168
Cortez, M., 8
cosmogony, 86
cosmos, 16, 26–27, 69
Coulston, J., 156
Creager, H., 150
create, 60
creation, 16–17, 56, 60, 62, 86
Crouch, C., 53, 144
cult objects, 95, 134, 194
cuneiform, 50
Curd, P., 167
curse, 77

daemon, 184
Dagān, 78
Dalley, S., 48, 59
Damm, B., 102
Darga, M., 98
Darnell, J., 18
Daryaee, T., 151
David, 120, 123
Davies, B., 24
Davies, P., 144
Day, J., 126, 128
de Cenival, J., 40
de Lacy, P., 178
de Moor, J., 115
de Pury, A., 131, 134
de Rochemonteix, M., 30, 32
de Roos, J., 86
de Vogel, C., 171
de Wit, C., 30, 35
Deanne-Drummond, C., 136
death, 101
deification, 94, 157, 173
Deimel, A., 52
del Olmo Lete, G., 114–15
Delitzsch, F., 135
demand, 156
Detienne, M., 168
Deurloo, A., 132
Dever, W., 124
Diakonoff, I., 48
Dick, M., 71, 80, 83, 116, 147–48, 150
Diels, H., 168
Dietrich, M., 51, 64, 97, 114–15
Dijkstra, M., 64, 124
Dion, P.-E., 142
divine, 9–10, 26, 42, 46, 65, 74, 77–78, 93, 116, 122, 138, 145, 152, 160, 191
Divine Embodiment Model, 10
divinity, 101, 161, 167, 170
Documentary Hypothesis, 120
Dodge, H., 156
Dohmen, C., 142, 144
Donlan, W., 156
Donner, H., 123
Douglas, M., 3
Dozeman, T., 120
Dreyer, B., 161
drinking, 109
Drozdek, A., 170
Dunderberg, I., 186
Dur-an-ki, 67–70, 72, 74, 83, 152
Durkheim, É., 35, 107

Ea, 53, 56–57, 78
Early Dynastic Period, 23
Eaton-Krauss, M., 20
Ebeling, E., 148
Echavarren, A., 101–2
Eden, 149
Edfu, 30, 32
Edmunds, L., 162

Edwards, I., 24
Edzard, D., 141
Egypt, 2, 11, 14, 16, 20, 23, 29, 38–39, 42, 44, 56, 73, 77, 79, 86, 89, 93, 100, 102, 118, 142, 147, 153, 163, 166, 189–90
Ehnunna, 80
Ehrenberg, E., 75
18th Dynasty, 19
eighth c., 48, 119, 124, 126, 128, 156, 196
Einwohnung, 31
Ekur, 70–71, 73
El, 115, 133
El Hawary, A., 25
El-Elohe-Israel, 133
elephantine, 132
Elohists, 119
embodied, 45, 99, 150, 168
embodiment, 9–10, 74, 95, 97, 120
Emelianov, V., 75–76
Emersio, 51
Empedocles, 168–69
empire, 98, 102
emplacement, 4
Engberg-Pedersen, T., 182
Enki, 57–60, 62, 71–72
Enlil, 60, 67–68, 70, 72, 77–78, 80, 82
Ennead, 27
Enuma Eliš, 52–53, 56–58, 62, 67–69, 90
Epictetus, 183
Epicurean, 179
Epicurus, 178–79, 181
Erdkamp, P., 156
Eridu, 78
Erman, A., 25
Esarhaddon, 122, 132
escape, 173
Eucharist, 113
Euphrates, 55, 71
existence, 7
eye, 18
Eye of Ra, 18

Farber, G., 67
Farber, W., 77
Farnell, L., 160
fashion, 21
Ferguson, E., 188
Festugiere, A.-J., 172–73
Field, H., 67
fifth c., 132
5th Dynasty, 35
Fildes, A., 163
Fine, G., 180
Finet, A., 48
Finkelberg, A., 173
first c., 1, 12, 156, 159, 197
First Intermediate Period, 19
first mill., 52, 76, 81, 127, 156, 159
Fisher, L., 142
Flannery, K., 187
flesh, 68–69
Fletcher, J., 163
Fletcher-Louis, C., 5, 7, 150
fluidity, 120
forge, 88–90, 117, 152
Formatio, 51
Forrer, E., 84
Fossum, J., 138
Foster, B., 48–49, 59–61, 63–64, 66
Foucault, M., 3–6
Four, 102
Fox, R., 162–63
fragment, 183
Fraktin, 104, 106–7
Franke, S., 77
Fratantuono, L., 178
Frazer, J., 35
Frede, M., 177
Fredricksmeyer, E., 161–62, 164, 166
Freund, P., 16
Frey, C., 175
Furley, D., 178–79
fusion, 185–88

Gaidhu, A., 3
Gaifman, M., 131, 133
Gardiner, A., 38, 42
Gardner, H., 44
Garr, W., 138–40, 143–44
Gav, 151
Gayōmard, 151
Geb, 29
Gelb, I., 77
Geller, S., 62
Genesis, 132, 135, 140–41, 143
George, A., 51, 55, 68, 81–82, 148
George, E., 68
Gerson, L., 181
Gertz, J., 120
Geshur, 123
Geyer, J., 55

Gišnumunab, 55
Giusfredi, F., 92
Giza, 35
Gnoli, G., 165–66
God, 1–2, 7–8, 10, 38, 42, 77, 100, 112, 119–20, 126, 128, 130–40, 142–43, 145, 147, 149–55, 165, 170–74, 176–77, 182–85, 189, 192, 196–97
Goddess, 27, 89
Goddess of the Night, 98
gods, 25, 27, 29, 38, 61, 75, 93, 96, 101, 107, 111–12, 194–95, 198
Goebs, K., 18
Goedegebuure, P., 98, 108
Goff, M., 81
Goldsworthy, A., 160
Golitzin, A., 150
Gomes, J., 131–32
good, 67, 172–73
Gorman, M., 158
Götze, A., 101, 104
Gould, J., 188
Gradel, I., 157
Graeco-Roman, 156, 159–60
Graesser, C., 131, 134
Graf, M., 8
Graham, D., 167–69
Granger, H., 175
Gray, J., 114
Greece, 2, 156, 167, 193
Greek, 12, 84, 93, 138, 156–57, 159–60, 162, 166, 170, 172, 176, 181, 189, 193
Green, P., 161–62
Greenbaum, D., 168
Grenet, F., 152
Greven, L., 17
Griffin, J., 156
Groddek, D., 111
Gross, W., 137
Gudea, 80, 141
Gulš, 86, 88, 90
Gunkel, H., 135, 139, 144
Gunton, C., 8
Gurney, O., 97, 101, 112, 131
Güterbock, H., 87–88, 97, 105, 109
Gvelesiani, M., 166

Haas, V., 85–86, 95, 104
Habachi, L., 39, 43–44
Habicht, C., 161
Hadad, 122
Hadd-Yith'i, 144
Hadley, J., 124, 126
Hadot, I., 185–86
Hamilton, J., 163
Hammond, N., 161–62
Hamori, E., 9
Haran, 132
Harper, P., 77
Harper, R., 76
Harrison, V., 8
Hartman, E., 175
Hassan, A., 41
Hathor, 45
Hatshepsut, 21–22
Hattic, 85
Hattusa, 84
Ḫattušili III, 95, 104
Hawkins, J., 92
Hays, H., 23
Hazenbos, J., 101
heaven, 68, 70, 100, 120
Hebrew Bible, 120
Hebron, 122–23
Heckel, W., 161
Heffron, Y., 105–6, 108–9
Heinaman, R., 175
Heket, 22
Heliopolis, 16, 23
Helios, 163
Heracles, 161–62
Heraclitus, 182
Hercules, 178
Hermopolis, 16
Herrenschmidt, C., 151
Herring, S., 10, 41, 79, 119, 126–27, 135–37, 141–43, 149–50, 152–54
heterotopia, 6, 27, 33, 74, 100, 170, 174, 188, 195
Hezekiah, 127
Hicks, R., 177
High Priest, 7
Himmelfarb, M., 7
Hintze, A., 165
Hippolytus, 169
Hittite, 12, 84, 86, 106, 131, 156, 191
Hoekema, A., 137
Hoffmeier, J., 19, 21, 149
Hoffner, H., 86, 88, 96
Holy of Holies, 7
Homer, 93, 183
Homo sapiens, 1

Hopkins, A., 3
Hopkins, D., 8
Hornung, E., 19, 38
Horowitz, M., 150
Horowitz, W., 67
Horus, 25, 30, 32, 38–39
Horus Behdety, 30
house, 25, 130
Houwink ten Cate, P., 112
human, 6, 50, 52, 67, 69, 74, 85, 99, 138, 145, 198
human nature, 85, 198
humanity, 15, 26, 56, 60, 87, 144
Humbach, H., 165
Humbert, P., 135, 144, 147
Hundley, M., 9–10, 69, 72, 79, 82, 85, 93–94, 98, 119, 130, 140
Hurowitz, V., 63, 71, 140
Hutter, M., 85, 92, 97, 101–2, 114, 131
Hutton, J., 125
Hyatt, J., 131–32

Ibbi-Sîn, 80
Ibbi-Suen, 67
Ichaporia, P., 165
Igigi, 61–62
image, 134–35, 138, 143, 153
Indo-European, 85, 92, 150–51
Inwood, B., 168, 181, 183
Iran, 48
Iranian, 165
Iraq, 48, 84
Irenaeus, 135
iron, 82, 84, 88–90, 127, 186, 192
Iron Age, 127
Isaac, 48
Ishida, T., 101
Isimud, 71–72
Isis, 30, 33
Israel, 9, 14, 48, 100, 118, 125, 130, 132–33, 150, 185, 192, 198
I-Thou, 15

Jacob, 48, 132–33, 152
Jacobsen, T., 53, 61, 66–67, 141, 150
Jaspers, K., 159
Jastrow, M., 138
Jehu, 126
Jerusalem Temple, 48, 127, 131, 141
Jervell, J., 139
Jesus, 14, 197
Jezebel, 126
Jirku, A., 131
Jobling, D., 138
Johnson, P., 4
Jones, P., 76, 80
Jónsson, G., 135
Joseph, 14
Josiah, 127
Judah, xii, 48
Judaism, 7, 114, 158, 197
Julius Caesar, 160
Junker, H., 25, 31
juxtaposition, 185

ka, 36
Kahn, C., 168
Kahn, M., 4
Kamionkowski, S., 9, 46
Kammenhuber, A., 85, 91–92, 107, 112
Kanawati, N., 41
KAR 4, 53, 58, 68
Karnak, 41
Kaska, 95
Kassian, A., 101
Katz, B., 120
Kees, H., 32, 39
Keidorn, L., 43
Kempinski, A., 84
Kennedy, D., 147, 179
Kenney, E., 178–79
Kent, R., 151
Keš, 71, 78
Kessler, M., 132
Kharlamov, V., 8
Khnum, 21–22, 29, 35, 37, 88
Khodzhash, S., 37
Khotanese, 165
Kidd, I., 188
Kienast, B., 77
Kim, W., 9
king, 25, 42, 52, 75, 77, 101–2, 107, 113–16, 165
Kingsley, P., 168
Kirk, G., 167–68
Kitchen, K., 38–39, 43–44, 46
Kition, 122
Kittel, R., 131
Kleiner, F., 44
Kline, M., 129, 137
Klock-Fontanille, I., 104
Kloekhorst, A., 92

Knudtzon, J., 76
Koenen, K., 131
Koenen, M., 178
Köhler, L., 138
Komjathy, L., 3
Konstan, D., 179
Korolëv, A., 101
Körper, 15, 49
Kothar, 114
Kranz, W., 168
Krauss, R., 25
Kraut, R., 170
Kuhlmann, K., 162
Kuhrt, A., 151
Kuntillet Ajrud, 124–26, 128–29
Kushan-Bactrian, 165
Kushite, 25
Kutha, 78
Kuttamuwa Stele, 92

Labarna, 111
Lafont, B., 48
Lakey, M., 8
Laks, A., 168
Lambert, W., 52, 54–59, 62–64, 66, 76, 153
land, 23–24, 48
Lanzillotta, L., 172
Lapp, G., 31–32
Laskowska-Kusztal, E., 32, 35
Latacz, J., 156
Late Bronze Age, 127
Latin, 12, 138, 178
Lebanon, 84
Lebenskraft, 34
Leeming, D., 16
Lefebvre, H., 4
Lehmkühler, K., 31
Leib, 15, 49
Lenz, J., 158, 167–68, 170–71, 174, 177–78, 181, 184
Leonard, W., 169
Lepsius, R., 34
Lesko, L., 16
Levenson, J., 137, 140, 154
Lévy-Bruhl, L., 35
Lichtheim, M., 19, 22, 25, 149
likeness, 143
Lindstrom, L., 35
literature, 50
Litwa, M. D., 8, 158, 183
Lohfink, N., 144
Long, A., 168, 182–88
Loretz, O., 97, 114–15, 135, 147
Lossky, V., 8
Louth, A., 135
Lovatt, H., 178–79
Lubotsky, A., 165
Lucretius, 178–81
lullabi, 78–79
Luwian, 85, 92
Lysimachus, 163

Macedonia, 161
Machinist, P., 83
MacKenzie, D., 166
Maderna-Seven, C., 40
Maḫ, 87
Malandra, W., 165
Mami, 61
manifestation, 29, 101
Mansfeld, J., 185, 187
Marduk, 53–57, 59
Mariette, A., 40
Martín, S., 101–2
Mary, 14
material, 26, 94
Mathwi, F., 8
Matthews, V., 135
Mauss, M., 35
Mayer, W., 97
McCarter, P., 122–23
McDowell, C., 119, 146–47, 149
McFague, S., 136
McGinn, B., 172
McKeown, J., 132, 138
McMahon, G., 84
Medina, 101–2
Mediterranean, 1, 12, 84, 156, 158, 161, 190, 193, 196, 198
Melchert, H. C., 92, 108
Memphis, 16, 25
Memphite Theology, 25
Mendes, 29
Menn, S., 172
Mercer, S., 23
Merikare, 18–21
Mesopotamia, 2, 11, 41, 48, 51–52, 55, 78–80, 86, 93–94, 100, 102, 118, 129–30, 142, 153, 185, 191
metal, 71, 88–89, 116–17, 186, 192
Mettinger, T., 147
Michalowski, P., 63, 77–78, 80

microcosm, 70, 72
Middleton, J., 20, 65, 135–37, 153
Mikalson, J., 178
Millar, F., 131
Millard, A., 59, 62–64, 142, 144
Miller, J. L., 91–92, 99, 110
Miller, J. M., 135
Mīs Pî, 147–49
mistress, 61
mixture, 66, 107, 184
Moberly, W., 126
Molossian, 161
Moltmann, J., 8
Moore, G., 131
Moorey, P., 45
Moran, W., 59, 65
Morel, P.-M., 178
Morray-Jones, C., 7
Morris, I., 156
mortality, 15, 59, 79, 106, 116, 169
mother, 25
Mourelatos, A., 167
Moussa, A., 35
Moyer, J., 84
Mummu, 53
Mumudu, 58
Munro, P., 35
Murnane, W., 41
Murphy-O'Connor, J., 8
Murray, O., 156
Mursili III, 102
mysticism, 7
myth, 59
Mythical Age, 159

Nagel, T., 176–77
Namma, 57
Narām-Sîn, 77–83, 102, 145, 162, 195
nature, 35, 65, 150
Nawotka, K., 161
Nefertari, 45
Nekhbet, 30
Nemeroff, C., 35
Nergal, 78
Nerik, 95, 104
Nestle, W., 168
Neve, P., 104
New Kingdom, 38
Nibru, 70–71
Nile, 27
19th Dynasty, 26, 31, 39
ninth c., 147
Ninḫursag, 78
Ninimma, 58
Ninmada, 58
Ninmaḫ, 57, 59, 62
Ninmug, 58
Ninniginna, 58
Ninšar, 58
Nintu, 60–62, 66
Nippur, 67, 78, 81
Niskanen, P., 145
Nissaba, 82
Noegel, S., 61
Nolan, D., 187
Nougayrol, J., 102
Nudimmud, 82
Nyord, R., 14–15, 17, 34

O'Brien, D., 168
O'Connor, D., 38
Obbink, D., 178
Ockinga, B., 19, 142
Oettinger, N., 113
Ogdoad, 17
Old Kingdom, 23, 25, 147
Olympias, 162
Ontological-Functional, 153
ontology, 28, 43, 46, 80, 104, 134, 160, 162, 193
Oppenheim, A., 49, 75
Opsomer, J., 183
Orlin, E., 149, 160
Orlov, A., 7
Osiris, 29
Otten, H., 86–87, 90, 104
Otto, E., 19–20, 29, 32, 142
Özgüç, N., 98, 106
Özgüc, T., 98

Pannenberg, W., 8
Papyrus, 22
Pardee, D., 114–15, 122
Park, S., 128
Parrot, A., 78
participation, 65
Pepi II, 23
Persia, 78, 164, 167, 189
Petrovic, A., 177
Petrovic, I., 177
Pettinato, G., 51, 67
Pharaoh, 38, 42, 45

Philip II, 162
Philo Judaeus, 7, 183
Philo of Byblos, 131
Phoenician, 122, 128, 146
Phoenix, 23
physical, 35, 150
Pinch, G., 16, 21, 23–24
Pindar, 167
Pinto, R., 4
Pīt Pī, 147–49
Pitkänen, P., 130
Plato, 168, 170–77, 180–81, 197
Pleyte, W., 37
Polansky, R., 177
Pollack, S., 48
Pomeroy, S., 156
Pongratz-Leisten, B., 64, 71, 122
Pope, M., 114
Popko, M., 97, 131
Posener, G., 38
Posener-Kriéger, P., 40
Presocratic, 167, 170
Primavesi, O., 168
Pritchard, J., 18, 25
Ptah, 17, 21, 25–26, 36, 42
Puduḫepa, 104, 106
Puhvel, J., 88–89, 92, 97, 108, 112–13
purity, 91
Putthoff, T., 3, 7, 45, 66, 114, 116, 158, 171–74, 182–84, 187–88
Pyle, A., 178
pyramid, 16, 23
Pythagoras, 167

queen, 107
Qumran, 7, 81

Ra, 17, 19–20, 22, 25, 29–30, 33, 39–40, 42, 163
Rabens, V., 7, 158
Rackham, H., 176
Ragavan, D., 45
Rahmouni, A., 115
Ramelli, I., 187
Ramesses II, 19–20, 39–40, 42–47, 77, 79, 84, 142, 145, 162, 195
Ramesses-Meryamun, 42
Rapiu, 114–16
Raven, J., 167–68
Rehfeld, E., 8
Reiche, H., 168
Reshef, 115
Reydams-Schils, G., 172
ritual, 86, 90
river, 86, 90, 94, 194
River Ritual, 90–91
Roberts, J., 156
Roeder, G., 39, 42
Roisman, J., 161
Röllig, W., 131
Roman, 12, 30, 156, 158–60, 181, 189, 193
Rome, 2, 156, 160, 169, 193
Rosenstein, N., 156
Ross, W., 176–77
Roth, A., 14
Roux, G., 48
Rowe, C., 167
royal, 195
Rozin, P., 35
Runia, D., 173
Russell, N., 158

Sallaberger, W., 80, 83
Saller, R., 156–57
Salonen, A., 67
Samaria, 124, 126, 128–29
Sambursky, S., 188
Sanmartín, J., 114–15
Saqqara, 35, 41
Sarah, 14
Sarenput I, 33
Sargon, 77
Sarna, N., 135
Sawyer, J., 138
Scarab, 23
Scheidel, W., 156
Schellenberg, A., 135
Schenkh, W., 23
Schenkl, H., 183
Schmid, K., 120
Schneider, M., 7
Schofield, M., 156, 167–68
Schrijvers, P., 178
Schüle, A., 119, 137
Schwarz, H., 8
Schweitzer, U., 35
Schwemer, D., 84, 86–87
Schwöbel, C., 8
Scurlock, J., 63–64
sea, 2
second c., 156, 188, 196
second mill., 1, 11, 14, 48, 52, 101, 118, 197

Sedley, D., 172–73, 178, 186
seed, 67
Segal, A., 64
self, 3, 6, 17, 26, 32, 37, 42, 50, 52, 62, 65, 77, 138, 150, 168, 174, 187
Sellars, J., 181
Selz, G., 50, 64, 67, 75–76, 78, 83
Sethe, K., 23, 25, 38
Seti I, 19, 40, 43
seventeenth c., 59
seventh c., 12, 52, 127
Shabaka Stone, 17, 25–26, 36
Shad, 115
Shahbazi, A., 165
Shaked, S., 151
Sharples, R., 178, 181, 189
Shaw, I., 14
Shechem, 133
Shields, C., 175, 177
Shu, 18, 23–24, 29, 32
Shutruk-Nahhunte, 78
Sidel'tsev, A., 101
Siegelová, J., 86–88, 90
Sikan, 122
Silverman, D., 37–39, 42
Silverman, J., 151
Simkins, R., 35
Simons, P., 185
Sinai, 124
Singer, I., 86, 95
Sippar, 78
Siwa, 162–63
Skinner, J., 131
Skjærvø, P., 151, 166
Smith, C., 3, 143
Smith, J., 138
Smith, J. A., 176
Smith, M., 116, 140, 144
Snell, D., 2–3, 15, 28–29, 35, 38, 61, 68, 74, 77, 80, 83, 93, 159, 167
Socrates, 167, 170, 172
Sogdian, 165
Solomon, 121, 130
Somers, H., 139
Sommer, B., 9, 46, 119, 121–24, 126–34, 148
song, 67–69, 72–73, 75, 90
Sonik, K., 64, 71, 78
Soudavar, A., 165
soul, 91, 171, 182
space, 3, 5–7, 27, 99, 174, 194
Spalinger, A., 19–20, 40
Sparks, K., 55
Speiser, E., 52
Spence, L., 22
spirit, 7, 38
Stallone, 79
Stamm, J., 138
statue, 29, 146–47, 152
Steinert, U., 49, 59, 63–65
Steinkeller, P., 53, 80
Stele, 17, 21, 24, 41–42, 78–80
Stendebach, F., 138
Stiebing, W., 48
Stoic, 182–83, 185, 187–88
Stoicism, 172, 181, 185
Stol, M., 144
stone, 25–26
Stoneman, R., 161–62
storm, 95, 104, 108
Storm-god, 95, 102, 104, 108
subservient, 42
Suchos, 29
Suen, 67
Šu-ilišu, 80
Šulgi, 70, 80
Sumerian, 12, 45, 48, 50, 57, 59, 66–68, 70, 73, 90, 94, 146
sun, 87, 95, 104–5, 108–9, 111–13, 151
Sun-god, 87, 104–5, 108, 111–13
Sun-goddess, 95, 104, 108–9
Suriano, M., 115
Susa, 78
Šū-Sîn, 80
Šuzianna, 58
symbol, 11
Syria, 84, 123
Syriac, 12, 66
Syrian, 59, 85, 132
Syro-Palestine, 2, 84, 118, 120, 128–29, 131

Tabernacle, 130
Taggar-Cohen, A., 92, 104
Talon, P., 52
Taracha, P., 85–86, 89, 91, 95
Ta-tenen, 26
Taylor, T., 167
Tefnut, 18, 23–24
Telipinu, 91
Tell Fekheriye, 144
Teman, 124, 126, 129
temple, 42, 69–71, 116, 119, 121, 130, 134, 140, 196
Terrien, S., 130
Teti, 32–33, 41
Thales of Miletus, 167
Theaetetus, 171

Thebes, 16
Theodorus, 172
theological, 8
theology, 120
theomachy, 54
Thiessen, M., 8
third c., 156, 182, 186
third mill., 1, 18, 23, 59, 67, 76, 81, 89
thirteenth c., 41, 84, 102, 118
Thomas, N., 35
Thoth, 25
Thunberg, L., 8
Tiamat, 52–54, 56
Tieleman, T., 182
Tigris, 55, 71
Todd, R., 185–87
Torrance, A., 8
Tritle, L., 161
Trostyanskiy, S., 186
Tuan, Y.-F., 5
Tudḫaliya IV, 102, 104
Turkey, 48, 84
Turner, V., 45, 140
Tuttul, 78
twelfth c., 76, 78
12th Dynasty, 33
25th Dynasty, 25
twenty-fourth c., 35
Two Lands, 42
Tylor, E., 35
Tyre, 122, 132

Ugarit, 115, 122
Ugaritic, 114, 122, 128, 146
Ullmann, M., 38
Unas, 23, 35
union, 107
universe, 174
Ur, 48, 67, 78, 80, 82–83, 118, 147
Ur III, 80, 82–83, 147
Urbild, 11
Uruk, 51, 82

van de Mieroop, M., 14, 48
van den Berg, R., 172
van den Hout, T., 102
van der Toorn, K., 71, 132
van Gennep, A., 45
van Kooten, G., 172–73
Victory Stele of Narām-Sîn, 78
Virolleaud, C., 115
von Rad, G., 136, 142, 153–54
von Staden, H., 182, 184, 188
Vriezen, K., 124, 127, 137

Walbank, F., 160
Walker, C., 71, 80, 83, 116, 147–48
Walton, J., 18–19, 26, 135, 141, 149
Weisberg, M., 185, 187
Weltbild, 37
Wenham, G., 137, 139
Westenholz, Å., 77
Westenholz, J., 75
Westermann, C., 136, 142
Widengren, G., 151
Wiggins, S., 126
Wilcke, C., 80
Wilcken, U., 161–62
Wildberger, H., 137–38, 143, 147
Wildung, D., 39, 45
Wilkinson, R., 18, 22, 149
Wilkinson, T., 14
Williams, A., 151
Williams, R., 21–22, 149
Wilson, J., 16–18
Wilson, R., 139
Winter, I., 41, 71, 77, 79–80, 83, 148
Witte, M., 120
wood, 59, 89, 116, 152
Wood, R., 185, 187
Worman, N., 3
worship, 40
Worthington, I., 161–63
Wyatt, N., 114–15, 126
Wyke, M., 3

Yamazaki, N., 24
Yarshater, E., 151
YHWH, 9–10, 21, 88, 118–30, 132–34, 139–47, 149–50, 152–54, 185, 192–93
Yima, 151
Yom Kippur, 7

Žabkar, L., 25, 29–30, 32–33
Zaphon, 122
Zeindler, M., 8
Zeno, 181, 185
Zeus, 161–63, 184
Zevie, xii
Zevit, Z., 124
Zgoll, A., 64
Zion, 120–21, 124
Zizioulas, J., 8